Dialogue, Stability and Security in the Central Asia Region: Comparative study on the EU and the Nato commitments in the Central Asia-region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan). by Caporrella, Toni
       
 
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TRIESTE 
Sede amministrativa del Dottorato di Ricerca 
 
 
Sedi Consorziate (IUIES) 
 
Università degli Studi di Udine - Università di Klagenfurt - Università MGIMO di Mosca -
Università di Nova Gorica - Università Jagiellonica di Cracovia - Università Eotvos Lorand di 
Budapest - Università Babes-Bolyai di Cluj-Napoca - Università Comenius di Bratislava - Istituto di 
Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia 
 
 
 
XXV CICLO DEL 
 
 DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN  
 
POLITICHE TRANSFRONTALIERE PER LA VITA QUOTIDIANA 
TRANSBORDER POLICIES FOR DAILY LIFE 
 
 
Dialogue, Stability and Security in the Central Asia Region: 
Comparative study on the EU and the NATO commitments in the 
Central Asia-region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan). 
 
(Settore scientifico-disciplinare: SPS/11) 
 
 
DOTTORANDO:  
Toni CAPORRELLA   
COORDINATORE DEL COLLEGIO DEI DOCENTI 
CHIAR.MO PROF. LUIGI PELLIZZONI 
UNIVERSITÀ DI TRIESTE 
 
 
 RELATORE 
CHIAR.MO PROF. Vasile PUSCAS   
UNIVERSITÀ DI CLUJ – NAPOCA (ROMANIA) 
 
 
                                                                      
                                        
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2011/2012 
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………..6 
ACRONYMS ………………………………….…………………………………………………..7 
 
 
 
- PART 1 - 
CHAPTER I 
THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CHANGED MULTILATER SYSTEM  
 
1.1 Chapter layout and Research Objectives………………………………………………………11   
1.2 Problem statement……………………………………………………………………………..12 
1.3 Literature review………………………………………………………………………………16 
1.4 Research Methodology………………………………………………………………………...25 
1.5 Overview of Russia and Central Asia States…………………………………………..............28 
1.5.1 Russia………………………………………………………………………………………29 
1.5.2 Kazakhstan…………………………………………………………………………………32 
1.5.3 Tajikistan…………………………………………………………………………………...33 
1.5.4 Turkmenistan……………………………………………………………………………….35 
1.5.5 Kyrgyzstan………………………………………………………………………………….37 
1.5.6 Uzbekistan………………………………………………………………………………….39 
1.5.7 Afghanistan…………………………………………………………………………………41 
1.6 Russia influence and cooperation with the Central Asia States………………………………..43 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE EUROPEAN UNION (E.U.) AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
(NATO) INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA  
 
2.1 The Europeans in C.A.: The EU and NATO Strategic Interests………..……………………...49 
2.2 The European Union Policy and Instruments. ..…………..……………………………………54 
2.3 The E.U Regional Strategies……………………………….…………………………………...61 
2.4 European Committee 2007-2013 Regional Assistance Strategy for C.A. Region….…………..64 
2.5 E.U. Human rights, Rule of Law, Good Governance and Democratization …………………...66 
2.6 E.U. as promoter of Development, Trade and Democratization.....…………………………….70 
2.7 Facing common threats and challenges…………………………………………………………75 
2.8 Dual Approach: the German Bilateral and Regional approach…………………………………78 
2.9 E.U. and the Security Sector Reform (SSR)…………………………………………………….89 
2.10 Conclusion: the way forward………………………………………………………………..87 
 3 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATO THE NATO STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE C.A. REGION 
 
3.1 An overview of the NATO………………………………………………………………...........90 
3.2 NATO Strategic Concept………………………………………………………………….........94 
3.3 The NATO Euro-Partnership and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)……………..…………........96 
3.4 NATO and C.A. States cooperation…………………………………………………………….98 
3.4.1 NATO and Kazakhstan Cooperation…………………………………..………………........99 
3.4.2 NATO and Kyrgyzstan Cooperation…………………………………..…………………..102 
3.4.3 NATO and Uzbekistan Cooperation…………………………………..…………………..105 
3.4.4 NATO and Turkmenistan Cooperation………………………………..…………………..107 
3.4.5 NATO and Tajikistan  Cooperation…………………………………..……………….......109 
3.4.6 NATO and Afghanistan Cooperation…………………………………..……………….…111 
3.5 Silk-Afghanistan, an example of Regional Cooperation………………………………………116 
3.6 A new Framework for Security Assistance Force (SFA)………………………………….......117 
3.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..121 
 
 
- PART 2 - 
 
CHAPTER IV 
TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1 Technical Methodology, Data, Survey and Profiles ……………………………………..........123 
4.2 Selecting Variables………………………………………………………………………….....126 
4.3 Standardization, Weighting, Income and wellbeing scores……………………………………127 
4.4 Sub-Index scores and Ranking…………………………………………………………….......128 
4.5 Sub-Index description……………………………………………………………………….....129 
4.5.1 Economy sub-Index…….………………………………………………………………….129 
4.5.2 Governance sub-Index……………………………………………………………………..131 
4.5.3 Education sub-Index……………………………………………………………………….133 
4.5.4 Security & Safety Sub-Index………………………………………………………………135 
4.6 The C.A Countries and the Sub-Indexes………………………………………………………138 
4.6.1 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...153 
4.6.2 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...157 
4.6.3 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..159 
4.6.4 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….161 
 4 
4.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..170 
4.7.1 The general model…………………………………………………………………………170 
4.7.2 The surveys………………………………………………………………………………...172 
4.7.3 Profiles, Quarterly Reports and Qualitative Case Studies…………………………………173 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS, EXPLAINING THE CHANGE……………………………………………………..174 
 
5.1 Kazakhstan……………………………………………………………………………………175 
5.1.1 Geography………………………………………………………………………................175 
5.1.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..176 
5.1.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...177 
5.1.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...178 
5.1.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..182 
5.1.6 Security  & Safety................………………………………………………………………183 
5.2 Kyrgyzstan……………………………………………………………………………………185 
5.2.1 Geography….……………………………………………………………………………...185 
5.2.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..186 
5.2.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...187 
5.2.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...189 
5.2.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..192 
5.2.6 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….193 
5.3 Tajikistan……………………………………………………………………………………...195 
5.3.1 Geography…………………………………………………………………………………195 
5.3.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..196 
5.3.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...199 
5.3.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...199 
5.3.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..202 
5.3.6 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….203 
5.4 Turkmenistan…………………………………………………………………………………205 
5.4.1 Geography…………………………………………………………………………………205 
5.4.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..206 
5.4.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...207 
5.4.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...208 
5.4.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..211 
 5 
5.4.6 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….212 
5.5 Uzbekistan…………………………………………………………………………………….213 
5.5.1 Geography…………………………………………………………………………………213 
5.5.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..214 
5.5.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...215 
5.5.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...217 
5.5.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..219 
5.5.6 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….221 
5.6 Afghanistan…………………………………………………………………………………...223 
5.6.1 Geography………….……………………………………………………………………...223 
5.6.2 Society……………………………………………………………………………………..224 
5.6.3 Governance………………………………………………………………………………...225 
5.6.4 Economy…………………………………………………………………………………...226 
5.6.5 Education…………………………………………………………………………………..232 
5.6.6 Security & Safety………………………………………………………………………….233 
5.6.7 Afghanistan Future………………………………………………………………………...236 
5.6.8 Afghanistan Designated as a Major Non-NATO Ally…………………………………….237 
5.6.9 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………239 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………..241 
6.1 Comparative Analysis.………………………………………………………………………...241 
6.2 Impact of EU and NATO efforts on the CA countries: Empirical analysis…………………...244 
6.3 Impact of Economic Impact……………………………………………………………...........251 
6.4 Security and Safety Impact…………………………………………………………………….255 
6.5 The “energy game”…………………………………………………………….........................261 
6.6 Changes?………………………………………………………………………………………268 
6.7 Room for Cooperation?………………………………………………………………………..269 
6.8 EU “regional approach” outcome .…………………………………………………………….270 
6.9 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………272 
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………281   
Annexes……………………………………………………………………………………………296 
 7 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ABP Afghan Border Police 
 
ACG Armed Criminal Group 
 
ADAM Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism 
 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
 
ALP Afghan Local Police 
 
ANA Afghan National Army 
 
ANP Afghan National Police 
 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
 
AOG Armed Opposition Group 
 
APRP Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program 
 
BBIED Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device (suicide vest) 
 
BCP Border crossing point 
 
BO Border outpost 
 
BOMCA Border Management Program in Central Asia 
 
CA Central Asia 
 
CABSI Central Asian Border Systems Initiative 
 
CADAP Central Asia Drug Action Program 
 
CAREC Central Asia Regional Environment Centre 
 
CARICC Central Asia Regional Intelligence and Coordination Centre 
 
CF Coalition Forces 
 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) 
 
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
 8 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
CN Counter-Narcotics 
 
COIN counter-insurgency 
 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
 
DAC District Administrative Centre 
 
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument 
 
DPU Drug Profiling Unit 
 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
 
EC European Communities 
 
ECE Economic Commission for Europe (also UNECE/United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe) 
 
ECHO European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Assistance 
 
EECCA E astern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia 
 
EIB European Investment Bank 
 
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
 
EMECW Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window 
 
ENPI European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument 
 
ESDP European Security Defense Policy 
 
EU European Union 
 
EUPOL European Police Mission in Afghanistan 
 
Eurasec Eurasian Economic Community 
 
EUSR European Union Special Representative 
 
EUWI European Union Water Initiative 
 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
 
FLEG Forest Law Enforcement and Governance 
 
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council 
 
 9 
GSP Generalized System of Preferences 
 
HR/SG High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Union/Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union 
 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
IAGS Illegal Armed Groups 
 
IBPP Institution Building Partnership Program 
 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
 
IFI international financial institution 
 
IGC Intergovernmental Commission  
 
ILO International Labor Organization 
 
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
 
IT information technology 
 
JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
 
MoD Ministry of Defense (Afghan) 
 
MoI Ministry of Interior 
 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
 
MP Member of Parliament 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
NDS National Directorate of Security 
 
NGO non-governmental organization 
 
NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan 
 
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
 10 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
 
PSC Private Security Company 
 
RCIED Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device 
 
SAF Small Arms Fire 
 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
 
SFA Security Force Assistance 
 
SME small and medium-sized enterprises 
 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
 
SVBIED Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
 
TEMPUS Trans-European mobility scheme for university studies 
 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia  
 
UN United Nations 
 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (also ECE) 
 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
US United States of America 
 
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
 
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
 
WFP World Food Program 
 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 6 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Using notions of Change developed by Thomas Kuhn, Governance by Michael Walzer and 
Persistent Conflicts and New Wars by Mary Kaldor, this thesis argues that the stability, security and 
cooperation among States as a whole, and in Central Asia States in particular are threaded by 
different issues as state collapse, religious extremist, terrorism, illegal narcotic and weapons 
trafficking. The attempt to find an ideal solution and the definition of common understanding have 
been hardly implemented due to different national interests and regional Powers’ pressure. Since the 
Soviet Union collapse, NATO and European Union institutions have adopted various political, 
economical, military instruments in order to pave the way of dialogue, cooperation, stability and 
security among states and in particular in the central Asia countries. As a result, both the theory and 
the practice of International Relations are in the midst of a paradigm shift. Emerging from this shift 
is particular global configuration of the practice of international relations. Kuhn’s thought of 
“incommensurability” appear to typify the relationship between the two components, while 
Kaldor’s concept explain the characteristic of contemporary civil conflicts, helping to understand 
the changed nature of intrastate warfare in terms of factors behind the wars: politics of warfare, 
economy of warfare, military strategies and religions struggles. Walzer proposes an international 
system lying between the antipodes, a thoroughly centralized global government under which all 
individuals are equal citizens of the world on the far left. As a result, such a system foresees the 
lack of sovereign states. On the far right, global anarchism, in which sovereign states are not 
subsumed by any meta-state structure. Kuhn provides a fundamental change in our vision of the 
discipline of International Relations, where the ontological side between access or denial World 
have a pivotal role. Kaldor affirms that the practice of International Relations and new War 
Economy are affected by factors emerged from globalization and transnational networks. All this 
entail to recast the study of International Relations as an emancipator system and the recognition of 
the centrality of Human Beings in the practice of International Relations for cooperation. If we are 
able to carry out this very ambitious End State, we can success. Hence, this research intends to 
evaluate the degree of the EU and the NATO commitments and impact on the Central Asia 
countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan), taking 
into account that changes in power structures could trigger violent confrontation between factions 
within States’ leadership.  
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- FIRST PART - 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
IN CHANGED MULTILATER SYSTEM 
 
 
 
1.1 Chapter layout and Research Objectives 
This research is basically divided into two parts, which correspond respectively to a 
theoretical and to a practical approach and the study consists of six chapters. In Chapter One, an 
effort has been made to state the nature of the problem, the central hypothesis, the aim of the 
Thesis, the frame, the methodology and the theoretical framework as clearly as possible and general 
overview of Russia and the Central States interdependency. Chapter Two attempts to shed more 
light on the concept of knowledge of the Main Actors involved in the Dialogue, Stability and 
Security Cooperation in Central Asia, with EU’s economic cooperation, US-led Security Sector 
Reform in established in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and NATO troops in Afghanistan 
all with a view to develop and enhance political economic relations and security energy agreements 
in the region. 
The chapter finally endeavors to provide an answer to the question of why European foreign 
policies should enhance Europe’s position within the international system and share the elements of 
security, economic and political power with the emerging region powers.  
Chapter Three is dedicated to analyzing NATO’s Strategic Objectives and serves as a general 
point of reference to the broader tenets of Mary Kaldor’s theory of “new wars” and “change”, 
which represents the leitmotif of the study.  
Chapters Four, deal with the deeply comparative analysis of EU and NATO commitments 
and their impact on the region within the Dialogue, Cooperation, Security issues.  
Chapter Five analyzes the case studies of Afghanistan as unit of study, by stating practical 
examples, the anomalies that have arisen with regard to the traditional understanding of the 
discipline of the International Relations. 
The main strands of Kuhn and Kaldor’s works are used in this research to explore the themes 
under discussion, with particular attention to the EU and NATO commitments in Central Asia. 
Indeed, both International Organizations cannot remain totally indifferent to the insecurity of others, 
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a minimum of external cooperation and stabilization of crises will continue to be necessary to bring 
about the expected change. 
 Following from this and through Kuhn and Kaldor’s “lens”, the research endeavors to 
answer three key questions: 
-What system of security does best serve Europeans’ values and interests? Should defense 
and consolidation of the interests of democratic West be the prime aim? Should European foreign 
policies shore up a Western supremacy and enhance Europe’s position within the international 
system or, on the contrary, to share the elements of security, economic and political power with the 
emerging globe powers? 
-Why and what extent have the EU and NATO impacted on the democratic transition process 
in the countries of Central Asia and in particular in Afghanistan? The wide-range analysis about 
various aspects of territorial cooperation, both at national and local levels, focuses on the 
progressive acknowledgement of territorial cooperation as an indispensable method of governance. 
-What’s the implication for EU, NATO, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan in terms of energy security in the long-term period? 
 
 
1.2 Problem statement  
International Relations reflect on human being journey which sometimes moves through flat 
landscapes and sometimes through mountain passes that most of these passes are only topography 
with little or no difference in climate, language or culture between the valleys on either side. But 
some passes are different; they are true divides (Drucker, 1989:3). In the past, International 
Relations have traversed these passages and once they have been crossed, the social and political 
landscape changes.  
The social, economical and political climate is different, there are new realities, insists 
Drucker, (1993:2). Draper (1997:21) comments that the fall of the Berlin Wall proved to be a 
“historical instant” that changed “old verities”, and also (Chomsky, 1998:45) is in line with this 
view. The twenty-first century is a world of fundamental interconnections and interconnectedness 
and one of most important outcomes is this is the emergence of new politics and new Wars (Kaldor 
2006:8) that prefigure the partial demise of the nation-state autonomy.   
Humanity seemed to have little control over these fast-moving changes and fluidity appeared 
to have become the hallmark of developments in the international arena. Rosenau (1990:7) 
expresses a similar sentiment when he refers to a period of “global turbulence” which has 
commenced with uncountable actors. 
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Also the sociologist Daniel Bell clearly foresaw this problem when he remarked that “the 
nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of the world and too big for the small 
problems of  life” (Bell, 1988:3). Bell’s statement encapsulated the dilemma of the nation-state as a 
structure unable to respond to “new” challenges such as unchecked global financial flows and 
endemic social and political troubles or to “small” challenges such as job losses at the local level 
and tending to complaints that government is perceived as being far away and unable to cope with 
the problems.  
No longer is the nation-state the sole actor in the field of international development: 
transnational social movements, community-based organizations (CBOs), no-governmental-
organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations (GOs) as North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and European Union (E.U) now also influence the entire process.  
However, as the globalization itself, the withdrawal of the state as the sole locus of power in 
the international system and the attendant arrival of a more pluralistic governance architecture have 
not been uniform processes. Indeed, the need for a more responsive global governance framework is 
acute when one considers the changing nature of “complex emergencies” and the fundamental 
challenge to the international aid system. 
As a result, the “Westphalian paradigm” had effectively become obsolete and the events of 
the end of “Cold War” in 1989 merely confirmed this. The loss of this guiding principle of 
international relations led to disarray and confusion. Both theorists and practitioners were 
overwhelmed by or oblivious to some of the complexities of post-international politics, the 
interdependence that sustains it, and the structural relations that underpin it” (du Plessis, 2001:135). 
 The need of new thinking or new agenda (Lawson, 2002:15) to resolve these crisis became 
increasingly evident and the post-Cold War period in Europe has been favorable for the 
development of new regionalization projects in which Europe is surrounded.  
Nevertheless, the focus on instability problems and its geopolitical and geo-economic 
importance triggered by Central Asia States’ position as a link between Europe and Asia bring them 
more closely to the European Union region. It is to be said that not every geographical area 
represents a stable and secure region from a political and economical point of view.  
Therefore, it is important to distinguish among horizontal and vertical relations between state 
and non-state actors in the economic, social and political, and region which define a particular 
geographical area (Fawn, 2009:12-13).  
The existence of several pre-conditions favors the stability of the area, such as the existence 
of a common historical experience, intense interactions between the members of that region which 
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are more intense than with the outsiders setting the borders of the state, and the existence of a legal 
and institutional setting.  
Thus, stability, governance and security are complex phenomenon with many types and forms 
in a continuous transformation and adaptation.  
What was necessary were new ways of seeing the world, a new ontology and the crafting of 
the language to make this ontology plausible and comprehensible. Unwilling or unable to escape 
from the principle of nation-state predominance, scholars and analysts of international relations 
should constantly tempt to be acquainted with assumptions about issues such as security, 
sovereignty and identity.  
We live in a world of fundamental interconnectedness and decentralization, in which the 
political and economic megatrends have unleashed powerful centrifugal forces, largely as a result of 
a multidimensional set of process began middle of last century.  
As said, Nation-state is no longer the sole actor in the political arena and in the international 
relations, but transnational movements, community-based organization and particularly 
nongovernmental organization have replaced states and have influenced the process as a whole. 
Keeping in mind the Weberian definition of the state as that agency, which upholds the 
monopoly of legitimate violence1, it becomes clear many central governments are unable to 
implement and coordinate political and economic activities. The need for a more responsive global 
governance framework is ever more acute, considering the changing nature of complex security and 
emergency2 and the challenge posed to the International System.  
To make a conjecture that nowadays many states are ineffectiveness to develop and delivery 
security and assistance, it presumes three things: this thesis supposes a change in the nature of the 
international violence, second that violence undermines the stability and assistance developments, 
third that assistance is worthwhile process to be addressed since the very beginning of the crisis. 
The increased involvement of external actors in Central Asia is often characterized as a new 
great Game. If there is a geopolitical game among Russia, China, US, EU, Iran, and Pakistan over 
influence in Central Asia, it seems centered on energy, primarily gas from Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. But there are also other factors at play that counter this perception of the region as a 
geopolitical struggle among major powers and emerging powers.  
                                               
1
 “Nation-state” is defined here, as it was by Max Weber in his seminal 1918 essay, Politics as a Vocation (Politik als 
Beruf), as the agency that upholds the monopoly of legitimate violence. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE 
VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004). 
2
 “Complex emergencies” are defined as the humanitarian crises associated with conflicts. They are multi-causal and 
their annual number has grown from 9 in 1985 to eighty-five in 2012. Mark Bradbury, Aid under fire: defending relief 
and development assistance in unstable situations, 2005. 
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There is more at stake in Central Asia then just energy, there is a long list of security threats 
ranging from internal threats to stability to regional ethnic tensions and from bad inter-regional 
relations to negative spillover effects from Afghanistan. Security is studied in state-by-state fashion, 
highlighting the location of past security problems (ethnic conflicts/uprisings and wars) and where 
potential problems are likely to find their sources in the future. Often researches are incorporated 
inter-state-relations, but these are generally limited to the bilateral conditions of hostility, neglecting 
to provide a complete picture of regional security.  
Thus, early observers could define that Central Asia States would not be affected by the 
interests of external powers.  
The reality is that each competing state considers itself to have an advantage to the others. On 
the one hand, Russia for instance had its historical ties and continuing economic hegemony and its 
interest remains an essential variable in many decision made by local leaders, as its power continues 
to loom large over the region. The United States could apply for economic, terrorism and drug-
trafficking related issues, Iran was connected by a common Islamic sceeity faith and Turkey had the 
advantage of its shared Turkish heritage.  
Yet, Pakistan has an open issue, with regard to the Duran line3 as the boundary between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand, US and European Union influence have made major 
inroads as a useful counterweight to Russian predominance, providing the post-soviet states with 
Security Sector Reforms4 (SSR) and Security Force Assistance5 (SFA). As for the remaining 
candidates for the “Great Game”, Iran and Turkey have not been able to provide enough financial 
and military support to keep their place at the table, while China has been increasing its financial 
and “moral support”.  
Central Asia is considered a vacuum power and the inner core of a greater region of 
instability that connect Central Asia and Middle East, the Black Sea Region and Southern Russia. 
Many analysts see the future of the region shaped by the interplay of external actors, but with a 
delicate balance among competing interests to avoid potential ethnic conflict and political 
fragmentation6.  
                                               
3
 The Durand Line was drawn up in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and British India after intense negotiations 
between the founder of modern Afghanistan, King Abdur Rahman Khan, and the British Foreign Secretary of India, Sir 
Henry Mortimer Durand, after whom the line was named. Since then, there have been endless debates on every aspect 
of the 1893 agreement among politicians, intellectuals and media on both sides of the Durand Line – debates that have 
further complicated the already difficult relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
4
 According to OECD, SSR can cover a wide range of topics, including non-proliferation of weapons, the global  war on 
terror, weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, nuclear disarmament, small arms flow, land mines, armed non-state 
actors, child soldiers, women, civilian-military relations, military/police training. 
5
 The US Department of Defense defines Security Force Assistance (SFA) as all activities that contribute to unified 
action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and 
their supporting institutions. 
6
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997, The Great Chessboard: the American primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, p. 124. 
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Central Asia is a region of systemic security analysis as the subject of the international 
balance of power dynamics would produce or ameliorate regional instability, subordinating the 
course of regional security relations to global or higher regional security dynamics. The analysis of 
the regional security relations provides the focus for the following chapters. 
 
 
1.3 Literature review 
Since the publication of Kuhn’s book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in 1962, the 
concepts coined by him has been applied in the natural, social and political sciences. The centre of 
Kuhn’s theory is the notion of a “paradigm” and his main concept and content have always been 
contested. Margaret Masterman (1970:61), for example, complained that the use of paradigm 
concept in no less than twenty-one different ways. “The vagueness of what is, after all, a central 
concept of Kuhn’s theory is also a reason this notion so quickly became the focus of criticism.”  
Given the various definitions of the concept, the most useful is Kuhn’s own description of a 
paradigm as “what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific 
community consists of men who share a paradigm” (Kuhn, 1996:176).  
Rephrasing some of Kuhn’s views, these “shared” aspects include a common framework, the 
latter which Kuhn (1970:242) maintains as a “prerequisite”, a shared worldview that helps to define 
problems, a set of tools and methods and modes of resolving the research questions.  
Adopting a paradigm, Maclaurin (2005:2) asserts that it means adopting a way of seeing the 
world, while remaining within the International Relations context, MccGwire (2001:777) defines a 
paradigm as “a mixture of beliefs, theory, preconceptions and prejudices that shapes ideas of how 
the international system works, generates expectations and prescribes appropriate behavior”. 
 Javaid (1997:2) notes that, while Kuhn cannot claim total credit for coining the term 
“paradigm”, no intellectual work had popularized the word like Kuhn’s. The concept of “paradigm” 
subsequently became widely and generally entrenched in both academic and popular texts, indeed 
Kuhn’s book is prescribed reading for most university courses on the history and philosophy of 
science.  
Given its widespread use of paradigm, the question may therefore rightfully be asked: Why 
turn to Kuhn again as a theoretical point of departure? Why “flog this notion of ‘paradigm’ any 
further, given its imperfections?  
The answer to this question is that Thomas Kuhn’s theory provides the International 
Relations researcher with a powerful instrument with which to engage the concept of change. Vale 
(2004:242) asserts that the “promise of deep-seated conceptual change is the inherent in the idea of 
  
 
17 
the paradigm”. Underlining the importance of change as a concept in International Relations, O. R. 
Holsti (1998:2) notes that one of the most important features distinguishing different schools of 
thought about International Relations is the notion of change.  
The same author, however, and importantly, adds that despite its critical importance, the 
concept of change remains under-theorized in International Relations literature. Holsti (1998:2) 
laments that in International Relations, we do not have even the beginning of a consensus on what 
constitutes change or transformation in political life” (also see Burch, 2000:182; Linklater, 1998:3-
8). Pointing out this same weakness, Vale (2003:13) contends that “neither academia nor the policy 
end of international politics has demonstrated a capacity to anticipate change, let alone adequately 
explain its immediate impact”.  
In the introduction it was argued that contemporary international relations is currently in the 
midst of a “crossing-over” period that commenced in 1989. In this period, the concept of change 
seems to be different in terms of its ramifications (the impact of change now progressively seems to 
be global) and in terms of its defining feature, indeed the year 1989 apparently signaled the onset of 
a period of fundamental change in international relations.  
It is against this background that Thomas Kuhn’s theory becomes even more relevant, as it 
allows for more than merely a better grasp of the concept of change. Kuhn’s theory also speaks 
directly to periods marked by profound change, it talks about episodes of “crossing-over”.  
In this context, and as will be explained, Thomas Kuhn’s theory addresses yet another aspect 
which has not been adequately dealt with in International Relations literature so far.  Hence, the 
second reason for choosing Kuhn’s theory is the insight that it brings pertaining to an understanding 
not only of change in general, but of periods of fundamental or pervasive change specifically. Kuhn 
addresses Laxer’s concern that “although our society is constantly awash in the rhetoric of change, 
fundamental change is nonetheless exceedingly difficult to imagine” (Laxer, 1998:58).  
Walzer calls for a complex arrangement of layered and geographically overlapping 
international institutions that would form a nexus of social relations crisscrossing state borders and 
would concern themselves with different aspects of global governance.  
However, because of the various International Organizations such as the U.N., the W.T.O., 
the I.M.F., the World Court, and various non-governmental organizations - ex hypothesis, 
conflicting aims as one group’s priority is A and another’s is B, then they are, in virtue of this fact 
in conflict - it is quite unclear how disputes between them might be resolved. Indeed, such opposing 
conflicts would seem to give rise to precisely what Walzer argues is the primary problem of 
independent and sovereign states, operating anarchically at the global level: War.  
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In other words, these meta-state structures, when equipped and armed, as the UN, NATO or 
EU, should operate as quasi-states at the global level to face violence. Although Walzer’s 
discussion of degrees along the continuum from anarchism to totalitarianism is interesting, his 
proposal for proliferating and overlapping meta-governments created to address lower-level prob-
lems does not demonstrate why or how such problems will miraculously become soluble by 
individuals acting within international structures of governance.  
Regarding the new nature of violence, the clear distinction between “Old” and “New” wars is 
well documented in the research of Mary Kaldor (2001:34-36).  
She argues for a cosmopolitan political project as a way of responding to new challenges and 
suggests that this argument can be treated as a way of deducing the more general case for a 
cosmopolitan political project for three reasons: 
First, the rupture with classical modernity that is associated with the process of globalization 
is perhaps most decisively illustrated by the changes in the pattern of organized violence. The 
twentieth century can be described as the period in which the nation-state system reached its apogee 
and this period will probably be best remembered for the terrible barbarity of totalitarianism and 
war. But in future, the twentieth century may also be remembered as the moment when the nation-
state system exhausted itself and when these statist phenomena (totalitarianism and inter-state war) 
were abolished, like slavery in an earlier period. 
Secondly, what she call ‘New Wars’ is an extreme manifestation of the erosion of the 
autonomy of the nation-state under the impact of globalization. Indeed in contrast to the wars of 
modernity, in which States were able to mobilize resources and extend administrative capacities, 
these wars could be described as implosions of the State. The general case for cosmopolitan 
democracy is based on the argument that democracy at a national level is weakened by the erosion 
of the autonomy of the state and the undermining of the state’s capacity to respond to democratic 
demands. In the specific case of war-torn societies (Held, 1995:65) argues that it is the collapse not 
just of democracy but of the consensus on which state rule is based under the impact of 
globalization.  
Thirdly, the legitimacy of political institutions is intimately linked to the physical protection 
of citizens. New wars can be viewed as ‘protection-failures’. Jones (1999:293) argues how and 
whether this protection is provided will shape the future of political institutions. The extent to which 
it is possible to echo Diogenes’ claim to be a world citizen (Kosmou polites) may depend on 
whether protection (at least against threats to physical security) can be guaranteed at a global level.  
The seventeenth century theorists of civil society based their argument on the concept of a 
social contract. For them, a civil society (societas civilis) was a rule of law in which citizens gave 
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up the freedom of the state of nature in exchange for the guarantee of certain rights – security for 
Hobbes plus liberty and property for Locke.  
Later definitions of civil society included the idea of an active citizenry checking violations 
of the social contract by the state. The emergence of civil society in the West was bound up with the 
construction of modern states and with inter-state wars. What Norbert Elias called the ‘civilizing 
process’ - the removal of violence from everyday life within the boundaries of the state - was based 
on the establishment of public monopolies of violence and taxation.  
The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all in the West, by a 
certain level of monopolization. Free use of weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a 
central authority of whatever kind, and likewise, the taxation of property or income of individuals is 
concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. 
The construction of these public monopolies was, as Tilly has shown, intimately bound up 
with war against other states. Tilly, (1990:70) sustains that Inter-state war became the only 
legitimate form of organized violence and, moreover, was sharply distinguished from peace. In 
place of more or less continuous warfare, war became a discrete episode that was reserved for use 
against other states and was excluded from internal relations.  
The individual rights that citizens enjoyed in peacetime were exchanged for the abrogation of 
those rights in wartime. In wartime, the citizens became part of a collectivity, the nation, and had to 
be ready to die for the state. In exchange for individual civil and political rights in peacetime, the 
citizen accepted a kind of unlimited liability in wartime.  
Hence, Elias, writing just before the Second World War, feared that the civilizing process 
would be engulfed by the barbarity of war. Inter-state war is sometimes described as Clausewitzean 
war. The wars of classical modernity had a kind of extremist logic that is well analyzed by 
Clausewitz. As war became more extreme and terrible, so the social contract was extended, 
reaching its logical end point during the Cold War period. Essentially, during this period, there were 
unprecedented gains in economic and social rights. But the risks were also dramatically extended. 
The price of these gains, during this period, was readiness to risk a nuclear war. This was the 
essence of the political compromises made in the late 1940’s between Democrats and Republicans 
in the United States, the Democrats retained big government in exchange for an anti - Communist 
crusade and between Europe and America, the Social Democrats could come to power in exchange 
for agreeing to NATO. 
The changes in the States system, on this analysis, can be explained by two phenomena. First 
of all, the social contract of the Cold War period was called into question. On the one hand, after 
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Vietnam, the readiness to risk life in war was no longer automatic. Indeed by the 1980’s , mass 
movements against nuclear war had developed.  
On the other hand, the growing neo-liberal consensus and the spread of globalization eroded 
the guarantee of economic and social rights. Under the impact of globalization, the distinction 
between Western and non-western societies is collapsing. The capacity of non-western States to 
sustain populist projects within closed societies is undermined and the increasing 
interconnectedness at a political as well as a cultural level provides some protection for disaffected 
individuals and allows them to demand extensions of political and civil rights.  
As the categories framing world society - the distinction between highly developed and under 
developed countries, between tradition and modernity - are collapsing. In the cosmopolitan 
paradigm of second modernity, the non-western societies share the same space and time horizon 
with the West (Beck, 2000:62). 
Globalization is a wild process involving interconnectedness and exclusion, integration and 
fragmentation, homogenization and diversity. The fundamental source of the new wars is the crisis 
of State authority, a profound loss of legitimacy that became apparent in the post-colonial states in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s and in the post - communist States only after 1989. Part of the story of that 
crisis is the failure or exhaustion of populist emancipator projects such as socialism or national 
liberation, especially those that were implemented within an authoritarian communitarian 
framework. But this failure cannot be disentangled from the impact of globalization. 
What is new about the crisis of state authority in the 1980’s and 1990’s s is not simply the 
uncompleted character of the ‘civilizing process’ in non Western societies but, rather, something 
that could be described as its opposite - the unraveling of the process. The monopoly of violence 
and taxation is being eroded and the balance between public and private and internal and external 
has shifted. In those areas prone to conflict, the balance between public and private has shifted as a 
consequence of the legacy of authoritarianism, the longevity of ruling groups or the failure of 
populist projects.  
In particular, centralized economic systems often tend to generate shortages of resources, 
which are rationed according to privileged and personal networks. The combination of privatization 
and globalization can give rise to a process, which is almost the reverse of the process through 
which modern states were constructed. Corruption and clientilism lead to an erosion of the tax 
revenue base because of declining legitimacy and growing incapacity to collect tax and because of 
declining investment (both public and private) and, consequently, production.  
The declining tax revenue leads to growing dependence both on external sources and on 
private sources, through, for example, rent seeking or criminal activities. Reductions in public 
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expenditure as a result of the shrinking fiscal base as well as pressures from external donors for 
macro-economic stabilization and liberalization further erode legitimacy.  
A growing informal economy associated with increased inequalities, unemployment and 
rural-urban migration, combined with the loss of legitimacy, weakens the rule of law and may lead 
to the re-emergence of privatized forms of violence - organized crime and the substitution of 
“protection” for taxation, vigilantes, private security guards protecting economic facilities, 
especially international companies, para-military groups associated with particular political 
factions. In particular, reductions in security expenditure, often encouraged by external donors for 
the best of motives, may lead to break away groups of redundant soldiers and policemen seeking 
alternative employment.  
These are the circumstances that give rise to the “new wars”. It is the lack of authority of the 
state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to 
respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatization and 
informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts.  
Moreover, this “un-civilizing process”, tends to be reinforced by the dynamics of the 
conflicts, which have the effect of further reordering political, economic and social relationships in 
a negative spiral of incivility. Rather than conflicts, they are called “new wars” because of their 
political character although they could also be described as massive violations of human rights and 
organized crime (Kaldor 2000:92). They are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the 
state.  
In the majority of cases, these wars are fought in the name of identity, a claim to power on the 
basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels - 
ethnic, linguistic, or religious - and the wars themselves give meaning to the labels. Labels are 
mobilized for political purposes. They offer a new sense of security in a context where the political 
and economic certainties of previous decades have evaporated.  
They provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or capture 
power, that uses the language and forms of an earlier period. Undoubtedly, these ideologies make 
use of pre-existing cleavages and the legacies of past wars.  
But nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments, often assisted by 
Diaspora funding and techniques and speeded up through the electronic media, that is the 
immediate cause of conflict. In these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilization. The 
aim is to capture territory through political control rather than military success. And political 
control is maintained through terror, through expulsion or elimination of those who challenge 
political control, especially those with a different label.  
  
 
22 
In these wars, physical destruction is very high, unemployment is very high and the various 
parties finance themselves through loot and plunder and various forms of illegal trading; thus they 
are closely linked into and help to generate organized crime networks and often depend on support 
from neighboring states, Diaspora groups, and humanitarian assistance. The division between so-
called realists and cosmopolitans has come to supplant the traditional division between left and right 
and observing events in Seattle and Washington, it is clear that those traditional divisions still exist 
(Giddens, 1994:60).   
The character of ‘new wars’ that efforts aimed at conflict prevention or management should 
focus on a reversal of the “un-civilizing process”, on the reconstruction of relations based on agreed 
rules and public authority.  
Above all, the centerpiece of any peace strategy has to be the restoration of legitimate 
authority. It has to counterpoise the strategy of “fear and hate” with a strategy of “hearts and 
minds”. This kind of restoration of legitimate authority cannot mean a reversion to statist politics; it 
must imply multi-layered authority –global, regional, and local as well as national (Kaldor 
2002:132).  
In nearly all conflict zones, it is possible to identify individuals, groups or even local 
communities that try to act in inclusive democratic ways. Precisely because these are wars which 
are not total and in which participation is low, in which the distinction between war and peace is 
eroding, there are often what might be called “zones of civility” that struggle to escape the 
polarization imposed by the logic of war and provide space for cosmopolitan politics.  
Examples include Tuzla in Bosnia Herzegovina, Northwest Somaliland as well as many other 
places (Kaldor 1999:173). Pro-democracy groups are not, moreover, confined to non-violent 
resistance. Self-defense groups or reformist forces like the Rwandan Patriotic Front7 (RPF) in 
Rwanda or even elements in the Kosovo Liberation Army8 (KLA) in Kosovo conflict may be 
counted among these cosmopolitan or democratic political groupings. 
Strengthening cosmopolitan politics is much more important than trying to reconcile 
opposing exclusivist groups, even though conflict resolution efforts at a societal level may be 
important in changing political perspectives. Negotiations among warring parties help to legitimize 
those who support exclusive approaches to politics and may result in impossible compromises 
involving various types of partition and power sharing that entrench identity politics.  
                                               
7
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the current ruling political party of Rwanda, led by President Paul Kagame. It governs 
in a coalition with other parties. Its ideology promotes democratic socialism and left-wing nationalism. 
8
 The Kosovo Liberation Army (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës  UÇK or Serbian: Ослободилачка Bојска 
Косова) was an Albanian insurgent organization which sought the separation of Kosovo from the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
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There may be a case for negotiations to stabilize the violence and create space for alternative 
cosmopolitan groupings but how this is done and with what aim should be understood as part of a 
common cosmopolitan strategy.  
Kuhn’s conception of the type of change that accompanies a “scientific revolution” (Kuhn, 
1996:25) provides insight into the epochal change confronting international relations today. The 
concept of a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 1996:150) has the potential to reflect something of the 
“cataclysmic change that precludes the effective operation of social structures and processes and 
destroys long-held convictions about the world” (De Santis, 1996:xi).  
Kuhn’s ideas of revolutionary change provide the basis for a credible response to critics such 
as Ruggie (1993:143-144) who argue that International Relations as a discipline has never been 
very good at explaining periods of “fundamental discontinuity” in the international system (also see 
Hopmann, 2003:101). Pointing perhaps to the crux of the matter, Shaw (2000:56) lays the charge 
that “theories of political change have not seriously grappled with the global”. Nef (1999:5) also 
underlines this shortcoming when he asserts that “scholars have been slow to react to global 
transformations and to fill the intellectual void”. Kuhn’s theory provides an instrument with which 
to address this particular concern.  
If, as De Santis (1996:xi) argues, this period of cataclysmic change has destroyed long-held 
convictions about the world we live in, using Kuhn’s theory thirdly seems to be justified because it 
allows for a better understanding of change from an ontological perspective. In this context, 
ontological concerns are those that “you recognize as the factors you will invoke to account for 
social life” (Taylor, 1989:159).  
Harper (2000:12-17) states that Kuhn’s book is about more than the method of scientific 
enquiry, it is about human ways of perceiving reality. Kuhn himself acknowledges that a paradigm 
shift indeed implies a change of worldview (Kuhn, 1996:111).  
Kuhn’s theory therefore creates the space, especially in periods of uncertainty and confusion, 
for a change of worldview, for breaking out of the mould, and for exploring new and original 
ontology. Here is agreement with Walker (1993:82) who insists that differences between 
approaches to contemporary international relations must be addressed at the level of basic 
ontological assumptions.  
This leads to the final reason why Kuhn, who once described himself as a bit of a 
“troublemaker” (Kuhn, 1970:246), might have a recipe to breathe new life into International 
Relations. Kuhn was never afraid to challenge orthodoxy, individuals challenging the status quo and 
imagining worlds beyond the conventional are, indeed, at the heart of Kuhn’s theory.  
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Kuhn’s views are compatible with critical theory, a strand that can be traced throughout this 
research. Critical theory argues that emancipation should be given precedence over traditional 
International Relations themes such as power and order (Booth, 1991:539).  
Thomas Kuhn’s theory allows for change with emancipation intent, it allows for an approach 
to change, which puts humanity and not the nation-state, at the heart of the International Relations 
project. Tying these various arguments together and at a first level, Thomas Kuhn’s theory provides 
an instrument with which to engage the concept of change. More importantly still, it provides 
insight into periods of fundamental change such as the one prevailing in contemporary international 
relations.  
Arguing that international relations should come to grips with the pervasive dynamics of 
transformation or with “new realities” (Drucker, 1990:63), the study represents an attack on the 
“states-are-forever habit” (Rosenau, 2002:23), the latter which is at the heart of the Westphalia 
paradigm. A “paradigmatic jailbreak” is required if International Relations wants to counter 
accusations such as that lodged by Erickson (1985:51) that “in the social sciences, paradigms do not 
die, but they develop varicose veins and get fitted with cardiac pacemakers”.  
This attack on the “states-are-forever habit” also includes criticism of its conceptual 
substructure. Deibert (1997:169) asserts that, as they are utilized today, traditional concepts act as 
ontological blinders rather than as aids to understanding. This inevitably leads to “one-eyed social 
science” (Strange, 1996:195). Especially when it comes to addressing change, these concepts are 
inadequate.  
Walker (1993:78) states that analysis remains caught within “what are essentially 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conceptions of space and time”. In the conceptual jails in 
which they lived and worked, academics’ and policymakers’ paradigms served them well as 
creative guides to the framing and analysis of problems. The same conceptual equipment now, 
however, blinds them to change that lie outside its scope (Rosenau, 1990:37).  
At a second level, Thomas Kuhn’s theory facilitates an understanding of change from an 
emancipatory perspective. This change entails that humanity is put at the centre of international 
relations. International relations should provide a voice to humanity – especially to “the poor, 
oppressed and otherwise disadvantaged” (Wapner, 2002:167).  
Drawing on the latent idealism in Kuhn’s theory, there is a belief that international relations 
could be other than it is at both the theoretical and practical levels. There is a need to move beyond 
our “constrained imaginations” (Booth, 1998:344) and to explore how we “can get from the present 
to a better future” (Rorty, 1999:231).  
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The Westphalian paradigm’s “preselected ontology” (Vale, 2003:42) must be forsaken to 
allow for new ways of seeing international relations. Only if this would be achieved the building 
conflict between “Access World” and “Denial World” would avert and the discipline of 
International Relations would remain viable and its lexicon relevant in a turbulent and fluid global 
environment. 
 
 
1.4 Research Methodology  
As stated in the introduction, this research aims to make a contribution to the debate raging in 
both theoretical and practical sphere of international relations between European and Central Asia 
States, following the interest of NATO and EU after the Soviet Union collapse in the region.  
Much comparative research is biased as well as limited by its way of selection, which may 
well impair the external and internal validity of results. Furthermore, too often comparisons are 
made without explicitly departing from theory-guided questions to the research design developed. 
All this imply that comparative political analysis remains shallow in developing new 
theoretical insights. Therefore, essential is that theory becomes before method to advance proper 
comparative analysis of politics and society.  
To do so, the research will also explore how national comparison can expand and strengthen 
the methodological process. I believe that, based on research findings, focusing on national unit is 
an important tool for increasing the number of observation and for making controlled comparison, 
thus mitigating some of the characteristic limitation of a small-N research design. Finally, national 
comparison better equip research to handle the uneven nature of major process of political, social 
and economic transformation9.  
The research would move by inquiring about the rationale behind the starting point of the EU 
and NATO interests and objectives in Central Asia region (main actors - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan- aims, context, opportunity, constrains and 
mechanism), evaluating in each case the role of systemic factors and local dynamics. 
Then, the research would underline the effects of the cooperation upon the main actors, the 
level of cooperation and the changes within the process across time. 
The selected areas were chosen in part because of the high degree of instability and lack of 
administrative capacity/infrastructure to cope with the basic needs of the population; besides this, 
target provinces are also chosen because of the most affected by political instability and the high 
degree of the drug and weapon trades. These will be monitored through appropriate indicators:  
                                               
9
 Richard C. Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.46-49. 
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General indicators: Area (millions KM2), Population (millions), Urban population (% of 
total), Population growth rate (annual %), Human Development Index (HDI)/ranking, Adult literacy 
(%), International and bilateral agreements established (%), Armed Forces personnel (hundreds) 
and number of conventional weapons (% of total).  
Governance indicators: Control of corruption, Rule of Law, Voice and accountability, 
Regulatory quality, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness; 
Economic Indicators: GDP (Billions US $), GNP per capita (US $), Services (%), Real GDP 
growth rate (%), External debt stock (US $), Debt Service (% of export of goods and services), 
Inflation rate % 2011, Exports and Imports of goods and services to and from E.U., Trade Balance 
with E.U.;  
Educational Indicators: How much is spent per student, number of schools, how much public 
investment is there in education, how much are teachers paid. 
Social Indicators: Access to safe water, access to improved sanitation, regional cooperation, 
regional projects, democratization and rule of law. 
Security Indicators: Number of incidents and threats to physical safety and security, degree of 
corruption, borders and migration smuggling, perceptions of safety and violence, number of the 
armed conflicts. 
About the methods of Data Collection, the research uses qualitative methods as survey 
methods, methods for elite and mass interviewing, archival and documentary research, life histories 
and political biographies, and the use of electronic search materials appropriate for political analysis 
and election monitoring.  
On the Data Analysis Method, the research carry out a qualitative methods as content and 
textual analysis of political texts, ethnographic and narrative analysis of political processes, 
familiarity with computer-based coding of political variables. 
All this in order to provide a robust and up-to-date socio-economic-politic-security data, by 
filling gaps and putting findings into a broader perspective. Moreover, it is intended to outline 
means and methods of work of the European Union (Security Strategy), NATO (Strategic Concept  
and Comprehensive Approach) and the bilateral agreements among the E.U., NATO and Central 
Asia States, with a view to respect the sovereign will of each country. 
This thesis analyses the E.U. and NATO Strategies towards Central Asia Region and their 
impact on the political, social and security cooperation.  
Therefore, it will be underlined the findings and advises, despite a deliberately optimistic 
vision of what the EU and NATO can achieve in their external policies, the content of cooperation 
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and how it impact elite accountability. Moreover, it examines the degree of EU and NATO 
involvement as an instrument that has served to enhance the quality of these democracies.  
The thesis ends with a deep Analysis and Evaluation of Afghanistan national development 
framework and on the implication of these findings for the long-term economic projects and 
international cooperation.  
The thesis warns against theories of international cooperation that treat States as unitary 
actors and overlooks the domestic distribution of international collective action benefits. It is clearly 
too early to assume that these advances will translate into lasting progress towards a coherent and 
effective NATO and EU strategies.  
Moreover, all efforts have been put in place to offer realistic reasons for optimism, an 
approach that the candidate believes to be justified by the wide-range of activities by the EU and 
NATO. This research is not be considered as a mono-thematic approach towards dialogue, 
cooperation, security and stability in Central Asia, but the analysis, since its very beginning, has 
stated from the concrete observation of the phenomenon and the related practical solution and 
observing the effects of different instruments adopted.  
About the impact of the instruments adopted to achieve a full and effective cooperation, it is 
necessary to underline that the aim of this research has a double objective: on the one hand, the 
attention is focused on the implementation and the interaction of all those agreements settled for a 
constructive cooperation and stability among the main stakeholders. On the other hand, the survey 
focuses on the capacity of EU and NATO to positively impact on the basic political and economical 
frameworks of those central Asian countries. 
The model of cooperation encountered in the Central Asia region is established by centuries-
old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together since Marco Polo’s journey in XV century. The 
Great Powers as Russia, France and Great Britain had been always interested in controlling the 
“Silk Road” and they feared each other for controlling the British expansion in the south of Asia 
during the second century. 
For each of them, the issue of who controlled Central Asia was understood through the lens 
of security and the battle for territorial control to attain this security and mineral resources 
exploitation: it came to be known as the Great Game. At the end, Russia and then Soviet Union 
accomplished the task of capturing the heartland.  
Central Asia is a region that is broadly contained between China, the Caucasus Mountains, 
the Russia borders, the Middle East and South Asia. Most authors agree that its core is the five post-
Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Other areas often 
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included are Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Xingjian, but for this research, Central Asia will be deed 
to be the five core states of the post-Soviet Union and Afghanistan too.  
 
 
1.5 Overview of Russia and Central Asia States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.1 Russia 
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Russia was founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy, was able to emerge from 
over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th – 15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb 
surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new Romanov Dynasty continued this policy 
of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under PETER I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was 
extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th 
century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia.  
Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which 
resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms. Repeated devastating defeats of the 
Russian army in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire 
and to the overthrow in 1917 of the imperial household. The Communists under Vladimir LENIN 
seized power soon after and formed the USSR.  
The brutal rule of Iosif STALIN (1928-53) strengthened Communist rule and Russian 
dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. The Soviet economy and 
society stagnated in the following decades until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-
91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize 
Communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 splintered the 
USSR into Russia and 14 other independent republics.  
Since then, Russia has shifted its post-Soviet democratic ambitions in favor of a centralized 
semi-authoritarian state in which the leadership seeks to legitimize its rule through managed 
national elections, populist appeals by former President PUTIN, and continued economic growth. 
Russia has severely disabled a Chechen rebel movement, although violence still occurs 
throughout the North Caucasus. Today, Russia owns ethnic groups as the follow: Russian 79.8%, 
Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%, Bashkir 1.2%, Chuvash 1.1%, other or unspecified 12.1% (2002 
census), with Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2% (2006 est.), a 
population about 142,517,670 (July 2012 est.) and its society has 0-14 years 15.7% (male 
11,498,268/ female 10,890,853), 15-64 years 71.3% (male 48,851,357/ female 52,806,900) and  65 
years and over 13% (male 5,622,464/ female 12,847,828) (2012 est.).  
Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving 
from a globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy to a more market-based and globally-
integrated economy. Economic reforms in the 1990’s privatized most industry, with notable 
exceptions in the energy and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak 
and the private sector remains subject to heavy state interference.  
Russian industry is primarily split between globally-competitive commodity producers. In 
2011, Russia became the world’s leading oil producer, surpassing Saudi Arabia; Russia is the 
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second-largest producer of natural gas and holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the 
second-largest coal reserves, and the eighth-largest crude oil reserves.  
Russia is the third-largest exporter of both steel and primary aluminum and relies on 
commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the highly volatile 
swings in global commodity prices. The government since 2007 has embarked on an ambitious 
program to reduce this dependency and build up the country's high technology sectors, but with few 
results so far.  
The economy had averaged 7% growth in the decade following the 1998 Russian financial 
crisis, resulting in a doubling of real disposable incomes and the emergence of a middle class. The 
Russian economy, however, was one of the hardest hit by the 2008-09 global economic crisis as oil 
prices plummeted and the foreign credits that Russian banks and firms relied on dried up. 
 According to the World Bank the government’s anti-crisis package in 2008-09 amounted to 
roughly 6.7% of GDP. The Central Bank of Russia spent one-third of its $600 billion international 
reserves, the world’s third largest, in late 2008 to slow the devaluation of the ruble. The government 
also devoted $200 billion in a rescue plan to increase liquidity in the banking sector and aid Russian 
firms unable to roll over large foreign debts coming due.  
The economic decline bottomed out in mid-2009 and the economy began to grow in the third 
quarter of 2009. However, a severe drought and fires in central Russia reduced agricultural output, 
prompting a ban on grain exports for part of the year, and slowed growth in other sectors such as 
manufacturing and retail trade. High oil prices buoyed Russian growth in 2011 and helped Russia 
reduce the budget deficit inherited from the lean years of 2008-09.  
Russia has reduced unemployment since 2009 and has made progress on reducing inflation 
since 2010 and long-term challenges include a shrinking workforce, a high level of corruption, and 
difficulty in accessing capital for smaller, non-energy companies, and poor infrastructure in need of 
large investments. Its GDP real growth rate is estimated 4.3% in 2011 and country comparison to 
the world is 87, while 4.3% in 2010 est. and -7.8% in 2009 est., with a labor force occupation 
agriculture 9.8%, industry 27.5% and services 62.7% in 201010. 
Industries have complete range of mining and extractive industries producing coal, oil, gas, 
chemicals, and metals, all forms of machine building from rolling mills to high-performance aircraft 
and space vehicles, defense industries including radar, missile production, and advanced electronic 
components, shipbuilding.  
In conclusion, Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from 
Afghanistan through Central Asian countries. China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed 
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islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with the 2004 
Agreement, ending their centuries-long border disputes. 
The sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai 
group, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories” and in Russia as the “Southern Kurils”, 
occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia, and claimed by Japan, remains 
the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities. 
Russia’s military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia, while with Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance and Iran 
continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea. 
Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010 and 
various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia (Kareliya) and other areas ceded to the 
Soviet Union following World War II but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands. 
Russia and Estonia signed a technical border agreement in May 2005, but Russia recalled its 
signature in June 2005 after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a 
historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia’s pre-war borders under the 1920 
Treaty of Tartu. Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on 
Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the 
treaty text. 
Lithuania and Russia committed to demarcating their boundary in 2006 in accordance with 
the land and maritime treaty ratified by Russia in May 2003 and by Lithuania in 1999 and operates 
a simplified transit regime for Russian nationals traveling from the Kaliningrad coastal exclave into 
Russia, while still conforming, as an EU member state with an EU external border, where strict 
Schengen border rules apply.   
Preparations for the demarcation delimitation of land boundary with Ukraine have 
commenced and the dispute over the boundary between Russia and Ukraine through the Kerch 
Strait and Sea of Azov remains unresolved despite a December 2003 framework agreement and on-
going expert-level discussions. 
Kazakhstan and Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005 and field 
demarcation should commence in 2007. Russian Duma has not yet ratified the Bering Sea Maritime 
Boundary Agreement with the US, while Denmark and Norway have made submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data 
to augment its 2001 CLCS submission11. 
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1.5.2 Kazakhstan  
Ethnic Kazakhs, a mix of Turkish and Mongol nomadic tribes who migrated into the region 
in the 13th century, were rarely united as a single nation. The area was conquered by Russia in the 
18th century and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1936. During the 1950’s and 1960’s 
agricultural “Virgin Lands” program, Soviet citizens were encouraged to help cultivate 
Kazakhstan’s northern pastures.  
This influx of immigrants (mostly Russians, but also some other deported nationalities) 
skewed the ethnic mixture and enabled non-ethnic Kazakhs to outnumber natives. Independence in 
1991 drove many of these newcomers to emigrate. Kazakhstan’s economy is larger than those of all 
the other Central Asian states largely due to the country’s vast natural resources.  
Current issues include: developing a cohesive national identity; expanding the development 
of the country’s vast energy resources and exporting them to world markets; diversifying the 
economy outside the oil, gas, and mining sectors; enhancing Kazakhstan’s economic 
competitiveness; developing a multiparty parliament and advancing political and social reform; and 
strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.  
Major deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, 
cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium are available. The ethnic 
composition see Kazakh (Qazaq) 63.1%, Russian 23.7%, Uzbek 2.8%, Ukrainian 2.1%, Uighur 
1.4%, Tatar 1.3%, German 1.1%, other 4.5% (1999 census), while main religions are Muslim 47%, 
Russian Orthodox 44%, Protestant 2% and other 7%.  
Population is about 17,522,010 (July 2012 est.), with social composition 0-14 years 24.4% 
(male 2,154,544/ female 2,126,508), 15-64 years 68.8% (male 5,846,991/ female 6,213,990), 65 
years and over 6.7% (male 404,254/ female 775,723) (2012 est.). 
 Kazakhstan, geographically the largest of the former Soviet republics, excluding Russia, 
possesses enormous fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals, such as 
uranium, copper, and zinc. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. In 
2002 Kazakhstan became the first country in the former Soviet Union to receive an investment-
grade credit rating and its economy has largely recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Extractive industries have been and will continue to be the engine of this growth. Landlocked, 
with restricted access to the high seas, Kazakhstan relies on its neighbors to export its products, 
especially oil and grain. Although its Caspian Sea ports, pipelines, and rail lines carrying oil have 
been upgraded, civil aviation and roadways have been neglected.  
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Telecoms are improving, but require considerable investment, as does the information 
technology base. Supply and distribution of electricity can be erratic because of regional 
dependencies. At the end of 2007, global financial markets froze up and the loss of capital inflows 
to Kazakhstani banks caused a credit crunch.  
The subsequent and sharp fall of oil and commodity prices in 2008 aggravated the economic 
situation, and Kazakhstan plunged into recession. While the global financial crisis took a significant 
toll on Kazakhstan’s economy, it has rebounded well. In response to the crisis, Kazakhstan’s 
government devalued the drop (Kazakhstan’s currency) to stabilize market pressures and injected 
around $10 billion in economic stimulus.  
Rising commodity prices have helped revive Kazakhstan’s economy, which registered 
roughly 7% growth in 2010-11. Despite solid macroeconomic indicators, the government realizes 
that its economy suffers from an overreliance on oil and extractive industries, the so-called “Dutch 
disease”.  
In response, Kazakhstan has embarked on an ambitious diversification program, aimed at 
developing targeted sectors like transport, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, petrochemicals 
and food processing. In 2010 Kazakhstan joined the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union in 
an effort to boost foreign investment and improve trade relationships. The government expects to 
join the World Trade Organization in 2012, which should also help to develop the manufacturing 
and service sector base.  
Its GDP12 increased 7% year-on-year in 2011 and the real growth rate is 7.5% (2011 est.), 
7.3% (2010 est.), 1.2% (2009 est.), labor force is agriculture 25.9% industry, 11.9%, services 62.2% 
(2010 est.). Ongoing demarcation with Russia began in 2007, while demarcation with China was 
completed in 2002. The creation of a seabed boundary with Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea 
remains under discussion13. 
 
 
1.5.3 Tajikistan  
The Tajik people came under Russian rule in the 1860’s and 1870’1s but Russia’s hold on 
Central Asia weakened following the Revolution of 1917. Bolshevik control of the area was fiercely 
contested and not fully reestablished until 1925. Much of present-day Sughd province was 
transferred from the Uzbek to the newly formed Tajik in 1929.  
Ethnic Uzbeks form a substantial minority in Tajikistan, becoming independent in 1991 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union, experiencing a civil war between regional factions from 
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1992-97. Tajikistan experienced several security incidents in 2010, including a mass prison-break 
from a Dushanbe detention facility, the country’s first suicide car bombing in Khujand, and armed 
conflict between government forces and opposition militants in the Rasht Valley.  
The country remains the poorest in the former Soviet sphere and therefore attention by the 
international community since the beginning of the NATO intervention in Afghanistan has brought 
increased economic development and security assistance, which could create jobs and strengthen 
stability in the long term. Tajikistan is seeking WTO membership and joined NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace in 2002.  
Ethnic groups see Tajik 79.9%, Uzbek 15.3%, Russian 1.1%, Kyrgyz 1.1%, other 2.6% (2000 
census), religions are Sunni Muslim 85%, Shia Muslim 5%, and other 10% (2003 est.), the 
population is about 7,768,385 (July 2012 est.), with the age structure 0-14 years 33.7% (male 
1,332,136/ female 1,285,643), 15-64 years 63% (male 2,424,903/ female 2,471,409), 65 years and 
over 3.3% (male 107,335/ female 146,959) (2012 est.). 
Economy in Tajikistan has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the 15 former Soviet 
republics. Because of a lack of employment opportunities in Tajikistan, as many as a million Tajik 
citizens work abroad, almost all of them in Russia, supporting families in Tajikistan through 
remittances. Less than 7% of the land area is arable.  
Cotton is the most important crop, and its production is closely monitored, and in many cases 
controlled, by the government. In the wake of the National Bank of Tajikistan’s admission in 
December 2007 that it had improperly lent money to investors in the cotton sector, the IMF 
canceled its program in Tajikistan.  
A reform agenda is underway, according to which over half a billion dollars in farmer debt is 
being forgiven, and IMF assistance has been reinstated. Mineral resources include silver, gold, 
uranium, and tungsten. Industry consists only of a large aluminum plant, hydropower facilities, and 
small obsolete factories mostly in light industry and food processing. The civil war (1992-97) 
severely damaged the already weak economic infrastructure and caused a sharp decline in industrial 
and agricultural production.  
Tajikistan’s economic situation remains fragile due to uneven implementation of structural 
reforms, corruption, weak governance, seasonal power shortages, and the external debt burden. 
Electricity output expanded with the completion of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower dam - finished in 
2009 with Russian investment. The smaller Sangtuda-2, built with Iranian investment, began 
operating in 2011.  
The government of Tajikistan is pinning major hopes on the massive Roghun dam which, if 
finished according to Tajik plans, will be the tallest dam in the world and significantly expand 
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electricity output. The World Bank has agreed to fund technical, economic, social, and 
environmental feasibility studies for the dam, scheduled to be completed in 2012.  
In January 2010, the government began selling shares in the Roghun enterprise to its 
population, ultimately raising over $180 million but Tajikistan will still need significant investment 
to complete the dam. According to numerous reports, many Tajik individuals and businesses were 
forced to buy shares. The coerced share sales finally ended in mid-2010 under intense criticism 
from donors, particularly by the IMF.  
Food and fuel prices in 2011 increased to the highest levels seen since 2002 due in part to an 
increase in rail transport tariffs through Uzbekistan. Tajikistan imports approximately 60% of its 
food and 90% of that comes by rail. GDP14 real growth rate is 7.4% (2011 est.), 6.5% (2010 est.) 
3.9% (2009 est.).  
In 2006, China and Tajikistan pledged to commence demarcation of the revised boundary 
agreed to in the delimitation of 2002, while talks continue with Uzbekistan to delimit border and 
remove minefields, but disputes in Isfara Valley still delay delimitation with Kyrgyzstan. 
Major transit country for Afghan narcotics bound for Russian and Western European markets. 
Tajikistan seizes roughly 80% of all drugs captured in Central Asia and stands third worldwide in 
seizures of opiates15 (heroin and raw opium). 
 
 
1.5.4 Turkmenistan 
Present-day Turkmenistan covers territory that has been at the crossroads of civilizations for 
centuries. The area was ruled in antiquity by various Persian empires, and was conquered by 
Alexander the Great, Muslim crusaders, the Mongols, Turkic warriors, and eventually the Russians. 
In medieval times Merv (today known as Mary) was one of the great cities of the Islamic 
world and an important stop on the Silk Road. Annexed by Russia in the late 1800’s, Turkmenistan 
later figured prominently in the anti-Bolshevik movement in Central Asia. In 1924, Turkmenistan 
became a Soviet republic, achieving independence upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. 
Extensive hydrocarbon/natural gas reserves, which have yet to be fully exploited, have begun to 
transform the country.  
Turkmenistan is moving to expand its extraction and delivery projects and its Government is 
actively working to diversify its gas export routes beyond the still important Russian pipeline 
network. In 2010, new gas export pipelines that carry Turkmen gas to China and to northern Iran 
began operating, effectively ending the Russian monopoly on Turkmen gas exports. 
                                               
14
 Source: The World Bank,https://www.econ.worldbank.org, accessed in June 2011, 
  
 
36 
President for life Saparmurat Nyyazow died in December 2006, and Turkmenistan held its 
first multi-candidate presidential election in February 2007. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, a 
deputy cabinet chairman under Nyyazow, emerged as the country’s new president and reelected in 
February 2012.  
Ethnic groups see Turkmen 85%, Uzbek 5%, Russian 4%, other 6% (2003), religions are 
Muslim 89%, Eastern Orthodox 9%, unknown 2%, population is about 5,054,828 (July 2012 est.); 
age structure is made of 0-14 years 27.1% (male 692,297/ female 675,224), 15-64 years 68.8% 
(male 1,723,403/ female 1,755,457), 65 years and over 4.1% (male 90,703/ female 117,744) (2012 
est.).  
Turkmenistan is largely a desert country with intensive agriculture in irrigated oases and 
sizeable gas and oil resources. The two largest crops are cotton, most of which is produced for 
export, and wheat, which is domestically consumed. Although agriculture accounts for roughly 10% 
of GDP, it continues to employ nearly half of the country’s workforce. Turkmenistan’s authoritarian 
regime has taken a cautious approach to economic reform, hoping to use gas and cotton export 
revenues to sustain its inefficient and highly corrupt economy.  
Privatization goals remain limited. From 1998-2005, Turkmenistan suffered from the 
continued lack of adequate export routes for natural gas and from obligations on extensive short-
term external debt. At the same time, however, total exports rose by an average of roughly 15% per 
year from 2003-08, largely because of higher international oil and gas prices.  
Additional pipelines to China and Iran, that began operation in early 2010, have expanded 
Turkmenistan’s export routes for its gas, although these new routes have not completely offset the 
sharp drop in export revenue since early 2009 from decreased gas exports to Russia. Overall 
prospects in the near future are discouraging because of endemic corruption, a poor educational 
system, government misuse of oil and gas revenues, and Ashgabat’s reluctance to adopt market-
oriented reforms.  
The majority of Turkmenistan’s economic statistics are state secrets. The present government 
established a State Agency for Statistics, but GDP numbers and other publicized figures are subject 
to wide margins of error. In particular, the rate of GDP growth is uncertain, however, here some 
estimation: GDP16 real growth rate is 14.7% (2011), 9.2% (2010) 6.1% (2009). 
Since his election, President Berdimuhamedow unified the country’s dual currency exchange 
rate, ordered the redenomination of the manat, reduced state subsidies for gasoline, and initiated 
development of a special tourism zone on the Caspian Sea.  
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Although foreign investment is encouraged, and some improvements in macroeconomic 
policy have been made, numerous bureaucratic obstacles impede international business activity. 
Cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan creates water-sharing difficulties for 
Amu Darya river states and field demarcation of the boundaries with Kazakhstan commenced in 
2005, with Caspian seabed delimitation remains stalled with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kazakhstan due 
to Turkmenistan’s indecision over how to allocate the sea’s waters and seabed. 
Bilateral talks continue with Azerbaijan on dividing the seabed and contested oilfields in the 
middle of the Caspian17 
 
  
1.5.5 Kyrgyzstan  
It is a Central Asian country of incredible natural beauty and proud nomadic traditions, most 
of Kyrgyzstan was formally annexed to Russia in 1876, but a major revolt was held against the 
Tsarist Empire in 1916, in which almost one-sixth of the Kyrgyz population was killed. 
Kyrgyzstan became a Soviet republic in 1936 and achieved independence in 1991 when the 
USSR dissolved, nationwide demonstrations in the spring of 2005 resulted in the ouster of President 
Askar Akaev, who had run the country since 1990.  
Subsequent presidential elections in July 2005 were won overwhelmingly by former Prime 
Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev. Over the next few years, the new president manipulated the 
parliament to accrue new powers for himself and in July 2009, after months of harassment against 
his opponents and media critics, Bakiev won re-election in a presidential campaign that the 
international community deemed flawed.  
In April 2010, nationwide protests led to the resignation and expulsion of Bakiev, his 
successor, Roza Otunbaeva, served as transitional president until Almazbek Atambaev was 
inaugurated in December 2011.  Continuing concerns include the trajectory of democratization, 
endemic corruption, poor interethnic relations, and terrorism.  
About the ethnic groups Kyrgyzstan owns Kyrgyz 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, 
Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uighur 1%, other 5.7% (1999 census), while religions are Muslim 
75%, Russian Orthodox 20% and other 5%. The population is about population 5,496,737 (July 
2012 est.). 
Age structure is 0-14 years 29.6% (male 830,939/ female 795,028), 15-64 years 65.5% (male 
1,761,524/ female 1,840,319), 65 years and over 4.9% (male 103,679/ female 165,248) (2012 est.). 
The Kyrgyzstan economy is a poor, mountainous country, with a dominant agricultural sector. 
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Cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products, although only tobacco 
and cotton are exported in any quantity. Industrial exports include gold, mercury, uranium, natural 
gas, and electricity. The economy depends heavily on gold exports - mainly from output at the 
Kumtor gold mine.  
Following independence, Kyrgyzstan was progressive in carrying out market reforms, such as 
an improved regulatory system and land reform. Kyrgyzstan was the first Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. Much of the 
government’s stock in enterprises has been sold. Drops in production had been severe after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, but by mid-1995, production began to recover and 
exports began to increase.  
In 2005, the Bakiev government and international financial institutions initiated a 
comprehensive medium-term poverty reduction and economic growth strategy. The government 
made steady strides in controlling its substantial fiscal deficit, nearly closing the gap between 
revenues and expenditures in 2006, before boosting expenditures more than 20% in 2007-08.  
GDP grew about 8% annually in 2007-08, partly due to higher gold prices internationally, but 
slowed to 2.9% in 2009. The overthrow of President Bakiev in April 2010 and subsequent ethnic 
clashes left hundreds dead and damaged infrastructure. Shrinking trade and agricultural production, 
as well as political instability, caused GDP to contract 0.4% in 2010.  
The fiscal deficit widened to 11% of GDP, reflecting significant increases in crisis-related 
spending, including both rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure and bank recapitalization. The 
economy grew 5.7% in 2011, and the budget deficit was reduced to just over 5% of GDP. Progress 
in reconstruction, fighting corruption, restructuring domestic industry, and attracting foreign aid and 
investment are key to future growth. GDP real growth rate is 5.7% (2011 est.), 0.5% (2010 est.) and 
2.9% (2009 est.). 
Kyrgyzstan has yet to ratify the 2001 boundary delimitation with Kazakhstan and disputes in 
Isfara Valley delay completion of delimitation with Tajikistan and its delimitation of 130 km of 
border with Uzbekistan is hampered by serious disputes over enclaves and other area. Illicit drugs 
cultivation of cannabis and opium poppy for CIS markets are country widespread and limited 
government eradication of illicit crops favor transit point for Southwest Asian, Russia and the rest 
of Europe.  
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1.5.6 Uzbekistan  
Russia conquered the territory of present-day Uzbekistan in the late 19th century. Stiff 
resistance to the Red Army after the Bolshevik Revolution was eventually suppressed and a 
socialist republic established in 1924. During the Soviet era, intensive production of “white gold” 
(cotton) and grain led to overuse of agrochemicals and the depletion of water supplies, which have 
left the land degraded and the Aral Sea and certain rivers half dry.  
Independent since 1991, the country seeks to gradually lessen its dependence on the cotton 
monoculture by diversifying agricultural production while developing its mineral and petroleum 
reserves and increasing its manufacturing base. Current concerns include terrorism by Islamic 
militants, economic stagnation, and the curtailment of human rights and democratization.  
Ethnic groups are Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%, Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Tatar 
1.5%, other 2.5% (1996 est.), with Muslim 88% (mostly Sunni), Eastern Orthodox 9%, other 3%, a 
population about 28,394,180 (July 2012 est.) and age structure is 0-14 years 25.8% (male 
3,757,958/ female 3,577,644), 15-64 years 69.5% (male 9,805,718/ female 9,924,871), 65 years and 
over 4.7% (male 567,148/ female 760,841) in 2011 est. 
Uzbekistan is a dry, landlocked country, 11% of the land is intensely cultivated, in irrigated 
river valleys and more than 60% of the population lives in densely populated rural communities. 
Export of hydrocarbons, primarily natural gas, provided about 40% of foreign exchange earnings in 
2009 and other major export earners include gold and cotton.  
Uzbekistan is now the world’s second-largest cotton exporter and fifth largest producer and it 
has come under increasing international criticism for the use of child labor in its annual cotton 
harvest. Uzbekistan enjoyed a bumper cotton crop in 2010 amidst record high prices, but is 
gradually diversifying away from cotton toward more high-value fruits and vegetables.  
Following independence in September 1991, the government sought to prop up its Soviet-
style command economy with subsidies and tight controls on production and prices. While aware of 
the need to improve the investment climate, the government still sponsors measures that often 
increase, not decrease, its control over business decisions.  
A sharp increase in the inequality of income distribution has hurt the lower ranks of society 
since independence. In 2003, the government accepted Article VIII obligations under the IMF, 
providing for full currency convertibility. However, strict currency controls and tightening of 
borders have lessened the effects of convertibility and have also led to some shortages that have 
further stifled economic activity.  
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The Central Bank often delays or restricts convertibility, especially for consumer goods. 
Uzbekistan has posted GDP18 growth of over 8% for the past several years, driven primarily by 
rising world prices for its main export commodities - natural gas, cotton and gold - and some 
industrial growth. In 2006, Uzbekistan took steps to rejoin the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurASEC), which it subsequently 
left in 2008, both organizations dominated by Russia.  
In the past Uzbekistani authorities have accused US and other foreign companies operating in 
Uzbekistan of violating Uzbekistani tax laws and have frozen their assets, with several new 
expropriations in 2010-11. At the same time, the Uzbekistani Government has actively courted 
several major US and international corporations, offering attractive financing and tax advantages, 
and has landed a significant US investment in the automotive industry, including the opening of a 
power-train manufacturing facility in Tashkent in November, 2011.  
Uzbekistan has seen few effects from the global economic downturn, primarily due to its 
relative isolation from the global financial markets, with a GDP 8.3% (2011 est.), 8.5% (2010 est.), 
8.1% (2009 est.).  
Prolonged drought and cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan created water-
sharing difficulties for Amu Darya river states, while field demarcation of the boundaries with 
Kazakhstan commenced in 2004, but border delimitation of 130 km of border with Kyrgyzstan is 
hampered by serious disputes around enclaves and other areas.  
Currently, Uzbekistan is a source country for women and girls trafficked to Kazakhstan, 
Russia, the Middle East, and Asia for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and men are 
trafficked to Kazakhstan and Russia for purposes of forced labor in the construction, cotton, and 
tobacco industries; men and women are also trafficked internally for the purposes of domestic 
servitude, forced labor in the agricultural and construction industries, and for commercial sexual 
exploitation. 
The government did not conduct any awareness campaigns regarding forced labor in the 
annual cotton harvest or other internal trafficking, but did continue its previous awareness 
campaigns about the dangers of transnational trafficking (2008). Transit country for Afghan 
narcotics bound for Russian and, to a lesser extent, Western European markets19. 
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1.5.7 Afghanistan  
Ahmad Shah DURRANI unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The 
country served as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires until it won independence from 
notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 
Communist counter-coup.  
The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan Communist regime, 
touching off a long and destructive war, but withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by 
internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw 
Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 
1994 to end the country’s civil war and anarchy.  
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., a 
US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering 
Osama Bin Laden. The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political 
reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and 
National Assembly elections in 2005.  
In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of 
Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Karzai was re-
elected in August 2009 for a second term and next Presidential and Parliamentary elections are 
scheduled in 2014. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban 
and continuing provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious 
challenges for the Afghan Government.  
In January 2011, Afghanistan assumed a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for 
the 2012-13 terms. Afghanistan sees its ethnic groups with Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, 
Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%; religions are Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia 
Muslim 19%, other 1% and its population is about 30,419,928 (July 2012 est.). Regarding the age 
structure, Afghanistan owns 0-14 years 43.2% (male 6,671,683/ female 6,460,034), 15-64 years 
54.4% (male 8,414,716/ female 8,121,616) and 65 years and over 2.5% (male 350,692/ female 
401,187) (2012 est.).  
Afghanistan’s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved 
significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of 
international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite 
the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent 
on foreign aid.  
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Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, 
medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, and the Afghan Government’s 
difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic 
growth. Afghanistan’s living standards are among the lowest in the world.  
While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan’s development, 
pledging over $67 billion at nine donors’ conferences between 2003-10, the Government of 
Afghanistan will need to overcome a number of challenges, including low revenue collection, 
anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity and poor public 
infrastructure. Its GDP20 growth real rate is 5.7% (2011 est.), 8.4% (2010 est.), 21% (2009 est.).  
Afghan, Coalition, and Pakistan military meet periodically to clarify the alignment of the 
boundary on the ground and on maps. Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary 
monument densification and resurvey. Iran protests Afghanistan’s restricting flow of dammed 
Helmand River tributaries during drought; Pakistan has sent troops across and built fences along 
some remote tribal areas of its treaty-defined Durand Line border with Afghanistan which serve as 
bases for foreign terrorists and other illegal activities.  
 Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan 
through Central Asian countries. World’s largest producer of opium, while poppy cultivation was 
relatively stable at 119,000 hectares in 2010, a poppy blight affecting the high cultivation areas in 
2010 reduced potential opium production to 3,200 metric tons, down over 40 percent from 2009. 
The Taliban and other antigovernment groups participate in and profit from the opiate trade, 
which is a key source of revenue for the Taliban inside Afghanistan. 
Widespread corruption and instability impede counterdrug efforts and most of the heroin 
consumed in Europe and Eurasia is derived from Afghan opium, with wide vulnerability to drug 
money laundering through informal financial networks and regional source of hashish21. 
 
 
1.6 Russia influence and cooperation with the Central states  
The five Central Asian countries include the great culture of the ancient Silk Road, moderate 
Islamic societies organized in secular states, governments that lend themselves as partners in the 
“global fight against terrorism” as well as for immediate tasks in neighboring Afghanistan, and the 
region’s mineral resource wealth.  
On the other hand, critics emphasize a deplorable human rights situation in almost all 
countries of the region, the despotic nature of at least some of the ruling regimes, corrupt 
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bureaucracies, and inequitable economic growth that benefits small elite while poverty and social 
injustice endure and investments in human development remain inadequate.  
Central Asia is also described as mixture of features, from which there are five of critical 
importances: a) the post-1991 power vacuum in which a complex geopolitical game occurs, among 
Russia, China, US, EU, as well as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates; b) it is a 
strategic area of energy resources; c) an important part of the Islamic world in which, because of 
low living standards, ethnic tensions and the oppressive nature of the political regimes often create a 
fertile area for terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking, and organized crime; d) a region at the 
crossroads of the great trade routes; e) several pipelines established and to be established and a 
buffer zone between countries with nuclear arms (or those developing the potential), e.g. Russia, 
China, Iran, India, and Pakistan.  
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, on December 26, 1991, Russia tended to 
neglect its relations with the former Central Asian republics and its foreign policy seemed to have a 
pro-Western orientation, while Central Asia occupied the second or even the third place among 
Russia’s interests.  
Later on, Russia became more actively involved in Central Asia as a result of the civil war in 
Tajikistan (1992-97), especially because of the large Russian minorities in the region. The Minsk 
Agreements and the Declaration of Almaty, from December 1991, set the foundation for a common 
security policy22. The civil war in Tajikistan and the incapacity of the Central Asian countries to 
preserve their security led to several agreements regarding peacekeeping operations and conflict 
resolution.  
These documents paved the way for the “Protocol on the Temporary Procedure for the 
Formation and Use of Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in Zones of Conflict between or within 
Member States of the CIS23”, and led to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, in 1992, by the heads of state and government of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia, he treaty was later joined by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. 
The Collective Security Treaty sets up a defensive alliance, forbids joining any military 
alliance or group of states against other members, and considers that aggression against one 
member is aggression against all.  
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 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.  
22
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov.  The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed on December 8, 1991 by 
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk Agreement Establishing the CIS. The Alma-Ata Protocol, which formed the initial legal basis 
for the operations of the new regional organization, became an integral part of the Minsk Agreement. 
23 Source: the Global Security website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm.  The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
has been unproductive and has not materialized into the political-military pact. Moscow had envisioned as a competitor to NATO and the EU. 
Moreover, several states rejected the May 1992 Treaty on Collective Security, or Tashkent Treaty, which Moscow had initiated as a “regional security 
structure within the CIS”. 
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In spite of this, all CIS member states established national military structures during and up to 
the end of 1992. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty 
in 1999. 
However, Moscow was willing to promote renewed “special relations” between Russia and 
Central Asia, with the Russian National Security Council that articulated the new policy in “Main 
Aspects of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”. The document asserted that 
Russia could not leave Central Asia without endangering its southern borders.  
Consequently, the Russian control over CIS borders in Central Asia was a desirable objective 
with priorities such as the Russian troops and their military bases in the region, the development of 
economic relations, Russia’s contribution to conflict prevention and resolution through efficient 
peacekeeping mechanisms and no interference from third parties in Central Asian affairs.  
Russia has insisted on pragmatic policies in Central Asia, taking into account the contracts of 
the Western energy consortiums in the CIS, as well as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program24.  
Vladimir Putin took the presidency in 1999, with the objective of Russia’s reemergence as 
great power, following the model used by Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov in the nineteenth century 
that was based on internal reforms and flexible foreign policy.  
Putin could develop a coherent and pragmatic foreign policy with clear priorities and well-
structured interests, concentrating on Russia’s “near abroad.” 
His strategy went in two directions. First, his administration looked to build a consistent 
strategy regarding the development of political and economic relations with Central Asia. The 
introduction of a customs union in 1996 and the decision to allow the free movement of citizens 
between several of the former Soviet republics, which altogether resulted in the creation of the 
EurAsEC25 (Eurasian Economic Community) in October 2000, strengthened the inclination toward 
cooperation.  
In order to enhance the Treaty’s effectiveness, the heads of state ratified a number of 
documents in May 2000 in Minsk, for example, the “Memorandum on Increasing the Effectiveness 
of the CST and its Ability to adapt to the Present Day Geopolitical Situation” and “A Model for a 
Regional Security System” both promoted the fight against terrorism and the need to build rapid 
deployment peacekeeping forces.  
                                               
24
 Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization www.nato.int. Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, 
the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between 
individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries. 
25
 Source: the Eurasian Economic Center, www.eurasian-ec.com. It is an international economic organization of the Member States aimed to form 
common external customs borders, to develop common external economic policy, tariffs, prices etc., and other functioning parts of a common market, 
adapted from European Community, WTO, and other international norms. EurAsEC is created in compliance with UN principles and international 
legal principles. EurAsEC is an Observer in the UN General Assembly. The Member States are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan; Moldavia, Ukraine and Armenia are Observers of EurAsEC. 
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The new foreign policy concept, from 28 June 2000, asserted that Russia’s geopolitical role 
as one of the largest Eurasian powers came with the responsibility of maintaining security in the 
world, both at global and regional levels. 
Russian Official statement emphasized the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism and 
international terrorism, which took on a special urgency after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, 
hence Russia was thus able to receive further Central Asian support for its military actions in 
Chechnya. 
As a consequence, Russia and and six former Soviet republics agreed to establish a rapid 
deployment of force of some 1,500 men who will be based in Kyrgyzstan, during the meeting of the 
Collective Security Council held in Yerevan, Armenia, in May 2001. Indeed, the CIS members 
created a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) in order to be able to provide a collective 
response to terrorist attacks or incursions. The CRDF for Central Asia, according to an August 2001 
decision, would comprise Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik units, totaling around 4,000 
persons26.  
In May 2002, the Collective Security Treaty became the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and the CSTO Charter entered into force on September 18, 200327.  The CSTO 
focused on three important areas: foreign policy, opposition against threats and challenges and the 
military dimension. The strengthening of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is 
both a result of these processes and an instrument to further enhance Russian supremacy28. 
In 2003, President Putin developed a new foreign policy concept. The policy instruments 
became more diverse: support for and personal relationships with local leaders, military 
cooperation, investments in energy and infrastructure, scholarships for attending Russian 
universities, and the huge influence over the mass media of the region, whereby Russia became the 
most important source for news in Central Asian countries.  
Beginning in 2004, Russia promoted the systematic cooperation within the CSTO and in 
June, the members of the Council on Collective Security and of the Council of Defense Ministers 
laid out plans for the military component of the organization29.  
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 Ian Jeffries, The Caucasus and Central Asia Republics at the turn of twenty-first century, Routledge, 2003, p.61.  
27
 There were some underlying tensions at the CSTO summit. Kazakhstan showed strong commitment to the project, but Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
had concerns over the legal issues and the precise terms under which the new force structure could be used within Central Asia. Uzbekistan secured a 
separate protocol limiting its participation in CSTO operations and will make military forces available for CSTO operations under certain conditions, 
depending on the political decision made at the time. 
28
 The Collective Security Treaty Organization, formed under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, serves as a mutual defense 
alliance among Russia, Belarus, Armenia and the four Central Asian states except Turkmenistan. The Eurasian Economic Community comprises a 
similar grouping of states but focuses on economics, including the creation of a common market, border security standards, a customs union, 
standardized currency exchange and joint programs on social and economic development. Both of these organizations are strongly supported by 
Russia and capitalize on residual political, economic, and bureaucratic linkages among former Soviet republics. 
29
 Source: United Nations Organization report, www.un.org. The Russian-Georgian war accelerated the militarization of the CSTO, indeed the 
Moscow Declaration of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO (September 5, 2008) was considered the first real consolidated position of the 
alliance, a view on international politics and the place of CSTO. 
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In August 2004, the Collective Security Treaty Organization conducted an extensive military 
anti-terrorism exercise, Exercise Rubezh-2004 “Border” 2004”, held in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, testing the CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force in action for the first time. Further 
Military Exercises were organized on the premise of pre-emptive strikes, Ex “Rubezh 2005” and Ex 
“Rubezh 2007” which were held in Tajikistan30.  
The “Plan for the Construction of the CSTO’s Military Coalition Forces through 2010” 
proposed the establishment of military ties on an interstate level and the formulation of a structure 
for political cooperation, as well as a second phase of the integration of the military forces on a 
macro-level. 
Yet, in 2010 Putin spoke frequently of several issues, including the requirement of treating 
Russia on the same level as the developed countries, a multi-polar world order, the rejection of 
“exporting democracy,” the development of the CSTO, and Russia’s right to retain “special 
interests” in the CIS.  
The strengthening of Russia’s position in Central Asia was in part made possible by Russian 
Government firm initiatives, which promoted closer relations with Central Asia’s neighbors - Iran, 
China, and India - in order to weaken relations between the Central Asian states and the West.  
On March 2011, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a document about the 
revision of the foreign policy, stating that Russia’s most important achievement was its new 
independent foreign policy31.  
The document underscored the importance of the Single Economic Space (SES), Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and EurAsEC. 
The bilateral relations between Russia and Central Asian states were described separately, 
while Kazakhstan was considered Russia’s most important strategic partner in Central Asia. 
The new approach took on a more critical tone toward the US and was followed by the first 
military intervention in a CIS member state (Georgia) after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (7 
August 2008).  
According to an Russian high-ranking Official in 2011, the Russian foreign policy focuses in 
five points: Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law; the 
world should be multipolar; Russia does not want confrontation with any other country, has no 
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 The Collective Rapid Reaction Force will have the same sort of training as the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance, it would comprise 16,000 
troops, with Russia providing 8,000 troops, Kazakhstan 4,000, and Tajikistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia 1,000 troops each. Of the 16,000, 
Russia will consider deploying 5,000 troops to Central Asia. 
31
 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced on July 20, 2011, stated: [Russia] will promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area, focusing on adapting the CSTO as a 
multifunctional integration body to the changing environment, as well as on ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to take prompt and 
effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into a central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility. The document mentions 
the concern about Georgia’s attempt to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia by force, concerns about the growing military capabilities and escalating 
tensions in the Caucasus region, the situation in Afghanistan, the situation around Iran, the prospects of establishing relations between the CSTO and 
NATO on a number of issues and support for the initiatives of the Russian Federation relating to a treaty on European security. 
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intention of isolating itself and will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and 
other countries as far as possible. 
Yet, protecting Russian citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority and 
Russia will respond to any aggressive acts committed against them and finally, Russia has 
privileged interests in certain regions32 (former Soviet Union).  
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 During a press conference, following the Moscow CSTO summit on February 4, 2009, President Medvedev stated that “the Collective Rapid 
Reaction Force should be an effective, all-purpose instrument that can be counted on to realize security objectives throughout the CSTO, including the 
fight against extremists, organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as dealing with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters. 
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2.1 The Europeans in Central Asia: EU and NATO’s Strategic interests   
The price of insecurity is huge and even though the number of conflicts has declined, civil 
wars are devastating entire region of the world and long-lasting conflicts such as in Sudan, Middle 
East, Afghanistan create conditions under which development reversals are transmitted across 
generations and where whole generations of children do not have access to even basic education, 
development is seriously hampered1.  
It is difficult to quantify the impact of conflicts on development, but it is clear that the 
absolute amounts are very large and that they dwarf the potential benefits of aid flows. In 
developing countries these threats have different degrees of relevance and urgency and are 
compounded by further structural challenges: poverty, weak state structures and governance, but 
also the trafficking and violence around the wealth or scarcity of natural resources and the 
availability of large quantities of firearms.  
When these threats materialize, they can cause the loss of millions of lives, undermine 
governance structures, fuel corruption and delay the development of countries and regions by 
decades. These situations are furthermore at the origin of sudden and massive displacements of 
populations, malnutrition, disease and increased environmental degradation. Their negative impact 
goes well beyond the countries involved and threatens the stability of whole regions.  
Security and development policies, together, have the potential to address these problems2. In 
response to this reality, EU and NATO have been strengthening their links to prevent violent 
conflicts and build sustainable peace, while security measures are sometimes needed to provide the 
basis for humanitarian assistance and long-term development. In situations of insecurity it is often 
difficult to act effectively, indeed, often, there is no clear interlocutor in the partner country or it is 
not clear to what extent the individual actors are actually prepared to cooperate with. 
The EU and NATO as a whole, have sometimes difficulties in speaking with one voice and 
institutional procedures and competence issues further complicate their task, hence having a 
coordinated approach is crucial if Europe wants to contribute to peace and development. 
To this end, it has been developing a wide array of instruments to prevent conflicts and to 
build peace in developing countries. As it has been said, it ranges from political dialogue, to more 
coercive or one-sided measures such as military operations, sanctions, embargos, through 
cooperation instruments in support of governance, including human rights initiatives, security sector 
reform, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, control of flows of weapons, regional 
cooperation and reconciliation.  
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 Kaldor Mary, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp.56-58. 
2
 OLCOTT, M., Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptions and Misperceptions, Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Chance. New York, 1995, 
p.140. 
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The EU and NATO have been using these instruments in an increasingly coherent and 
convergent way for the benefit of sustainable peace and security world-wide. With their work on 
governance, the promotion of democracy and human rights the EU makes an important contribution 
to the prevention of situations of fragility and the outbreak of violent conflicts and NATO enhance 
internal and external security.  
Situations of fragility are typical in countries where either governance structures are weak or 
deteriorating or in countries that suffered from a natural disaster or an economic or human shock. 
The EU and NATO have a tradition of engagement and pay particular attention to addressing and 
preventing situations of fragility with a view to establishing conditions which are more conducive to 
development. 
With regards to the Central Asia countries, EU and NATO have established, at different 
levels, relations on governance, education, role of law, gender equality, infrastructures, security, 
economy, quality of life, energy, health, private sector and trade3, with all six former Soviet 
republics after the fall of the U.R.S.S. in 1991. In this respect, they have known considerable 
evolution in political and economic transformation, influencing the regional political and 
economical developments. 
 In its new regional strategy adopted in 2006, the EU has given priority to the political issues, 
human rights, democratization, good governance and eradication of poverty which represents the 
central concepts in its new approach. Since then, the regional countries are entitled to receive 
assistance from the EU according to their performance in the field of political and economic 
reforms, regardless of their size in population and geography.  
Nowadays Central Asia countries are facing fundamental economic, social, political and 
defense secure changes since they achieved their independence in 1990’s and both NATO and EU 
have a regional strategic plan for assistance and cooperation in the long period 2011-2030.  
The European Union Security Strategy4 (December 12, 2003) identified the following major 
threats for the European Union: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, failing states, organized crime, and recognized the energy dependence as a special 
concern for Europe. Although Central Asia was not specifically mentioned, all these challenges 
from the international environment are valid for this region.  
The EU’s interests in Central Asia are mainly geopolitical and geo-economic: growing 
stability and the capacity of these states to manage the threats, tackling drug-trafficking and 
organized crime, prevention of states from failing and enhanced capacity of crisis management, 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and migration and energy security.  
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 FOUST, J., Post-Soviet Central Asian National Interest in Afghanistan, a Century Foundation Report, New York, 2010, p.42. 
4
 Source : http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries Accessed in January 2012. 
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Although the Central Asian countries have not been included in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy5 (ENP), they could be involved in its regional programs. The ENP and the EU’s relationships 
with the Central Asian states reinforce each other. Consequently, the concepts of “wider 
neighborhood” or “the neighbors of the EU’s neighborhood” are often considered to be of great 
importance. According to its renewed 2007 Political Strategy, the EU has a strong interest in a 
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Central Asia, because the strategic, political, and economic 
developments, as well as trans-regional challenges, affecting the EU in some capacity, whether 
directly or indirectly.  
Regarding the security initiatives, in January 2001 the European Union set up the Central 
Asian Drugs Action Program6 (CADAP), as main objective was the development of drug control 
strategies in Central Asia in line with EU anti-narcotics strategies. Initially, CADAP covered 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, offering equipments and trainings, while 
Anti-Drugs Measures in Tajikistan7 (ADMIT) has functioned apparently well.  
The Border Management in Central Asia Program8 (BOMCA) was launched in April 2003 in 
order to strengthen border control and to facilitate transit and legal commerce. BOMCA also has the 
support of the US, OSCE, and UNDOC (the UN’s Office on Drugs & Crime) and introduce also the 
concept of an integrated border management9 (IBM) and a corridors approach, which were also 
embraced by the SCO10 and EurAsEC.  
In Central Asia, BOMCA projected two corridors: the Ferghana Valley11 and the North-South 
transit corridor in the west of Central Asia, however, the European Commission stated that progress 
was limited because of the insufficient expertise of the local institutions, uncontrolled border areas, 
corruption, and lack of political will. 
The topic of the insecurity of Central Asia was approached in other international 
organizations as well, as within the OSCE framework which has promoted projects regarding police 
reform, water management, antiterrorism, the fight against organized crime, weapons and drugs 
trafficking and crisis management in Central Asia.  
On September 2008, the EU-Central Asia Forum on Security Issues was launched by the EU 
French Presidency, where consultations between the EU and the five countries in the region have 
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 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm Accessed in April 2012. 
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 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/border-management-fight-against-drugs/cadap_en.htm, Accessed 
in April 2012. 
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 Source: http://www.caricc.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=266&Itemid=1&lang=english, Accessed in January 2012. 
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 Source: http://www.bomca.eu, Accessed in March 2012. 
9
 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/initiatives/docs, Accessed in March 2012. 
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 Source: http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/, Accessed in June 2012. 
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actually emphasized convergence on the importance of the region’s stability and the need to step up 
cooperation between all the parties to find common answers to the challenges ahead.  
On the other hand, NATO has also formal relations with all central Asia countries, which 
entered the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1992), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), 
and Partnership for Peace program (1994). Indeed, the cooperation and exchange of information are 
developed proportionally with national interests, expectation and capacity.  
The 50 - nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum for 
dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and Partner 
countries. It provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for the bilateral relationships developed between NATO 
and individual Partner countries under the Partnership for Peace program.  
Partner states has chosen various activities such as defense reform, defense policy and 
planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military cooperation, common exercises, 
civil emergency planning and disaster response all in order to prepare an Individual Partnership 
Action Plan12.  
Since 2006, Kazakhstan has an Individual Partnership Action Plan and then Kyrgyzstan in 
2007, have participated in the NATO Planning and Review Process. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan have limited relations with NATO, but all five Central Asian states have established 
diplomatic representation at NATO’s headquarters at Mons (Belgium).  
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are also represented in the so-called Partnership 
Coordination Cell, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) supported 
by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2003 and 200513.  
NATO has an Information Center and a Partnership for Peace (PfP) Center in Almaty which 
although have a symbolic and little practical impact on Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces those centers 
cooperate with local institutions, universities, NGOs, and local media. Furthermore, the whole 
project to build peacekeeping forces that can take part in North Atlantic Alliance or UN operations 
in no sense reflects wider trends or capabilities in other Central Asia country’s armed forces, as 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
At the last NATO Foreign Ministers’ Session, in 2012, confirmed NATO’s long-term 
commitment in Central Asia, which plays a crucial role for the gradual NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdraw in Afghanistan. Moreover, analysis of fields as energy 
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 Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm, Accessed in April 2012. 
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 Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is NATO’s principal civil 
emergency response mechanism in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is active all year round, operational on a 24/7 basis, and involves NATO’s 28 allies plus 
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needs, security sector reform, regional cooperation and the interdependency were discussed among 
the key players, NATO, EU, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Afghanistan representatives. 
Also EU deploys specific efforts in all the areas of governance: political, economic, security, 
defense, environmental and social, strengthening the social fabric and the democratic culture of a 
country are further important avenues in dealing with situations of fragility. NATO addresses 
threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, ethnic violence and lack of adequate legal frameworks 
or law enforcement capacity, which fuel crime-based economies and perpetuate the grip of illegality 
and illegitimacy.  
In addition, the EU addresses the problems of corruption, organized crime as well as other 
security concerns of the populations in partner countries through its work on SSR, while NATO 
through SFA14, by taking a comprehensive approach including reforms in border management, 
justice and police. 
Those programs have been identified as priority areas in post-conflict situations where NATO 
and EU are deployed. In the past few years, the EU has provided SSR support in over 70 countries 
in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. In order to ensure a proper transition and restore 
national capacity to provide essential basic services, EU main external instruments are used and 
coordinated in the best way possible.  
On the short- term Instruments, EU operates under CFSP/ESDP, political dialogue as an 
important instrument for EU engagement and through ESDP missions, so far 15 in total, the 
Member States are able to undertake civilian and military joint action. The Instrument for Stability 
(IfS), which came into operation on 1 January 2007, enables the EU to provide strategic support in 
relation to potential or real crisis situations and kick-start assistance that will then be followed up 
with long-term support under other Community instruments.  
It can be used in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, initial post-crisis political 
stabilization and early recovery from natural disasters, complementing or spearheading support 
under the mainstream EU external instruments.  
On the long-Term Instruments, EU puts in place Enlargement Instrument which can 
contribute to long-term stability and conflict prevention through financial support. The perspective 
of joining the EU is a strong incentive for candidate countries to strengthen democratic governance 
and minority rights.  
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The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) plays an important role as a foreign policy tool, 
it draws on all available EU instruments and include commitments in political areas such as 
democratic reforms, minority rights, rule of law, regional cooperation, cooperation on CFSP and 
ESDP issues, organized crime, terrorism, ICC, weapons of mass destruction.  
The European Development Fund (EDF) for the ACP countries is increasingly used for 
conflict prevention and peace-building. In countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone the EDF provides substantive resources to security-
sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation, 
democratic governance, human rights and natural resource management.  
The Development Cooperation Instrument for Asia and Latin America is providing support to 
conflict prevention and peace-building in a range of countries including Colombia, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Timor East, Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal. 
This is done either as a follow-up to the Stability Instrument and in relation to ESDP or through 
stand-alone activities in the areas of dialogue processes, security-sector reform, demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants, natural resource management, mine action, human rights, 
democratic governance, transitional justice and reconciliation.  
The EU has managed to work increasingly on the synergies between security and 
development. However, many questions are still open and the different elements do not yet add up 
to a comprehensive and coherent approach.  
 
 
2.2 The European Union Policy and Instruments  
The European Union is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 European 
countries that together cover much of the continent. It was created in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. The first steps were to foster economic cooperation with the clear aim to trade with one 
another become economically interdependent and so to avoid conflict15.  
The result was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially 
increasing economic cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Since then, a huge single market has been created and continues 
to develop towards its full potential. 
But what began as a purely economic union has also evolved into an organization spanning 
all policy areas, from development aid to environment, a name change from the EEC to the 
European Union in 1993 reflected this change. 
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 Soruce: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm, Accessed in April 2012.  
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The EU has delivered half a century of peace, stability, and prosperity, helping to raise living 
standards and launching a single European currency. Thanks to the abolition of border controls 
between the EU countries, people can travel freely throughout most of the continent, becoming 
much easier to live and work abroad in Europe. 
The EU is based on the rule of law, this means that everything that it does is founded on 
treaties, voluntarily and democratically agreed by all member countries. These binding agreements 
set out the EU’s goals in its many areas of activity. 
The EU covers over 4 million km² and has 495 million inhabitants - the world’s third largest 
population after China and India and its living standards can be compared by measuring the price of 
a range of goods and services in each country relative to income, using a common notional currency 
called the purchasing power standard (PPS). Comparing GDP per inhabitant in PPS provides an 
overview of living standards16 across the EU. 
Helping countries that have the potential to become members has been the EU’s response to 
changes in the European political landscape over the past 50 years, promoting economic 
growth and strengthening democratic forces in countries emerging from dictatorship from uniting 
East and West. Indeed, the 6 founding members of the EU in 1957 were Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but from 1973 on, most of the other Western 
European countries joined the Union.  
Then, following the collapse of their regimes in 1989, many former communist countries 
from central and eastern Europe became EU members in 2 waves, between 2004 and 2007. 
The EU operates according to the principle of sub-sidiarity, which means that the European 
Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive jurisdiction) unless it 
is more effective than action taken at the national, regional, or local level. 
The EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in fields including the customs union, 
the common commercial policy, competition rules, and monetary policy for euro countries, 
jurisdiction is shared between the EU and the Member States in specified areas including internal 
market rules, aspects of social policy, economic, social, and territorial cohesion, agriculture and 
aspects of fisheries, security, and justice. 
The decision-making is formed by the European Council, made up of the presidents or prime 
ministers of Member States, along with the presidents of the European Commission and European 
Council. It represents the highest political authority in the EU.  
                                               
16
 CLEMENT, N.C., Economic forces shaping the borderlands, In Pavlakovich-Kochi, 2004, p.60. 
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The European Commission is the executive branch of the EU, European Commission 
proposes legislation, manages the Union’s day-to-day business and budget, enforces the rules, and 
negotiates international trade agreements on behalf of the EU.  
Council of the European Union, which is made up of ministers from the 27 Member State 
governments, the Council adopts laws in conjunction with the European Parliament, coordinates the 
Member States’ broad economic policies, concludes international agreements between the EU and 
other countries or international organizations and approves the EU budget (jointly with the 
European Parliament).  
The European Parliament, which represent the voice of European citizens, Members of the 
European Parliament are directly elected for five-year terms. The Parliament also approves the 
membership of the European Commission and its leadership.  
In order to intensify cooperation with Central Asia states, the EU makes full use of the 
potential of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Commission and Member States programs, 
cooperation frameworks, political dialogue, using the variety of CFSP17 structures and instruments: 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which meets at the ambassadorial level as a 
preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international 
situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic 
direction. 
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within 
the Council and it is composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the Member States, who are regularly 
represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice 
and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. 
In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM). This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives 
its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.  
The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) contributes to the objectives of the 
European External Action Service, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy and a more secure 
international environment by the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military 
operations, ensuring coherence and effectiveness of those actions as part of the EU comprehensive 
approach to crisis management and developing CSDP partnerships, policies, concepts and 
capabilities. 
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 Source: www.europe.eu, it is the Common Foreign Security Policy and represents the use of diplomacy - backed where necessary by trade, aid and 
security and defence - to resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding, accessed in March 2012. 
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The European Union Military Staff  (EUMS - working under the direction of the EUMC and 
under the authority of the HRVP) is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise 
within the EEAS. As an integral component of the EEAS’s Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS 
coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and 
those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability. 
Enabling activity in support of this output includes: early warning (via the SIAC), situation 
assessment, strategic planning, CIS, concept development, training and education, and support of 
partnerships through mil-mil relationships.  Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining 
the Kortenbergh OPSCEN (both activated and dormant parts) and providing its core staff when 
activated. 
The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is part of the EEAS, is the 
permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP 
operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security 
Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the CPCC ensures the effective 
planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper 
implementation of all mission-related tasks. 
Since its establishment, the EU has developed a network of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements designed to continually expand and deepen relations with its partners. As a major global 
actor, the EU is at the forefront of promoting free trade, sustainable development, the fight against 
poverty, freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights18. 
The EU also holds regular summit meetings with major partners such as the United States, 
Japan, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, India, China, and Brazil. The EU also holds regional dialogues 
with other countries in Asia, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. These 
relationships cover political dialogue, investment, economic cooperation, finance, energy, science 
and technology, human rights, environmental protection, counterterrorism, and international crime. 
The EU is a staunch proponent of multilateralism - relying on an effective multilateral system 
- principle at the core of its external relations, whether in international trade, development, human 
rights, or foreign and security policy19. 
Indeed, following the collapse of former Soviet Union in 1991, the European Union 
immediately established bilateral and multilateral relations with the Central Asian states, especially 
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 MEYER, D., Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, Social Forces, 2004, Vol. 82, nr. 4, pp.162-165.  
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 LUCKHAM, R., Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security  
    Establishments in Transitional Democracies. Zed Books, London, 2003, p.38. 
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with the framework of TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of independent States) 
program and signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA20) with each regional state.  
In the period between 1996 and 2001, the European Union provided technical assistance 
primarily to economic and commercial reforms, state-building processes, and encouragement of 
foreign investments, although the Union expressed that democratization and liberal market 
economy were integral part of its mutual relations. Thus, these agreements were oriented towards 
concrete areas rather than political matters.  
The EU’s policy has evolved from a project based one to a new strategic partnership 
approach based on the contemporary democratic values, but the existing regional conditions, such 
as the authoritarian culture of the Central Asian countries and Islamic religion wide-spread, may 
prevent the EU’s success in the region.  
Hence, this research focuses on the change in the EU’s Central Asia policy and its impact on 
the C.A. countries, examining the EU’s new partnership strategy. The EU stepped up its efforts to 
address the five countries of Central Asia in a comprehensive EU-wide external relations approach 
encompassing the fields of foreign, security, energy, and development policies.  
Later on, the EU Council has also elaborated a Political Strategy paper for Central Asia 
(2007), with bilateral level agreement through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCAs). It promotes stability and security, sustainable economic development and poverty 
reduction and facilitates closer regional cooperation of the Central Asia countries.  
The challenge has been to devise a policy that is both in line with the EU’s “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” and with the individual member states’ diverse economic, political and 
security interests in that still-near-by and yet so-far-away region.  
From a development policy perspective, Central Asia is a difficult “client” - or rather five 
difficult clients. While fast-growing, resource-rich Kazakhstan has slowly graduated out of many 
donors’ aid portfolios, Turkmenistan is only slowly re-emerging from President Niyazov’s 
isolationist policy since his death in December 2006, just few examples.  
Long-time aid to Kyrgyzstan has been puzzling the international community with continuous 
political infighting since its “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005, heavy-handedly ruled Uzbekistan 
has provoked international sanctions with the brutal suppression of protest in Andijon barely two 
months later, and Tajikistan appears to be falling back into a repressive dictatorship again after a 
peaceful post-civil war transition had been brokered by international mediators in 1997.  
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Neighboring Iran, Russia, and China which share common borders with the region, have kept 
a vigilant eye on developments inside Central Asia, in particular, external attempts (by EU for 
instance) to influence these developments. 
From an EU point of view, many believe the risk of instability is high despite appearances of 
calm on the surface and analysts point out a number of problems that could feed instability, 
including Islamic radicalism - especially in the Ferghana Valley- which straddles the borders of 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; drug-trafficking; potential conflicts stemming from the 
spread of infectious diseases; environmental pollution; corrupt governance and so on21.  
The EU’s huge stake in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and its interest in access to energy 
markets in Central Asia are also compelling reasons to focus on the security situation in the region. 
Although there is no question that stability and security in the region are very important to the EU, 
there is some debate about what is the biggest threat facing Central Asia.  
Since 2001, the European Union changed its regional strategy in a radical way due to its need 
for new external energy resources, the emergence of regional issues that threaten the security of the 
region as well as global security and its enlargement process.  
Therefore, the European Union intends to find solutions to its security concerns within the 
framework of its Good Neighbourhood Policy, to respect democracy and human rights, especially 
countries that are considered within the framework of the Good Neighbourhood Policy due to the 
fact that the Union has indeed viewed these concepts as a basis of having friendly relations among 
the states. 
In line with new Security Strategy, the EU wants to enhance its relations with the Central 
Asian states in the fields expressed in the Strategy, such as terrorism, organized crime, regional 
issues, drug trafficking, trade, economical development and others. For this reason, the EU urges 
former socialist countries to have democratic and pluralist regimes because promotion of good 
governance, fighting against corruption and abuse of power, the advancement of the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights have been considered as the integral parts of the Security Strategy22.  
Secondly, the EU has initiated an energy program, the Baku Initiative23, regarding its security 
in energy supply and giving priority to the regional cooperation in order to reach regional energy 
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 BOOTH, K., The security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.184. 
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 Under the title of the Democratic Development and Good Governance, the European Union plans to attempt 1) to develop respect for human rights 
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resources and encouraging the discovery of new energy resources and helping to repair existing 
energy infrastructure in the Central Asia.  
On this occasion, the participants agreed on their mutual interest for supporting the gradual 
development of regional energy markets in the Caspian Littoral States and their neighboring 
countries, enhancing the attraction of funding for new infrastructures, embarking on energy 
efficiency policies and programs and making progress towards a gradual integration between the 
respective energy markets and the EU market. 
The “Baku Initiative” is aiming to facilitate the progressive integration of the energy markets 
of this region into the EU market as well as the transportation of the extensive Caspian oil and gas 
resources towards Europe. Indeed, secure and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas will be 
important for the EU’s security of energy supply by increasing the geographical diversification of 
the EU’s external energy supplies.  
Supplying the EU market at competitive international prices will also be crucial for 
facilitating the economic, social and political development of countries of the Caspian region. 
Moreover, with the adoption of the Instrument for Development Cooperation24, the EU plans 
to force the countries, which have relations with, to act in conformity with the UN Millennium 
Development Goals. Thus, they will spend their energies to eradicate poverty, to develop universal 
fundamental education, gender equality, to secure women’s rights, to improve health services and 
so on.  
The budget allocated under the DCI for the period 2007-2013 is €16.9 billion, €10.06 billion 
for the geographic programs (60% of the total), €5.6 billion for the thematic programs (33% of the 
total), €1.24 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries (7% of the total). 
Although the EU Strategy does not encourage the Union to become a party in the “New Great 
Game”, by mentioning strategic importance of the Central Asia region, the EU points out that the 
regional states should become more democratic, peaceful and economically developed countries. In 
favor of new mentality, the EU attempts to have regular political dialogue, starting from the 
European Education and the European Rule of Law Initiatives, to organize Human Rights and the 
Energy Dialogues with the regional states.  
In this manner, the EU would continue supporting human rights issues, to help the 
establishment and development of independent courts, to promote the legal reforms and cooperating 
in to support membership to the WTO, INOGATE25, TRACECA26 and other regional projects. 
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2.3 The EU’s Regional Strategies 
The European Union has prepared three different regional strategies. The first strategy, 
“Central Asia Regional Strategy Paper 2002 – 2006”, was adopted in 1999 that covered the period 
between 2002 and 2006 and its basic objectives were to make contributions to the stabilities and 
securities of the regional states as well as making efforts to eliminate poverty and to contribute their 
sustainable economies.  
In this context, the European Union proposed to take concrete steps in the fields of security 
and conflict management, political and social difficulties, and lastly commerce and investments. 
Meanwhile, the EU Council expressed that it gave priority to the development of political dialogue, 
the eradication of poverty, social and economic development, good governance, fighting against the 
drugs, and border management. However, the regional states again preferred to receive assistance in 
economic and administrative fields despite the EU’s insistence that the assistance should go to 
political reforms27. 
The second strategy, “ENPI28 Eastern Regional Indicative Program 2007 – 2010”, gives 
priority to three fields: 1) the development of regional cooperation and Good Neighborly relations 
in the Central Asia; 2) the eradication of poverty and the improvement of the living standards, and 
3) good governance and economic reforms.  
The third one, “ENPI Eastern Regional Program Strategy Paper 2010 – 2013”, has repeated 
the basic principles of the previous strategies, but the Program aims at supporting the political and 
economic transition of the region, strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance, and 
reinforcing the respect for human rights.  
It has indicated the following objectives: 
1. Assuring the stability and security of the Central Asia region; 
2. Eradicating the poverty and to raise the living conditions; 
3. Developing the regional cooperation on the subjects of energy, transportation, high 
education and environmental issues. 
To achieve these objectives, the Union plans to provide assistance to these areas: 
1) In the context of the regional cooperation: INOGATE, TRACECA, Black Sea and Central 
Asia energy corridor, environment, border management, organized crimes, and fighting against 
terrorism. 
2) In the context of the eradication of poverty and improvement of living standards: social 
development, the development of urban areas, and agricultural sectors, and other national sectors. 
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3) In the context of the good governance and economic reforms: political reforms, 
strengthening states institutions, supporting civil societies, democratization and trade. 
The transformation of the Central Asian states to more democratic and liberal ones in the 
short - and medium terms is not an easy task for the EU, as the “authoritarian” mentality of the 
regional regimes are still in place. A matter of fact is that the regional Leaders have provided some 
privileges to their clans in order to preserve their regimes29. 
As a result, bad governance, corruption, radical movements and illegal migration have 
become ordinary issues due to the weak administrative institutions and existence of the privileged 
clans in these countries. For that reason, the Political Leaders and privileged clans have viewed any 
democratic, economic and political reforms as a threat to their political and economic positions. 
As a result the regional regimes do not support so much EU project that demands the 
promotion of civil society organizations and more political participation. They began to pursue 
more suppressive policies in order to protect their regimes, especially after the colorful revolutions, 
openly violating the human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of press30.  
Today, the Central Asian states do not have effective democracies but it is also clear that the 
colorful revolutions are not influential instruments to make their democracies more effective. The 
common goal of achieving stability and prosperity by means of peaceful inter-action makes Europe 
and Central Asia partners for increased cooperation. 
The strong EU commitment towards its Eastern neighbors will also bring Europe and Central 
Asia closer to each other, both in terms of political cooperation and economic development. The 
development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies, adhering to international norms, is 
essential to bring the partnership between the European Union and Central Asia states to full 
fruition.  
Good governance, the rule of law, human rights, democratization, education and training are 
key areas where the EU is willing to share experience and expertise. Lessons learnt from the 
political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe can also be offered. With their 
rich traditions and centuries-old exchanges, the EU and Central Asia can contribute actively to the 
dialogue between civilizations. Many challenges facing the globalised world affect Europe and 
Central Asia alike, and warrant a common response. 
Therefore, the European Union has to make serious attempts, such as implementing 
economical programs, in order to create next generations who are familiar with the European values 
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in the long-term period. The European Union has to encourage the regional young people to be 
educated at the European Universities in order to embrace the contemporary values, such as human 
rights, as their own properties. In the meantime, the European universities and/or research centers 
can inform them about the European values while being in cooperation with the local education 
institutions and research centers. 
For that reason, the EU has to have close relations with local firms, non - governmental 
organizations and governmental institutions in order to realize effective implementation of the 
projects. But, at the current stage Brussels has only one representative Office in Almaty, capital of 
Kazakhstan.  
Nevertheless, its representatives play a very low profile role in getting direct and reliable 
knowledge about the regional affairs, providing facilities to the European researchers and investors, 
monitoring the regional projects closely, and preparing TACIS31 strategy papers in a true and 
reliable way.  
Unlike other regional and external powers, the EU has not been motivated by a logic of great 
power struggle in the region, which is called the “New Great Game”. This is an advantage for the 
EU to cooperate with other regional powers such as Russia and China in order to implement the 
regional projects collectively, such as TRACECA and INOGATE. 
Indeed, from this point of view, the European Union should continue to follow its existing 
attitude, and to support the projects that provide regional development and improve the living 
conditions in the region. Meanwhile, it should also continue its aim of contributing to the 
transformation of the region within the framework of prevailing contemporary values rather than 
acting as a strategic competitor.  
The aim of the EU Strategy is therefore to actively cooperate with the Central Asia states in 
reaching these goals as well as to contribute to safeguarding peace and prosperity in neighboring 
countries.  
The Strategy builds on the progress which the Central Asia states have themselves made since 
attaining independence, taking into account their common aspects as well as specific national 
contexts and requirements and also builds on the results obtained under the implementation of the 
various Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.  
The Strategy is based upon common interests of the EU and the states of Central Asia and 
lines up expectations of Central Asian partners with those of the EU will be a mutually beneficial, 
reinforcing process as a whole. The EU has an interest in security and stability as well as in 
adherence to human rights and the rule of law in Central Asia states because:  
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a) strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-regional 
challenges in Central Asia impact directly or indirectly on EU interests; b) with EU enlargement, 
the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea 
Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are moving closer together; c) significant energy 
resources in Central Asia and the region’s aim to diversify trade partners and supply routes can help 
meet EU energy security and supply needs. 
Therefore, EU strongly believes that strengthening the commitment of Central Asia states to 
international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, as well as to a market 
economy will promote security and stability in Central Asia, thus making the countries of the region 
reliable partners for the EU with shared common interests and goals.  
Strong cooperation with the UN, in particular the UNECE32, the OSCE, NATO and other 
international financial institutions and regional organizations are also in place.  
Moreover, public-private partnership initiatives as well as bilateral agreements, Member State 
programs can play an important role in increasing the EU’s commitment in Central Asia, linking 
with international financial institutions as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development33 (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank34 (EIB).  
Human rights dialogues constitute an essential part of the EU’s overall strategy aimed at 
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, sustainable development, peace and 
stability. Against this background and on the basis of the relevant EU guidelines, the EU raises 
human rights issues with each Central Asian state through an appropriate channel for discussion, 
inter alia by entering into a structured, regular and results-oriented human rights dialogue.  
 
 
2.4 EC 2007-2013 Regional Assistance Strategy for C.A. 
The EC’s 2007-2013 Assistance Strategy for Central Asia is conceived as a tool to support 
strengthening of political dialogue with the Central Asia states at regional and national level and to 
pursue the objectives defined above.  
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In order to reflect greater EU engagement in the region, the EC assistance budget to Central 
Asia has been significantly increased under the new financial perspectives 2007-2013 to a total 750 
million EUR, with the average annual allocation to the region under the development cooperation 
instrument increasing from 58 million EUR in 2007 to 139 million EUR in 2013.  
The bulk of EC assistance to Central Asia - 70% - will be directed at the bilateral assistance 
programs, taking into account the policy agenda of the individual Central Asia countries and their 
distinct political and social realities. With more than 50% of the rural population living below the 
poverty line, poverty reduction through social sector reforms and schemes, including education, to 
increase living standards especially in rural areas, C.A. States will continue to be the key priority 
for EC bilateral assistance.  
Implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers35 and similar policy documents to 
which the Central Asian governments have committed themselves would serve as guiding 
framework for such programs.  
The content of the programs has been defined in agreement with the authorities and tailored 
to the specific needs of each country. Given its importance for the sustainable development of 
Central Asia, 30% of assistance has been dedicated to facilitating closer inter-state cooperation both 
within Central Asia and between Central Asia, South Caucasus and the EU, particularly in the 
energy, transport, environmental and education sectors.  
In these domains, the alignment of regional cooperation priorities and programs for Central 
Asia with the regional strategy for EU Eastern neighbors lies at the heart of future assistance policy.  
The 2007-2013 regional assistance strategy puts a clear focus on three main areas of 
intensified policy dialogue and enhanced co-operation: Rule of Law, Education, Environment.  
Accordingly, three related initiatives have been launched as Rule of Law is an essential 
condition for the development of a stable political framework and efficient economic structures. In 
the context of the EU-CA Strategy, the EU - Central Asia Rule of Law Initiative launched in 
November 2008 has supported reforms and sharing of experience between the EU and Central Asia 
in the area of legal and judicial reforms, including intensified policy dialogue at all levels.  
The Initiative envisages two kinds of actions, an EU-Central Asia Rule of Law Platform (with 
regular meetings at ministerial level, regional level and national level) and specific long-term 
projects. The EU-Central Asia Rule of Law Platform project became operational at the end of 2011. 
                                               
35
 Source: International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are prepared by the member countries through 
a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as eng development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund. Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and 
programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated eng financing needs and major 
sources of financing. Interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs) summarize the current knowledge and analysis of a country’s poverty situation, describe the existing 
poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion. The country documents, along 
with the accompanying IMF/World Bank Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs), are being made available on the World Bank and IMF websites by 
agreement with the member country as a service to users of the World Bank and IMF websites. Accessed in March 2012. 
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This project supports the cooperation objectives set between the European Union and Central 
Asia, and provides services required for an efficient implementation of the Rule of Law Initiative 
work plan, also promoting regional cooperation between the countries of Central Asia, in order to 
advance constitutional, legal and judicial reform in the region. 
On the Education side, the EU - Central Asia Education Initiative, endorsed by the European 
Council in 2007, has led to closer links of Central Asia with the European Education Area, 
supported by a significant increase in EU support for educational exchanges, education reform, and 
vocational training, a key area for economic and social development.  
The initiative also plays the role of a coordination mechanism for EU donors. Under the 
initiative a number of cooperation programs take place at a regional level, as Tempus 
(modernization in the higher education sector), Erasmus Mundus Partnerships (academic 
partnerships and student/scholar mobility) and the Central Asia Research and Education Network -  
CAREN (financing for high-speed information and communication networks). 
The European Union also supports the EU-Central Asia Education Platform which started in 
February 2012, which aims to strengthen education reforms in the region by promoting policy 
dialogue as well as better coordination of donor financed education projects and programs. 
On the Environment side, the EU-Central Asia Environment and Water Initiative is led by 
Italy with the support of the European Commission, representatives from the Central Asian 
countries, and international organizations such as the OECD or the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE). 
The regional environmental programs for Central Asia - in accordance with the objectives of 
the Environment and Water Initiative - aim at enhancing regional cooperation and partnership with 
Europe. The programs facilitate the development of the EU - Central Asia Environment and Water 
Cooperation Platform and focus on integrated water resource management, environmental 
protection measures, environmental governance and climate change. 
 
 
2.5 EU Human Rights, Rule of Law, Good Governance and Democratization 
The EU Strategy recognizes that human rights, rule of law, good governance and 
democratization as long - term political commitment to develop the CA States. 
The EU is working on establishing or upgrading Human Rights dialogues with all Central 
Asian countries and systematically raised in all the political meetings, including to the meeting of 
National Coordinators (the last held on 20 March 2012 in Brussels).  
  
67 
The Human Rights dialogue with Uzbekistan was the first to be formally agreed, as indicated 
in the GAERC36 conclusions of 16 November 2006, and is held in the framework of the Sub-
committee on Justice and Home Affairs, Human Rights and related issues under the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement.  
The last round was held in July 2012 and an ad hoc Human Rights dialogue with 
Turkmenistan has also been held since 2005.  
The EU - Central Asia Ministerial meeting in Ashgabad in April 2008 marked an very 
important agreement to begin such dialogues with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic 
in the context of the European strategy, a specific initiative - the EU Rule of Law Initiative for 
Central Asia - is being developed to support reforms and the sharing of experiences between the EU 
and Central Asia in the area of legal and judicial reforms, which is recognized by Central Asian 
countries as particularly needed.  
Italy, France and Germany are the lead coordinators on the EU side in developing this 
Initiative and a first concept paper was agreed within the EU and shared with Central Asian partners 
at the Ministerial meeting in Ashgabat. The Initiative includes intensified policy dialogue at all 
levels and more resources for judicial reform programs by the EC and EU Member States.  
Cooperation in the areas of human rights, rule of law, good governance, and democratization 
is supported by assistance projects, both those of the EC and Member States, which aim to promote 
reform efforts. EC assistance includes projects under thematic budget lines such as the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Non-State Actors Program, as well as the 
Institution Building Partnership Program (IBPP), which also support civil society development, so 
crucial for ensuring citizen participation in transformation and reform efforts.  
The objectives of a human rights dialogue with each of the countries of Central Asia includes: 
- discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on human rights, inter 
alia in multilateral forum such as the United Nations and the OSCE; 
- concerns felt by the EU as regards the human rights situation in the countries concerned, 
information gathering and initiatives to improve the relevant human rights situation. 
In addition, human rights dialogues contribute to supporting practical steps aimed at meeting 
human rights objectives at national level, in particular through financial and technical cooperation 
and specific projects to be funded under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights. 
                                               
36
 Source: The General Affairs and External Relations Council, www.ec.europa.eu.  GAERC meets once a month bringing together the EU Foreign 
Ministers. Ministers responsible for European affairs, defense, development or trade may also attend the meetings, depending on the items on agenda. 
In addition to the Union’s external relations, the Council coordinates the work of the other Council formations, prepares for European Council 
meetings, and attends to institutional matters and issues concerning enlargement. Accessed in April 2012. 
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The EU will respond to suggestions put forward by the Central Asia states and will further 
intensify cooperation on matters pertaining to the rule of law, good governance and combating 
corruption.  
Within the framework of this Rule of Law Initiative, the EU supports the Central Asia states 
in core legal reforms, including reform of the judiciary, and in drawing up effective legislation, for 
example in the fields of administrative and commercial law. In promoting the consolidation of 
peace and international justice, the EU and its Member States are determined to share, with the 
Central Asia states their experience in the adoption of the necessary legal adjustments required to 
accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in combating international 
crime in accordance with international law. 
The EU and Member States aim to: 
- allocate adequate funds to this Rule of Law Initiative; 
- second judicial and administrative experts to Central Asia states on both short-term and 
long-term assignments; 
- provide training opportunities to experts from Central Asia states; 
- support the transparent implementation of legal reform; 
- offer the possibility of international exchanges by organizing and sponsoring specialized 
conferences; 
- facilitate cooperation by Central Asia states with the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe; 
- encourage implementation of ILO37 norms and conventions for decent work; 
- coordinate closely with existing activities of OSCE field missions, the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), bilateral programs as well as the UN 
and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; 
- provide technical assistance and establish close cooperation aimed at making the legislative 
and constitutional amendments required for accession to and implementation of the Rome 
Statute. 
The task of sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy work for its citizens 
calls for the active involvement of civil society, indeed, a developed and active civil society and 
independent media are vital for the development of a pluralistic society.  
The EU cooperates with the Central Asia states to this end and promotes enhanced exchanges 
in civil society, pursuing its objectives of ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights 
                                               
37
 Source: The International Labour Organization, www.ilo.org. It is an international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing 
international labor standards. It is the only 'tripartite' United Nations agency that brings together representatives of governments, employers and 
workers to jointly shape policies and programs promoting Decent Work for all. This unique arrangement gives the ILO an edge in incorporating 'real 
world' knowledge about employment and work. Accessed in April 2012. 
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throughout the world, as well as in Central Asia states, through international bodies such as the 
General Assembly or the Human Rights Council.  
High standard education is also essential in order to open up potential improvements for the 
younger generation, therefore, EU has set up a European Education Initiative for Central Asia38 in 
order to contribute to the adaptation of the education systems of Central Asia states to the needs of 
the globalised world.  
In particular, under the European Education Initiative, the EU and Member States are willing 
to offer the support in the fields of: 
- primary school education; 
- secondary school education; 
- vocational education and training; 
- higher education cooperation, academic and student exchanges, for instance under the new 
Erasmus Mundus facility and TEMPUS and bilaterally. 
The EU supports the development of regional education centers and cooperates closely with 
the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and ready to open an European Studies Institutes in the region.  
The EU also supports the continuation of the activities performed by the European Training 
Foundation in the field of vocational education and training in Central Asia and enhances the EU e-
network through the development of an “e-silk-highway” long distance learning. 
 It is the EU aim to link Central Asia to global Internet-based communication networks and 
to enable Central Asian students, teachers, academics, and scientists to participate in modern forms 
of life-long learning.  
In the margins of the next Tempus Ministerial meeting, to be held in Brussels, a special 
meeting with Central Asian partners will be set up to discuss cooperation activities. Preparations for 
this project are well under way but for implementation to go ahead successfully the political 
commitment of the Central Asian countries is needed, including the nomination of one focal 
organization that would represent the research and education community of their country in the 
project and the readiness to consider co-financing of the project in order to secure the longer - term 
viability of the project.  
 
 
 
                                               
38
 More than 130 universities from all over Central Asia have participated in 230 projects over the past 15 years, involving several thousand scholars 
(an estimated 5,000 have been directly involved and students from the EU and Central Asia Through these projects. Tempus has supported the 
development of new curricula at Bachelors and Masters Level in a wide range of disciplines - including a few joint degrees with EU universities - 
bringing modern teaching and learning methodologies in line with the principles of the Bologna process. Through the CAREN (Central Asia Research 
and Education Network) project, it  provides high capacity Internet links for the first time for one million students and researchers in over 200 
universities and research institutions along the ancient Silk Road  in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
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2.6 The EU as a promoter of Economic Development, Trade and Investment   
The EU supports the removal of trade barriers between the Central Asia states and it of course 
continues to support World Trade Organization (WTO) accession for the five Central Asia states 
which are not all yet WTO members (currently Kyrgyzstan is a WTO member, 20 December 1998) 
on commercially viable terms and in full compliance with WTO requirements.  
WTO accession is a key factor for wider economic reforms and diversification and better 
integration of the countries into the international trade and economic system.  
The EU promotes the creation of regulatory and institutional frameworks for an improved 
business and investment environment and further support economic diversification and in this 
respect, the EU continues to cooperate with Central Asia states in order to improve access for 
Central Asian products to EU markets.  
In this regard the renewed EU Generalized System of Preferences39 (GSP – 2006/2015) offers 
the best ever preferential framework aimed at encouraging exports and economic diversification in 
these countries.  
Equally, it will be an incentive for diversifying their economies on the basis of the market 
access advantages offered by the EU and through INOGATE (Baku Initiative) and TRACECA 
(funded through DCI and ENPI), the EU promotes the development and expansion of the regional 
infrastructure in the fields of transport, energy and trade in order to make better use of Central 
Asia’s economic potential, not least through improved regional cooperation.  
As an important trade corridor between East and South Asia and Europe, Central Asia can 
benefit from increasing trade and in this connection, the EU cooperates with interested companies 
from the EU in a public-private partnership to promote the market economy, offering training and 
assistance programs for Central Asian partners.  
The EU supports the aspirations and actions of the Central Asia states towards market 
economy structures through: 
- full support for deeper integration of Central Asia into the world trade and economic system, 
in particular through the WTO accession process and eventual membership; 
- support economic diversification with a view to promoting sustainable development by 
improving local skills and potential (science and technology, innovation, tourism), 
promotion of SMEs, development of basic infrastructure (road, rail, telecom, IT); 
                                               
39
 Source: The European Union, www.europa.eu. The purpose of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) is to help developing countries to 
reduce poverty by using tariff preferences to help them obtain international trade revenue. In the Communication the Commission sets out the 
principles that should underpin regulations between 2006 and 2015 in order to achieve this objective. It proposes improving the current system (GSP 
for the period 2002-2005) in several areas by simplifying the GSP (reducing the five arrangements currently in place to three), targeting the system on 
the developing countries that need it most, encouraging regional cooperation and increasing the additional preferences granted for sustainable 
development, good governance and so on. Accessed in April 2012. 
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- support substantial reforms of the financial systems which are needed in most countries, 
especially in the banking and micro credit sector; improved banking regulation, supervision 
and enforcement; privatization of state banks; increased competition among banks and 
easier entrance for foreign banks are key steps which Central Asia states need to take; 
- study further possible options to enhance the Central Asia states’ ability to make better use 
of the available GSP and encourage regional trade; 
- develop the necessary systems, including with regard to regulatory approximation to the EC 
acquis, to allow a practical better access to the EU market for Central Asian products; 
- continue to support the efforts of the Central Asia states to fully implement the trade and 
economic provisions of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements; 
- extend trade-related technical assistance and policy advice to facilitate the creation of 
legislative and institutional frameworks conducive to better business environments and to 
attracting foreign direct investment; 
- help the countries of the region to work out strategies to improve their individual credit 
ratings in order to qualify for future lending programs; 
- support these countries in enforcing best customs practices as set by the World Customs 
Organization; 
- support initiatives for know-how transfer and capacity building. 
 
The EU and Central Asia share a paramount interest in enhancing Energy Security as an 
important aspect of global security. There is a common interest in diversifying export routes, 
demand and supply structures and energy sources.  
Besides oil, gas and electricity, water management is a decisive aspect of energy cooperation 
with Central Asia and hydro-power production and distribution are crucial to promoting stability 
and prosperity in Central Asia and beyond, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 The development of resources in oil and gas has significantly increased the role of Central 
Asia states as energy producers and transit countries. Increasing oil and gas exploitation will 
contribute to better world market supplies. Gas deliveries from the region are of special importance 
to the EU. 
The key elements for a long-term partnership based on common interests and reciprocity can 
therefore be established in the years to come: the exploitation of the energy resources of Central 
Asia states calls for substantial and sustained investment as well as for comprehensive policies 
addressing all the components of their energy sectors and facilitating access to most developed 
markets.  
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The EU, for its part, is ready to consider all options for the development and transportation of 
these resources, in cooperation with other interested partners. A market-based approach to 
investment, procurement, transparent, stable and non-discriminatory regulatory frameworks 
guarantee, for all sources of energy, the best prices and increased opportunities for all stake-holders. 
Against this background, the EU conducts an enhanced regular energy dialogue with Central 
Asia states in the framework of the Baku Initiative.  
 The EU lend political support and assistance to Central Asian countries in developing a new 
Caspian Sea - Black Sea - EU energy transport corridor, promoting the creation of an integrated 
Central Asian energy market and supporting public-private partnerships which encourage EU 
investment. Based on the objectives laid down in the Baku Initiative the EU would focus on 
cooperation with Central Asia states in particular on the following matters:  
- converging of energy markets on the basis of the EU internal energy market principles 
taking into account the particularities of the partner countries; 
- enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy exports/imports, supply 
diversification, energy transit and energy demand; 
- transparency and capacity-building in statistics and in the governance of the energy sector; 
- supporting and enhancing technological cooperation between the EU and the Central Asia 
states in the energy sector; 
- supporting sustainable energy development, including the development of energy efficiency, 
renewable energy sources and demand side management; 
- attracting investment towards energy projects of common and regional interest; 
- supporting the rehabilitation of existing pipelines and the construction of new pipelines and 
electricity transportation networks inside the region and towards Europe; 
- supporting the development of comprehensive action programs aiming at the promotion of 
energy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energy, notably with a view to meeting 
commitments in the framework of the Kyoto protocol; 
- supporting the “Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund” initiative40; 
- encouraging the countries to take initiatives similar to those taken by the EU in the Action 
Plan for an Energy Policy for Europe (European Council of March 2007).  
                                               
40
 Source: www.climatefundsupdate.org ,the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
designed to maximise the private finance leveraged through public funds funded by the European Commission and managed by the European 
Investment Bank. GEEREF is structured as a fund of funds, and invests in private equity sub-funds that specialise in financing small and medium-
sized project developers and enterprises (SMEs) to implement energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in developing countries and 
economies in transition. Accessed in April 2012. 
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In the meantime, the EU continues to promote the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative41 within the Central Asian region as a means to contributing to sustainable development 
and poverty reduction. 
The EU is already one of the major trading partners for Central Asia, but there is still much 
scope for further intensifying trade and economic ties, encouraging Central Asian partners to make 
better use of the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and to increase and diversify their 
economic production and exports.  
The gradual approximation of the countries’ legislation and practices to the main EU trade 
related acquis as foreseen in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements should support this 
process and the EU is ready to continue providing the partners with its technical assistance in this 
respect.  
EU assistance programs have put specific emphasis on supporting reform efforts in the area 
of improving the investment climate in Central Asia, as it is essential for attracting more 
investments into the region.  
The EU remains committed to the success of the Nabucco project42 and appreciates the 
progress achieved in the last year, supporting the further steps needed in order to implement the 
project as scheduled. Transport is a long-established area of cooperation between the EU and the 
Central Asia countries, as the extension of the trans-European transport networks and the 
approximation of transport regulations would facilitate transport and trade flows between the EU 
and the Central Asia countries.  
Improving energy and transport links is a third priority of the new EU strategy. Though 
researchers still debate whether EU seeks to ensure energy supplies is the most important goal of 
the EU’s Central Asia policy. The debate in academic circles arises from different assessments of 
the capacity of Central Asian states to provide oil and natural gas to the EU.  
Several factors could have an impact on that capacity: The Central Asian states are interested 
in having a diversified market for their energy products and want to attract investment and 
cooperation from various actors. Thus, they certainly support the EU as a potential huge consumer 
of their energy products, particularly natural gas.  
                                               
41
 Source: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, www.eiti.org. It is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors 
and international organisations. This is reflected not only in the EITI processes in the countries implementing the EITI, but also on the international 
level: the EITI Board consists of members from governments, companies and civil society, and is appointed at the bi-annual EITI Global Conference. 
Accessed in April 2012. 
42
 Source: The Nabucco Gas Pipeline, www.nabucco-pipeline.com, is the new gas bridge from Asia to Europe and the flagship project in the 
Southern Corridor. It will be a pipeline to connect the world’s richest gas regions - the Caspian region and Middle East - to the European consumer 
markets. The pipeline will link the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Baumgarten in Austria - one of the most important gas turntables in Central Europe - 
via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. When completed the 1,300 km pipeline’s annual capacity will be scalable between 10-23 bcm. The construction 
of the pipeline is supported by the 2009 Intergovernmental Agreement signed in Ankara in July 2009, which harmonises the legal framework and 
grants stable and equal transport conditions for all partners and customers. Accessed in April 2012. 
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EU access to the Central Asian energy market, however, remains an issue. One possibility is 
the Nabucco gas pipeline, which received EU backing since 2006. Extending for 3,300 kilometers, 
the pipeline would link Turkey and Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and expand EU 
access to Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin supplies.  
The potential capacity of the line is 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year by 2020 and it is 
scheduled for construction from 2009 to 2013. However, the pipeline has been plagued by setbacks. 
The main sources of natural gas for Nabucco would be the Caspian region and the Middle 
East. Theoretically, Turkey’s neighbors, particularly Russia (through the under-utilized Blue Stream 
pipeline43), Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Syria and Iraq, could be another source for Nabucco. 
But there is no direct infrastructure to tie gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into 
Nabucco and there are doubts about how much gas Turkmenistan can provide. The future of 
Nabucco is further complicated by the South Stream pipeline, a joint venture between Russia’s 
Gazprom and Italy’s Eni.  
This line, which will run from Russia to Europe across the Black Sea floor, will enable 
Gazprom to compete with any new pipelines not controlled by Russia that threaten to bring gas 
from Central Asia or the Middle East into Europe via Turkey.  
At this point, from an economic and political standpoint the South Stream pipeline seems to 
have a brighter future than Nabucco and besides this, Russia’s energy policy towards the Caspian 
Sea region and Central Asia significantly affects whether the EU could successfully adopt its policy 
of diversification of energy supplies and gain access to the Central Asian market.  
In May 2007, the Presidents of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to build a new 
pipeline along the Caspian Sea coast to transport Turkmen natural gas to western markets44.  
The construction of the pipeline has started in 2008 and it is expected to have an annual 
capacity of 10 bcm by 2012. Gazprom has also signed long-term contracts with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the rights to a large portion of their gas reserves. This necessarily 
reduces the share of their gas reserves that the Central Asian countries can sell to other consumers. 
Yet, Russia has been extraordinarily successful in picking off the major gas distribution 
companies in Europe, which has limited the EU’s ability to diversify its gas supplies. 
                                               
43
 Source: Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, www.eni.com, Blue Stream is a transport system for the supply of gas from the network of southern Russia to 
Turkey via the Black Sea, with transport capacity of 16 billions m3/yr. The system is owned and operated by Blue Stream Pipeline Company BV 
(BSPC), a joint venture between Eni and Gazprom. Accessed in April 2012. 
44
 Source: Gazprom, www.gazprom.com. In cooperation with Central Asian countries Gazprom is intent on contributing at best to exploiting gas 
resources. Together with gas transmission organizations and companies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Gazprom has completed the operations 
required to expand the Central Asia gas transmission system. In particular, the project is ongoing to restore gas production from the Shakhpakhty field 
in Uzbekistan under the PSA (Production Sharing Agreement). The work is underway on the geological survey of subsurface resources in the Ustyurt 
region of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Agreement on the general principles for the geological survey of subsurface resources was signed with the 
Government of Tajikistan for the Rengan, Sargazon, Sarykamysh and Western Shaambary oil and gas prospects. In 2010 Gazprom Group slightly 
increased the purchases of Central Asian gas and acquired 37.8 versus 38.3 billion cubic meters in 2009, including 10.7 billion cubic meters 
of Turkmen gas, 13.9 billion cubic meters of Uzbek gas and 12.4 billion cubic meters of Kazakh gas. Accessed in April 2012. 
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Since the EU is still at the early stage of formalizing its very complicated common external 
energy policy, it is not easy for the EU to get the upper hand over Russia in efforts to diversify its 
gas supply with imports from Central Asia. However, some analysts argue that, given the amount of 
energy reserves in Central Asia is still unclear, it is too early to conclude the EU will be unable to 
get as much energy from that region as it would like.  
In addition, the new leadership in Turkmenistan has shown interest in following Kazakhstan’s 
lead in adopting a reform policy that might lead to the diversification of Turkmenistan’s export of 
natural gas in the future. These are opportunities for the EU that should not be squandered; unlikely, 
EU should pursue energy cooperation with the regional countries more aggressively.  
 
 
2.7 Facing common threats and challenges 
Modern border management could facilitate trade and exchange in the region and help 
combating regional criminal activity, especially the international drug trade. Assistance in fighting 
organized crime is one of the priorities of the EU in the region, aiming at a reduction of non-
conventional threats to security. Moreover, Migration is another of the major global challenges of 
the 21st century.  
The impact of migration, both positive and negative, can be felt in all countries, including in 
Central Asia. The EU seeks to enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration with regions of 
transit, origin and destination through the EU’s Global Approach to Migration. As part of the 
Global Approach the EU proposes to launch a close dialogue on migration with the eastern and 
south-eastern neighboring regions.  
The EU wants to steps up its support for the development of modern border management in 
the region of Central Asia, including the borders with Afghanistan. Through BOMCA, the EU seeks 
a multilateral and regional approach and synergy with projects under implementation to reform 
customs services. In fact, the EU through close cooperation between BOMCA, the OSCE and other 
border projects from Member States and third countries wants to: 
- continue to introduce the basic principles of integrated border management in border guard 
services and other relevant services; 
- work on specific border crossing points; 
- provide organizational assistance to support transformation of border guards from a 
conscript to a professional service;  
- support transition from a purely military system to a more police-style law enforcement 
agency and to support efforts to strengthen control mechanisms; 
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- seek increased involvement of customs services to facilitate trade; 
- update the legal framework in accordance with international law in the field of combating 
organized crime (e.g.: UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
Protocols), with a focus on illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, preventing and 
countering drugs and precursors trafficking;  
- improve institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies, and strengthen regional 
cooperation in fighting trans-national organized crime. 
At the same time, the EU continues to offer its assistance to help the interested Central Asia 
states - both at national and at regional level - to manage migration in a more balanced manner, 
which implies setting up of well functioning systems, matching labor demand and supply, 
facilitating integration of legal migrants and providing international protection to asylum seekers 
and refugees and other vulnerable persons.  
 The EU gives greater support to the fight against corruption, the drug trade, human 
trafficking, illegal trade of weapons from and to Afghanistan and organized crime in Central Asia, 
with a specific EU presence in Dushanbe45.  
Yet, the EU, dedicating special attention to programs on border management, intra-regional 
trade and free movement of goods and persons, wants to secure “issues” at regional level which 
requires close cooperation between the EU and each Central Asian state, not neglecting countries as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.  
The EU Strategy for Central Asia serves as an overall framework for the EU external policies, 
seeing a mutual interest in sustained dialogue and cooperation with the five Central Asia states, 
respecting their differences and fostering closer cooperation among them on regional issues. 
CA states and EU are attributing increasing importance to “common threats and challenges” 
as a cornerstone of intensified relations to consolidate the shared awareness of security common 
threats and challenges, by launching a periodic EU-Central Asia Ministerial Forum on Security 
Challenges. 
The introduction of modern border management practices, creating open but at the same time 
secure borders would facilitate trade and economic exchanges in the region and help combat drug 
trafficking. A number of border crossing points (BCPs) have been modernized through BOMCA 
assistance and about 20 additional BCPs received equipment, while a number of border outposts 
(BOs) along the “green border” have been upgraded.  
                                               
45
 The European Commission has sought to significantly enhance its presence in Tajikistan in 2008. Under the EC’s strategic development document, 
covering the years 2007 through 2013, Tajikistan stands to receive 43 million euro in assistance for 2011-2012. That total represents nearly a 100 
percent increase over the aid allocated during 2009-2010. 
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Numerous training sessions on Integrated Border Management for approx. 1500 Central 
Asian border guards and customs officers have been carried out and some operations have also been 
planned to support the adoption of modern drug prevention methodologies in one pilot prison. 
Furthermore, support continues by the EU to the setting up of Drug Profiling Units46 (DPU) 
at Central Asian airports and railway stations with a particular focus on providing training on 
precursor detection skills.  
An important new project to combat drug trafficking in the region has been launched in the 
framework of the Instrument for Stability to support combating drugs and precursors trafficking and 
organized crime, and includes the setting up of a secured network of national intelligence units in 
the countries members of CARICC47 (Central Asia Regional Intelligence and Coordination Centre) 
and cross border cooperation with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. 
CARICC was established under the UNODC project TD/RER/H22 “Establishment of the 
Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)” as part of “Rainbow” 
strategy and its objectives are: 
- Coordination of the efforts of the member-states in combating the illicit drug trafficking at 
the regional level; 
- Facilitation of the enhanced cooperation between the competent authorities of the member-
states in combating trans-border crime associated with illicit drug trafficking; 
- Establishment of cooperation mechanisms between competent authorities of the member-
states; 
- Assistance in organizing and executing joint international operations and investigations, 
including controlled deliveries; 
- Collection, storage, protection, analysis and exchange of information in the field of 
combating illicit drug trafficking.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
46
 The EU-UNDP Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) has handed over in 2009 a newly constructed building for a Drug Profiling Unit 
(DPU) to the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The DPU would help Uzbek drug control agencies to detect drug trafficking and make 
searches for drugs as well as collect, collate and analyze information for the detection of illegal drug trafficking. The DPU has been established as a 
part of the CADAP “Drug Control at Airports and Railway Stations” project. The agencies responsible for implementing the project in the Republic 
of Uzbekistan are the National Security Service, the State Customs Committee, the Ministry of the Interior and the State Border Guards Committee. 
The total cost of the construction work and equipment (computers, furniture, and the drug detection devices) is about 76,000 euro. The CADAP and 
its government partners have established interagency DPUs in all the countries in the region to promote border security by analysing collected 
information and by working with the drug control agencies in the country. 
47
 Source: www.caricc.org, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic substances and their precursors, established within the Memorandum of Understanding on sub-regional drug control cooperation dated 
May 4 1996 (Tashkent, Uzbekistan) between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, 
the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed in April 2012. 
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2.8 Dual Approach: the German Bilateral and Regional approach 
Efforts have been undertaken over the past year to give concrete emphasis to bilateral and 
regional aspects of the the EU Strategy to different areas of the globe. In addition to that, the 
meetings held with each country under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or the Trade 
and Cooperation Agreements have been used to discuss bilateral priorities.  
These discussions paved the way for the elaboration of the five “bilateral priorities papers” 
which combine Commission and Member States’ programs and would guide the implementation of 
bilateral aspects of the Strategy in particular.  
As far as Central Asia region is facing a significant regional challenges, which require cross-
border cooperation, the need for a regional approach has been duly taken into account while 
implementing the Strategy in such areas as combating drug trafficking, modernizing border 
management, dealing with environmental problems and fostering energy and transport links.  
In line with the EU Strategy, two regional initiatives are being developed as a whole: a 
European Education Initiative for Central Asia, and a European Rule of Law Initiative for Central 
Asia, underlining particular emphasis on the need for increased coordination between EU and 
Member State instruments and assistance.  
Part of the implementation effort over the past year has included two assistance coordination 
meetings organized by the Commission with Member States, contributing to the elaboration of the 
bilateral priorities papers and allowing for a comprehensive overview of ongoing and planned 
assistance and policy dialogue initiatives.  
For instance, the Ismaili spiritual leader Aga Khan48, who has been engaged in development 
projects in many parts of Central Asia, endorses the EU’s “regional diagnosis” of Central Asia and 
also Germany pointed out the advantages of regional cooperation. Even policy-makers in the region 
have gradually accepted that Central Asia could be seen as a regional entity, though, so far, national 
identities are still stronger than a regional identity.  
The EU is still struggling with its regional approach towards Central Asia from its own 
historical experience and recognizes the importance of regional development, integration and hopes 
its experience would be translatable to the context of Central Asia too.  
It is argued that many EU policies involved in its process could be successfully adapted by 
the Central Asian countries, in fact, Central Asia urgently needs to cooperate on a regional level to 
                                               
48
 The agencies of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) are private, international, non-denominational development organisations. They 
work to improve the welfare and prospects of people in the developing world, particularly in Asia and Africa, without regard to faith, origin or 
gender. Its programmes are designed to bring a critical mass of economic, social and cultural activities to bear on a given area. Its projects encompass 
many of the determinants of the quality of life, including the natural and built environments in both urban and rural areas, food security, health, 
education, access to financial services and economic opportunity, as well as the cultural areas of traditional music, architecture and art.  
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tackle many of the problems it currently faces, such as drug-trafficking, water management, 
migration, environmental protection and so on.  
Overcoming the problems of small markets and a disproportionate distribution of natural 
wealth (oil, gas, water and minerals) it is important to set up a regional approach towards the 
development of Central Asia.  
It is also important to note some analysts in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have criticized the 
EU’s previous lack of a regional strategy toward Central Asia in the past. In their view, there are 
four main reasons for these critics: 
1. The countries of Central Asia lack the political will to work as a regional entity. Many of 
them are still seeking to forge their own political and cultural identities and jealously guard 
their national interests, and relations between the countries are often poor. 
2. The five countries have different paths to development based on different needs. The EU 
should develop strategies based on the specific needs of the individual countries. The 
assumption of the EU that the Central Asian countries can successfully cooperate on a 
regional basis and present a united front in international forum like the Baltic States do is 
wrong. 
3. Uzbekistan is the main obstacle to a regional approach. It has borders with all the other  
Regional countries. Instead of cooperating with others, it has become the source of trouble, 
making regional cooperation impossible. Several EU officials have offered responses to 
these criticisms. For these reasons each of the Central Asian countries is specific in nature 
and legitimately anxious to assert its independence. As a result the EU plans to carry out 
three quarters of its projects by way of bilateral cooperation.  
 
The debate is a reflection of the EU’s ongoing uncertainty over the basic question of whether 
Central Asia can be seen as a region. The new strategy paper proposes “a balanced bilateral and 
regional approach,” but so far it is still not clear whether the EU can successfully convince those 
skeptical of its regional approach. 
Germany is the only country among the EU member states that has embassies in all the 
Central Asian states, becoming involved in Central Asia very quickly after independence and being 
within the EU, the largest bilateral donor in Central Asia, playing a leading role in the release of the 
new Central Asia Strategy, which in some ways is driven by several factors, both historic and realist 
in nature.  
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First, approximately one million German-Russians lived in the Central Asian region and after 
the beginning of the Second World War, they were deported from the area where they had settled 
along the Volga river to Central Asia.  
When the states in the south of the former Soviet Union gained independence, the desire to 
immigrate to Germany was awakened in these German-Russians and over two-thirds have since 
made the move49.  
Second, Germany has been an active North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
participant in Afghanistan since 2001, keeping as many as 3,500 troops in Afghanistan, part of a 
larger NATO force of roughly 41,000 in the country. Almost the entire German contingent is based 
in Kabul and other parts of northern Afghanistan, close to the German military base in Termez, 
Uzbekistan.  
The Termez military base is favorable because of its comparatively better infrastructure and 
relative security. As long as Germany keeps its position in the International Security and Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, it will be a priority to maintain good relations with the Uzbek 
government to ensure the continued use of the Termez base.  
Third, among the EU member states, Germany is the Central Asian countries’ chief trading 
partner, especially Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and the Uzbekistan’s fifth most 
important supplier of goods, after Russia, China, South Korea and the United States.  
After a number of difficult years, trade with Germany has picked up again since 2001, 
reaching approx. US$ 300 million in 2011 (an increase of 9 % over the previous year). German 
crude oil imports from Kazakhstan for the period August 2005 - July 2006 amounted to 7.458 
million tonnes (August 2009 - July 2011: 9.459 million tons). As such, Kazakhstan ranks fifth 
among Germany’s sources of oil (total imports for the period August 2009 - July 2011: 213,585 
million tons). 
The Central Asian countries, however, prefer bilateral security relations with the United 
States of America and other NATO members, such as Germany, France, and Netherlands.  
They supported the operations in Afghanistan with military bases for Western forces. 
Germany has an air base with 300 soldiers in Termez (Uzbekistan) while US has an air base in 
Manas (Kyrgyzstan). France had troops in Kyrgyzstan and one logistic centre in Dushanbe 
(Tajikistan), while the Netherlands had an agreement with Kyrgyzstan, allowing the use of Bishkek 
airport by its Air force jets.  
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 See https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/382808/publicationFile/4275/ZentralasienstrategieENG.pdf. Accessed in April 2012. 
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Besides all these reasons, it should be noted that Berlin is frustrated by what it perceives as 
the EU’s failure to address developments in the eastern part of the European continent in a proper 
way50. 
Also the focus on the “northern dimension” by the Scandinavian EU states has failed to 
incorporate Russia and former Soviet Republics into a broader European context and it seems 
Germany feels compelled to take up the role of an advocate for Europe’s eastern neighbors.  
After many years of development assistance, the EU is frustrated by being seen only as an aid 
donor, with a view from Brussels that its effort to influence the CA States is not proportionate to its 
economic contribution and strategic weight. The EU aspires to being an outside player on par with 
Russia, China and the United States.  
The release of the new strategy paper has certainly raised Europe’s visibility to some extent. 
It is unclear, however, what resources the EU could draw on in order to raise its visibility in Central 
Asia in the future. Russia has political, historical and cultural links that help it to maintain its huge 
influence in the region and the markets of the region are awash in Chinese commodities, evidence 
of China’s significant presence. 
As for US, its military bases in the region and involvement in Afghanistan clearly show it 
will to stay in CA region for a long time to come. Other problem regarding visibility is how to 
establish an image for the EU that is distinct from its member states, some of which have already 
been quite visible in the region (as already mentioned the case of Germany).  
If the EU cannot successfully coordinate with its member states, the regional countries will be 
left with images of some European countries, but not of the EU as a whole.  
The EU is not a unitary actor when it comes to foreign policy and major joint decisions need 
unanimity among 27 member states and one could one wonders whether Central Asia as a region 
would continue to garner attention from the EU: France, for example, while attentive to the region, 
is primarily interested in getting EU foreign policy to focus on the Mediterranean.  
Germany, on the other hand, is determined to develop the EU’s relations with its eastern 
neighbors, following a new “Ostpolitik”, Germany wants the EU to have a coherent and 
comprehensive set of policies for the former Soviet Union, including the Central Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether Germany would get sufficient support from other 
member states, providing enough momentum to push the implementation of the new strategy 
forward. Another question is whether the member states can reach a consensus on making a 
favorable human rights record a precondition for development assistance.  
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 See http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/germanys-changing-role-in-central-asia.html. Accessed in April 2012. 
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In fact, during the 1990’s, the EU did link assistance programs with human rights records in 
some countries in the region, but they were not very strong. With the urgent need for an alternative 
supplier of energy, it is very unlikely the EU would want to further strengthen such conditionality. 
According to some political analysts, EU officials privately would “close an eye” on the 
current human rights concerns in order to avoid that it will negatively affect the EU’s pursuit of 
energy supply in the region. In fact, the EU is quietly reviewing the premises of its foreign policy 
posture and is currently involved in a “period of reflection” on the usefulness of sanctions against 
countries such as Uzbekistan. 
 
 
2.9 EU and the Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
Central Asia is confronted by trans-national, regional and national security threats. The main 
trans-national threat derives from Afghanistan in the form of drug trafficking and the risk of conflict 
spilling over as Taliban factions try to get a foothold in Central Asia.  
In Afghanistan, even though the EU is increasingly active in support of SSR, it is not an 
influential player in security issues nor in assistance to SSR as it has been in the Western Balkans, 
or currently in Congo and Georgia.  
As far as SSR goes, the EU has little room to fund or work on genuine SSR projects with a 
strong good governance focus. Nonetheless, Brussels and member states should use the 
opportunities that are available, especially since SSR is the ideal link between the human rights, 
democracy, good governance and rule of law priority it has set out to pursue and the security 
concerns that underpin EU engagement with Central Asia.  
The main programs of ESDP51 consist of police mission (EUPOL) and Commission 
involvement in justice reform. Europe’s SSR support is largely still provided by individual member 
states - especially those that contribute to the ISAF mission - and the EU’s programs are still in 
need of more funding and qualified personnel.  
The main link between EU SSR support to Afghanistan and Central Asia is border control, 
for instance through the Border Management Badakhshan (BOMBAF) that was largely EU funded, 
implemented by UNDP and focused on building three border crossing points on the Tajik-Afghan 
border while training Afghan border guards and providing equipment too.  
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share a border with Afghanistan that is over 2000 
kilometers long and the EU would do well to step up BOMCA work through increased funding, 
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 In December 1998 the French and British governments signed an agreement at St. Malo, which paved the political path for EU governments to 
launch the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999. The St. Malo Declaration stated 
that the European Union ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. 
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bringing in more partners and, in a broader sense, using the BOMCA experience in other parts of 
the security sector such as police or disaster relief.  
The most substantial regional threat facing Central Asia derives from tensions over water 
management. Energy-rich Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lack sufficient water 
resources for irrigation of crops, while mountainous and water-rich Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack 
sufficient fossil fuel resources. Over the past few years tensions have risen between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan in particular. The former plans to construct an enormous dam in the Vakhsh River 
which would enable the Tajiks to generate the electricity they badly need while being able to 
control water flows to Uzbekistan and other countries in the region.  
Uzbekistan fiercely resists Tajik water projects, fearing that it would not have enough water 
to irrigate its extensive cotton fields. Uzbekistan has already on a few occasions restricted the flow 
of gas to Tajikistan. Regional cooperation between the Central Asian countries has not yielded 
substantial results, and international organizations and important powers such as Russia, the EU and 
the US have been reluctant to get involved in regional disputes over water resources.  
With climate change having a further negative effect on available water resources, the risk of 
regional conflict rises, especially between Uzbekistan and its water-rich though devastatingly poor 
Tajik and Kyrgyz neighbors. The EU is involved in water management issues through an Initiative 
on Environment and Water which is aimed at donor coordination.  
A large water governance project is one of the key projects the EU is implementing, although 
unfortunately Uzbekistan is not included.  
Although maybe not directly SSR related, the EU engagement in good governance on topics 
that have a clear security bearing is crucial to the implementation of the security-oriented Strategy 
for the region. Lastly, the countries of the region deal with internal instability to different extents. 
Moreover, at first sight all five regimes seem to have a strong grip on power. However, strong 
presidential regimes or authoritarianism are no guarantee for staying in power as became clear in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2005 when President Akayev was ousted by frustrated elites in favor of current 
President Bakiyev.  
Also it is unclear whether power transitions as a result of a leader’s sudden death will always 
run as smoothly as in Turkmenistan following Niazov’s death in December 2006. Disloyal political 
and business elites, the poor and disillusioned populations as well as radical Islamic groups can all 
threaten the status quo in Central Asian republics.  
These factors provide reason enough for Central Asian leaders to have strong intelligence 
services that can detect potential threats in time, or internal security forces that can quell unrest if 
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necessary. An extreme example of when such services were deployed was the situation that arose in 
the Uzbek city of Andjion in 2004, where hundreds of protesters were massacred.  
In this sense SSR, if understood by Central Asian leaders as contributing to democratic 
reform of security structures, is likely to be considered a threat to the regime.  
Although all five Central Asian states have strong presidential regimes there are substantial 
differences between the leaderships, the conditions they work in, the level of freedom and the 
possibilities for reform.  
In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there might be interest in EU-supported small scale 
projects on SSR that touch on governance and even democratization aspects. Large overhaul 
projects are unlikely but smaller civil society driven projects, with support through EIDHR, the Non 
State Actors/Local Authorities in Development program and especially through EU national 
government funding.  
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are dim for EU involvement in SSR and 
governance support, but the EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO, which upholds 
reasonably positive diplomatic and military contacts with these countries.  
Yet, radical Islam is characterized by most Central Asian governments as internal security 
threat number one. Until now the EU has been wary of initiating EU-Central Asia exchanges of 
experience in working on and with moderate Islamic groups on society-related issues, including 
security.  
In the EU-Central Asia Strategy the final priority outlined is ‘Building Bridges and inter-
cultural dialogue’. Again, although not directly related to SSR, both moderate and radical Islam are 
societal forces to be reckoned with; the former to build a dialogue with, the latter, if violent, to 
address through security services. 
Still, only a little of the EU’s technical assistance through the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) - the two 
main EU assistance instruments that apply to Central Asia - can be regarded as Security Sector 
Reform assistance.  
However, some initiatives, such as a project on human rights awareness in the Kyrgyz police 
forces or assistance to judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are part and parcel of SSR, 
although maybe not presented directly in this way by Brussels. The EU Instrument for Stability 
(IfS) that would be suitable for SSR work until now barely applies to Central Asia.  
Although the EU does not have a SSR strategy for Central Asia, it has become one of the 
foremost international donors and promoters of SSR through Commission funding and long-term 
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projects and EU Council driven European Security and defense (ESDP) missions in Afghanistan, 
Africa, the Balkans, South Caucasus and the Middle East.  
The main focus of EU SSR is on police forces, border guards and the judiciary, generally 
excluding reform of the military.  
The EU sees SSR as a tool that can help reach broad objectives of the Union’s external and 
security policies such as poverty reduction and strengthening human rights, democracy, good 
governance and rule of law. Finally, Brussels devotes attention to SSR in fragile states as outlined 
in the new EU Security Strategy. 
With no ESDP missions active in a region beset by a range of security challenges, it would 
make sense for the Special Representative to discuss possible EU-Central Asia cooperation on SSR 
in his regular meetings with Central Asian political elites. Security structures in Central Asia are 
characterized by a lack of training and resources (the Armed Forces in particular), corruption (for 
example in the police forces) and absence of oversight mechanisms besides presidential power 
(internal security forces and intelligence come to mind).  
It is unlikely that EU would receive any interest from Turkmen and Uzbek authorities but it 
might find an opening for cooperation in the somewhat more liberal regimes of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
A final aspect of EU engagement in SSR in Central Asia can be related to the OSCE and 
NATO due to the large overlap of membership and both regional security organizations’ activities 
in Central Asia.  
Cooperation between the EU and NATO is limited in Central Asia and non-existent when it 
comes to SSR. All five countries are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), but only 
Kazakhstan is actively engaged in SSR activities through the Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP) that it agreed with NATO and which incorporates aspects of security-related reform of 
armed forces and oversight mechanisms.  
Kazakhstan also participates in the PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan – Defense Institution 
Building) initiative in which NATO liaises with partners from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus 
and Kazakhstan on good governance of the defense sector.  
While NATO holds consultations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on defense and security 
sector reform, but is not directly involved through substantial cooperation or assistance 
programming, OSCE is an interesting partner for the EU in Central Asia in terms of SSR activities.  
OSCE has a presence in all five countries and has broad experience of ‘doing’ SSR, both 
through the politico-military and human dimensions. Over 70 per cent of the OSCE budget is 
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funded by EU member states, most of them in full support of OSCE field missions, although the 
OSCE centers in Central Asia only have small budgets.  
One way for the EU to step up support for SSR in Central Asia would be to provide so-called 
“extra budgetary support” to projects that can be implemented by the OSCE; this would be 
advantageous since Central Asian countries themselves are members of the OSCE and thus have a 
stake in the defining and implementation of SSR activities.  
Although some Central Asian countries, particularly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, would be 
unwilling to have the OSCE work on democratization of the security sector, the other three states 
are more open to this. But there are also less sensitive SSR related issues the OSCE works on in 
Central Asia, such as police and border guard training.  
These are areas where the EU and OSCE need to carefully coordinate and cooperate since the 
EU also tends to focus on these areas in support of SSR. In that sense close cooperation is expected 
between the EU BOMCA project and the newly opened Border Management Staff Office in 
Dushanbe. 
In conclusion, a strong EU involvement including a unified vision in support of Security 
Sector Reform in Central Asia is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The political landscape in 
Central Asia is largely not receptive to key aspects of SSR such as democratic control of armed 
forces and other state security institutions through the power ministries, the parliament and civil 
society.  
Although the EU Strategy’s underlying theme is based on security, it would be worthwhile to 
look into ways of feeding SSR aspects into the political dialogue between the EU and Central Asian 
republics.  
In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there might be interest in EU supported projects on 
SSR. The EU and its member states could increasingly look into possibilities of supporting SSR 
projects implemented by local and international civil society organisations, also in cooperation with 
the governments of the three countries.  
In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are largely absent for a substantial EU 
involvement in SSR that goes beyond current work in BOMCA. Nonetheless, the EU should make 
an effort to closely liaise with NATO and the OSCE, also in practical terms through small 
awareness-raising exercises. 
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2.10 Conclusion: the way forward 
The implementation of a new Central Asia Strategy is well under way by EU institutions and 
the past year has seen a significant intensification of political dialogue and practical cooperation 
between the EU and Central Asia. With high expectations in Central Asia and increasing relevance 
of Strategy priority areas such as energy diversification, the fight against drugs, or the impact of 
climate change on the environment, it is crucial that the current pace of implementation be 
maintained by EU.  
New EU Member States have an important role to contribute to EU-Central Asia relations, 
given their own transformation experiences, like in the field of Rule of Law. A number of Member 
States are also actively engaging and are providing significant levels of assistance for the countries 
of Central Asia.  
Nevertheless, to support the realization of larger-scale projects of interest for the EU and 
Central Asia, is also a priority of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), with the clear scope 
of financing new projects.  
The most important challenge in the years to come will be maintaining the political 
momentum created over the last year, namely through reinforced coordination between the EU 
institutions and Member States, greater EU visibility in the region, increased financial resources and 
active involvement as well as contributions from Central Asian countries that are all essential for 
delivering on the ambitious goals of the new Strategy52.  
The EU is aiming to make further substantial progress in all priority areas of the Strategy. A 
greater effort should be made to promote human rights and democratization and to ensure active 
involvement of civil society, Parliaments, local authorities and other actors in the monitoring and 
implementation of the Strategy.  
The EU will continue work on establishing or upgrading Human Rights dialogues with all 
Central Asian countries and in the field of education, the Central Asia Research and Education 
Network (E–Silk–Highway) should get underway and supported by a broad exchange between 
European and Central Asian educational institutions.  
In the field of Rule of Law, solid cooperation should continue addressing key areas of 
legislation and the judicial system. In the field of environment and water, the EU should be 
supporting a dynamic political process with the aim of putting an integrated regional resource 
management system in place.  
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 Source: www.eurpe.eu., the Europe 2020 is the EU’s growth strategy for the coming decade. In a changing world, Member States want the EU to 
become sustainable and inclusive economy. These three mutually reinforcing priorities should help the EU and the Member States deliver high levels 
of employment, productivity and social cohesion. Concretely, the Union has set five ambitious objectives - on employment, innovation, education, 
social inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached by 2020. Each Member State has adopted its own national targets in each of these areas. Concrete 
actions at EU and national levels underpin the strategy. Accessed in June 2012 
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In the field of common challenges, the EU should continue to play an active role in 
stakeholder coordination on drugs and borders and contribute to reaching tangible results on 
reducing drug trafficking and enhancing border management in Central Asia.  
Finally, the EU will also have to develop further the dialogue started with other regional 
organizations active in the region, with an aim for its part to engage in concrete cooperation on 
Central Asia, especially in the fields of border and water management, as well as the fight against 
drug trafficking and trans- border crime. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE NATO STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE C.A. REGION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sorce: www.nato.int, accessed in December 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
90 
3.1 An overview of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO)  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, 
and several Western European nations in common agreement to provide collective security against 
the Soviet Union. In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom recognized to 
consider attack against one an attack against all, a prospect that led to the treaty’s most famous 
provision, Article V1. 
Today, the Alliance consists of 28 independent member countries and after than sixty years 
later, the threats facing the alliance’s members have changed considerably.  
NATO member states share common interests in preventing disruptions to the global 
economy, fostering stability across Europe by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly 
communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans2. 
In the 2000’s, NATO has broadened its scope through the mission in Afghanistan as well as a 
counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and 
off the Horn of Africa. 
At Summit in Lisbon in 2010, Allied leaders declared that NATO’s partnerships “can provide 
frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation in the field of security and defense, 
contribute to strengthening Allied common values and essential are the success of the current 
operations and missions.”  
A focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy was launched at Lisbon, with a view 
to making dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. 
Following up on the Lisbon decisions, a new partnership policy was endorsed by NATO 
foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011. 
The new policy aims to reinforce NATO’s existing partnerships by strengthening consultation 
mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy 
outlines a “toolbox” of mechanisms and activities, simplifying the way that NATO develops 
cooperation offers to partners. 
In line with the new Strategic Concept3, NATO offers its partners “more political engagement 
with the Alliance and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations 
to which they contribute.  
                                               
1
 Soruce: NATO website, www.nato.int, accessed June 2012. 
2
 BARNET, M., Peace-building: What is in a name? Global Governance, a review of Multilateralism and International Organization, 2003, Vol. 13, 
p. 38. 
3
 Source: NATO website, www.nato.int, the NATO Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and 
its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach 
to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces based on the changed environment. Accessed in July 2012. 
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NATO is also prepared to widen its engagement to develop political dialogue and practical 
cooperation with key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe that share the 
Allies’ interest in peaceful international relations but have no partnership program with NATO4.  
The Alliance also engages actively with other international actors and organizations on 
defense and security-related issues, and is seeking to deepen this cooperation as for the Central Asia 
States5. 
The complexity of today’s peace-support and stabilization operations and the multi-faceted 
nature of 21st century security challenges call for a comprehensive approach6 that effectively 
combines political, civilian and military instruments. 
NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with non-member countries on a wide 
range of political and security-related issues, and partners contribute to NATO’s goals and tasks, 
including to NATO-led operations and its actions against terrorism and emerging security 
challenges. 
In the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance engages in relations with non-member countries 
through the 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a 
major program of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these 
partners, NATO has also developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and 
Central Asia States. 
NATO is developing relations with the southern Mediterranean-rim countries through the 
Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as with countries from the Gulf region through the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative7. 
In addition to these more structured partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries 
which are not part of these structures. Formally referred to as “partners across the globe”, including 
Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia. 
Under the new partnership policy, the strategic objectives of NATO’s partner relations are to: 
- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability; 
- Promote regional security and cooperation; 
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 “Our new policy recognizes that in today's world we need cooperative security if we are to accomplish our security tasks.  And to that end we want 
to reach out to major players across the globe,” said NATO’s Secretary General after the Berlin meeting. Source: NATO website accessed in July 
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5
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- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including 
international efforts to meet emerging security challenges; 
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership; 
- Promote democratic values and reforms; 
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions; 
- Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a 
view to preventing crises; 
Within these strategic objectives for partnership, dialogue, consultation and cooperation, 
NATO prioritizes in the following areas: 
- Political consultations on security developments, as appropriate, including regional 
issues, in particular with a view to preventing crises and contributing to their 
management; 
- Cooperation in NATO-led operations and missions; 
- Defense reform, capability and capacity building, education and training; 
- Interoperability; 
- Counter-terrorism; 
- Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 
- Emerging security challenges, including related to cyber-defense, energy security and 
maritime security, including counter-piracy; 
- Civil emergency planning; 
- better engage with partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security, and 
reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical 
cooperation; 
While respecting the specificity of existing partnership frameworks, all partners are offered 
access to the whole spectrum of partnership activities NATO offers. All partners with which NATO 
has an individual program of cooperation  (whether they are Euro-Atlantic partners, or partners in 
the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or global partners) have access 
to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu8, which comprises some 1600 activities. 
NATO further develop the “28+n” formula as a mechanism to provide more flexible formats 
for meetings and, as appropriate, activities which brings NATO and partners together, across and 
beyond existing frameworks.  
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A  meeting “28+n” meeting was held at NATO Headquarters in September 2011 to discuss 
counter-piracy, involving representatives from 47 nations and organizations involved in counter-
piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.  
In terms of widening NATO’s engagement to key global actors and other new interlocutors 
with which NATO does not have formal partnership arrangement, NATO is prepared to develop 
political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation across the globe that shares its interest 
in peaceful international relations.  
These new interlocutors may include countries such as China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Colombia or Brazil. 
Allies also decided at Lisbon to review the Political-Military Framework that governs the 
way NATO involves partners in political consultation and the decision process for the operations 
and missions to which they contribute. At Berlin summit, NATO foreign ministers endorsed 
proposals for the establishment of a more structured role for NATO’s operational partners in 
shaping the strategy of NATO-led operations to which they contribute. 
Since the 1990’s, NATO has developed close working relations with the United Nations 
(UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). This is an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing transformation to address effectively the 
complex challenges of crisis management, as well as terrorism and emerging security challenges 
such as the proliferation of weapons, cyber security, energy security and piracy9. 
The Alliance is also developing cooperation in specific areas with a number of other 
international and non-governmental organizations, including the African Union, Central Asia 
States10, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for 
Migration, the World Bank, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
NATO is committed to pursuing efforts towards enhancing its relations with other relevant 
international organizations in accordance with the Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Summit 
Declaration, and the action plan for the Comprehensive Approach.  
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3.2 NATO Strategic Concept 
Since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO’s 
strategic thinking has evolved, the Cold War period, the immediate post-Cold War period and the 
security environment since 9/11. 
One could say that from 1949 to 1991, NATO’s strategy was principally characterized by 
defense and deterrence, although with growing attention to dialogue for the last two decades of this 
period. From 1991 a broader approach was adopted where the notions of cooperation and security 
complemented the basic concepts of deterrence and defense11. 
From 1949 until the end of the Cold War, there were four Strategic Concepts, accompanied 
by documents that laid out the measures for the military to implement the Strategic Concept, while 
in the post-Cold War period, three unclassified Strategic Concepts have been issued, complemented 
by classified military documents. 
Since the terrorist attacks12 of 9/11, NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy have 
given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
Indeed, NATO has committed troops beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and reached a membership of 
28, because of new threats have emerged such as energy security and cyber-attacks.  
These are among the factors that brought Allied leaders to produce a new Strategic Concept: 
From 1949 to 1991, the International Relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between 
East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than it was on dialogue 
and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race13.  
The immediate post-Cold War period, 1991, a new era commenced and the formidable enemy 
that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved and Russia, together with other former 
adversaries, became NATO partners and in some case NATO members (Poland, Hungary and so 
on). For the Alliance, the period was characterized by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other 
new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations. 
NATO’s second unclassified Strategic Concept, 1999, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, 
Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defense and 
peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security 
which recognized the importance of political14, economic, social and environmental factors in 
addition to the defense dimension.  
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It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included 
terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the 
spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. 
The document stated that the Alliance’s fundamental tasks were security, consultation, and 
deterrence and defense, adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to 
enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It noted that NATO had managed to 
adapt and play an important role in the post-Cold War environment, and established guidelines for 
the Alliance’s forces, translating the purposes and tasks of the preceding sections into practical 
instructions for NATO force and operational planners.  
The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the 
full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defense to peace support and other crisis-
response operations. It also stipulated that the Alliance would maintain for the foreseeable future an 
appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. 
The security environment since 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought the 
threat of terrorism15 and weapons of mass destruction to the fore. NATO needed to protect its 
populations both at home and abroad, therefore underwent major internal reforms to adapt military 
structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks, such as leading the UN-mandated 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 
NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its 
transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to 
respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world. 
These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO’s strategic documents as a first step in 
that direction was taken in November 2006 when NATO leaders endorsed the “Comprehensive 
Political Guidance”.  
This is a major policy document that sets out the framework and priorities for all Alliance 
capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years and analyses the 
probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. 
Against that analysis, it sets out the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform in light 
of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and the kinds of capabilities the Alliance need. 
Later, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 200916, NATO leaders endorsed the 
“Declaration on Alliance Security” which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept.  
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This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the 
economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, re-prioritizing and reforming 
NATO.  
The 2010 Strategic Concept was issued in Lisbon that basically equips the Alliance for 
security challenges and guides its future political and military development and reflects a 
transformed security environment and a transformed Alliance.  
New and emerging security threats, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO’s crisis 
management experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the value and importance of working 
with partners from across the globe, all drove NATO to reassess and review its strategic posture in 
view of the evolution of the strategic environment17.  
After having described NATO as “a unique community of values committed to the principles 
of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, one can affirm that NATO’s 
three essential core tasks are collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security.  
Yet, the Strategic Concept also affirms how NATO aims to promote international security 
through cooperation, reinforce arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, 
emphasizing NATO’s open door policy for all European countries and significantly enhancing its 
partnerships in the broad sense of the term.  
 
 
3.3 The NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
The Alliance seeks to foster security, stability and democratic transformation across the Euro-
Atlantic area by engaging in partnership through dialogue and cooperation with non-member 
countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia18. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership is underpinned 
by two key mechanisms: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) program. 
The 50-nation EAPC19 brings together the 28 Allies and 22 Partner countries in a multilateral 
forum for dialogue and consultation, and provides the overall political framework for NATO’s 
cooperation with Partner countries. 
The PfP program facilitates practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner 
countries and NATO, tailored according to the specific ambitions, needs and abilities of each 
Partner. 
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NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which was approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 
2010, states that the EAPC and the PfP program are central to the Allies vision of a Europe whole, 
free and at peace. At Lisbon, Allied leaders reiterated their commitment to further develop the 
EAPC/PfP as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, 
including enhanced military interoperability, and that they would continue to develop policy 
initiatives within this framework. 
Three priorities underpin cooperation with Partners: 
- Dialogue and consultations; 
- Building capabilities and strengthening interoperability and supporting reform. 
After having reiterated NATO’s enduring purpose and key values and principles, the 
Strategic Concept highlights the Organization’s core tasks. 
The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the 
security of NATO’s territory and populations and to assure their security, the Alliance must and will 
continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding 
Alliance members and always in accordance with international law: 
- Collective defense, in which NATO members will always assist each other against 
attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO will deter and 
defend against any threat of aggression and against emerging security challenges where 
they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. 
- Crisis Management, in which NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military 
capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises - before, during and after conflicts. 
NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to 
help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before 
they escalate into conflicts. 
- Cooperative security, in which the Alliance is affected by and can affect, political and 
security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance 
international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international 
organizations. This is through the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament and 
by keeping the door of membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies 
that meet NATO’s standards. 
Nowadays, NATO is adopting a holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging NATO 
involvement at all stages of a crisis, encouraging a greater number of actors to participate and 
coordinate their efforts and is considering a broader range of tools to be more effective across the 
crisis management spectrum.  
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At the root of this cooperation is the principle of seeking security “at the lowest possible level 
of forces” by supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. A fundamental 
component of its cooperative approach to security is partnership, understood between NATO and 
non-NATO countries, as well as with other international organizations and actors20.  
Activities under the EAPC and PfP are set out in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan 
and this is a catalogue of around 1600 activities covering over 30 areas of cooperation, ranging 
from arms control, through language training, foreign and security policy, and military geography. 
The EAPC and the PfP program have steadily developed their own dynamic, as successive 
steps have been taken by NATO and its Partner countries to extend security cooperation, building 
on the partnership arrangements they have created. 
As NATO has transformed over the years to meet the new challenges of the evolving security 
environment, Partner countries are engaged with NATO in tackling 21st century security challenges, 
including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The ways and means of cooperation developed under NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
have proven to be of mutual benefit to Allies and Partners, and have helped promote stability. The 
mechanisms and programs for cooperation developed under EAPC/PfP are also being used as the 
basis to extend cooperation to other non-member countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. 
 
 
3.4 NATO and the C.A. States’ cooperation 
NATO has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policy of cooperation and assistance 
toward Central States, driven primarily by the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and 
by its Strategic Concept in providing extensive resources and expertise to CA States in a variety of 
areas, including humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-
narcotic programs, and infrastructure projects.  
A further instrument handle by NATO in providing cooperation is the NATO - Russia 
Council (NRC), which represents another forum in which pilot project for counter-narcotics training 
of Afghan and Central Asian personnel has been launched in December 2005 to help address the 
threats posed by the trafficking of narcotics in Afghan and CA States.  
It seeks to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by 
sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid-level officers from Afghanistan, 
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Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan21. Pakistan became the 
seventh participating county in 2010. 
The project is being implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), it represents a joint endeavor of many NRC nations - Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States - and Finland (since 2007) together with the project’s beneficiary countries22. 
Fixed training takes place in one of four institutes either in Turkey, Russia or the United 
States and mobile courses are being conducted in each of the six participating countries. At the 
Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed to expand the scope of the project to provide further direct 
assistance to institutional capacity building in the future, hence by April 2012, some 2000 officers 
had been trained under the NRC project. 
 
 
3.4.1 NATO and Kazakhstan cooperation 
NATO-Kazakhstan relations began in 1992, when Kazakhstan joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) and the 
cooperation increased by Kazakhstan joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995.  
In 2002, Kazakhstan joined the PfP PARP and the main focus was on supporting 
Kazakhstan’s domestic reform processes. 
NATO and Kazakhstan actively cooperate on democratic, institutional, and defense reforms, 
having developed practical cooperation in many other areas. The Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP) lays out the overall program of cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO.  
Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
The NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia conducts 
high-level political dialogue with Kazakh authorities through regular visits to the country.  
NATO and Kazakhstan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the 
country’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), setting out reform plans and timelines in 
IPAP, which is agreed for a two-year period 2010-12 and completing the second cycle of the IPAP 
2008-2010 and is currently developing a third cycle action plan in consultation with NATO: The 
IPAP covers key areas to include political, military and security-sector reforms23. 
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Kazakhstan also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other 
areas through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
tailoring its own participation in the PfP program through an annual Individual Partnership 
Program, selecting those activities that will help achieve the goals it has set in the IPAP. 
Another area of tight cooperation is the Security sector, in which Kazakhstan has allocated an 
air assault battalion as a peacekeeping battalion for potential deployment in NATO-led peace 
support operations, under UN Security Council mandates. Elements of the Peacekeeping battalion 
have joined NATO Allies in a number of live exercises.  
The defense - related fields of cooperation are supported by the Planning and Review Process 
(PARP), in this framework, one of the major projects is the expansion of this force into a brigade 
structure (KAZBRIG), giving Kazakhstan the capability to sustain a battalion size contribution 
through rotation. 
Kazakhstan, along with Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Belarus, completed an agreement 
with NATO in 2010 allowing the transportation of non-lethal ISAF cargo to Afghanistan by rail, the 
first trial shipment was successfully completed in June 2010 and regular shipments are now 
ongoing24. 
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Kazakhstan plays an active role in both hosting and participating in PfP training and 
exercises, establishing a PfP regional training centre and continuing to work with Allies and 
regional partners in military and language training techniques. 
Kazakhstan contributes to the fight against terrorism through its participation in the 
Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, 
enhancing national counter-terrorist capabilities and improving border security. 
NATO and Kazakhstan have hosted major military exercises, named “Steppe Eagle”, yearly 
since 2006, contributing to strengthen the interoperability of KAZBRIG with Alliance forces.  
On the Security Sector Reform, NATO is supportive of the democratic and institutional 
reform process underway in Kazakhstan, which is outlined in its IPAP, contributing a considerable 
expertise that Kazakhstan can draw upon. 
In consultation with the Allies, Kazakhstan continues to lay the conceptual framework for 
defense and security sector reform and in advancing key reform projects within the Ministry of 
Defense. Kazakhstan’s subscription to the objectives of the Partnership Action Plan on Defense 
Institution Building initiative (PAP-DIB) is reinforcing these efforts.  
Kazakhstan’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 2002 has 
helped in developing the ability of its forces to work with NATO through interoperability, giving 
also emphasis on its Air-Mobile Forces.  
Moreover, NATO and Kazakhstan have been cooperating to the Civil emergency planning, 
enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities through an active role 
of participation in activities organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre 
(EADRCC). 
To further develop cooperation in this area, Kazakhstan appointed a representative to the 
EADRCC in 2008. In 2009, the country hosted the EADRCC “ZHETYSU” exercise near Almaty. 
Along with mentioned areas of cooperation, NATO and Kazakhstan have been developing 
tight relations on the Science and environment, in which the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
Program, has received grant awards for over 20 cooperative projects for collaborate scientific and 
environmental projects.  
Projects include collaboration on studies into radiological risks in Central Asia, integrated 
water resources management and new technology exploration for seismic resistant construction. In 
total, scientists and experts from Kazakhstan have had leading roles in 82 activities. 
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Kazakhstan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to improve 
internet access for academics and research communities in the countries of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia through a satellite-based network. 
In October 2009, participants from Kazakhstan attended an advanced training course on 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through enhanced border security, in 
May 2010, scientists and engineers from Kazakhstan, as well as other countries from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed 
to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen 
the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region. 
A very interesting area of cooperation and development between Kazakhstan and NATO is 
the Public information, where increasing the public awareness of NATO and the benefits of its 
relations with Kazakhstan is also an important tool to enhance the area of cooperation in Central 
Asia.  
A joint NATO-Kazakhstan workshop was conducted to contribute to training the Kazakh 
press and public information officials since 2007 and the Resource and Information Centre on 
NATO, at the Al Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, which opened in 2007, hosts a 
number of NATO-themed events and visits from NATO representatives annually.  
In addition, a NATO Depository Library was inaugurated in Astana in 2008, establishing a 
wider public information strategy. 
Moreover, in every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as 
a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies 
of the Alliance.  
 
 
3.4.2 NATO and Kirgizstan cooperation 
Kyrgyzstan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 (later renamed the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). The country joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, to 
work alongside the Allies in areas where bilateral aims converge. Since PfP accession, Kyrgyzstan 
has participated in a number of PfP exercises, with a special focus on command and control, civil-
emergency planning and civil-military cooperation. 
The Kyrgyz Republic cooperates with NATO within the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO and Kyrgyzstan have developed practical cooperation in many 
areas, with the goal of enhancing regional and global security. The Individual Partnership 
Cooperation Program (IPCP) lays out the program of cooperation between NATO and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
and the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
conducts high-level political dialogue with Kyrgyz authorities, along with the NATO Liaison 
Officer in Central Asia in Bishkek reviews cooperation with the government. 
NATO and Kyrgyzstan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the 
country’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), which is jointly agreed each year, 
where the key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation, 
border security, crisis management and civil emergency planning. 
The country joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 2007 to work more 
closely with the Allies on military interoperability and defense planning initiatives, with objectives 
underpinned by a set of tailored Partnership Goals. 
Kyrgyzstan attends all the meeting on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is taking place in expanded format at the NATO Summit in Chicago 
in May 2012, while in the security cooperation, it can be added that Kyrgyzstan participates in 
numerous PfP exercises, identifying a number of units as available for NATO/PfP operations and 
training exercises.  
NATO and Kyrgyzstan have developed recently an agreement on the transit of surface (rail 
and road) cargo for ISAF across Kyrgyz territory. 
On the Defense and Security Sector Reform, Kyrgyzstan is in the process of reforming its 
armed forces and through the PARP, which Kyrgyzstan joined in 2007, has the potential to further 
assist the government in developing reform plans and activities.  
These reforms could also enhance Kyrgyzstan’s ability to take part in peacekeeping 
operations alongside NATO forces. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is working to enhance its military 
education which plays a role in these processes and cooperation, covering a wide range of areas, 
including language training, search and rescue education and training, border security and control, 
and the law of armed conflicts and human rights25. 
Kyrgyzstan also participates in a NATO-supported retraining program for released military 
personnel, with the clear goal of cushioning the socio-economic consequences of the country’s 
restructuring armed forces, facilitating the re-entry of former military personnel into the civilian job 
market. 
As far as the Civil emergency planning is concerned, this is a key area of cooperation for 
Kyrgyzstan and NATO, improving its effectiveness in responding to natural disasters and 
emergency situations and Kyrgyzstan seems to be particularly interested in relevant scientific and 
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technical cooperation of the mechanisms available through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 
Coordination Centre (EADRCC). 
Also Kyrgyzstan is interested in Science and environment development, indeed, scientists 
from Kyrgyzstan have received grant awards in a range of subject areas under NATO’s Science for 
Peace and Security (SPS) program, working alongside of experts from Belgium, Russia and the 
Slovak Republic, on a project to prevent landslide dam disasters in the Tien Shan, a mountainous 
region in the Kyrgyz Republic prone to major earthquakes and vulnerable to landslides. 
In addition, scientists from the Kyrgyz Republic, United Kingdom, Italy and Uzbekistan have 
been working together on a project aimed at increasing geo-environmental security in the region of 
Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station.  
Kyrgyzstan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to increase 
internet access for academic and research communities in countries of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia through a satellite-based network, in September 2008, participants from Kyrgyzstan attended 
an advanced training course on the concept and parameters of the use of force in countering 
terrorism.  
In May 2010, scientists and engineers from Kyrgyzstan, as well as other countries from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed 
to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen 
the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region. In total, 
scientists and experts from the Kyrgyz Republic have had leading roles in 49 activities under the 
SPS program. 
Last, but not least, Public information continues to be a very import filed of cooperation 
between Kyrgyzstan and NATO, increasing public understanding of NATO and the benefits of 
cooperation. This is done through different strands of activities, including visits to NATO 
Headquarters, international workshops in Kyrgyzstan, and video conferences between NATO and 
Kyrgyz academic institutions.  
Work is ongoing to build and enhance networks with universities, non-governmental 
organizations and the press and media in order to increase awareness of the Alliance and Euro-
Atlantic security issues in general.  
NATO supports educational activities relevant to security and defense issues and is working 
with Kyrgyzstan to increase public access to NATO and security-related documents. To this end, 
NATO and Kyrgyzstan opened a NATO Depository Library at the Diplomatic Academy in Bishkek 
in February 2009. 
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In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact 
point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the 
Alliance and the current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Kyrgyzstan is the embassy of Germany. 
 
 
3.4.3 NATO and Uzbekistan cooperation 
NATO-Uzbekistan relations began in 1992, when Uzbekistan joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) and further 
relations were developed in 1994, when Uzbekistan signed up to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program and in 2002, when the country acceded to the Planning and Review Process (PARP). 
NATO and Uzbekistan are actively developing practical cooperation and the Alliance 
appreciates the country’s attendance at Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meetings and its 
engagement in discussions with Allies and partners.  
Defense-related fields of cooperation are being carried out through the Planning and Review 
Process, which Uzbekistan joined in 2002, while other areas of practical cooperation include 
education, training of personnel, civil emergency planning and science.  
In 2008, Uzbekistan and NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program reached an 
agreement to convert several tons of toxic mélange into a harmless chemical and the conversion 
process was successfully completed during the summer of 2010. 
Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
and the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
conducts high-level political dialogue with Uzbek authorities through regular visits and meetings to 
the country. Also the NATO Liaison Officer in Central Asia tightly cooperates with Tashkent and 
on regularly basis support the Ministry of Defense on planning and doctrine related-issues. 
Under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, NATO and Uzbekistan have been developing 
different practical activities in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership 
Program (IPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). 
Form 2002, with regards to the Security cooperation, Uzbekistan has been playing a key role 
in supporting Allied operations in Afghanistan, allowing Germany the use of its airfield at Termez 
and permitting over-flights and transit permission for Allied forces and supplies. Yet, Uzbekistan 
continues to be a main transit route for humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan, the majority of which 
is delivered via the Hairaton Bridge26.  
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Specialists from Uzbekistan have also assisted in implementing tangible infrastructure 
projects in Afghanistan, including the reconstruction of ten bridges connecting the northern part of 
the country with Kabul. 
Also Uzbekistan, along with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, made an agreement 
with NATO in order to allow the transportation of non-lethal ISAF cargo to Afghanistan by rail. As 
far as Defense and Security Sector Reform are concerned, NATO supports the institutional reform 
processes undertaken by Uzbekistan, with particular attention to the reform of the Armed Forces. 
Uzbekistan’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 2002 aims 
at attaining interoperability between elements of its armed forces and those of NATO Allies. While 
there was a pause in PARP cooperation following the events in Andijan in 2005, but Uzbekistan 
reaffirmed its participation in the program from 2010 onwards. 
Along with several other countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan has received counter-terrorism 
training through NATO-funded courses and in May 2010, officials from Uzbekistan attended an 
Advanced Training Course, funded through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program, to 
learn the latest counter-terrorism methods and strategies.  
Uzbekistan has also benefited from counter-narcotics training, hence Uzbek officers were 
able to put to use the counter-narcotics training they received through an initiative of the NATO-
Russia Council, when they seized nearly 600 kilograms of heroin that was being smuggled through 
the country. 
Uzbekistan continues to participate in seminars and workshops on defense policy and strategy 
within the PfP framework, as well as military education of Uzbek officers, with an emphasis on 
English language training.  
Finally, on Civil emergency planning  and disaster-relief cooperation, Uzbekistan has 
significant areas of cooperation, hosting  the first EAPC exercise held in Central Asia in April 2003, 
so called Exercise “Ferghana 2003”, in which was simulated an international response to a major 
earthquake in the region. 
On the Science and environment, Uzbekistan is enhancing the Science for Peace and Security 
(SPS) Program and the local authority has received grant awards for over 50 projects for scientific 
and environmental collaboration, while scientists and experts from Uzbekistan have had leading 
roles in 164 activities. 
In May 2010, scientists and engineers from Uzbekistan, as well as other countries from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed 
to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen 
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the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region. Also 
Uzbekistan participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project. 
The process of supporting Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms27 intensified, and the country’s role 
in PfP activities continued to increase. While Uzbekistan-NATO relations declined to some extent 
following the events in Andijan in 2005, currently NATO and Uzbekistan engage in regular 
dialogue through the EAPC, and are actively redeveloping cooperation in a number of specific 
fields. 
 
 
3.4.4 NATO and Turkmenistan cooperation 
NATO’s relations with Turkmenistan have to be viewed through the Partnership for Peace 
framework, which Turkmenistan joined in 1994. Turkmenistan adheres to a policy of permanent 
neutrality and does not offer any armed forces units or infrastructure for use in the context of 
NATO-led operations. 
NATO and Turkmenistan have been actively cooperating in security-related, science and 
environmental issues and other areas and an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) 
lays out the program of cooperation between NATO and Turkmenistan. 
Regular political dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) and even in this case, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for 
the Caucasus and Central Asia and the NATO Liaison Officer conduct high-level political dialogue 
with Turkmen authorities28. 
NATO and Turkmenistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through 
the country’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), aiming at introducing and 
familiarizing Turkmen personnel with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) issues, as well as 
enhancing deepening cooperation in areas such as border control and security, civil emergency 
planning, and defense planning.  
Based on its policy of permanent neutrality, Turkmenistan does not offer any armed forces 
units or infrastructure in the context of NATO-led operations, however, Turkmenistan is willing to 
contribute to disaster relief, humanitarian and search and rescue operations. 
Every year, officials from Turkmenistan’s armed forces participate in a range of courses 
provided by NATO and NATO member states, covering topics as arms control, disarmament and 
non-proliferation, the law of armed conflicts, courses aimed at familiarizing officers with combating 
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terrorism techniques and illegal trafficking issues, border security and control, defense planning and 
budgeting, language training, medical services and other areas. 
In the case of trafficking, in particular, Turkmenistan has worked with NATO to address 
several of these issues and since 2006, Turkmenistan has sent numerous personnel to attend counter 
narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council. 
Civil emergency planning and disaster-relief coordination are key areas of cooperation 
between Turkmenistan and NATO in preparing Turkmenistan’s units to contribute to international 
disaster relief operations.  
To assist Turkmenistan with its intention of establishing a Ministry of Emergency Situations, 
NATO has held a number of seminars on civilian emergency planning in Ashgabat since 2009.  
Since its involvement with NATO’s science activities began in 1996, Turkmenistan scientists 
and experts have participated in over 30 activities, under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
Program, receiving grant awards for over 8 cooperative projects for scientific, environmental and 
educational collaboration. 
These collaborative projects include studies into radiological risks and the safe handling of 
radioactive waste in Central Asia, oil spill risk prevention and pollution in the South Caspian Sea 
and strategic management of sensitive natural resources. 
As part of a networking project, teachers from European institutes trained Turkmen from 
different institutions, via internet-based distance-learning technologies, supporting the expansion of 
the academic and educational internet communication system in Turkmenistan, including the 
connection of additional academic centers in Ashgabat and medical colleges in other regions of the 
country, as well as training Turkmen researchers in how to use the network. 
Turkmenistan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to improve 
internet access for academics and research communities in the countries of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia through a satellite-based network. 
NATO continues its information and outreach activities with Turkmenistan since the very 
beginning and in 2011, Turkmen parliamentarian and diplomatic officials visited NATO 
Headquarters for a series of information and discussion sessions on the current NATO's priorities, 
including its partnerships with Central Asian Republics. 
NATO-Turkmenistan relations began in 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, in 1997). 
Increasing relations were developed in 1994, when Turkmenistan joined the Partnership for Peace 
program and through this framework have expanded to include a range of activities in which the 
aims of NATO and Turkmenistan coincide. 
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3.4.5 NATO and Tajikistan cooperation 
NATO-Tajikistan relations date back to 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, joining the Partnership for Peace in 2002 to work alongside the Allies in areas 
where bilateral aims converge. Since joining PfP program, Tajikistan has played an active role in 
hosting and participating in PfP exercises, with a special focus on command and control, civil-
emergency planning and civil-military co-operation. 
NATO’s relations with Tajikistan29 have been implemented through the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) framework, in which the country joined in 2002 and actively cooperates in the fight against 
terrorism. Tajikistan Dialogue with NATO takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) and tight exchange of political and military relations have been 
established since the country became independent.  
NATO and Tajikistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the 
country’s Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year period and 
the major key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, especially counter-terrorism 
cooperation and border security, crisis management and civil emergency planning.  
It is worth mentioning that Tajikistan plays an important role in supporting Allied operations 
in Afghanistan through the hosting of French military aircraft at Dushanbe Airport, where NATO 
and Tajikistan also cooperate in the fight against international terrorism. NATO is supporting the 
country in its efforts to create an educational course on counter-terrorism for the Military Institute 
of the Ministry of Defiance and a number of SFA project in order to enable the Tajikistan Armed 
Forced capable to deal with internal and external threats.  
Tajikistan has listed a number of units as available for NATO/PfP operations and training 
exercises, including an infantry platoon to support PfP activities, a group of staff officers and a 
group of military medics. Tajikistan is also seeking to enhance cooperation with NATO Allies in 
mine-clearing activities, participating in a number of PfP exercises with NATO Allies and other 
partner countries.  
As hinted above, Tajikistan aims to develop sustained and effective democratic control of its 
armed forces, developing coordination procedures between the government, parliament and the 
military. It is also in the process of reforming its armed forces through the SFA concept.  
Cooperative processes with the PfP framework assist in achieving these goals and enhance the 
country’s ability to take part in peacekeeping or other operations alongside NATO forces.  
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Tajikistan is also considering the participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) mechanism, consolidating its efforts to hence Defense policies, Strategies and relevant 
legislation within the SSR process as a whole. 
NATO and Tajikistan are working to further cooperate in strengthening the country’s border 
security and countering cross-border crime, especially drug trafficking, hence Tajikistan has sent 
numerous personnel to attend counter-narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-
Russia Council. 
Military education is also a key area of cooperation and joint efforts are ongoing to develop 
courses in several areas, including border security and control, as well as language training. NATO 
and Tajikistan continue to work on preparing selected individuals from the country for NATO-
related activities and possible introduction of Alliance standards in the country’s military education 
programs.  
Tajikistan has sent officers to take part in NATO familiarization courses and in various other 
courses at the NATO School at Oberammergau (Germany) and within the PfP Trust Fund project 
Tajikistan wish eliminating stockpiles of large munitions, as well as assess the security of weapons’ 
storage facilities is currently under development. Moreover, NATO is engaged with Tajikistan 
providing Civil emergency planning support and course to further familiarize itself with Allied 
disaster-relief organization and procedures.  
The country is establishing the creation of its own disaster-relief operation centre and the 
creation of a small, NATO-compatible disaster-relief unit in order to develop early warning systems 
for natural disasters. This is made by Tajikistan representatives participating in NATO-run tactical 
and operational civil-military-cooperation courses: a NATO introductory course on civil emergency 
planning took place in Dushanbe in July 2011. 
On the “Science and environment”, it is to be said that scientists from Tajikistan have 
received grant awards in a number of areas under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
program (more detail will be given in the Chapter IV. Since 2006, a networking infrastructure grant 
was issued to upgrade the cooperative area network in the Tajik technical university, to teach 
scientist and engineers the latest technology to secure the cyber networks of the educational and 
scientific communities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. 
Collaboration with NATO and other Partner countries is also ongoing on uranium extraction 
and environmental security and new SPS projects are under preparation. Tajikistan also participates 
in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to increase internet access for academic and 
research communities in countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based 
network.  
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Tajikistan is also working along NATO to increase the public understanding of NATO and 
the benefits of cooperation, aiming to increase public awareness in support of defense and security 
reforms.  
A number of networks with universities, non-governmental organizations and the press/media 
have been established in order to increase awareness of the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security 
issues, continuing to enhance it through different activities: these include international conferences 
in Tajikistan and Tajik participation to yearly NATO-Afghan Student Forums. Work is ongoing on 
the potential establishment of a NATO Depository Library at the Tajik National University of 
Dushanbe. 
NATO supports educational activities relevant to security and defense issues in the country, 
sponsoring the summer academy in Tajikistan which brings together advanced students from around 
the country and beyond, to learn about and discuss international security issues.  
 
 
3.4.6 NATO and Afghanistan cooperation 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn 
Conference in December 2001, when Afghan opposition leaders, attending the conference, began 
the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the 
Afghan Transitional Authority30.  
The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan 
Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and 
around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan31. 
These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the 
Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) and ISAF. 
NATO agreed to take command of the force in August 2003 and the UN Security Council 
subsequently mandated the expansion of ISAF’s operations to cover the whole country by October 
2006. ISAF is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected government of 
Afghanistan. 
Since August 2003, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been 
conducting security operations, while also training and developing the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) have been the main objective of the Alliance. 
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To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in 
partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the 
government and international community in security sector reform, including mentoring, training 
and operational support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP).  
The intention of this counterinsurgency strategy is to isolate extremists by building 
relationships with the Afghan people32 and the government and ISAF’s campaign aims at: 
- Protecting the population from violence, coercion, intimidation and predatory groups; 
- Neutralizing insurgents networks and degrade their capability to a level that the Afghan 
national security forces can manage, and to deny sanctuary in Afghanistan to the 
extremists; 
- Building a professional, independent and sustainable Afghan National Army and Police, 
so that they are able to provide security and law enforcement to the Afghan people 
throughout the country; 
- Promoting effective governance by helping the Afghan Government to become 
inclusive, accountable and acceptable to the people. 
Moreover, in agreement with Afghanistan Government, NATO has established on 21 
November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which brings together 
national training efforts under one single umbrella.  
It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and 
the European Gendarmerie Force33 (EGF). 
NTMA’s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the Afghan national 
security forces, support the ANA’s institutional training base and the ANP reform at the district 
level and below.  
It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, 
medevac34, and intelligence) through ‘train the trainer’-modeled programs. 
The launch of NTM-A was made hand in hand with the establishment of the ISAF’s Joint 
Command (IJC), which is focused on operations.  
Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training 
capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police 
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continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising 
and assisting. 
NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan authorities to provide 
effective security across the country and ensure that the country can never again be a safe haven for 
terrorists. 
As of July 2012, fifty nations are contributing troops to the mission, including 22 non-NATO 
partner nations from around the globe, working alongside the 28 NATO Allies.  
As part of the international community’s overall effort, ISAF is working to create the 
conditions whereby the Afghan government is able to exercise its authority throughout the country. 
While not technically a UN force, ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter and Fourteen UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF have been issued: 
1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1817, 1890, 1917, 1943 and 2011 (12 
October 2011). 
However, at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, ISAF Heads of State and 
Government agreed a list of principles which guide ISAF’s gradual shift from a combat to an 
increasingly supporting role.  
The aim was to make Afghan Authorities capable to keep a safe and secure environment 
through strengthening Afghan National Security Forces and working through increasingly skilled 
Afghan institutions.  
The draft model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the 
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated 
annual budget of US $4.1 billion, and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security 
environment. 
Sustaining a sufficient and capable ANSF is the responsibility of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by the International Community, as part of the wider 
International Community, and building upon existing mechanisms in developing, coherent and 
effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF.  
As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s 
yearly share will increase progressively from at least US $500 m in 2015, with the aim that it can 
assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces35.  
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Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will play a crucial role in 
ensuring security and stability, and in supporting legitimate governance and sustainable economic 
growth across the country. 
To this end, the International Community launched in 2011, the transition to Afghan full 
security responsibility to be completed at the end of 2014, and giving NATO lead a follow-on 
mission to continue to support the development of ANSF capacity.  
Wider cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan are in place under the Enduring 
Partnership agreement, signed in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit. 
Transition to Afghan leadership is well underway and the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) is growing stronger and more capable, bringing ISAF’s mission to evolve in nature and 
scope it own mission. 
Since the beginning of transition implementation in July 2011, ISAF’s mission has been 
gradually evolving from one focused primarily on combat to an enabling Security Force Assistance 
(SFA) role, which centers on training, advising and assisting its Afghan partners. 
Inteqal - the Dari and Pashtu word for transition - is the process by which the lead 
responsibility for security in Afghanistan is gradually being transitioned from the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces36.  
Implementation is well underway with Afghan forces in the lead for security for around 75% 
of the Afghan population. The aim is for Afghan forces to have full responsibility for security 
across the country by 2014 and it foresees three main phases: 
- Transition Tranche 1 
On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and 
districts to start transition. This decision was based upon operational, political and economic 
considerations, drawing on the assessment and recommendations of the Afghan government and 
NATO/ISAF through the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB). 
- Transition Tranche 2 
On 27 November 2011, following the decision-making process above, President Karzai 
announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities for transition implementation. 
- Transition Tranche 3 
On 13 May 2012, President Karzai announced the third set of areas to enter the transition 
process, covering over 75% of the Afghan population, meaning in every one of the 34 provinces of 
Afghanistan, including every provincial capital, and will cover almost two-thirds of the country’s 
districts. 
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Transition draws on the JANIB’s recommendations, which are based on a thorough 
assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground. The following 
elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision-making process37: 
- the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to shoulder additional 
security tasks with less assistance from ISAF; 
- the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities; 
- the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined 
as ISAF assistance is reduced and whether ISAF is postured properly to thin out as 
ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish. 
For Transition to be successful, the Afghan National Security Forces, under effective Afghan 
civilian control, need to assume their security responsibility on a sustainable and irreversible basis - 
albeit with some level of continued support from ISAF. 
A secure and stable Afghanistan would make an important contribution to the Central Asia 
Region, in which security, stability and development are interconnected.  
Fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap and building the Enduring Partnership, NATO decided on the 
phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security. 
Meanwhile, NATO appreciates fact that a number of ISAF countries have concluded, or are 
in the process of concluding, bilateral partnership agreements with the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, which would form the basis of cooperation and friendship between an 
independent, sovereign and democratic Afghanistan and those countries on the basis of equality and 
mutual interest38. 
A political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration is key to a peaceful 
and stable Afghanistan and in this context, NATO reiterates the importance of the principles 
decided at the Bonn Conference. These are that the process leading to reconciliation must be truly 
Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and must be inclusive and representative of the legitimate interests 
of all Afghan people, regardless of gender or status.  
Reconciliation must also contain the reaffirmation of a sovereign, stable and united 
Afghanistan, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism, and 
compliance with the Afghan Constitution, including its human rights provisions, especially on the 
rights of women.  
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A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will positively contribute to economic and 
social development in the wider region and deliver progress in the fight against narcotics 
trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime. 
 
 
3.5 Silk-Afghanistan, an example of regional cooperation  
Named after the Great Silk Road trading route linking Asia and Europe, the SILK-
Afghanistan project provides high-speed internet access via satellite and fiber optics to 18 Afghan 
universities as well as some governmental institutions in Kabul.  
The project assists the Afghan authorities in developing their educational system. It became 
operational at Kabul University in Afghanistan in 2006 and the network has since been expanded to 
the provinces. 
Today, the vast majority of university students and lecturers from 18 universities in Baghlan, 
Balkh, Bamiyan, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul (four universities), Kandahar, 
Khost, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia and Parwan provinces are connected to the information highway 
through the SILK-Afghanistan project. 
Over the past few years, the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education and some fifteen 
universities across the country have been equipped with video conferencing systems and the aim is 
eventually to equip all universities with this facility. 
A Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), which has been up-and-running since autumn 2009, 
provides internet connectivity to a number of government and academic institutions in Kabul. The 
MAN consists of a WiMax “blanket” connected to the network operation centre at Kabul 
University. 
SILK-Afghanistan is jointly funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
program and the US Department of State. In addition to connectivity, it provides extra funding to 
build information technology (IT) infrastructure and to train IT staff at the universities. 
The program39 builds on NATO’s experience of initiating and running the “Virtual Silk 
Highway” project, which provided high-speed internet access (via satellite) in NATO’s partner 
countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia from 2002 to 2011. 
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3.6 A new framework for Security Assistance 
In March 2012, NATO agreed on an Updated List of Tasks to update its Comprehensive 
Approach Action Plan, these tasks are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force 
that involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands. 
NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of crisis management, and is 
working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors in 
the planning and conduct of operations. The Alliance promotes the clear definition of strategies and 
objectives amongst all relevant actors before launching an operation, as well as enhanced 
cooperative planning. 
The Allies agree that elements of stabilization and reconstruction are best undertaken by 
those actors and organizations that have the relevant expertise, mandate, and competence. However, 
there can be circumstances which may hamper other actors from undertaking these tasks, or 
undertaking them without support from NATO.  
To improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, 
when required, to stabilization and reconstruction, Allies agreed to form an appropriate but modest 
civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning 
in crisis management. 
Applying a comprehensive approach means a change of mindset, the Alliance is therefore 
emphasizing joint training of civilian and military personnel to encourage better coordination. 
This is no easy task in view of the complexity of the concept. A lot more work is needed to 
forge a common understanding on the scope, nature and direction of the Alliance’s Comprehensive 
Approach. 
NATO cannot be successful in achieving Allies’ agreed political goals in an operation 
without well-coordinated civil-military capabilities throughout the campaign. 
Well-coordinated capabilities must be planned and exercised; they require integrated training. 
Best practices and lessons learned must update training and education programs to be understood 
and employed. They cannot be achieved through ad hoc methods. 
Improving NATO’s capability for working with others actors such as the EU and the UN is 
critical in this context. 
There are two distinct but related asset pools for preparing NATO as an organization to work 
closely on a Comprehensive Approach - military forces and critical civilian capabilities. Both are 
indispensable if NATO, internally and with partners, is to achieve optimum civil-military 
teamwork. 
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First, NATO commands must determine the military resources necessary to achieve initial 
stability and the return of essential services in the immediate wake of military operations. These are 
assets such as military police, CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation), construction engineers and 
military medical personnel. These forces have the mission to move into areas in the wake of conflict 
and work with combat forces that are still securing the area.  
They must provide public security, temporary governance and the most basic of services. 
These forces must be culturally aware and accustomed to working with both traumatized 
populations and civilian actors, including NGOs that may already be in the conflict area. 
Second, NATO military organizations at all levels must be able to prepare and conduct 
integrated military-civil missions, including through two-way, co-equal organizational interfaces. 
This requires pre-established information sharing, comprehensive planning methods, role 
integration and ultimately operational support. Military support to civil agencies can be extensive 
and generally requires resources (vehicles, shelter, communications, security, supplies, etc) in 
excess of the kit required by the military unit alone.  
Joint pre-mission exercises and training are key to ensuring common understanding of the 
different organizations’ approaches, cultures and objectives. Civilian capabilities that might be 
integrated with military capabilities can come from two broad sources. 
First, they can come from NATO Allies’ and partners’ national assets. In fact, as with 
military assets, so too with civilian - the preponderance of capabilities are owned by nations. These 
include capabilities such as interagency departments of member governments. Contractor support 
has also become a large factor in national support. 
If this is indeed to be the primary and most dependable source for embodiment of a 
Comprehensive Approach, there is reason to consider establishing a modest NATO capacity to 
coordinate national contribution and planning efforts. 
Second, civilian support can and usually does come from a host of international 
organizations, both nongovernmental and multinational, many with specialized and highly desirable 
skills. Key organizational partners for NATO are well known: the UN, EU, and OSCE. Other 
potential partners include regional organizations and major NGOs such as the Red Cross. 
When working with these organizations, a memorandum of understanding to enable planning 
and capacity development should be agreed upon well in advance, in addition to crisis-specific 
work from the earliest stages in the pre-deployment planning phase. Most operations have a dearth 
of civilian resources, and military commanders are eager to partner with any quality civil resource.  
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That calls for cooperation with national and international partners, both nongovernmental and 
multilateral. For any civilian-military cooperation, institutional liaison is essential at the operational 
and tactical levels, and ideally at the strategic level as well. 
Unfortunately, unlike military capabilities, civilian resources are rarely available and ready 
on the massive scale required for deployment to current crises. It can take considerable time to 
identify and deploy necessary civilian resources. Allies should consider organizing a standing 
civilian corps for international crisis response.  
Such a capability could be used under NATO or the EU so long as it was available to both 
organizations. Merely compiling a list of volunteers and skills is not sufficient. These resources 
should be afforded specialized education and exercise opportunities that expose them to the 
operational environment they will have to manage. 
Any Comprehensive Approach to civil-military cooperation must address the justice, rule of 
law and governance sector. Without a systematic effort in this field, securing a sustainable transition 
to post-conflict development and reconstruction has proven to be extremely difficult. 
Critical to this is addressing the problem of organized crime that often fills the gaps in 
governance in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Civilian capabilities must take the lead in 
dealing with this pervasive de-stabilizing menace.  
That requires specialized advanced intelligence planning and continued access to information 
both from international law enforcement and from local governments. In turn the military must be 
tied closely to the information flow on criminal activity and enforcement actions in their operational 
area. 
Another critical civilian task in crises resolution is police training. Here again, close 
coherence of civil and military efforts is key to operational effectiveness. Justice and rule of law 
could be an area suitable for enhanced cooperation between NATO and EU, for example through 
the establishment of joint centers of excellence with a view to enhancing transatlantic thinking and 
developing common strategies, based on lessons learned, on how to solve this difficult challenge in 
future peace missions. 
Another challenge to be overcome in building an integrated comprehensive capability is the 
task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Just as NATO’s many militaries have cultural 
differences, so too each civilian organization has a unique culture. Operations in Afghanistan and 
Kosovo experienced hard communication stovepipes among organizations that proved difficult to 
breech.  
For civilian organizations working with a strong, large and ever-present military organization, 
individuality is important. NGOs are special organizations with cultures of strict impartiality that 
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are essential to self-protection and effectiveness. The military should do nothing in word or deed to 
compromise NGOs’ impartiality. 
To break down barriers between military and civilian partners, NATO must engage in 
integrated training, educating, exercising, and planning for military and civilian personnel who may 
be operating together. It also needs to emphasize as a top priority the imperative to share 
information laterally as well as vertically across the network. 
There is a single pool of both civilian and military resources among Allies and partner nations 
for operations. These assets overwhelmingly belong to nations who commit them to organizations 
such as the EU, NATO or the UN. Enhancing the capabilities of these forces helps all organizations. 
The most potent civil-military organizations for transatlantic cooperation are the EU and 
NATO. In response to unfolding or extant crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan, these two 
organizations have created “on-the-spot” provisions to work together. A far better approach is to 
plan ahead for cases where NATO-EU cooperation is in order.  
There is potential in the coming year or two for major strides on several interrelated efforts, 
including maturing EU preparations for military and civil missions, full integration of NATO’s own 
capacities, and a mechanism to coordinate expeditious planning and decision making between them. 
Some initiatives both NATO and the EU can pursue to help realize these goals might include: 
- Continue strengthening ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) where practical; 
- Seek Allied acceptance of ways to renovate the effectiveness and timeliness of NATO’s 
political decision making processes, formally and/or informally; 
- Further rationalize the NATO command structure to accommodate participation by 
France and for more optimal command and control, including for a Comprehensive 
Approach, at all levels; 
- Synergize a Comprehensive Approach to capabilities and operations, both internally and 
through NATO-EU structures, such as a standing NATO-EU planning group; 
- Consider establishment of a transatlantic framework for civil-military cooperation to 
systematically collect experiences, to develop common concepts, and to conduct training 
and exercises for officials and military staff engaged in reconstruction and development 
in peace missions; 
These steps, if pursued in parallel, could over time allow an evolution that would strengthen 
both NATO and the EU, and appeal to the interests of all Allies. A fundamental ingredient for its 
success would be for all Allies to embrace the broadened range of NATO capabilities and roles in 
practice – most of which Heads of State have already agreed in principle to give the Alliance. 
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Concluding on the real civil-military capabilities that operate within the Comprehensive 
Approach concept is that prior, civil-military integrated planning and coordination is essential to 
achieving and maintaining early post-conflict success and setting the optimum conditions for a 
return to normality.  
The more effective the civil-military team, the quicker the operation moves to subsequent 
phases and ultimately its culmination and drawdown, reducing deployment times, costs and 
casualties, both civilian and military.  
With that in mind, NATO should re-double its efforts to move beyond the current limited ad 
hoc arrangements, and take another step at Bucharest to ensure that the Comprehensive Approach 
initiative moves closer to a Comprehensive Capability. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
Transnational insurgent groups exploit limitations on government power and authority, 
placing themselves outside of the state’s reach. They make the best efforts at counterinsurgency 
more complex by increasing the transaction costs that governments face when they deal with their 
neighbors.  
Often times, cross-border fighting between rebels and the state sour regional relations and can 
prompt escalatory dynamics that lead to clashes between neighbors. Rival neighbors use rebel 
organizations as an alternative to the direct use of force, but these groups can provoke interstate 
violence.  
Weak rebel hosts can be drawn into conflicts with their neighbors because they are unable to 
prevent rebel access or incursions by other states. However, states can and do cooperate on border 
security matters to prevent the escalation of conflict. Learning from these examples can provide 
lessons for today’s challenges.  
Promoting clear lines of communication, sharing intelligence, and establishing border 
cooperation regimes can go a long way in both countering violent groups and preserving friendly 
relations between states. Thus, effective diplomacy is critical to preventing the escalation of 
regional crises.  
Afghanistan and its neighbors and allies will certainly confront transnational violence for 
some time to come. As foreign forces begin to withdraw it is essential that agreements with 
neighbors are struck so as to establish appropriate coordination mechanisms and border security 
regimes.  
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Such steps will help to limit insurgent movements and preserve stability in neighborhoods 
that have long been plagued by conflict. But there are some feeling that neighborhoods States, as 
Kazakhstan could not play along with NATO auspicious.  
Indeed, Kazakhstan has recently participated in international military exercises with its 
NATO partners as well as through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in what at 
first sight appears to confirm that its multi-vector foreign policy also strongly influences its defense 
and security policy.  
Nonetheless, the scope, intensity and seriousness attached to the country’s defense and 
security relations with Moscow and its involvement in the CSTO goes far above the lip service it 
pays to cooperation with NATO and EU in some extent.  
This critical distinction in Astana’s defense policy is amply demonstrated by the country 
hosting the CSTO’s first peacekeeping exercises from October 8 to October 17 2011. 
In early September, Kazakhstan hosted its annual Steppe Eagle military exercise, which 
provided an opportunity for the United States and United Kingdom to train and showcase the 
Central Asian country’s peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT).  
The Steppe Eagle exercise also represented ongoing efforts to fully expand KAZBAT into a 
NATO interoperable brigade (KAZBRIG). Also in early September, Astana signed a new 
Individual Membership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO for 2012 to 2013, representing its third 
cycle since becoming the first country in the region to join IPAP in January 2006.  
While NATO officials publicly welcomed this as a step toward deepening cooperation with 
the Alliance, Kazakhstan’s Defense Minister was much more circumspect in his comments, 
avoiding any political claims concerning the extent of Kazakhstan’s defense cooperation with 
NATO.,  
None of these developments suggest that Astana would suspend its cooperation activities 
with NATO, but ahead of the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 there are growing signs that 
Astana’s security policy is distinctly Eurasian, rather than Euro-Atlanticist.  
Astana’s efforts to boost the CSTO and deepen bilateral cooperation with Russia reveal that 
its defense policy will remain much more Moscow-friendly for the long term. 
NATO’s interest in Central Asia largely equals that of the EU (partnership, stability and 
security) but its activities are mostly constrained to some military cooperation and most 
importantly, political dialogue and diplomatic exchanges with a view to increase access to 
Afghanistan for NATO’s ISAF mission.  
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- SECOND PART - 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY, DATA, SURVEY AND PROFILES 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Technical Methodology   
This Chapter explores the methodology of how to measures and assesses the Central Asia 
States through the “Human Development Index1 (HDI)”, since there has been a global change in the 
understanding each country prosperity. It has been taking in account an assigned prosperity ranking, 
which is calculated from the average score2 of the country’s rankings across four different sub-
indices.  
Through this HDI, the research endeavors to measures and assesses the impact and effects 
(positive or negative) generated by the EU and NATO over the CA states, since their full 
involvement in supporting, assisting, advising and cooperating with them in a wide range of 
political, social and economical segments. Each sub-index represents a fundamental aspect of 
prosperity and those pillars are the economy, governance, education, safety & security.  
This Chapter gives also an overview of the Methodology, meaning the method for choosing 
variables, the weighting of each variable and data sources used in the construction of the index, the 
standardization3 procedures and the four sub-indexes.   
Therefore, this holistic approach would allow painting a more complete picture of the Central 
States’ developments, providing an empirical basis for the insight of each country. The HDI 
confirms that key drivers of national prosperity include a blend of income4 and wellbeing5 such as 
entrepreneurship, job opportunity, effective accountable government, freedom of movement and the 
implementation of the Rule of Law.  
                                               
1
 Source: UNDP, www.undp.org (accessed in July 2012), the first Human Development Report introduced a new way of measuring development by 
combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite human development index, the HDI. 
2
 A score is a standardized value that allows to order, compare, aggregate and rank each variable or sub-index. 
3
 Standardization is a common statistical method used to reconcile variables or scores that are based on different units of measurement. It allows 
comparison between variables that are measured in different units such as euro, years, percentages, etc. 
4
 Whenever it is used the terms income regressions or income scores, it refers to regressions and scores that are related to the GDP per capita, or 
“income” variable. 
5
 Whenever it is used the terms wellbeing regressions or scores, we are referring to regressions and scores that are related to the “life satisfaction” 
variable. 
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For each of these four sub-indices, the research looks at two kinds of variables: those related 
to income and those related to wellbeing. As a consequence, there are about 72 different variables in 
the index, split between the sub-indices, which combine to produce both an income score and a 
wellbeing score. These overall sub-index scores are the sum of both the income and wellbeing 
scores. This is then the averaged to give each country on its overall prosperity ranking. As far as 
HDI is concerned the thesis analyzes the last 10 years of developments in the region of Central Asia 
States, 4 sub-indexes as said above, 10 Global data sources, 72 variables, 90% CA region 
population coverage, 99% CA region GDP coverage, 6 countries, a number of people interviewed 
by Gallup Institute in each country and 5000 Data-points used for HDI.   
At large, global prosperity is increasing despite the most severe financial crisis in modern 
times, despite citizen uprisings that have toppled some of the world’s most autocratic regimes 
(Arabic Springs), despite protests and riots that have erupted around the world (see tab.1).  
 
 
Difference in index score 2001-2011 
 
 
1 Central 
 Asia 
  
2 South East  
Asia 
   
3 East  
Asia 
     
4 Latin 
America 
      
5 Europe 
 
       
6 Asia  
Pacific 
        
 
Tab. 1, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012).  
 
On the other hand, security and safety are decreasing (see tab. 2, pag. 3), as the Arab spring 
has been driven by countries such as Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt; yet the worst performers for 
  0 0 0 1 0 2 0 4  
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citizen safety and security are driven by Central Asia States were extremely high rates violence, 
which are due to assaults and thefts and official high-ranking corruption.  
The global assessment of prosperity in the Central Asia States are based on Economy, 
Governance, Education, Safety & Security and Social Capital Indicators and for the purpose of this 
research, it is considered to promote a holistic understanding of the regional prosperity by providing 
a framework for its measurement.   
The HDI focus on providing an empirical basis for the intuitive sense that true prosperity is a 
complex blend of income and wellbeing, examining the correlates of both income and wellbeing 
across different dimensions of society and exploring how these factors may influence a country’s 
income and the happiness of its citizens. 
The human development represents the expansion of people’s opportunity, which builds on 
shared natural resources, addresses sustainability-locally, nationally and regionally through ways 
that are equitable and empowering. To this regard, EU and NATO have aimed at pathways that 
enable people, communities and countries to promote sustainability, dialogue, cooperation and 
equity so that they are mutually reinforcing. 
 
 
Changes in Sub-indexes 2001-2011 
 
 
 Economy 
 
  
 Governance 
 
   
 Education 
 
     
 Safe & Security 
 
      
 
 
Tab. 2, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012) 
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4.2 Selecting Variables: 
Based on the current academic literature on income growth and wellbeing (Romer, 1990;45), 
it has been identified a large number of variables (Deaton 2008:72) that have an impact upon wealth 
and wellbeing and could therefore be considered for inclusion in the HDI.  
Then these variables (Deaton and Kahneman, 2010:96) were reduced to 72 considering a 
global coverage for each variable and that includes at least 90% of the countries in the Index. 
Approximately two-thirds of the Index variables are objective and they fall into three categories:  
1) survey-based objective variables, such as how many computers are in a household;  
2) objective “hard” statistics, such as the inflation rate;  
3) estimates or assessments that are based on expert research, such as the World Bank 
Governance indicators.  
These variables are objective, not because they are flawless, but because a comparable 
standard of objectivity has been applied across observations. The remaining one third of the 
variables consists of variables that measure respondents’ perceptions of life, such as how much 
people is worried, how satisfied they are with health system and so on.  
The HDI has tried to maintain a balanced approach, using both objective and subjective 
variables, to prevent the country rankings from being biased due to either prejudice or 
misperceptions.  
At the end of the process, 72 independent variables from 10 widely recognized global data 
sources, 45 variables are national-level averages, obtained using the Gallup World Pull surveys6, 27 
variables are national-level statistics provided by the World Development Indicators from the 
World Bank and the remaining variables are provided by a variety of globally recognized sources7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 See http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx, accessed in July 2012 
7
 See Annex 1, p.296. 
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4.3 Standardization, Weighting, Income and Wellbeing scores 
The 72 variables are based on many different units of measurement. For example, subjective 
variables, such as the proportion of citizens that express confidence in financial institutions are 
measured in percentage terms, while capital per worker is measured in US dollars. These variables 
were transformed to a common scale using a statistical technique called standardization. The 
standardized variables are then comparable and can be combined to form composite indices.  
A variable is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. A 
variable’s weight, which the technical term is ‘coefficient’, represents its relative importance to the 
outcome (either income or wellbeing). 
Because some variables within each sub-index capture different elements of the same theme, 
there is a potential for high correlation between these factors. These weights are not arrived at 
through subjective judgments or discretionary choices, but are based on the particular statistical 
relationship between each variable and changes in income and wellbeing.  
The initial choice of variables was worked out through a careful study of current empirical 
and theoretical research, as well as on the availability of data. But the variables’ weights are 
determined by their statistical correlations with income and wellbeing.  
For each country, the latest data available in 2011 were gathered on the 72 independent 
variables. For each country, the “raw values” are standardized and multiplied by the weights 
determined by the prior regression analysis discussed above. These weighted variable values are 
then summed to produce a country’s wellbeing and income score in each sub-index. The income 
and wellbeing scores are then standardized so that they can be compared.  
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4.4 Sub-index scores and rankings 
The standardized income and wellbeing scores are added together to create the countries’ 
sub-index scores and the countries are ranked according to their scores in each of the four sub-
indices. Finally, the HDI score is determined by assigning equal weights to all four sub-indices for 
each country. The average of the four sub-indices yields a country’s overall prosperity score.  
For each country, an overall income score was also produced, obtaining as the average of the 
four sub-index income scores and an overall wellbeing score obtained as the average of the four 
wellbeing scores. The HDI applies equal weights to each sub-index for the six countries, regardless 
of their level of development. While it is true that countries at different levels of development will 
each have different needs, constructing a global index it is crucial to measure each country by the 
same yardstick. Giving different weights to countries would make country rankings incomparable 
across income levels.  
The Economy sub-index, which measures countries’ performances in four areas: 
macroeconomic policies, economic satisfaction and expectations, foundation for growth, and 
financial sector efficiency.  
The Governance sub-index measures countries’ performance in three areas: effective and 
accountable government, fair elections and political participation, and rule of law. 
The Education sub-index measures countries’ performance in three areas: access to 
education, quality of education, and human capital. 
The Safe & Security sub-index measures countries’ performances in two areas: national 
security and personal safety.  
 
Central Asia: Basic Facts: 
 
Total area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 
77,000 sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 
174,500 sq. mi; Afghanistan: 652,700 sq. mi. Total population: approximately 92 
million; Kazakhstan: 15.5 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.6 m.; Tajikistan: 7.6 m.; Turkmenistan: 
5.0 m.; Uzbekistan: 28.1 m.; Afghanistan: 29.5 (July 2011 est., (Source: CIA). Total 
gross domestic product: approximately $346 billion in 2010; per capita GDP is about 
$5,600, but there are large income disparities and relatively large percentages of people in 
each country are in poverty. Kazakhstan: $196.4 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $12.0 b.; Tajikistan: 
$14.7 b.; Turkmenistan: $36.9 b.; Uzbekistan: $85.9 b. (Source: CIA) 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov accessed November 2012. 
 
  
129 
4.5 Sub-Index description 
 
4.5.1 Economy sub-index 
Stable and growing economies increase their own per capita income and promote the overall 
wellbeing of its citizens.  
As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these 
areas. The sub-index demonstrates that outcomes of sound macroeconomic policies, such as robust 
domestic savings rates, low rates of inflation and unemployment, and an efficient financial sector 
have a positive impact on average levels of both income and wellbeing.  
 
Variable Weights: 
 
                            Macroeconomic Policies (GDS8 +, UR9 -, I10 -).   
1) Income                 Foundation for Growth (Capital per Worker +, Market size +, High-Tec 
      Export +). 
                            Financial sector Efficiency (Non-performing loans -)  
 
                             Macroeconomic Policies (GDS +, I -, ES11+, five year Rate of Growth +).    
2) Wellbeing             Economic Satisfaction and Expectations12+. 
                             Financial Sector Efficiency (Confidence in Financial Institutions +).           
 
This also shows that investing in physical capital per worker, innovative high-tech exports, 
and a competitive economy that attracts foreign investment, are essential to boosting per capita 
income. Positive expectations about the future of the economy and satisfaction with living standards 
also make an important contribution to the overall wellbeing of a country’s citizens.  
Data collection also shows that increased economic strength over time is generally good for 
everyone but the rapid increases in GDP are related to lower levels of happiness in a society. 
The financial crisis of 2008 and its spread into a global recession have continued to have 
damaging effects on the world economy. According to the IMF, the world economy shrank by 0.5% 
in 2009 and growth returned in 2010 at a rate of 5.1%, despite its projection slows to 4% in 2011. 
                                               
8
 Gross Domestic Savings. 
9
 Unemployment Rate. 
10
 Inflation. 
11
 Employment Status. 
12
 Satisfaction with Standard of Living, Adequate Food and Shelter, Perceived Job Availability, Expectations of the Economy. 
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However, despite the recent financial crisis has severely affected the global economy, the 
HDI shows that prosperity has increased in every region between 2009 and 2011. Furthermore, 
certain subjective survey-based data capture humble signs of recovery. 
The Economy Sub-Index, for example, captures aspects of the downturn through the decline 
in domestic savings rates and foreign investment and the higher rates of unemployment and non-
performing loans. Certain variables across the five sub-indices tend to be more long-term or 
enduring by nature and are therefore less affected by temporary fluctuations in the global economy. 
As might be expected, for instance, the countries hardest hit by the crisis as Afghanistan, 
Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have seen decline in their Economy ranking (see tab. 3).  
 
 
Rank 2011 
 
Country 
  
Country Scores 
 
  2009 2010 2011 
1    8 Germany13 2.34 2.23 2.86 
2   56 Kazakhstan 0.90 0.69 0.76 
6   87 Kirgizstan 0.25 0.05 0.14 
4   73 Tajikistan 0.60 0.51 0.70 
3   60 Turkmenistan 0.78 0.57 0.66 
5    65 Uzbekistan 0.52 0.38 0.42  
7    105 Afghanistan -0.10    -1.5 -0.5 
 
Tab. 3, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012) 
 
- High ranking countries (Top 30) 
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50) 
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward ) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 Germany has been selected as reference country (sub-unit) to compare the 6 Central Asia States. 
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4.5.2 Governance sub-index 
Well-governed societies enjoy higher levels of economic growth and citizen wellbeing as a 
whole. As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these 
areas.  
Stable and democratic governing institutions protect political and economic liberty and create 
an environment of civic participation, leading to higher levels of income and wellbeing. The 
Governance sub-index measures levels of competition and corruption in the government and 
citizens’ confidence in elections, the judicial system and the military.  
The sub-index shows (see tab.4) that citizens prefer governments that are stable and 
accountable. Public wellbeing is also related to people’s perceptions of how well the country 
addresses poverty and preserves the environment. The research shows that political freedom, 
strength of institutions and regulatory quality are significant contributors to economic growth.  
Effective, fair, and accountable governments also increase public confidence, leading to 
higher levels of life satisfaction among citizens.  
 
Variable Weights: 
 
                            Effective and Accountable Gov (GE14 +, GS15 +, SP +).   
3) Income                Rule of Law + and Regulation +. 
                            Fair Election and Political Participation+, Political Rights +.  
 
                             Efforts to Address Poverty +, Business and Government Corruption -, 
     GE+, Confidence in Government +).    
4) Wellbeing             Rule of Law +, Confidence in the Judicial System +, Confidence in 
                  Military +. 
                             Financial Sector Efficiency (Voiced concerned+, Confidence of in the 
      Honesty of Elections +).           
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Government Effectiveness.   
15
 Government Stability. 
  
132 
 
Rank 2011 
 
Country 
  
Country Scores 
 
  2009 2010 2011 
1    17 Germany 2.55 2.69 2.43 
2    80 Kazakhstan -1.82 -1.72 -1.46 
5   108 Kirgizstan -2.1 - 1.9  -1.4 
6   141 Tajikistan -1.93 -1.84 -1.80 
3    87 Turkmenistan -1.87 -1.79 -1.54 
4    95 Uzbekistan -1.79 -1.67 -2.03 
7    159 Afghanistan -2.9 -2.5 -2.2 
 
Tab. 4, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012). 
 
- High ranking countries (Top 30) 
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50) 
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward ) 
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4.5.3 Education sub-index 
Education is a building block for prosperous societies and this sub-index measures countries’ 
performance in three areas: access to education, quality of education, and human capital. As 
illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these areas (see 
tab.5). The Education sub-index demonstrates how access to education, as measured by enrolment 
rates, allows citizens to develop their potential and contribute productively to their society.  
In addition, it shows that human capital stock, which is measured by the average levels of 
education in the workforce, is essential for promoting research and development as well as 
producing useful knowledge for a society.  
Because of the importance of citizen’s own perceptions of the educational opportunity 
available to them, the sub-index uses both objective and subjective variables to assess the quality of 
education in a given country. The Education sub-index uses pupil to teacher ratio, as well as 
measures of citizens’ perception of education, to assess quality.  
This sub-index is built on research on economic growth that has found human capital to be an 
engine for growth, making a case for the non-diminishing effect of education on rising GDP levels. 
While the relationship between higher levels of education and wellbeing is less clear-cut, research 
shows that basic education enhances people’s opportunities to increase life satisfaction. 
 
Variable Weights: 
 
                            Access to Education (GSE16+, NPE17 +, Girls to Boys ER18+).   
5) Income                Quality of Education (Pupil to teacher ratio -). 
                            Human Capital +, Political Rights +.  
 
                             Access to Education (GSE +, NPE +, Girls to Boys ER +).    
6) Wellbeing             Quality of Education (SEQ19 +, LS20 +). 
                             Human Capital +, Secondary Education per Worker +.    
 
 
 
                                               
16
 Gross Secondary Enrolment. 
17
 Net Primary Enrolment. 
18
 Enrolment Ratio. 
19
 Satisfaction with Educational Quality. 
20
 Learning in Society. 
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Rank 2011 
 
Country 
  
Country Scores 
 
  2009 2010 2011 
1    27 Germany 2.55 1.59 1.73 
2    42 Kazakhstan -1.62 0.41 0.76 
4    80 Kirgizstan -1.89 -1.32 -1,25 
3    68 Tajikistan -1.80 -1.16 -1.48 
5    73 Turkmenistan -1.88 -1.92 -1.89 
6    89 Uzbekistan -1.99 -2.03 -1.15 
7    120 Afghanistan -2.89 -2.57 -2.64 
 
Tab. 5, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012). 
 
- High ranking countries (Top 30) 
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50) 
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward ) 
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4.5.4 Security & Safety sub-index 
Societies hindered by threats to national security and personal safety cannot foster higher 
income and wellbeing. The Safety & Security sub-index measures countries’ performances in two 
areas: national security and personal safety. As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the 
sub-index are categorized into these areas.  
Stable social and political conditions are necessary for attracting investment and sustaining 
economic growth. In addition, when citizens worry about their personal safety, their overall 
wellbeing is diminished. The Safety & Security sub-index combines objective measures of security 
with subjective survey responses about personal safety. Instability resulting from group grievances 
and demographic pressures, for example, is a key element in limiting per capita GDP.  
Similarly, the ability to express political opinions without fear of persecution and feeling safe 
walking alone at night, are positively correlated with higher levels of wellbeing. When people and 
basic institutions are unsafe and unstable, then capital, investment and people begin to flee. 
The research shows that organized political violence such as riots, coups, and civil war, as 
well as general crime and mistrust stemming from a lack of social cohesion, impede economic 
growth. In addition, conditions that produce fear and uncertainty negatively affect life satisfaction 
(see tab.6).  
 
Variable Weights: 
 
                            National Security (GG21-, R22 -and IDP23 -, SSPV24 -).   
7) Income        
     Personal Safety (Assault -, Property stolen -, SWAN25 +). 
                           
 
                             National Security (DI26-, CV27-, IDP-).    
8) Wellbeing             
                             Personal Safety (SWAN +, Assault -, EPO28+. 
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 Group Grievances. 
22
 Refugees. 
23
 Internally Displaced People. 
24
 State-Sponsored Political Violence. 
25
 Safe Walking Alone at Night. 
26
 Demographic Instability. 
27
 Civil War. 
28
 Express Political Opinion. 
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Rank 2011 
 
Country 
  
Country Scores 
 
  2009 2010 2011 
1     20 Germany 1.95 2.15 2.18 
2     49 Kazakhstan 0.73 0.58 0.23 
6     84 Kirgizstan -1.8 -1.95 -2.4 
5     76 Tajikistan -1.5 -1.8 -2.10 
4     60 Turkmenistan -0.8 -0.92 -1.07 
3     57 Uzbekistan 0.45 0.07 -0.34 
7     154 Afghanistan -2.35 -2.67 -2.93 
 
Tab. 6, Source: made by the author based on the United Nations Development Program, 
www.hdr.undp.org (accessed July 2012). 
 
- High ranking countries (Top 30) 
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50) 
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward ) 
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4.6 The Central Asia countries and the sub-indexes 
It is clear, by analyzing the data in Table 3, 4 and 5 that differences between the countries of 
Central Asia in the economy, governance, education and security spheres can present major 
challenges in terms of the free movement of goods, services and people and finding joint 
approaches to solving shared problems.  
Therefore, developing regional economic cooperation among the Republics of Central Asia, 
neighboring countries and with Europe, will represent a key factor to their sustainable socio-
economic developments. Therefore, the strong EU and NATO commitment towards the CA 
countries will also bring Europe and Central Asia closer to each other, in terms of both political 
cooperation and economic development.  
The EU can offer experience in regional integration leading to political stability and 
prosperity, while NATO can accelerate the development and the capacity to the security & safety 
responsibilities. Equally, a number of issues are most appropriately addressed through assistance at 
national level, where lessons learnt from the political and economic transformation can also be 
offered with specific value added and impact.  
Going into details, the EU has set, during 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 periods, the so called 
CA DCI Indicative Program, with a total EU grant of ~ € 821 million planned for Central Asia 
under DCI429, equivalent to an average annual budget of € 107m per year (+/- 21 % compared to 
the previous CA IP).  
The indicative average allocation per year to Promotion of regional cooperation and good 
neighborly relations is set at € 35 m, while € 72 m on average per year is indicatively earmarked for 
the CA national assistance programs at country level, for the priority areas poverty reduction and 
increasing living standards, and good governance and economic reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
29
 Development Cooperation Intrument.  
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Country 
 
 
Annual Average  
 
Percentage 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
 
~ € 10 m/yr 
 
14% 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
~ € 17 m/yr  
 
24% 
 
Tajikistan 
  
 
~ € 20,7 m/yr  
 
29 % 
 
Turkmenistan 
  
 
~  € 10,3 m/yr  
 
14% 
 
Uzbekistan  
 
 
~  € 14  m/yr  
 
19% 
 
 
 
 
~  € 72 m/yr 
 
100% 
 
Source: made by the author based on the European Union website and meetings held in Brussels, www.europa.eu  
(accessed July 2012). 
 
 
 
The promotion of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations foresees around 33% of 
available DCI financial allocation for CA countries and the main focal sectors are:  
-  Rule of law; 
- Sustainable regional development, as energy, environment and business cooperation 
networks; 
-  Education, and People- to- People activities; 
-  Border management, customs, and the fight against organized crime. 
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Regional Cooperation  Programme  
Indicative allocations 
 over the period  
€  million 
 
Focal sectors  
 
 
 
- Sustainable regional development;  
- Energy; 
- Environment;  
- Business cooperation. 
 
50 
25 
20 
5 
 
- Education People- to- People activities   
 
 
45 
  
- Rule of law, border management,  
  customs and the fight against 
  organised crime    
  
 
 
10 
 
TOTAL regional CA 
 
 
105 
 
(Total Central Asia -regional and bilateral programmes )  
 
321 
 
Source: made by the author based on the European Union website and meetings held in Brussels, www.europa.eu  
(accessed July 2012). 
 
One of the main economic/social developments is the extraordinary rise in mobile cellular 
subscriptions through the 6 CA countries. By the end of 2001, the number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions had grown to an estimated six million, bringing mobile cellular penetration levels to 
70 per cent in the developing CA region. At the same time, more than one third of the countries is 
using the Internet. Key factors driving consumer demand and allowing more and more people to 
join the information society are EU and NATO technological influence and user-oriented service, 
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure investments and falling ICT service prices. 
The number of Internet users continues to grow rapidly, close to 30 per cent in Afghanistan 
and 90 per cent in Kazakhstan, while an average of 60 per cent in the remaining CA region. Mobile 
technology and services have helped to overcome major infrastructure barriers and brought more 
people online. But there is still a big gap to bridge, between countries in CA, in terms of capacity, 
quality and speed. 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
Partnership 
Capacity Development of Selected 
Developing Member Countries on 
the Implementation of the WTO 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
 
450,0 
2006 - 
ongoing 
 
Assistance in development of 
a plan for implementing the 
WTO Agreement  on Trade 
Facilitation. 
 
Integrated Trade Facilitation 
Support for CA Regional Economic 
Cooperation 
 
33,5 
2007- 
ongoing 
 
Assistance in strengthening 
customs cooperation among 
the EU Program countries, 
expanding trade facilitation 
work into new areas with a 
focus on the six transport 
corridors 
 
 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
 
 
CA 
countries 
 
 
Upgrading border checkpoints in 
the Central Asian region. 
21,8 
2005 
ongoing  
Upgrading border checkpoints  
incl. introduction of IT 
systems for document 
processing. 
 
Source: made by the author based on the European Union website, www.europa.eu  (accessed July 2012). 
 
On the bilateral assistance programs, the DCI indicative budget 2011-2013 for CA country 
(except for Afghanistan, which will highlighted later on) has allocated by country as follows: 
The 67% of available DCI- CA financial allocations, with priority area 1, reduction of 
poverty and increasing living standards, by focusing in agriculture, regional community 
development, support to social sector reforms as health and education; priority 2 area, Governance 
and economic reform as strengthening public administration and public finance management. 
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Central Asia bilateral country programmes: DCI Indicative allocations 2011-13 
 
CA Bilateral Indicative Programmes   Priorities: Focal Sectors  Indicative allocations over the 
period,  € million 
Kazakhstan  
Regional development and local governance  8 
Judicial reform  10 
Enhancement of public service capabilities for social and economic 
reforms  
12 
Total                                                                                                                                                                                                          30 
Kyrgyzstan   
Social protection reform and income-generating activities  19 
Education reform  18 
Judicial law and rule of law  14 
Total                                                                                                                                                                                 51 
Tajikistan  
Social protection and employment 20 
Health sector reform  20 
Private sector development  16 
Public finance reform  6 
Total 62 
Turkmenistan   
Strengthening economic and social development of rural areas 9 
Support the improvement of human capital development 14 
Long term sustainable energy development 8 
Total                                                                                                                            31 
Uzbekistan 
Raising living standards through rural and local development 
schemes 
17 
Rule of law and judicial reforms, and support to local government 
bodies 
15 
Enhancing mutual trade, busi9ness climate and SMEs development 10 
Total                                                                                                                                                                      42 
GRAND TOTAL bilateral CA        216 
Total CA Regional and bilateral programmes                             321 
 
Source: made by the author based on the E.U. website and Meetings in Brussels, www.europa.eu (accessed July 2012). 
 
One should take into consideration that financial allocations are indicative over the three year 
period and in case of serious sector or country specific absorption issues, re-allocations could 
possibly be considered within the limits allowed by the relevant legal basis and after agreement 
between all EU services concerned.  
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In summary, total country bilateral allocations are increased by 31% compared to the 
previous CA IP 2007-2010, while regional allocation is increased by only 4% taking into account 
the frontloading of € 40m made for CA regional allocations in DCI AAPs 2009/10 to support the 
implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia.   
Throughout the improvement of regional economic cooperation, the Republics of Central 
Asia, the neighbors’ countries and the European Union, are providing huge support to the sub-
national institutions, civil service capabilities, rule of Law and socio-economic development at 
large. Several of the challenges faced by Central Asian countries, such as developing regional 
trading corridors, creating efficient energy systems and networks, managing river basins and 
environmental issues and keeping security & safety through the establishment of robust security 
forces, are inherently trans-border in character and can only be tackled effectively through a 
cooperative effort at regional level.   
In this respect, NATO has realized a Border Security and Management project, allocating € 
85 mln., in the period 2001-2011, to transfer to the CA countries, with particular attention to the 
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and local institutions in order to enhance 
the capacity and leadership in security & safety; moreover, the Security Assistance Force 
programme (SFA) on the field continues on schedule to enable the Afghan National Army and 
Police in order to take the lead for security responsibility in transitioning areas. About, € 232 mln 
have been allocated in the period 2001-2011 to continue fielding the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with counter mining explosive equipment, mentoring  and strengthening 
border guard capacities. 
In particular, the NATO Science for Peace Projects (SfP) gives a “flavor” on 48 Science for 
Peace (SfP) projects that NATO carried out ongoing as of 31 October 2011. These summaries the 
main project of each SfP project, providing the main objectives and states the most significant 
accomplishments in the priority areas overseen by the NATO Political and Partnerships Committee 
(PPC). In addressing Defense Against Terrorist Threats, advances are noted in the Detection of 
Explosives as well as Cyber Defense. In addressing Defense against CBRN Agents, 
accomplishments are described in the area of development of novel Detection Methods for CBRN 
agents as well as Detection and Decontamination, Destruction and Countermeasures against CBRN 
agents.  
In addressing Other Threats to Security, there have been significant accomplishments in areas 
encompassing Environmental Security and especially Management of Water and other Non-
renewable Resources, Radioactive Waste/Tailings, as well as Disposal of Dangerous Chemicals and 
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Pesticides. Progress is also reported in dealing with the protection against Natural Disasters 
including those caused by Earthquakes and Floods. A 
Also described is important work underway on Energy Security and Security Related 
Technologies, as well as Security-Related Regional Studies involving three or more Neighboring 
Partners, encouraging cross border cooperation. The SfP program has enabled scientists and 
engineers from Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to engage in these projects jointly 
with their counterparts in NATO countries. The training of young scientists, infrastructure 
development, publications and technical exchanges carried out within the framework of these 
projects are noted here. Also described are some of the concrete measures taken for the 
implementation of the results through government agencies, private industries, academia and highly 
placed decision makers.    
These have been organized in three major parts, i.e. “Defense against terrorist threats”, 
“Defense against CBRN agents” and “Other Threats to Security” i.e develop Good Governance. 
Each of these parts is further divided into subtopics that relate to the approved priorities of the 
Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC). Each project summary report includes a numerical 
reference to the original SfP Project. All projects are listed in Theme order, according to the key 
priorities and the names and affiliations of the project co-directors, approval date, duration, NATO 
budget and, if applicable, NATO consultant, other collaborating institutions, intellectual property 
rights and internet references are provided.    
SfP projects are jointly carried out by NATO countries in cooperation with Partner and/or 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries. These countries are eligible for NATO funding.   
- NATO countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
- Partner countries: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1, Georgia, Ireland, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.    
The following Partner countries are ineligible for NATO funding support, but may participate 
fully in SPS activities at their own expense: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.    
- Mediterranean Dialogue Countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia.    
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- Countries of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates   
NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2004, aims to contribute to long-term 
global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical 
bilateral cooperation with NATO. These countries may participate in SPS activities at their own 
expense.    
- Global Partner Countries (formerly called Contact Countries): Afghanistan, 
Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and New 
Zealand.   
NATO cooperates with a range of countries which share familiar strategic concerns and key 
Alliance values and have expressed an interest in deepening relations with NATO. These countries 
may participate in SPS activities at their own expense.  Participation in NATO’s Science for Peace 
initiative helps Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue scientists to increase contacts in the NATO 
science community, while building a stronger science infrastructure in their home countries. SfP 
projects require collaboration between science and industry or between science and governmental 
authorities.    
SfP projects have as essential characteristics:   
- relevant to the key NATO SPS Key Priorities; 
- high quality applied science and technology with a potential for commercialization in 
the case of industry-oriented projects; 
- substantial scientific cooperation among Partner and NATO scientists; 
- ability to contribute to the solution of problems, dealing with industrial or 
environmental issues; 
- ability to promote collaboration among scientists, industry and end-users; 
- good prospects for promoting the integration of the country’s scientists into the 
international R & D community; 
- application of modern management practices and techniques; 
- substantial participation of young scientists.   
SfP projects are non-proprietary and fully open to inspection by the Project Co-Directors, SfP 
Program Staff, the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG) and NATO consultants. The 
ownership of all intellectual property rights and patents on equipment, processes or protocols 
resulting from a SfP project shall be governed by the national laws and regulations of the 
participating countries. Progress on all projects, including the financial status, is reported on a semi-
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annual basis to the SfP Program Working Group by 20 April and 20 October each year. Individual 
progress reports are then compiled in a SfP progress report. 
 
 
 
Agency 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
Partnership 
 
 
 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
 
Border management Combating; 
human trafficking Combating; 
terrorism Conflict prevention and 
resolution Military reform and co-
operation 
 
 
 
ongoing  
budget  
1,6 
2001-2011 
Integrated Border 
Management Systems; 
Techniques of search 
international transport and 
risk analysis; Document 
Integrity, Profiling and 
Imposters; Intelligence 
gathering, Analysis and Info 
Sharing; Chemical precursors. 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
Support to Regional Cooperation in 
Border Security and Management   
 
Conflict Prevention and Early 
Warning 
1,3 
2001-2011   
 
1,5 
2001-2011 
Training in conflict 
prevention to address issues 
of concern with local 
authorities and communities 
in near-border areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO 
 
 
 
 
Tajikistan 
Development of National Border 
Strategy and Implementation Plan   
Development of Canine Center   
Patrol Programming & Leadership 
Customs assistance;  Development of 
the Tajik Border Troops Academy   
Development of Cross-Border  
Cooperation within the Border 
Delegate cooperation framework   
Police. 
 
 
 
 
6.9 
2001 – 2011 
 
 
 
Provision of infrastructure, 
equipment and training, 
workshop and conferences   
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, www.nato.int (accessed 
July 2012). 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
Partnership 
 
 
Turkmenistan 
 
 
Strengthening border guard 
capacities    in Turkmenistan 
 
 
2,0 
 
 
2001-2011 
Skills training of border 
guards in patrolling, map 
reading, basic reconnaissance 
methods, navigation, 
information gathering, 
reporting, etc. 
 
 
 
Uzbekistan 
Assistance to the Fight against 
Illicit Drug Circulation; 
   
Assistance in introduction of a local 
system of machine readable travel 
documents with biometric 
identifiers 
1,0 
2001-2011  
   
 
 
 
 
1.3 
2003-2011 
Trainings for middle level 
officers of Uzbek law 
enforcement agencies 
including representatives 
from Uzbek Border Guards;  
 
Committee on organization 
and tactics of counteraction to 
illicit drugs circulation and 
identification of drugs 
smuggling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO 
 
Afghanistan  
 
 
 
Establishment of a Border 
Management Information System 
(BMIS) 
 
 
Training Centre for Border Guards  
in Khorog and Dushanbe 
 
2,7 
 2005-2011 
 
 
 
0.4 
Nov 2005 – 
ongoing 
Development of a systematic 
migration data collection, 
analysis and sharing 
mechanism. 
 
 
Training on border control 
and identification of false 
documents, computer skills, 
migration legislation, English 
language. 
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meeting in Brussels, www.nato.int (accessed July 2012). 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
Partnership 
 
Border Crossing Point Upgrades at  
Bahram Chah (South) 
 
 
Construction of Border Outposts ( 
 
 
 Office of defense cooperation 
(ODC), Equipment for Afghanistan 
Special Forces Units   
 
 
ODC, Interagency Communications   
 
 
ODC, National Training Center in 
Kabul, training ranges construction 
 
 
2001-2011   
3,0  
 
 
 
 
2004 – 
ongoing   
 
0,7  
 
 
 
2010-2011     
1,4 
 
 
 
 
2010-2012    
3.8 
 
 
 
 
2007- 
ongoing 
 
5,0 
 
Training/improvement of 
training facilities    
 
 
Improvement of 
accommodation and working 
facilities  
 
 
Training/improvement of 
training facilities    
 
Provide modern tactical and 
training equipment as well as 
radios, computer equipment; 
 
Vehicles to Afghan Armed 
Forces (ANSF) 
 
 
 
Border Interdiction Training     
 
 
2005   
ongoing   
2,0 
 
 
Nov 2005 - 
Dec 2011  
3,4 
 
Interdiction and Enforcement  
Techniques for those 
inspecting cargo at borders   
 
 
Training & Equipment for 
law enforcement agencies. 
International Conferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Afghanistan  
 
 
Training at State Customs Service 
Training Academy  Export Control 
and Related Border Security 
Program. 
 
2004 
ongoing 
5,6 
 
 
Training for customs officers 
supply chain security, SFA 
methodology 
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meeting in Brussels, www.nato.int (accessed July 2012). 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million  
 
Partnership 
 
 
Border Interdiction Training 
3,0 
 
2005 
ongoing   
 
 
0,8 
Nov 2009 - 
Dec 2011 
Interdiction and Enforcement 
Techniques for those 
inspecting cargo at borders   
 
Training & Equipment for 
law enforcement agencies. 
International Conferences. 
 
Strengthening drug and related 
crime control measure in selected 
checkpoints    
 
11,3 
2001-2011  
 
 
Technical (expertise) 
assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Afghanistan  
 
 
Support to strengthening of the 
State Drug Control Service 
 
 
Strengthening control along Tajik-
Afghan border Countering the 
trafficking of Afghan opiates 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening Container Control 
regime 
 
 
2,5 
On – going  
2005 
 
 
9,2 
2001 –2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9,6 
2008-2012 
 
Training of ANA, ABP, ASF 
 
 
 
Training activities (for Tajik-
Afghan officers) Enhance 
border crossing facilities with 
established lines of 
communication and 
intelligence-sharing 
 
Expertise, training/equipment 
to enhance knowledge of the 
staff and technical capacity of 
the checkpoint Training in 
supply chain security to 
facilitate the legal trade  
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, www.nato.int (accessed July 2012). 
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Here are some projects of interest: 
NATO Science for Peace Projects in Theme Order 
 
Project nr. Title Country Date 
 
983945 
Assessing Trans 
boundary Water 
Pollution in Central 
Asia 
Kyrgyzstan  
Kazakhstan 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
2001 
2011 
 
 
983931 
Sustainable 
Management of 
borders in Central 
Asia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Turkmenistan 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
2001 
2011 
 
 
983142 
Geo-Environmental 
Security of the 
Toktogul 
Hydroelectric Power 
Station Region, 
Central Asia 
 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Uzbekistan 
 
2001 
2011 
 
 
983289 
Prevention of 
Landslide Dam 
Disasters in the Tien 
Shan, Kyrgyz 
Republi 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
2001 
2011 
 
98281 
Microbiological 
safety of drinking 
water in Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Uzbekistan 
 
2001 
2011 
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Example of project: 
SfP 983945 Assessing transboundary water pollution in Central Asia   
Project Co-Directors: - Prof. Eiliv Steinnes Trondheim, Norway (NPD); 
- Prof. Oktiabrin Sadyrov Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (PPD) 
- Prof. Zafar Razykov, Hudjand, Tajikistan 
- Prof. Nasrulla Ismailov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
- Prof. Uylesbek Besterekov, Shymkent, Kazakhstan 
    
Approval Date:  23 May 2011  
Effective Starting Date: 1 July 2011  
Duration:  3 years, until July 2014 NATO Budget:   
EUR 869,000 
 
Abstract of Research   
Due to initial delay the effective starting date of the project is fixed at July 1, 2011. The main 
equipment to be used in the project has been decided, and installation is expected in the near future. 
Efforts to renovate the laboratory areas designated for the project are under way in the four 
participating universities. No research can be performed before the equipment is in place and the 
personnel working in the project has received the necessary training. The basic training session is 
scheduled at January 2012.   
Major Objectives   
To follow the concentration of nine key heavy metals in the Syr-Darya river systems over a 
period of three years in order to assess variations in contamination levels and the extent of 
transboundary transport of these metals between the Central Asian countries of Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
To lay the foundation for a permanent joint water monitoring program in the region, 
involving these four countries, who all depend on Syr-Darya as a main water resource. 
Overview of Achievements since the Start of the Project until 30 September 2011.   
Decision has been made on the purchase of equipment for Atomic Absorption Spectrometry 
(AAS), the main instrumental tool to be used in the project.  
The AAS equipment has been ordered, and delivery to the four universities and installation in 
underway.  
Equipment for the purification of water, which is a must for the trace element analyses to be 
performed, has been ordered and will be delivered in due course.  
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The first official Project meeting was organized in Bishkek on September 5-8, 2011. 
Renovation of the laboratory facilities to be used in the project is completed in Kyrgyzstan 
and underway in the other Partner Countries.  
An agreement has been reached with the Alex Stuart Laboratories, Karabalta, Kyrgyzstan on 
the conditions for training of personnel from the four universities in AAS Spectrometry.   Payments 
through NATO Funds: EUR 76,550   
Milestones for the Next Six Months   
Final installation of AAS equipment (December 1, 2011)  
Preparation of Quality Assurance Project Plan (March 1, 2012)  
Training of laboratory staff (March 15, 2012)  
Acquisition of equipment for field registrations (February 1, 2012)  
Development of field schedules (February 15, 2012)  
Start field sampling (March 1, 2012) 
NATO Consultant : N/A   
Other Collaborating Institutions : N/A    
Intellectual Property (IP) Rights : N/A 
    
Abbreviations:  AAS: Atomic Absorption Spectrometer; CPO: Common Procedures of 
Operation; GLP: Good Laboratory Practice; FCCT: Faculty of Chemistry and Chemical 
Technologies; ICP: Inductively Coupled Plasma spectrometer; KNU: Kyrgyz National University; 
KR: Kyrgyz Republic; MiTA: Micro-Trace Analysis; MMIT: Mining- metallurgical Institute of 
Tajikistan; MSU: Moscow State University; NPD: NATO Country Project Director; NTNU: 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology; PPD: Partner Country Project Director; QA: 
Quality Assurance; QAPrP: Quality Assurance Project Plan; QC: Quality Control; RK: Republic of 
Kazakhstan; SAEL: Stewart Assay and Environmental Laboratories; SKSU: Southern Kazakhstan 
State University; TCTI: Tashkent Chemical-Technological Institute; TR: Tajik Republic; UDS: 
Unified Database System; UzR: Uzbek Republic 
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4.6.1 Governance 
Both EU and NATO have encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible 
members of the international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and 
through coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-
democratic regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders 
publicly embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they 
have established some trade and aid ties with Iran.  
The societies of Central Asia have been beset by lackluster and often abusive rule, first by 
warring and insular feudal chiefs, then by colonial conquerors from Russia, and then by their Soviet 
successors. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union 20 years ago, the five Central Asian 
republics have struggled to find viable governance models and to place their economies, long 
moored to Moscow, on stable footing. The region’s governments have largely failed in that quest. 
Central Asia faces a bleak political landscape, with corruption and human rights are routinely 
ignored and economic opportunity is limited. The early 1990s, well-placed Communist Party 
officials ascended to presidencies across Central Asia and twenty years later, three out of five 
remain in power, with no clear succession plans in sight. The other two left the scene, leaving 
behind muddled aftermaths. Central Asia does not need external reminders of its instability, 
Kyrgyzstan had its own season of political renewal, the country went through two revolutions in the 
space of five years, both predating regime overthrows. 
Most recently, security forces in Kazakhstan shot and killed at least 16 people in December 
protests in a Western oil town— the most serious explosion of violence in the country’s history30 
For instance, Ralph S. Clem, political analysts at Florida International University, has 
attempted to quantify the similarities between Central Asia and the Middle East by studying data on 
governance, economic development, corruption, and wealth gaps from sources such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank. The empirical data in his possess suggest a very close fit between 
socioeconomic conditions in Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and the five Central Asian 
countries on the other, especially with regard to the youthfulness of the population.  
In other respects and in some countries, the pre-conditions associated with political unrest are 
even more problematic in Central Asia than in North Africa,” Clem writes . He goes on to say that 
this comparison, between the Middle East and Central Asia, portends turbulence ahead, particularly 
for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. None of this is to suggest that political change in Central Asia 
will follow the Middle Eastern or Kyrgyz scenarios of street protests and revolutions. 
 
                                               
30
 Kazakhstan Asks UN to Help Investigate Deadly Clashes,” BBC News, December 22, 2011, accessed January 8, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16305005.  
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
Partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
Tajikistan  
Border Crossing Point Upgrades at 
Nizhniy Pyanj  
 
Construction of Border Outposts 
(Zastavas) 
 
 Office of defense cooperation 
(ODC), Equipment for Tajikistan 
Special Forces Units   
 
ODC, Interagency 
Communications,    
National Training Center in 
Karatag, Phase 1: Training ranges 
construction 
50,0 
2004-2011   
 
 
2007 – 
ongoing   
0.5 
 
 
 
2,0     
 
2001-2011 
 
 
2010-2012    
 
0,7 
 
 
 
 
Training/improvement of 
training facilities;  
 
 
Improvement of 
accommodation and working 
facilities; 
 
 
Provide modern tactical and 
training equipment as well as 
radios, computer equipment, 
and vehicles to Tajik special 
forces teams. 
 
Provision of modern life 
support and training facilities 
for the Tajik Armed Forces to 
enhance their forces’ capacity 
to counter narcotics 
trafficking   
 
 
 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
 
Border Interdiction Training     
 
0,3 ongoing   
since 2007 
 
1,3 
Nov 2009 
Dec 2011  
 
Interdiction and Enforcement  
Techniques for those 
inspecting cargo at borders   
 
 
 
Training & Equipment for 
law enforcement agencies. 
International Conferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO  
EU 
 
 
Afghanistan  
 
 
Training at State Customs Service 
Training Academy  Export Control 
and Related Border Security 
Program (EXBS) 
 
0.2 
ongoing  
2010 -2012 
 
Training for customs officers 
in IBM, supply chain security,  
DPU methodology 
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, www.nato.int (accessed July 2012). 
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For all the structural similarities between parts of Central Asia and the Middle East, there are 
critical differences, too; as the population of Central Asia tends to be depoliticized and some of its 
most active members are either content with the relative economic stability as in Kazakhstan or are 
working in Russia as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and they are not clamoring for political change. 
The tumultuous experience of Kyrgyzstan has given authoritarian regimes in the neighboring 
countries a resonant argument: revolutions lead to chaos and bloodshed and authoritarian stability is 
preferable to half-baked democratic experiments 
In the years to come, political change in Central Asia will likely be driven by inter-elite 
tussles, particularly during succession struggles following the death, retirement, or incapacitation of 
longtime rulers: There are no simple solutions in the region. A rush toward democracy and 
elections, by itself, will not solve Central Asia’s many crises and may exacerbate them in the short 
term. The precise events that triggered street protests in Kyrgyzstan and the Middle East vary from 
country to country, but what they all have in common is popular anger at the anything-goes crony 
capitalism practiced by the ruling elites coupled with a lack of economic opportunity. 
Across much of Central Asia, the failures of the ruling regimes and their crackdowns against 
many forms of dissent have left their citizens with few political alternatives. In the absence of a 
secular opposition, religious groups may enter the fray, a scenario that is plausible in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, particularly in light of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.  
Despite their façade of invincibility, some Central Asian regimes are inherently unstable, as 
the example of Kyrgyzstan has demonstrate. But as Kyrgyzstan also shows, the sudden collapse of a 
dictatorial regime may also have unforeseen consequences and unleash violence and given the 
historical, cultural, and linguistic kinship among the five nations that make up Central Asia, one 
would expect a degree of regional unity.  
Such unity could help the states tackle common problems, advance a coordinated position 
with respect to foreign powers, and ease cross-border travel for Central Asian citizens, to mention 
just a few possible areas of cooperation. The Central Asian states inherited a complex set of borders 
from centuries of Russian gerrymandering, giving rise to border disputes that continue to this day. 
In a region that is dependent on agriculture, management of scarce water resources across borders 
has sharpened mutual recriminations, particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which 
historically have sparred on a variety of issues.  
The region’s primary waterway, the Amu Darya River, flows northwest, giving the countries 
upstream, including Tajikistan, control over how much water travels downstream to Uzbekistan, 
where thirsty crops such as cotton require a lot of irrigation. Tajikistan wants to build a large dam 
  
156 
and harness the Amu Darya’s power for electricity production, a plan that is causing consternation 
in Uzbekistan. 
However, according to international analysts in the longer run, their foreign policies may not 
be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of other Islamic states. Some Western 
organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in particular those of the OSCE, 
which has been criticized by some Central Asian governments for advocating democratization and 
respect for human rights. However, despite this criticism, President Nazarbayev successfully pushed 
for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE. 
The EU has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the region has become 
more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons of mass destruction, 
refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Such interests contributed to the launch of 
a Strategy Paper for assistance for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the 
EU’s appointment of a Special Representative to the region.  
The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs, which set forth 
political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. An existing 
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was supplemented in 2004 and 
2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative and Astana Energy Ministerial Declaration to diversify energy 
supplies. One project involves the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could transport Caspian 
region gas to Austria31. 
In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations 
for 2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state and assistance of $1 billion 
over the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced 
because EU enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it to 
Central Asia’s borders.  
The strategy also stresses that the dependency of the EU on external energy sources and the 
need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security open further 
perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia and that the EU will conduct an 
enhanced regular energy dialogue with the states. Under the strategy, the EU holds dozens of 
projects, meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues as human 
rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment, 
environmental and energy cooperation and other issues. 
 
                                               
31
 For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin. See also 
European Union, “The EU and the Countries of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions Agree on a Common Energy 
Strategy,” Press Release, November 30, 2006, at http://www.inogate.org.  
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4.6.2 Economy 
 
Economy and trade is a cornerstone of the European Union‘s economic prosperity and for 
consumers, trade provides access to a wider variety of goods at lower prices than could be produced 
domestically. For EU businesses, it provides larger markets and access to essential production 
inputs, including technology developed abroad. International trade takes place within a framework 
of rules developed through negotiations, refined through practice and clarified through litigation 
before the national courts and international trade dispute settlement mechanisms under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  
However, the global economy witnessed unprecedented economic stresses in terms of 
massive global imbalances, very large real exchange rate swings, and a boom-bust cycle of 
exceptional amplitude in the first decade of the 2000’s. These had profound consequences in terms 
of real activity, wealth effects, fiscal situations, unemployment, social and political stresses, and 
consequent resort to extraordinary policy measures which directly or indirectly have had significant 
implications for global trade flows. These rules are designed to ensure that trade works to the 
mutual benefit of the trading partners and is based on genuine competitive advantages.  
On the economic front, a qualified exception could be made for Kazakhstan, where aided by 
the country’s generous oil reserves, an authoritarian government there has presided over economic 
growth. But Kazakhstan also faces real challenges of governance, economic diversification and 
equitable distribution of wealth going forward. Elsewhere in the region, pronouncements of 
economic growth and low inflation do not tell the full story of the economy’s true shape. Oil-rich 
Kazakhstan, for instance, is a far cry from the poor and fractious state of Tajikistan and the ongoing 
political ferment in Kyrgyzstan offers a stark contrast to the sterile political atmosphere of 
Uzbekistan. As it can be seen from the table below, another driver for EU engagement in CA region 
is economic. Trade over Central Asian hydrocarbons, uranium and electricity is part of the 
European Union strategy to gain confidence and support dialogue as a regional driver in Eurasia. 
However, the EU economic presence is facing with stiff competition from China and the Russia, 
with regards to gas and a few niche areas. 
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European Union imports, exports and total trade with Central Asian states in 2011 in millions of Euros 
 
 Imports 
from EU 
 
Rank 
Exports to 
EU 
 
Rank 
 
Total trade 
 
Rank  
Kazakhstan 4,238.4 (18.7%)  
3 
31,780.8 
(4.9%) 
 
3 
 
6,019.2 
(10.3%) 
 
3 
Kyrgyzstan 810.4 (15%) 2 268.7 (32.1%) 1 1,079.1 
(17.3%) 
2 
Tajikistan 646.8 (32.2%) 1 76.9 (8.5%) 3  
723.7 (24.9%) 
1 
Turkmenistan 600.6 (14.2%) 3  
101.9 (4%) 
8 702.5 (10.3%) 4 
Uzbekistan 1,382.8 (21.4%) 1 1,047.8 
(24.1%) 
1 2,430.6 
(22.5%) 
1 
 
Source: Table based on information from 2011 European Commission statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/coun-tries-and-regions (accessed 22/10/12). 
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4.6.3 Education 
In the developing regions of the globe, the net enrolment rate for children of primary school 
age rose from 82 to 90 per cent between 1999 and 2011. However, a closer look at the data reveals 
that nearly all of this growth occurred between 1999 and 2004, and that progress in reducing the 
number of out-of-school children slowed considerably after 2004. At the same time, many of the 
countries facing the greatest challenges have recorded significant progress towards universal 
primary education.  
More than 90 per cent of children of primary school age were enrolled either in primary or 
secondary schools in 2011. In central Asia, at least 95 per cent of primary-age children were in 
school. Globally, there has been progress in reducing girls’ exclusion from primary education, with 
the female share of out-of-school children in developing countries as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
dropping from 58 to 53 per cent between 1999 and 2011.  
In 2011, the primary completion rate, assessed by the gross intake ratio to the last grade of 
primary education, reached 90 per cent, compared with 81 per cent in 1999. Regional values ranged 
from 70 per cent to almost 100 per cent in Central Asia. With more children completing primary 
education, the demand for secondary education is growing.  
This increased demand poses a serious challenge for Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
with limited resources and unsecure environment. Indeed, Afghans and Uzbeks, about one quarter 
of the children who complete primary school do not continue on to secondary education. The 
regional average, however, hides substantial differences between countries. The transition rate from 
primary to secondary education ranges from around 30 per cent in Afghanistan, Kirgizstan and 
Uzbekistan to 98 per cent in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Young people who do not pursue their 
education join the group of adolescents of lower-secondary age who are not enrolled in either 
primary or secondary school.  
The continued degradation of the education systems in Central Asia, including vocational and 
higher education, has had a negative impact on the quality of education at all levels. It has also 
exacerbated the mismatch between education and training on the one hand, and the needs of labor 
markets and employment on the other one.  
Resolving these issues will be essential for the implementation of CA countries’ poverty 
reduction/social welfare improvement strategies. The demand by CA partners for the EU to 
strengthen its cooperation in this field remains very high, including for vocational education and 
training. CA countries request for assistance to gradually bring their education systems in line with 
the Bologna process32 and the EU’s higher education modernization agenda are also of particular 
                                               
32
 http://www.bolognaprocess.it/  
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strategic importance. Training of faculty staff and graduates is part and parcel of a comprehensive 
approach to adjust education to market economy requirements and upgrade knowledge and 
competencies to face the sustainable development challenges of the region.  
Actions in the area of higher education institution building and cooperation and mobility of 
students and teaching staff have been made as contributions to the development of the partner 
countries. Moreover, increased action in science and research is supporting the development of a 
knowledge based economy.   
The TEMPUS IV and ERASMUS MUNDUS programs have the flexibility to adjust to the 
specific needs of each country’s sustainable development strategies in the field of education it 
continues to constitute a main instrument for delivering assistance. 
In all such activities, gender balance should be ensured. Another recent initiative is the 
Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN), the aim of which is to narrow the digital 
divide and contribute to the modernization of the education and research sector in the region. 
CAREN is also assist in building the capacity of higher education and research institutions to take 
part in the 7th Framework Program and increase their involvement with the European Research 
Area.   
The EU and its Member States have set up a European Education Initiative for Central Asia 
in order to help the education systems of Central Asian states adapt to the needs of the globalized 
world. A regional approach leading to the emergence of a harmonized regional education area is 
also highlighted as an important issue for the future sustainable development of the countries of the 
region, particularly in view of the sizeable flows of migrant workers.  
They have been keen to adapt the reform of their higher education systems to the principles of 
the Bologna Process and in line with the Lisbon Agenda, in particular through the TEMPUS and the 
ERASMUS Mundus programs and participation in the 7th Framework Programs for research and 
technological development. All these EU programs have been given a new impetus through support 
for political dialogue mechanisms and new initiatives set up under ENP, the Eastern Partnership and 
the EU Central Asia Strategy. 
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4.6.4 Security & Safety 
 
Central Asian states face continued challenges in managing their borders and the movement 
of people and goods across them. The principles of integrated border management have proven 
effective in ensuring transparent but secure borders. There is potential for enabling sustainable 
cooperation mechanisms among the CA countries by applying shared principles for border 
management, which deliver economies of scale for certain activities such as legal approximation 
and training.  
The region is a key trafficking route for arms, illegal drugs and human beings. Addressing 
these issues requires intervention at national level to improve existing legal and judicial 
frameworks, tackle corruption and improve border management. Security remains the first driver 
shaping EU and NATO involvement in Central Asia. The challenges are multiple, as any 
destabilization in the weak Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, or the most unpredictable Uzbekistan might 
lead an Islamist infiltration, an increase in the inflow of drugs, reaching European population, 
which is already widely targeted by drug traffickers. Even though Europe has no border with 
Central Asia and thus no territorial contiguity, the securing of the south-east borders of Central Asia 
is seen as a question of wide-range of security.  
It can be said that Central Asia is therefore viewed by NATO and then by EU as a buffer zone 
with a south that is increasingly subject to a strategic uncertainty and non-traditional threats. Even if 
the EU and NATO do not officially endorse interference in the internal affairs of Central Asia, 
international analysts are becoming more and more aware of the fact that slow development in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan creates insecurity and lack of preparation for political 
change may have a destabilizing impact.  
Europe is discretely starting to encourage the Central Asian governments to undertake 
reforms for avoiding the Arabic spring-type situations may occur because of the potential “cocktail” 
of political repressions, social and economic depression and the “securitization” of national 
resources by a shrinking elite.  
The EU strategy for Central Asia outlines seven priorities,38 its main interests lie foremost in 
the stability of the region and countering negative spill-over effects from Afghanistan, as well as in 
securing energy resources (potential gas imports from Turkmenistan and oil from Kazakhstan). At 
the same time the EU tries to place an emphasis on democratic values and human rights, which is 
challenging considering the authoritarian nature of the Central Asian regimes.  
In practice, these objectives have competing logics. The European desire to diversify gas 
export routes in order to reduce its dependence on Russia has led to a relaxation of EU human rights 
  
162 
pressure on Turkmenistan. The potential for the country to participate in the Southern Corridor, 
even at a modest 10 billion cubic metres per year, has led to some human rights and rule of law 
criticisms being overlooked.  
Meanwhile, the Central Asian governments that participate in the Northern Distribution 
Network, with Uzbekistan at its core, want to be rewarded for their “support” to the Western 
campaign in Afghanistan. When faced with NATO, the EU has not succeeded in arguing its case 
and has instead found itself somewhat paralyzed by security priorities, which is all the more 
paradoxical considering that the domestic stability of the Central Asian states partly depends on a 
secure Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, the EU’s development investment is still limited and spreads thinly over the 
region and is having little effect due to the corrupt nature of the Central Asian ruling classes. Taken 
together, the EU’s objectives seek to link energy, security, values and development goals and 
interests, though not in a structural or achievable manner. The EU and NATO role as a hard security 
actor on the international scene is limited and most European countries place their trust in NATO to 
guarantee their security on a global level.  
The reasons for disagreements between European member states on the development of 
CSDP33 structures, the awkward relationship between the EU and NATO caused by a large 
overlapping membership and above all to defense cuts around Europe. 
In Central Asia, EU mechanisms barely relate to hard security and the soft security initiatives 
are too dispersed to have a serious impact. Moreover, security assistance is often associated with 
institutions other than the EU. The OSCE, for instance, has a border guard training program in 
Central Asia, while NATO support own association strategies, via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for Kazakhstan. Member states are also 
engaged in bilateral programs (including aid for police training)Moreover, enhancing cooperation at 
regional level in the fields of migration and asylum and combating organized crime, including 
trafficking and related police/judicial reform, is an essential tool, providing the capacity to cope 
with issues of major trans-border dimensions in line with the EU approach.  
With the implementation of the projects mentioned above table, the long-term impact that EU 
and NATO foresee is the adoption of an Integrated Border Management approach allowing for the 
facilitation of legitimate trade and transit whilst reducing illicit cross-border movement of goods 
and people. Yet, the enhancement of cooperation between border, customs and migration services 
within states and between the states of Central Asia will be also relevant for EU and international 
community. 
                                               
33
 Common Security and Defense Policy, source http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence?lang=en 
accessed  October 2012. 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million  
 
Partnership 
 
Central Asia Regional Information 
and Coordination center-CARICC 
 
 
 
Strengthening drug law 
enforcement systems for criminal 
intelligence collection, analysis and 
exchange   
 
 
15,4 
2004-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
6,2 
2001-2014 
 
Information &intelligence 
sharing among the region to 
promote regional cooperation 
against drugs. 
 
Training in criminal 
intelligence collection and 
information management 
capacities, mechanisms for 
information exchange. 
 
Project on Counter-Narcotics 
Training of Afghan, Central Asian 
and Pakistani Law Enforcement 
Personnel. 
 
Precursors control in Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) and Azerbaijan 
 
5,9 
2007-2013 
 
 
 
7,5 
2001-2011 
 
 
Mid-level drug control 
training pilot project in 
Central Asia & Afghanistan 
 
 
 
Assistance in precursor 
control to improve national 
and regional regulatory, 
scientific & law enforcement 
capacities; to improve 
precursor control cooperation 
with other countries in the 
region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO, 
UN, 
OSCE, 
WB,  
JICA,  
US 
GOV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countering the trafficking of 
Afghan opiates via the northern 
route by enhancing the capacity of 
key border crossings points and 
through the establishment of Border 
Liaison Offices  (Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan  & Uzbekistan. 
 
Cross border resources and 
conflicts   
 
21,6 
2007- 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
125,00 
2007-2011 
 
Enhanced capacity for 
international cooperation 
against organized crime,  
corruption, drug trafficking 
and terrorism. 
 
 
Enhancing cooperation via 
joint training and conference 
events 
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO, UN, OSCE, WB, JICA and US GOV websites and meetings in 
Brussels, in 2012. 
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Moreover, the gradual adoption of EU best practice in the field of drugs policy should lead to 
foster the improved application of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the 
protection of human rights. Of course, EU and NATO expect as main outcome a greater 
harmonization of procedures at regional level, including with regard to integrated border 
management principles, the fight against organized crime and anti-drugs related legislation. 
The enhancement of the border and migration management cooperation and systems, 
increased trade flows and more effective combatting of illicit trafficking through increased regional 
cooperation. Further, the institutional and operational capacity of border, customs, law enforcement 
authorities and judicial bodies would support the exchange of inter-agency coordination information 
on the main threats for the CA countries. As a result, the enhanced of the regional and cross-border 
cooperation among border authorities (including exchange of information, progress towards joint 
border crossing points, joint patrolling or controlled deliveries for drugs, anti-money-laundering) 
should put in place the creation of a modern customs administration geared to facilitating the 
exchange of goods, whilst implementing controls at the required level of quality. 
Better understanding and shared information, and increased cooperation on migratory flows 
would also facilitate the circulation and integration of legal migrants, assistance to asylum seekers 
and increased capacity to detect and prevent trafficking of human beings.   
On the terrorism fighting, the CA states have supported the operation in Afghanistan with 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the 
Taliban, fearing Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking. Most Central 
Asian states agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and NATO non-lethal supplies to 
Afghanistan as an alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan, providing aid and 
increased trade and transport links with Afghanistan.  
But later on (October 2010), although Kazakh President Nazarbayev announced that the 
country would send some officers to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, the Taliban reportedly 
issued a threat two days later to retaliate against Kazakhstan for supporting ISAF, with a bombing 
attack occurred at security offices on May 17 and 24, 2011. Hence, the Kazakh Senate rejected the 
bill approved by the lower chamber. 
In Central Asia the EU’s focus lies primarily in the sphere of soft security or human security. 
Development assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is largely underpinned by stability and 
security concerns, for instance in the fields of poverty reduction and migration. EU assistance 
programs seek to build more inclusive societies that can resist security threats such as ethnic 
violence, internal instability and interstate tensions. In this sense the EU’s regional programs are 
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designed to bring the five countries, which have weak and strained relationships with each other, to 
the table in order to foster cooperation on water management or rule of law reforms. 
 
Top 4 European Union interests in Central Asia 
 
1 
 
Helping to secure and stabilize Central Asia. 
 
2 
 
Accessing Central Asian hydrocarbons. 
 
3 
 
Promotion of democratic values and human rights. 
 
4 
 
Meeting internationally agreed development criteria. 
 
Source http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence?lang=en accessed  October 2012. 
 
Combating corruption is an important element in countering many of these security 
challenges”. The EU development  policy, focus on democratic values and security, supporting the 
concept of security and stability in the event that it differs from Central Asian one and recognizing 
that the denial of basic rights and opportunities is equal to the absence of democracy and the rule 
law can lead to situation of insecurity. 
 
 
Source: http://www.transparency.org/, Corruption perceived Index, accessed on November 2012. 
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The anticorruption group Transparency International maintains that high levels of bribery, 
abuse of power and secret dealings continue to “ravage” societies around the world and in particular 
in the Central Asia countries, despite a growing public outcry over corrupt governments. The annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index, the Berlin-based group, shows that two-thirds of 176 countries are 
perceived by citizens to be highly corrupt. Transparency International report states the findings 
indicate a public demand for institutions and officials to be more transparent and accountable. 
Afghanistan, along with North Korea and Somalia, were once again at the bottom of the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, while two-thirds of the 176 countries scored below 50 on a scale 
from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 100 (perceived to be very clean). 
Despite the demonstrations all over the world, in many countries, which were sparked on the 
ground of corruption, the governments still remain inactive and still continue to act as before, and 
continue not to take effective measures to tackle corruption. Russia placed 133rd, alongside Iran and 
Kazakhstan. 
Elsewhere in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan ranked 154, followed by Tajikistan (157), 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (both 170). There are situations which are not improving in Russia 
and other former Soviet republics, with the very small exception of Georgia. These governments 
continue to be utterly opaque and no accountable to citizens, even though many of these 
governments introduced very elegant anticorruption legislation, these remain to be not enforced and 
not implemented. And also there is a continued lack of citizen oversight over what the governments 
are doing or not doing. 
It is to be said that the world’s leading economies can influence the global fight against 
corruption by making sure their institutions are fully transparent and their leaders are held 
accountable. Unfortunately, EU officials have difficulty explaining to Central Asian counterparts 
what their security objectives are and how they plan to meet them and the EU’s security approach to 
the region remains vague and all-encompassing. The 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia lists 
security among its goals, particularly in regards to border management, Afghanistan’s proximity 
and drug trafficking.  
Among EU programs for border securitization, the best known - BOMCA (Border 
Management in Central Asia Program) and CADAP (Central Asia Drug Action Program), 
implemented by the UNDP - focus on the upgrading and/or building of border posts, on equipping 
them with high-tech material, training border guards in searching goods and people, detecting illicit 
sub – stances and on performing combined exercises with neighboring countries as it is described in 
the below table. Currently the BOMCA program is moving increasingly from providing hardware to 
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know-how. In addition, both programs are also designed, at least in theory, to help improve cross-
border trade.  
European countries support several multilateral initiatives, one example being the Central 
Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI), organized by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior 
with support from the European Union, to provide a platform for dialogue and discussion. The EU 
meets at regular intervals with members of the international donor community and agencies 
involved in border security technical assistance, such as the UNDP, OSCE, UNODC, IOM, Japan, 
the Russian Federation and the United States. Another initiative, the Central Asia Regional 
Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics, 
psychotropic substances.  
However, due to a lack of independent evaluation, it is unclear if any of these Western-led 
programs have had a positive impact, or if they are even sustainable. One could argue that the EU’s 
border management program BOMCA should be turned into a CSDP mission, at least the part that 
refers to the Tajik- Afghan border. This would make sense because the CSDP has experience with 
border management programs (EUBAM in Moldova) and with border monitoring (EUMM in 
Georgia and in the Balkans).  
Such a mission, deployed on the Tajik-Afghan border, would be able to prepare for possible 
negative consequences of NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan over the coming years and fit 
nicely with EU activities in Afghanistan on border control or the CSDP police mission. Also a 
CSDP border mission might establish greater pressure on Tajik political elites to get serious about 
reform of border management and maybe even spur some anti-corruption action.  
But clearly the EU member states lack the political will and the resources to think ahead and 
invest in a region far away and of less interest than the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighborhood 
and in the event that interest or necessity rises to the level required for the deployment of a CSDP 
mission, the EU would first need to reach an agreement with Russia, but Moscow would be unlikely 
to be happy to see another CSDP mission be deployed in what it sees as its sphere of influence. 
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Agency 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Program/Project 
 
 
Budget 
€ euro 
million 
 
 
Partnership 
Border Management in Northern 
Afghanistan (BOMNAF) Tajik-
Afghan Poverty Reduction 
Initiative 
 
Combating illicit trafficking of 
radiological and nuclear materials 
in CA 
13,0 
2004-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,5 
 
Training activities (for Tajik-
Afghan officers; 
 
 
Training in border security for 
border/customs officers; 
provision of specialized 
equipment 
 
Fighting organized crime & 
trafficking alongside heroin routes 
 
12,0 
2011- 2012 
 
Reinforcement of national and 
regional activities; law 
enforcement cooperation, 
intelligence sharing, 
integrated response   
 
 
 
 
 
NATO, 
UN, 
OSCE, 
US 
GOV, 
WB, 
JICA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project of Demining Activities  in 
Rushon District; 
 
 
Project for the Installation of X-ray 
Scanning Equipment at the Check 
Points of Uzbekistan Borders with 
the Neighboring Countries 
 
 
Airport,  new passenger terminal 
 
 
15,3 
2006 
ongoing 
 
5.5  
2009-2011   
 
 
 
27,0 
2009 -  2011 
 
Advisory/Advocacy for  
safety of local population; 
 
 
Improvement of customs 
clearance and strengthening 
narcotics/arms control. 
 
 
Training in security and 
smooth flow of passengers 
 
Source: made by the author based on the NATO, UN, OSCE, WB, JICA and US GOV websites and meetings in 
Brussels, in 2012. 
 
One could ask himself, why it is so hard to stop Central Asia’s drug trade and the answer is 
not to easy to be explained. An underreported and underappreciated aspect of international security 
in Central Asia is the fight against drug trafficking. As everyone should know, Afghanistan is the 
world’s largest producer of opium and it reaches world markets through Central Asia and Russia. 
Central Asian countries western partners have been increasingly focusing on drug trafficking in 
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their security assistance to the region, but thus far too little effect. Indeed, defining drug trafficking 
as a “spillover” effect from Afghanistan also leads to a poor assessment of the mechanisms that are 
needed to counter it.  
EU and NATO are focused on improving border security, principally its material aspects (like 
buildings, infrastructure, and equipment), and of course, true is that Central Asian states need better 
border security. Their border guards require better material conditions and training in new 
technologies and best practices and as new states on the international scene, they require foreign 
assistance to rise to international standards.  
However, it is naïve to assume that the fight against drug trafficking can be waged 
successfully with such measures and in the short term-period. To secure a border with checkpoints, 
barbed wire, and watchtowers is not enough to make the frontier impermeable, as the recurrent 
failure of the United States to “close” its southern border with Mexico has shown. In Central Asia, 
all border points, even those that the international community has best equipped, are open borders, 
as corruption has rendered them permeable. Every entry into Central Asian territory can be 
negotiated. 
Drug traffickers are the only ones that try to get across borders by avoiding checkpoints, 
through mountain passes or across rivers and Central Asian borders with Afghanistan cannot be 
made secure by physical means alone. It requires the political will to fight against corruption, and 
for the long term. To be effective, efforts to combat drug trafficking in Central Asia must therefore 
be first political in nature. Russia tries to press the E.U. and NATO to eradicate poppies at the 
source in Afghanistan, which the coalition is unwilling to do because it would alienate the large 
numbers of ordinary farmers who make their livelihood in opium farming.  
But Russia has its own problems that keep it from effectively combating drugs in Central 
Asia. For one, suspicion of European presence in Central Asia has led Moscow to shun cooperation 
with Western drug combating efforts. Secondly, when Russia has been more seriously involved in 
policing the border with Afghanistan, deploying border guards in Tajikistan, its officers got 
involved themselves in the drug trade. 
So with feckless Western and Russian responses, it looks like the fight against drug 
trafficking depends on the Central Asians themselves. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
It was a quite daunting task to assess and measure the impact for several reasons: First, there 
was a wide range of methodological problems. 
To give an example, claiming that a specific bundle of projects have made life safer for the 
rural population of a district in Afghanistan for instance, it means that it is quite sure that the same 
district would be less safe and less stable if it had not received these projects. Hence, we have to 
know what would have happened.    
There are different ways of reaching an answer to such a question: One is to link a specific 
project to a specific outcome, by tracing the processes - step by step - by which the spark created by 
a project can lead to a certain outcome lends a certain plausibility to the argument that it was indeed 
the project that contributed to these changes.  
A second way is to compare the actual development (for example, of household incomes in a 
country that participate in a poverty relief program) with the expected “normal” future 
development. Such a comparison requires that the process can be estimated with some confidence 
how the future development would have been without the intervention. A third way is to compare 
how households that received aid have fared compared to households that did not. Provided that all 
households are similar at the onset of the program, one can attribute observable differences with 
some plausibility to the impact of aid. This research used the first and the third approach, but 
adapted both to the context.  
The second challenge stemmed from huge amount of data available for a complex research 
questions. The third challenge was very much from real life and can be summarized as “no roads, 
no names, no data”. It was one peculiarity of conflict zones where collecting data were often 
logistically demanding. That means that driving from A to B might take weeks and one cannot be 
sure to reach B in one “piece”. Another peculiarity was that reliable data is Afghanistan was not so 
good due to the conflict in place.  
Many areas/villages have no names at all, while others have more than one name, borders 
areas are unknown or just being redrawn, hence, the research took also into account the challenging 
conditions typical for conflict zones.  
 
 
4.7.1 The General Model  
A general model posits the major hypotheses of the investigation, proposing the causal chains 
that bring along those changes which are, according to the research framework, helpful for 
stabilizing the conflict zone and assess the ongoing. It specifies which political, economical and 
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social changes the research will focus on and which factors may have caused these changes. At its 
most basic, such a general model is a set of testable assumptions about the causes of the observed 
changes.  
The research assumed that positive impacts of development cooperation will reflect in much 
more security for communities, a better resource endowment, increased government capacities, a 
more positive perception of the state’s capacity to deliver basic services, better institutions that 
facilitate dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way and a broad acceptance of international 
organizations and development agencies on the ground. 
The model also defines the factors that have assumingly caused the observed changes in the 
dependent variables. It is presumed that the changes may be caused by three different sets of 
factors: By the ongoing development projects, by preexisting local capacities that enable countries 
to better deal with the conflict situation and by a range of other exogenous factors. 
 
  
 
THE BASIC MODEL 
 
   
 
Independent variables 
 
 
Cause 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
(Study Variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence 
 
 
 
Security 
 
 
Conflict Processing 
 
 
Resource Endowment 
 
 
 
Preexisting  
Local Capacities 
(Control Variables) 
 
 
Influence 
 
Governmental  
Organizational 
Capacities  
 
 
Other external factors 
(Control Variables) 
 
 
Influence 
 
 
State Services 
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The research used the basic model as a guideline for specifying what data was needed. 
Accordingly, it was collected data on security, governance, education and several development 
cooperation projects, preexisting local capacities other external factors which may have an impact 
on the changes that was observed.  
Furthermore, collected data on changes occurred on the dependent variables were also taken 
into consideration: security for the countries, a better resource endowment, increased governmental 
organizational capacities, a more positive perception of the state’s capacity to deliver basic services, 
better institutions or dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way and a broad acceptance of 
international organizations on the ground. 
Data were collected through five different methods, by survey among Key Leader 
Engagement (KLE) in the target countries, making sure that the sample was representative for the 
country, which let the research establish profiles of six countries and comparing previous surveys in 
order to trace changes. 
Then, based on NGO collection data, the research was able to profile and compare the data 
collected by other Agencies, for example, the number of schools or the access to markets before or 
later the EU and NATO deployment. The same logic applies to the country community clusters 
comparing the data from the survey, more objective, whereas the survey data is more subjective.  
Yet, semi-structured reports were used to be filled in by local correspondents four times a 
year, the so called quarterly reports of major events and significant changes, for examples major 
new cooperation initiatives, outbreaks of violence, fear and democratic development of public 
elections and natural disasters. This kind of data was useful to construct time series on a limited 
range of variables.  
The research was also conducted in-depth qualitative case studies, representing untypical high 
or low values on the dependent variables and relying on standard qualitative methods: expert 
interviews and focus groups interviews.  
Finally, it was used existing data bases from a development agency to create data on the 
infrastructure situation of the countries. 
 
 
6.7.2 The Surveys  
The basic assumption was that the impact of the EU and NATO presence should be 
observable at different countries levels, therefore, a baseline questionnaire (Annex 2, pag 301) was 
established, allowing the capacity of gathering relevant data on our variables for selected areas. The 
main unit of analysis was therefore the community.  
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It was also assumed that in Afghanistan, for instance, the household (rather than the 
individual) forms the structure of the community. Hence, it was imperative to make sure to have a 
representative and random sample of households for each community. Indeed, it was surveyed 
2,034 households in 77 communities. The size of the samples varied according to the size of the 
community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the community as a whole, 
making possible to aggregate data on country level.  
The two main limiting resources in doing survey research, were the budget available and the 
time that taken by respondents to answer.  
Before implementing the survey, it made sure that the questionnaire was peer-reviewed by 
country experts and carefully followed the process of translating the questions into local languages 
or for those much more educated were translated in English. 
 
 
7.4.3 Profiles, Quarterly Reports and Qualitative Case Studies 
The data collection of the profiles can best be understood as a combination of expert 
interviews and focus group interviews. These profiles contain information on the history, 
demography, ethnic composition, political and social organization, resource endowment, and levels 
of received aid of communities.  
It should be noted that in other settings much of this data would be readily available from 
statistics and censuses. In the Afghan context, however, we had to collect this data on our own. The 
quarterly reports are semi-structured reports, to be filled in by local correspondents four times a 
year. The correspondents were trained in a weeks-long workshop in Kabul.  
The quarterly reports record major events and significant changes that affect the dependent 
variables, but that are not captured in village profiles and surveys, such as major new development 
initiatives, outbreaks of violence, military operations, natural disasters, etc. While the surveys and 
the profiles provide “snapshots” of a given situation at a given time, the quarterly reports provide 
information on change and allow for process-tracing.  
The standardized questions focus on political leadership and violent conflicts within the 
communities, on violent conflicts affecting the community, on threats and developments that affect 
the security situation of the community, on relations between the community and state officials and 
state institutions, especially instances of compliance and non compliance with state rules, and, most 
importantly, on new projects and new aid flows that affect the community. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
ANALYSIS, EXPLAINING THE CHANGE 
 
 
This Chapter provides an analytical information and data on the geography and society issues, 
along with the assessment of the governance, economy, education and security & safety indicators 
for the six Central Asia countries. Moreover, it studies the political and social dynamics of the 
mentioned countries not just from the short-term perspective, but also from the wider and longer-
term perspective of the resilience and weaknesses of organizations, warlord networks and 
institutions. Finally, here is depicted the implications and dynamics with three main actors: Russia, 
US, EU and NATO influence and commitments.  
Russia and China are the most influential external actors in Central Asia, while the US, EU 
and NATO has substantially increased their activities and presence in the region since 1990’s. The 
security and development interests of these five actors are sometimes at odds but can also overlap. 
The five actors are usually perceived in terms of different stereotypes. Whereas the Westerns are 
known for its emphasis on democratic values and human rights, Russia is seen as the main security 
actor (not including the United States and its actions in Afghanistan) and China as the main investor 
in infrastructure and importer of energy.  
Russia and China do not share Europe’s view on numerous international questions and have 
criticized Western policies in Central Asia, denouncing interference in internal affairs in the name 
of human rights and democracy promotion. On the international scene, China is increasingly 
presenting itself as an alternative to the West. 
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5.1 Kazakhstan  
5.1.1 Geography  
Kazakhstan is located in the centre of the continent of Asia, with a coastline only on the 
landlocked Caspian Sea. Russia forms its entire northern border.  
Size: At 2,717,000 square kilometres, Kazakhstan’s area is about four times that of Texas, 
making Kazakhstan the ninth largest nation in the world. Some 47,500 kilometres of the total area is 
occupied by bodies of water.  
Land Boundaries: Kazakhstan has common borders with the following countries: China 
(1,533 kilometres), Kyrgyzstan (1,051 kilometres), Russia (6,846 kilometres), Turkmenistan (379 
kilometres), and Uzbekistan (2,203 kilometres).  
Disputed Territory: Post-Soviet border disputes with China and Kyrgyzstan have been 
settled, but numerous points along the Uzbekistan border remained in dispute in 2006. Kazakhstan 
has signed seabed distribution treaties with Azerbaijan and Russia on resource exploitation in the 
Caspian Sea. Remaining unresolved in 2006 was the distribution of the Caspian Sea water column 
among the littoral states.  
Length of Coastline: Kazakhstan’s only coastline runs 1,894 kilometres along the 
landlocked Caspian Sea.  
Maritime Claims: Jurisdiction over oil, natural gas, and other resources in the Caspian Sea is 
in dispute with other littoral states.  
Principal Rivers: Seven of Kazakhstan’s rivers are 1,000 kilometres or more in length: the 
Chu, Emba, Ili, Irtysh, Ishim, Syr Darya, and Ural. The Irtysh and Ural rivers flow partly through 
Kazakhstan and partly through Russia. The Ili River flows from China into Lake Balkhash in 
eastern Kazakhstan. The Syr-Darya flows from eastern Uzbekistan across Kazakhstan into the Aral 
Sea. 
Natural Resources: In 2006 Kazakhstan’s estimated reserves of oil and natural gas were 35 
billion barrels and 1.9 trillion cubic meters, respectively. Future exploration of offshore fields in the 
Caspian Sea is expected to significantly raise the oil estimate. The country is believed to possess 
about 1 percent of the world’s total reserves of natural gas and petroleum. Also present are 
significant reserves of chromium, coal, copper, gold, lead, tungsten, and zinc. Substantial amounts 
of good agricultural land are present, although Soviet and post-Soviet agricultural practices have 
greatly reduced the extent of that land. 
Environmental Factors: Most of Kazakhstan’s water supply has been polluted by industrial 
and agricultural runoff and, in some places, radioactivity. The Aral Sea, which is shared with 
Uzbekistan, has shrunk to three separate bodies of water because of water drawdown in its tributary 
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rivers. A Soviet-era biological weapons site is a threat because it is located on a former island in the 
Aral Sea that is now connected with the mainland. The reduction in the Aral Sea’s water surface has 
exacerbated regional climatic extremes, and agricultural soil has been damaged by salt deposits and 
eroded by wind. Desertification has eliminated substantial tracts of agricultural land. Plants in 
industrial centers lack controls on effluents into the air and water. The Semey region in the 
northeast has long-term radiation contamination from Soviet-era weapons testing. The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection is underfunded and given low priority. Some new environmental 
regulation of the oil industry began in 2003, but expanding oil operations on Kazakhstan’s Caspian 
coast add to that sea’s already grave pollution. International programs to save the Aral and Caspian 
seas have not received meaningful cooperation from Kazakhstan or other member nations. 
 
5.1.2 Society  
Population: In 2006 Kazakhstan’s population was estimated at 15,233,244, of which about 
52 percent was female. Population density was 5.9 persons per square kilometer. Some 56 percent 
of the population lives in urban areas, and the population is heavily concentrated in the northeast 
and southeast. In the early 2000’s, economic growth brought significant movement from rural to 
urban areas. Because the annual growth rate has been negligible in the early 2000’s, population 
growth is a critical issue for policy makers. Although in recent years a large number of legal and 
illegal immigrant workers have come to Kazakhstan from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in 2006 the 
estimated net migration rate was - 3.33 individuals per 1,000 populations. 
Demography: In 2006 some 23 percent of the population was younger than 15 years of age, 
and 8.2 percent was older than 64. The birth rate was 15.8 births per 1,000 population, and the death 
rate was 9.4 per 1,000 population. The overall fertility rate was 1.9 births per woman. The infant 
mortality rate was 28.3 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth was 61.6 years for 
males and 72.5 years for females. 
Ethnic Groups: According to the 1999 census, 53.4 percent of inhabitants were Kazakh, 30 
percent Russian, 3.7 percent Ukrainian, 2.5 percent Uzbek, 2.4 percent German, and 1.4 percent 
Uyghur. In 1991 the Kazakh and Russian populations were approximately equal. Between 1989 and 
1999, 1.5 million Russians and 500,000 Germans (more than half the German population) left 
Kazakhstan, causing concern over the loss of technical expertise provided by those groups. These 
movements have continued in the early 2000s. The Kazakh population is predominantly rural and 
concentrated in the southern provinces, while the German and Russian populations are mainly urban 
and concentrated in the northern provinces. 
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Religion: Some 47 percent of Kazakhs are Muslim, primarily Sunni Muslims; 44 percent are 
Russian Orthodox, and 2 percent are Protestant. Because the Muslims of Kazakhstan developed 
their religion in isolation from the rest of the Islamic world, there are significant differences from 
conventional Sunni and Shia practices. For example, the teachings of the Quran are much less 
central to the Kazakh version of Islam than in other parts of the Muslim world. 
 
5.1.3 Governance 
Kazakhstan has emerged as the most prosperous country in the region and is reluctant to be 
treated in the same category as the rest, maintaining that the Soviet designation of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan is still valid. Its political economy is increasingly important for regional dynamics. 
Kazakhstan is one of the former Soviet Union countries that have emerged after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It is a ninth largest country in the world and one of the developed countries in the 
Central Asian region, with abundant natural resources. Its population is 15.6 million and its GDP 
per capita is $ 9,832. Based on Human Development Index Kazakhstan is considered being a 
medium developed country with unemployment rate 7.3 %, population below poverty line 13.8%, 
with literacy rate 80.4 %.  
In the post-Soviet era, Kazakhstan remained closely tied to Russia by energy supply lines, 
national defense, and the importance of Russian technologists in Kazakhstan’s economy, but 
Kazakhstan also sought closer relations with the West.  
Beginning in the 1990s, the discovery of major new oil fields and subsequent international 
investment enabled Kazakhstan’s economy to pull far ahead of its Central Asian neighbors. Indeed, 
Kazakhstan choose a path of democratization that implied the active economic liberalization and 
adopting a western style of governance. Economic reforms proved to be effective contrary to 
political reforms that reverted from democratic rule toward old style Soviet rule that was based on 
an idea of a total control of one leader or party.  
Today, Kazakhstan political regime can be described as monocracy, with a strong institution 
of presidency and one of the fastest growing economies in the CA region, but also is an important 
player in the regional arena. It actively involved in strengthening its influence not only in CA but 
also in the Caspian region that is vital for Europe current economic stagnation. Moreover, its 
political leadership was able successfully reform an economic system by reducing a role of ideology 
in economic policies, adhering e to the principles of a market oriented reforms and so significantly 
increasing living standards. 
The political establishment, having made some questionable policy decisions after 
independence, including bringing ethnic Kazakhs from Mongolia, has found a happy medium, 
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elaborating a policy the cornerstones of which are a commitment to the country’s multiethnic 
character, economic success, European social values, and Asian culture and traditions. Kazakh 
history and tradition enjoys official encouragement, but not at the expense of other peoples. This 
state orientation reflects a forward-looking project, based on future progress rather than dwelling on 
past injustices.  
Economic success of Kazakhstan partly contributed to an export of oil and gas but it is the 
effective leadership that was able to manage monetary policies, increasing general living standards 
that cannot be done without certain degree of control and effective management. Despite the 
significant progress in economic area, Kazakhstan is still considered to be a monocracy where all 
power belongs to a highly centralized political institution in the face of the communist party that 
does not tolerate any type of disobedience or critique of the regime that often leads to human rights 
abuse.   
Kazakhstan is one of the 20 least democratic countries on the Human Development Index and 
its government is only the 68th most effective globally. With almost two decades since the last 
major constitutional shift, the country ranks around the global average for regime stability, but there 
are very few checks and balances, preventing arbitrary action by those in power and Kazakhstan 
ranks among the five lowest nations for the degree of competition in the legislative and executive 
branches of government.  
Nevertheless, the Kazakh government has a very high approval rating of 82%, placing it 11th 
on this variable. Almost four in ten Kazakhs approve of the country’s welfare programs, which is in 
line with global averages. In contrast, levels of public confidence in environmental policy are below 
the global average. Perceptions of corruption in government and business are relatively low, with 
Kazakhstan placing in the top 30 countries on this variable.  
Nevertheless, the rule of law is relatively weak by global standards and the quality of 
regulation of business and the economy is among the bottom 30 on the Index, while 86% of 
Kazakhs have confidence in the armed forces and only 53% have confidence in the judiciary.  
Political rights are very poor in Kazakhstan; just 11% of people had expressed an opinion to a 
public official in the year prior to being surveyed in 2011 and over half of the population has 
confidence in the honesty of the electoral process, which is above the international average. Despite 
differences, important similarities exist among CA States, with the exception of Kazakhstan where 
progress in judicial reforms, coupled with enrichment, has increased the role of its Government, 
while the decline in education and healthcare have lost momentum along with many other Soviet 
social achievements. 
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The biggest challenge lies in the nature of the rule of the groups in power, as this means that 
the foundations of political systems are shaky and are prone to shock and crises. The cornerstones 
of such rule are networks of patronage underpinning governance, the monopoly of the ruling group 
over the main assets, the dominant role of the security sector and a strong leader as a centerpiece of 
a political regime.  
While some of Central Asia’s problems can undoubtedly be traced back to the circumstances 
of the Soviet collapse, many of the current sources of tension result from practices, which 
flourished at the time of independence and for Kazakhstan since the beginning of 1999, a series of 
corruption scandals arose and frequent changes of government disrupted economic policy. 
 
5.1.4 Economy 
Kazakhstan is the region’s economic powerhouse, with an economy larger than all the other 
Central Asian countries combined and a key investor in Kyrgyzstan, with investments in gas 
distribution, telecommunications and banking. An Agreement on Encouragement and Mutual 
Protection of Investments entered into force on 1 June 2005. This is in part due to the country’s 
significant hydrocarbon wealth - both oil and natural gas - full development of which could make 
the country one of the top five oil producers in the next decade.  
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In recent years, Kazakhstan has endeavored, with success, to implement a program of 
economic, social and political reforms. Kazakhstan’s economy is driven by the hydrocarbon sector 
and there are significant disparities in income levels and between the central and peripheral regions. 
Although efforts have by made by EU, the main challenges continue to be the modernization of the 
public administration, developing good governance, including at the local level, diversification of 
the economy and social sector reform.   
These challenges are reflected in the government’s strategies, which aim to achieve 
sustainable development for the country. By 2002 new oil extraction operations restored the GDP 
share of industry to about 30 percent and overall economic indicators rose substantially. The 
government engaged in widespread privatization, although many profitable enterprises went to 
members of the government-connected elite. The economy has remained poorly diversified, but oil 
has accounted for more than half of Kazakhstan’s industrial output, and many other industries are 
dependent on it.  
Indeed, proven reserves include about 85 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 30 billion 
barrels of oil, concentrated in the massive Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak fields. Production is 
already at 1.54 million barrels per day in 2009, and up to a third of GDP is generated by the oil and 
gas sector. Further sector development is expected to double productivity by 2019. A key economic 
goal is membership in the World Trade Organization where negotiations were active in late 2006. 
As oil continues to spur rapid growth, key goals of mid-term economic policy are diversifying the 
economic base by expanding non-oil manufacturing, raising agricultural productivity, and 
improving the environment for small and medium-sized enterprises1. 
 In 2008, in order to underpin the objective of further strengthening its links with the EU, the 
Government of Kazakhstan, at the request of President Nazarbayev, adopted the “Path to Europe” 
Program, which was implemented in the period 2009 - 2011. The focus of the program aimed to 
promote economic cooperation, modernize Kazakhstan’s economy.  
Despite this resource wealth, by some estimates about 20 percent of the population continues 
to subsist below the poverty line and Kazakhstan still lacks access to a major seaport and is reliant 
on overland pipelines, leaving exports vulnerable to regional geopolitics. 
EU bilateral cooperation in 2011 was valued at roughly € 2.6 million, an increase of over 400 
percent since 2001 and its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) accounted for about 25 percent of the 
country’s total, giving the European companies room for investment about € 3 million in 
Kazakhstan, mostly in the oil and gas sector. 
 
                                               
1
 Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed in November 2012.  
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
 
Education
Security
Governance
Economy
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Education € 5 million, Social 
protection € 4.5 million, Governance € 28.5 million, Economy sector € 6 million. 
 
 
 
 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
 
Governance
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Governance € 30 million. 
 
The reform of the judiciary has been identified by the Government of Kazakhstan as a top 
priority in its modernization program for state administration. Indeed, the Support to Strengthen the 
Judiciary program (€ 3.5 million) provides technical assistance for the development of a sector 
strategy for judicial reform, with a specific focus on capacity building and developing the legal 
framework to improve the investment climate for local and foreign investors.  
The EU is sharing its own experience of modernizing public administration and building on 
previous EU programs, implementing the Public Sector Reform and Modernization program (€ 10 
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million). The Support to Kazakhstan’s Local Development Policies program (€ 15 million) 
launched in 2010 aims to transfer EU know-how and experience in territorial development, local 
governance and development policies. The program builds on achievements of the former policy 
development and advice program and is establishing synergies with the economic diversification 
and public sector reform programs, thus providing a coherent assistance framework for public 
sector reform and development. 
Kazakhstan performs relatively well on a number of macroeconomic indicators. The country 
has one of the top 20 rates of gross domestic savings in the Index, at above 38% of GDP. The 
unemployment rate is almost 7%, in line with global averages and 65% of respondents to a 2011 
survey indicated that they had paid or unpaid work, again one of the 20 highest rates in the Index. 
Nevertheless, 36% of Kazakhs have a positive view of local employment opportunities, an 
above average figure, and overall levels of economic confidence are among the 30 highest in the 
world. The amount of physical capital available to workers and the size of the domestic market are 
just above global averages and in addition, high-tech goods account for 30% of manufactured goods 
exports, placing the country 10th on this variable. Kazakhstan also attracts one of the 20 highest 
rates of foreign direct investment in the Index, as measured by both net inflows and volatility.  
There are, however, concerns over banking sector stability, over 20% of total bank loans are 
classed as non-performing, and fewer than six out of 10 Kazakhs express confidence in the financial 
sector. 
 
5.1.5 Education 
Access to primary education is relatively limited in Kazakhstan, with a net primary enrolment 
rate of 89%, ranking 87th globally. However, enrolment figures improve significantly at secondary 
and tertiary levels: Kazakhstan ranks 22nd and 50th respectively on these variables. There is near 
gender equality in primary and secondary education in Kazakhstan and primary school children are 
likely to get a fair amount of individual attention, with one teacher for every 16 pupils. 
Measured subjectively, however, education quality is poor. Only two-thirds of people are 
satisfied with the education provided in their local areas, and just 68% feel that children have the 
opportunity to learn and grow every day; both figures rank in the bottom half of the Index. 
Nonetheless, high enrolment ensures the country has a relatively highly educated workforce. An 
average of 3.8 years of secondary education per worker ranks Kazakhstan eighth internationally, 
while 1.1 years of tertiary education per worker places the country 42nd on this variable. 
Education is mandatory between ages seven and 15, where Primary school is a four-year 
period, followed by five years of mandatory secondary school. Two years of specialized secondary 
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school are optional. Beginning in the early 1990s, the primary language of instruction shifted from 
Russian to Kazakh, although in 2005 many institutions still were instructing in Russian. The public 
education system has declined since the Soviet era, in part because of insufficient funding and in 
part because the emigration of Russian and German scientific experts has exhausted the teaching 
corps in the technical fields.  
From 1999 through 2005, government spending on education declined as a percentage of 
gross domestic products; it accounted for 3.5 percent of the budget in 2005. Between 2001 and 
2005, enrollment in the primary grades decreased and programs to restructure the Soviet-era 
education system have not been completed. Between 1996 and 2004, the number of private 
education institutions nearly quadrupled; private schools increasingly are preferred by those who 
can afford them because of deterioration in the public system. In 2005 some 181 institutions of 
higher learning were in operation, attended by 747,100 students. Enrollment in higher education 
increased rapidly in the early 2000s, with some 1,440,700 students were enrolled in the 2001 - 
2011.  
 
 
 
5.1.6 Security & Safety 
Kazakhstan has a moderate level of problems from refugees and internally displaced persons 
and from group grievances based on recent or historical injustices, ranking 48th and 57th on these 
variables in the Index. There are also reports of state-sponsored political violence, with relatively 
few Kazakhs feel safe expressing their political views, placing the country ranking in the bottom 30 
on this variable.  
There is a moderate level of demographic instability resulting from border disputes, 
ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical 
sites, or proximity to environmental hazards. Despite these national security issues, the flight of 
professionals, intellectuals, political dissidents and voluntary emigration of the middle class is the 
33rd lowest worldwide. Government control of the media has increased in the early 2000s and 
newspaper and broadcast reporters have been beaten and imprisoned when government corruption 
became a major focus of reporting. As an additional control, the government has restricted access to 
printing and distribution facilities.  
Killings of politicians in 2010 in Kazakhstan, seemingly the most stable Central Asian 
country, which the international observers began to see as having turned the corner of endemic post-
Soviet mismanagement. Corruption is widely attributed to emerging succession struggles, although 
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in theory it seems too early for succession competition to unfold. Bureaucratic succession would be 
the most realistic option, but no preparation for this is visible.  
Instead, some leaders continue to behave as if they are immortal and a crisis of succession in 
a fragile state can easily lead to social disorder. No Kazakhs died in episodes of civil violence in 
2011 and personal safety is also relatively good overall. Just 4% of respondents reported being 
assaulted in the year prior to the 2011 survey and only 9% had property stolen in the same time 
frame. 
Kazakhstan ranks 19th on this variable, nevertheless, only 58% feel safe walking alone at 
night, putting Kazakhstan below the global average for this variable. Besides monitoring cross-
border trade, Kazakhstan’s border police are also seen as the first defense against trafficking, 
particularly the lucrative drug trade emanating from Afghanistan. 
Border guards, who often work alongside customs officials and other law-enforcement 
officials, are seen as vulnerable to corruption and often jockey with rival agencies for a share of the 
profits. 
This is especially true along the Kazakh-Chinese border, where China produces an estimated 
80 percent of household goods sold to Kazakhstan’s middle-class consumers. Many traders prefer to 
offer bribes at the border rather than pay legal customs charges as punishingly high. The importance 
of education and training of the border Police is something that is totally dropped from the focus of 
the Government. 
Some critics say this lack of autonomy has further hampered the service, particularly at a time 
when both terrorism fears and growing obligations to regional trade and security bodies like the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Belarus-
Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union have put a priority on border issues. 
Although the critical foreign military link remains Russia, which is the main source of 
military equipment and personnel training, Kazakhstan is a signatory of the Collective Security 
Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
Kazakhstan also has cultivated military links with the NATO, under the Partnership for Peace 
program, while U.S. and Kazakhstani troops have engaged in regular joint training exercises since 
1997. Finally, Kazakhstan signed a five-year cooperation program supplying small amounts of U.S. 
military equipment. Police-wise, the government has used police to harass and incarcerate 
opposition journalists, political figures, and demonstrators. Human rights organizations have 
reported frequent incidents of police brutality. The secret police have been effective in discouraging 
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opposition organizations, but the regular police, who are poorly paid, are ineffective and often 
corrupt. 
The government has successfully discouraged civil unrest except for demonstrations on 
specific issues such as pension arrears. Crime figures on Kazakhstan are not available, but 
organized narcotics smuggling and human trafficking have prospered in recent years because of 
Kazakhstan’s location between source countries and Russia and the ineffectiveness of border 
controls. Seizures of smuggled narcotics from Afghanistan increased substantially in 2011. 
Although Islamic fundamentalism has no attraction for Kazakhstan’s Muslims, the 
government poses the terrorist threat as a pretext for domestic repression and in 2005 the Majlis 
banned the pan-Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization because of the group’s calls 
for an international Islamic government, hence Kazakhstan’s international diplomatic and economic 
position continued to advance region-wide, supporting antiterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. 
 
 
 
5.2 Kyrgyzstan 
5.2.1 Geography 
Location: Kyrgyzstan is located along the eastern border of the Central Asian region, 
southeast of Kazakhstan, west of China, east of Uzbekistan, and north of Tajikistan.  
Size: The second-smallest of the five Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has an area of 198,500 
square kilometres, of which 7,100 square kilometres is water.  
Land Boundaries: Kyrgyzstan has 1,099 kilometres of border with Uzbekistan, 1,051 
kilometres with Kazakhstan, 870 kilometres with Tajikistan, and 858 kilometres with China.  
Disputed Territory: Kyrgyzstan has unresolved border disputes with Tajikistan (in the Isfara 
Valley to the southwest) and with Uzbekistan (on the status of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and 
elsewhere along the common border).  
Length of Coastline: Kyrgyzstan is landlocked.  
Principal Rivers: Kyrgyzstan has no navigable rivers. The Chu River arises in the mountains 
of northern Kyrgyzstan and flows northwest into Kazakhstan. The Naryn River arises in the Tien 
Shan Mountains of eastern Kyrgyzstan and crosses central Kyrgyzstan before meeting the Kara 
Darya to form the Syr Darya in the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley.  
Natural Resources: Kyrgyzstan’s only mineral resource of economic value is gold. 
Substantial amounts of antimony and coal are present, but economic factors preclude large-scale 
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exploitation. Kyrgyzstan also has deposits of mercury, tin, tungsten, and uranium oxide. Most of 
Kyrgyzstan’s terrain is too mountainous to grow crops, but higher-elevation pastures support 
livestock rising.  
Environmental Factors: Because it was not designated as a heavy industrial zone in the 
Soviet system, Kyrgyzstan has avoided the grave environmental problems encountered by the other 
Central Asian countries. The main problems are inefficient use and pollution of water resources, 
land degradation, and improper agricultural practices. Gold and uranium mining operations have 
leached toxic chemicals into soil and water in the eastern half of the country, and salinization is a 
problem along the eastern stretches of the Naryn River.  
In the post-Soviet era, increased automobile use has made air pollution a problem in urban 
centres. Overuse of forest reserves also is an environmental issue. In 2004 an unusually high 
number of avalanches, floods, and landslides was attributed to the melting of glaciers in the eastern 
mountains. The Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations is the national enforcement agency 
for environmental policy, which is summarized in the National Environmental Action Plan. 
However, that plan is heavily subsidized and directed by international donors, and the president’s 
strong role in environmental policy has politicized some issues. 
 
5.2.2 Society  
Population: In 2006 Kyrgyzstan’s population was estimated at 5,213,898. The annual growth 
rate was 1.32 percent, while in the early 2000s, increased emigration of Russians and other minority 
nationalities with technical expertise has been an important economic issue. In 2005 the net 
migration rate was - 2.5 persons per 1,000 population. The population is concentrated in small areas 
in the north and southwest in the Chu (north-central), Fergana (southwestern), and Talas 
(northwestern) valleys. About two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, and that figure has 
risen as the predominantly urban Russian population decreases.  
Demography: In 2006 some 31 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, 
and 6 percent was 65 years of age or older. The birthrate was 22.8 births per 1,000 population, and 
the death rate was 7.1 per 1,000 population. Infant mortality was 34.5 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Life expectancy for the total population was 68.5 years: 72.7 years for females and 64.5 years for 
males. The fertility rate was 2.7 births per woman. In 2006 the population’s sex ratio was 0.96 
males per female. 
Ethnic Groups: According to the 1999 census, the following ethnic groups were present in 
Kyrgyzstan: 65 percent Kyrgyz, 14 percent Uzbek, 13 percent Russian, 1 percent Dungan (ethnic 
Chinese Muslim), 1 percent Tatar, 1 percent Uyghur, and 1 percent Ukrainian. Substantial numbers 
of Tajik refugees entered the country in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, about 15,000 Russians left 
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the country annually, while the Uzbek minority is concentrated around the southwestern city of 
Osh, and the Russian population is concentrated in Bishkek and adjacent Chu Province. 
Religion: About 80 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population is Muslim, and 16 percent is 
Christian. The vast majority of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations are Sunni Muslims. The Kyrgyz 
practice a version of Islam that is influenced by earlier beliefs and practices and by the nomadic 
nature of earlier Kyrgyz society. This combination is most prevalent in the north, while the Islam 
practiced in the southwestern population centers (where the Uzbek minority is concentrated) 
resembles more closely that practiced elsewhere in Central Asia.  
Most of the Russian population professes Russian Orthodoxy. In the post-Soviet era, some 
Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary activity has taken place, but proselytization has been 
discouraged officially and unofficially. A “black list” of harmful sects includes the Seventh Day 
Adventists, Ba’hai Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Governance 
In 1989 the liberalized policies of Communist Party First Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
ignited strife between the Kyrgyz and the minority Uzbek population in Osh Province. In the 
presidential election of 1990, the resulting general democratization movement led to the defeat of 
Communist Party by physicist Oskar Akayev.  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Akayev took several steps to increase presidential power vis-à-
vis the legislative branch, including questionable referenda and suppression of opposition groups. 
Before the 2000 presidential election, chief rival for the presidency was imprisoned.  
In 2001 Kyrgyzstan offered the United States an air base at Manas Airport in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, reinforcing relations with the United States but 
increasing tension with Russia. 
In February 2005, international monitors declared the first round of national parliamentary 
elections to have been unfair. In March the protests that arose in response, which came to be known 
as the Tulip Revolution, forced Akayev to flee into exile.  
During the elections, the International Community provided support for election 
administration, training for political parties, assistance with televised candidate debates, support for 
civil society engagement and robust election monitoring efforts.  
With EU and U.S. support, civil society has taken a more prominent role in public life, 
particularly with their mandated participation in public supervisory boards that include oversight of 
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government ministries and the public broadcaster. One example of I.C. support for civil society 
stabilization and reconciliation efforts through small grants was a successful SMS news service, 
which sends text messages via mobile phone in Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek.  
In 2009, the four donors, plus the World Bank, established a multi-donor trust fund to support 
public finance management reforms. Activities include strengthening the budgeting process, 
improving the midterm budget framework, improving the internal audit function, and building 
capacity in the Ministry of Finance and for public finance management training providers.  
Despite the political crises of 2010, Kyrgyzstan held a constitutional referendum and 
successful and competitive parliamentary and presidential elections, all of which reflected the will 
of the people. The peaceful and democratic presidential transition in 2011 marked the first such 
transfer of power in the country’s history.  
Indeed, the people of the Kyrgyz Republic witnessed the successful transition of power 
following the October 2011 presidential election, the first such peaceful, democratic transfer in 
Central Asia. The E.U. provided assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic to support its transition to a 
stable, democratic country, strengthening democratic institutions, promote regional security, and 
support the rule of law and broad-based economic opportunity. Rapid deployment of E.U. and 
NATO humanitarian assistance helped stabilize conflict-affected areas, alleviating suffering of 
those affected.  
Moreover, the EU contribution to the trust fund is € 2.8 million. Under the Operational 
program on Good Governance for Social Justice (€ 3 million) the EU and several UN agencies have 
been working together to improve access to social services for children, youth and women in 30 
selected municipalities. The program also serves to strengthen the capacity of government 
institutions and civil society organizations for mutual dialogue and for planning and delivering 
quality social services, and to increase public awareness, dialogue and demand for quality social 
services.  
Rule of law and judicial reform is one of the main areas of cooperation identified in the 
Multi-annual Indicative Program for 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 there are several supporting 
interventions. Through the project Supporting Prison Reform in the Kyrgyz Republic (€ 3 million) 
the EU is supporting the State Service for Execution of Punishments in policy formulation and 
design for prison reform.  
This project addresses the internal training capacity of the institutions and helps to improve 
their financial effectiveness. It also supports income-generating activities in the prisons as well as 
improving sanitary premises in selected prisons to enhance hygiene and prevent the spread of 
disease. Following the April 2010 political crisis, the EU, with the support of the Venice 
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Commission, the Council of Europe advisory body on constitutional matters, provided important 
and rapid assistance to the Kyrgyz interim authorities in drafting a new Constitution.  
Further support to the constitutional referendum and the legislative elections in October 2010 
was quickly provided through a Democratization and Stabilization Package (€ 7.2 million) financed 
by the EU Instrument for Stability. After the elections, actions have focused on capacity building 
for new institutions, conflict prevention (e.g. addressing inter-ethnic relations) and social 
stabilization (e.g. engaging unemployed youth in labor activities and vocational training). 
However, Courts often do not observe the nominal right to counsel and to presumption of 
innocence of the accused. Prisons are overcrowded and have serious shortages of food and medical 
support. In the early 2000’s, tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency virus rates in prisons were 
high and authorities were accused of having lost control of the prison population when a major 
prison riot occurred in November 2005. The reporters of some independent media outlets have been 
harassed and threatened acts of violence have occurred, and copies of independent newspapers have 
been confiscated. 
 
5.2.4 Economy 
Prior to 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s economy was highly dependent on the economy of the Soviet 
Union. The loss of key Soviet inputs caused severe economic contraction in the 1990s and has 
required substantial restructuring. The market reform program pursued in the 1990s has been partly 
abandoned as the state assumed a greater planning role in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Agriculture and services are the most important sectors, as industry remains concentrated in 
specific regions and outputs and in the early 2000’s, workers have moved from industry to 
subsistence agriculture as industrial enterprises fail. A Comprehensive Development Framework 
has set economic goals from 2001 to 2010, with strong guidance from international financial 
institutions. As much as 50 percent of the gross domestic product is contributed by the gray 
economy.  
The government has launched two major programs to privatize state enterprises, which by 
2003 had shifted about 7,000 enterprises to the private sector. However, domestic opposition and 
low foreign investment have slowed the rate of privatization. In 2006 widespread unemployment 
was a major cause of large-scale street demonstrations. In 2010, the Kyrgyz Republic’s economy 
contracted significantly due to political instability and E.U. assistance helped to restore food and 
animal feed production levels. Middle 2000, the E.U has started with a $4.1 million voucher 
program which supplied 3,600 metric tons of quality seed to 34,000 farmers, enabling them to 
produce at least $20 million more food than in the previous year.  
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Besides this, in the early 2000s, international funding upgraded the main airport, Manas, at 
Bishkek and a smaller facility at Osh. In 2006 Manas was the only one of Kyrgyzstan’s 37 airports 
with a runway longer than 3,000 meters and the only airport supporting international flights. 
Smaller airports provide connections among domestic destinations.  
The state agency Kyrgyzaltyn owns all mines, many of which are operated as joint ventures 
with foreign companies. Uranium and antimony, important mineral outputs of the Soviet era, no 
longer are produced in significant amounts. Investment and restructuring have remained at low 
levels and the electricity industry (traditionally an important part of industry’s contribution to GDP) 
has stagnated in recent years. Government support is moving away from the machine industries, 
which were a major contributor to the Soviet economy, toward clothing and textiles. 
The limitations of Kyrgyzstan’s pipeline system are a major impediment to fuel distribution, 
with 367 kilometers of natural gas pipeline and 16 kilometers of oil pipeline in 2003, after adding 
167 kilometers of natural gas pipeline in 2006. 
However, Kyrgyzstan’s isolated geographic position and import requirements have hindered 
the development of trade relations outside the former Soviet Union. Business environment reforms 
resulted in estimated costs savings of $110 million for entrepreneurs and the Kyrgyz Republic 
jumped from 99th to 47th place in the World Bank’s Doing Business report in just three years. The 
need to reform revenue collection and allocation systems has delayed a planned revision of the state 
unemployment insurance system2.  
The government’s 10-year Comprehensive Development Framework includes a poverty 
reduction program supported by the International Monetary Fund. 
The first E.U. Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the 
Development and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 55 million for bilateral programs with 
Kyrgyzstan. The second Multi-annual Indicative Program for the period 2011-13 earmarked € 51 
million for bilateral cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. The indicative priority areas for cooperation 
during this period are social protection reform and rural development activities, education reform, 
and judicial reform and rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed in November 2012.  
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
Governance
Agriculture
Education
Social protection
Other
 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Governance € 3 
million, Agriculture  € 12.7 million, Social protection  € 31 million, Other € 3 million, Education € 5.5 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
Governance
Agriculture
Social protection
Education
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Governance € 13.5 
million, Agriculture/Rural development € 4.5 million, Social protection € 13 million, Education education € 20 million 
 
 
 
 
  
192 
5.2.5 Education 
The need to reform the education system in Kyrgyzstan has been identified by the Kyrgyz 
Government as one of the most urgent social development priorities. In 2003 some 4.5 percent of 
gross domestic product was spent on education.  
In 2003 the literacy rate in Kyrgyzstan was 98.7 percent, with education compulsory for nine 
years, between ages seven and 15. Following four years of primary and five years of lower 
secondary school, the system offers two years of upper secondary school, specialized secondary 
school, or vocational/technical school.  
In 2004 some 89 percent of the relevant age-group was enrolled in the compulsory program, 
but this figure has decreased in the late 2000’s. In 2005 some 49 institutions of higher learning were 
operating, most notably the Kyrgyz State University, Kyrgyz Technical University and Kyrgyz-
Russian Slavonic University. The majority of primary and secondary schools teach in Kyrgyz, but 
the language of instruction in the higher institutions is Russian. Budget cuts that have reduced 
teacher salaries and equipment availability are reflected disproportionately in reduced numbers of 
female students.  
The EU, although a recent donor in the education field in Kyrgyzstan, has nevertheless 
adopted a long-term approach. Through the Support for the Kyrgyz Education Sector program (€ 
5.5 million) the EU is providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Education to help it refine 
the current education policy and build up the institutional and human resources capacity for 
formulation, management and monitoring of a future sector strategy. The Ministry of Education and 
its regional branches will be technically upgraded with equipment and necessary software for 
financial management. 
Under the Multi-annual Indicative Program 2007-10, further assistance to the education 
sector was planned in the amount of € 20 million. The Commission and EU Member States are 
helping to determine education sector strategies with the catalyst fund, Education for All - Fast 
Track Initiative. This is a global partnership between donors and developing countries for 
accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 
2015.  
The EU has been one of the leading donors for the reform of the social protection system in 
Kyrgyzstan, providing significant financial resources, policy advice and technical assistance over 
the years. The Sector Policy Support Program in Social Protection and Public Finance Management 
(€ 40 million) receives both geographic and thematic funding since 2007. Additional funds (€ 13 
million) have been earmarked in the Multi-annual Indicative Program 2011-13. 
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5.2.6 Security & Safety 
In the post-Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan has joined several regional organizations in an effort to 
improve its security and economic position, among those organizations is the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Asian Development Bank, Central Asian Cooperation Organization, 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (of the Commonwealth of Independent States), Economic 
Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Community, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Moreover, it has also jointed the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Monetary Fund, International 
Organization for Migration, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Partnership for 
Peace (of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), United Nations, United Nations Committee on 
Trade and Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Customs 
Organization, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization, and World Trade 
Organization. Because such organizations have not had the intended effect, Kyrgyzstan’s 
meaningful foreign relations have largely been bilateral.  
Between terrorist attacks that occurred in 1999 and 2003, military spending increased by 
about 50 percent, but the armed forces did not grow significantly during that period, while the 
ground forces constitute the main fighting element. Kyrgyzstan has suffered incursions by terrorist 
groups (notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—IMU) from hotbeds of Islamic insurgent 
activity in nearby Tajikistan and the Fergana Valley.  
In 1999 Islamic terrorists took a group of Japanese and Kyrgyzstani hostages in Kyrgyzstan, 
and an Islamic insurgency continued in Batken and Osh in 2000. In 2003 a series of minor incidents 
in Osh were attributed to terrorists. Those events showed that Kyrgyzstan did not have sufficient 
security forces to prevent a major terrorist incursion. Events in 2006 caused speculation about a 
possible resurgence of the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in that area. As of 2006, 
membership in the security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization had not materially 
improved Kyrgyzstan’s border security. A bilateral border treaty with China has improved security 
to the east.  
The SCO membership assumed particular meaning for Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as the SCO, 
assuming a more active geopolitical role than previously, urged that Kyrgyzstan expel U.S. troops 
stationed there. Relations with Russia have remained a primary concern because Kyrgyzstan had 
been unusually dependent on the Soviet structure in security and economic matters. After the 
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posting of U.S. troops in Kyrgyzstan for the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2002, 
President Akayev sought to balance that presence with ongoing Russian interests.  
However, U.S. influence diminished in September 2005 as Russia concluded a bilateral 
agreement with Kyrgyzstan. Since 2000 tensions with Uzbekistan have increased because of 
disputes over the two countries’ fuel-for-power arrangement and Uzbekistan’s unilateral steps 
against cross-border terrorist organizations. Uzbekistan’s mining of the common border has brought 
complaints from Kyrgyzstan. In 2005 more than 500 refugees from the Andijon crisis in Uzbekistan 
fled to Kyrgyzstan, causing further tension when Uzbekistan demanded their return.  
In 2011 Kyrgyzstan’s army had 8,500 active personnel and its air force had 4,000 active 
personnel, with some 57,000 individuals were in military reserve status and the paramilitary Border 
Guard Service had 5,000 troops. None of the neighbor countries constitute a conventional military 
threat to Kyrgyzstan. The porous southern and western borders, however, have allowed terrorist 
groups to enter and occupy southwestern Kyrgyzstan from the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan. 
Corruption and incompetence in the police force have led to uncontrolled crime in urban parts 
of Kyrgyzstan and in 2005 and 2006, the Bakiyev government came under increased criticism for 
failing to control criminal organizations as incidents of violent crime increased. 
Kyrgyzstan’s location between Tajikistan (a major transit country for narcotics from 
Afghanistan) and Russia has made the western part of Kyrgyzstan a major transit region for 
narcotics and human trafficking, with related increases in overall crime. Since middle 2000, 
domestic narcotics production and abuse have grown sharply and in 2011 Kyrgyzstan had the third-
highest rate of opium addiction in the world. Domestic crime groups also have become linked 
increasingly with transnational groups. In the Fergana Valley, tension exists between citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over land and housing rights.  
Domestic forces have been upgraded somewhat in 2000’s, but Kyrgyzstan likely would need 
assistance from Russia or Uzbekistan to counter a serious insurgency. In the recent years, 
Kyrgyzstan received by I.C. about 2 billion to combat domestic terrorism as part of the new Manas 
rental agreement.  
The E.U. provided in-depth interactive training to prosecutors throughout Kyrgyzstan and 
training and equipment to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and other law 
enforcement and justice system agencies. 
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5.3 Tajikistan  
5.3.1 Geography  
Location: Tajikistan is located on the southern edge of the Central Asian group of nations, 
bordering Afghanistan to the south, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and Uzbekistan to 
the west.  
Size: The smallest of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Tajikistan has an area 
of 143,100 square kilometers, of which 400 square kilometers is water.  
Land Boundaries: The border with Afghanistan is 1,206 kilometers; with Uzbekistan, 1,161 
kilometers; with Kyrgyzstan, 870 kilometers; and with China, 414 kilometers.  
Disputed Territory: Tajikistan has a territorial dispute with Kyrgyzstan over land in the 
Isfara Valley in the far northeast, and full demarcation of the border with Uzbekistan has been 
delayed by Uzbekistan’s mining of its borders.  
Length of Coastline: None. Tajikistan is landlocked. 
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Principal Rivers: In Tajikistan’s dense river network, the largest rivers are the Syr Darya, 
the Amu Darya (called the Panj in its upper reaches in Tajikistan), the Vakhsh (called the Surkhob 
in its upper reaches in Tajikistan) and the Kofarnihon. The Amu Darya carries more water than any 
other river in Central Asia. The Vakhsh is an important source of hydropower.  
Natural Resources: Tajikistan’s most notable resources are rich deposits of gold, silver and 
antimony and the water power provided by its rivers. About 85 percent of arable land requires 
irrigation to grow cotton and grain, the main crops. 
Environmental Factors: The major environmental problems are concentrations of 
agricultural chemicals and salts in the soil and groundwater, pockets of high air pollution caused by 
industry and motor vehicles, water pollution from agricultural runoff and disposal of untreated 
industrial waste and sewage, poor management of water resources, and soil erosion.  
Soil erosion affects an estimated 70 percent of irrigated land, and overgrazing also contributes 
to soil erosion. Air pollution is a particular problem during times of the year when atmospheric 
conditions hold industrial and vehicle emissions close to the surface in urban areas. In summer, dust 
and sand from the deserts of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cause air pollution across the entire 
southwestern lowland region.  
A large Soviet-era uranium mining operation left poorly constructed repositories of 
radioactive waste in northwestern Tajikistan. Other operations in Tajikistan extracted and processed 
gold, antimony, tungsten, mercury and molybdenum, each of which is known to leave toxic waste. 
The Kofarnihon, Zarafshon, and Vakhsh rivers pass through heavily polluting industrial regions of 
the country, carrying pollutants into the Amu Darya and thence to the Aral Sea. The expansion of 
aluminum processing at Tursunzade, a key but long-delayed economic goal, would increase 
industrial pollution in the Dushanbe region. Tajikistan’s withdrawal of water for irrigation from the 
Syr Darya and tributaries of the Amu Darya also influences the quantity of water downstream. 
Therefore, Tajikistan’s water management policies are a regional concern. 
 
5.3.2 Society  
Population: In 2006 Tajikistan’s population was estimated at 7,320,815 people. The growth 
rate was 2.19 percent per year and the average density was 51.3 people per square kilometer, but the 
population was concentrated heavily in the western, southwestern, and northwestern regions. Some 
30 percent of the population was classified as urban, the lowest percentage among the former Soviet 
republics. In 2006 an estimated 700,000 Tajikistanis, mostly men, spent some or all of the year as 
migrant workers in Russia and other countries, creating a significant male-female imbalance in the 
adult population. In 2006 the net migration rate was about - 2.5 per 1,000 population.  
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Demography: In 2006 some 37.9 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, 
and only 4.8 percent was 65 years of age or older. The birthrate was 32.6 births per 1,000 
population. The death rate was 8.3 per 1,000 population. In the early 2000s, estimates of the infant 
mortality rate have varied widely, from 54 to 111 deaths per 1,000 live births, according to differing 
standards of calculation. In 2006 overall life expectancy was 64.9 years: 62 years for males, 68 
years for females. The fertility rate, four children per woman, was the highest among the former 
Soviet republics.  
Ethnic Groups: Tajiks are the country’s largest ethnic group, with Uzbeks making up a 
quarter of the population, over half of which is employed in agriculture and just one-fifth in 
industry. Nearly half of Tajikistan’s population is under 14 years of age. 
According to the 2000 census, 79.9 percent of the population was Tajik, 15.3 percent Uzbek, 
1.1 percent Russian, and 1.1 percent Kyrgyz. Smaller ethnic groups include Germans, Jews, 
Koreans, Turkmens, and Ukrainians. Between the censuses of 1989 and 2000, the Uzbek population 
decreased from 23.5 percent to 15.3 percent, and the Russian population decreased from 7.6 percent 
to 1.1 percent.  
In the same period, the Tajik population increased from 62.3 percent to nearly 80 percent. 
Particularly in the Fergana Valley, intermarriage between Tajiks and Uzbeks has essentially merged 
the two groups. The Russian population is concentrated in Dushanbe and Khujand. Since 2000 the 
rate of Russian emigration has slowed. Tajikistanis also have a strong regional affiliation: 
mountains divide the country into northern and southern regions, whose rivalry spurred the civil 
war of the 1990s. 
Languages: The official state language is Tajik, which is related to Persian. Russian is 
widely used in government and business, and Uzbek is the main language of about 25 percent of the 
population. Variants of Tajik are spoken in the mountains of the autonomous province of Gorno–
Badakhshan, Tajikistan’s eastern region. The Tajik language is very close to Persian, spoken in Iran 
and to Dari, spoken in Afghanistan. 
Religion: Some 85 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim and 5 percent, Shia Muslim. 
The Pamiri population of the autonomous province of Gorno–Badakhshan is mainly of the Ismaili 
sect of Shia Islam. About 3 percent of the population is Christian, mainly Russian Orthodox and 
concentrated in Dushanbe. Small groups of other Christian denominations and a small Jewish 
community also exist. 
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5.3.3 Governance  
The five-year civil war between the Moscow-backed government and the Islamist-led 
opposition, in which up to 50,000 people were killed and over one-tenth of the population fled the 
country, ended in 1997 with a United Nations-brokered peace agreement. Tajikistan is a republic 
with three branches of government dominated by the executive branch. The current constitution was 
adopted in 1994 and amended significantly in 1999 and 2003. Political stability has improved since 
the civil war ended in 1997, but in order to gain control of certain areas, the central government has 
compromised and forged alliances among regional factions and clans, which retain substantial 
political influence.  
Particularly important is the rivalry between politicians of the northern regions and those of 
the south and the accumulated power of southerner President Imomali Rakhmonov’s clique has 
caused substantial resentment in the north, which had held a dominant position in the Soviet era. 
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but bribery and nepotism are endemic in the 
political system. 
The Supreme Court is the highest court and other high courts include the Supreme Economic 
Court and the Constitutional Court, which decides questions of constitutionality. The president 
appoints the judges of these three courts, with the approval of the legislature, with judges of all 
courts are appointed to 10-year terms. Suffrage is universal for citizens 18 years of age and older 
and a new election law passed in 2004 has received international criticism for its restrictive 
candidate registration requirements.  
Election requires an absolute majority of votes, if no candidate gains a majority, a second 
round is held between the top two vote getters. In the early 2000’s, independent political parties 
continued to exist, but their operations were circumscribed and their influence marginal. The 
governing People’s Democratic Party (PDP) gained strength as some opposition party leaders 
joined the government and others were disqualified from participation in elections. The Communist 
Party of Tajikistan, a nominal opposition party that has supported President Rakhmonov on most 
issues, has lost support since 2000. 
In the post-Soviet era, newspaper circulation has decreased sharply because of the high 
expense of materials and the poverty of the population. As a result of government pressure and 
refusal of license renewals, no opposition newspapers were operating in the run-up to the 2006 
presidential election. 
Tajikistan is divided into three main provinces: Soghd (formerly Leninobod), including all of 
the northwestern part of the country; Khatlon, including all of the southwest, and the autonomous 
province of Gorno–Badakhshan, which covers the entire sparsely populated eastern half of the 
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country, with Dushanbe, the capital, is administered separately from the rest of all provinces. 
Because of its isolated location, Tajikistan continues to rely chiefly on economic, military, and 
political support from Russia.  
In turn, Russia has used Tajikistan as a foothold in Central Asia and in 2005 Tajikistan owed 
Russia about US$300 million and remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia were an 
important source of national income. With Russia’s approval, Tajikistan offered the United States 
use of air bases in the anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-2. In the early 2000’s, 
Tajikistan has sought closer economic ties with the United States and U.S. military and 
humanitarian aid increased significantly. From the U.S. perspective, Tajikistan became more 
important as a base in Central Asia when neighboring Uzbekistan rejected reforms and cooperation 
with the United States late 2000’s. 
Tajikistan has signed a series of bilateral treaties with China, improving relations with that 
powerful neighbor, while Iran was a key facilitator of the 1997 accord ending Tajikistan’s civil war. 
In the early 2000’s, Iran, the traditional rival of Russia for influence in Tajikistan, has funded major 
projects such as the completion of the Sangtuda hydroelectric power plant. Following the defeat of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, Tajikistan’s relations with that country have improved 
substantially and relations with neighboring Uzbekistan, however, remain problematic.  
Key bilateral issues include the ostensible presence of terrorist groups in Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan’s mining of the common border and disputed allocation of Tajikistan’s water resources. 
Tajikistan’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan) has not provided the expected improvement of commercial or 
security conditions. 
 
5.3.4 Economy 
Tajikistan’s economy, which had been the poorest in the Soviet Union, was severely 
disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the civil war of 1992–97. With 
independence, Tajikistan lost the nearly 50 percent of its state revenue that had come as transfers 
from Moscow, as well as barter arrangements that brought food from other republics in exchange 
for cotton and aluminum.  
The civil war disrupted both agricultural and industrial production. Particularly hard-hit was 
the cotton industry, a key economic element in the Soviet era. The output of aluminum, Tajikistan’s 
most important industrial product, has not approached the pre-independence level in the early 
2000s. Economic reform has been uneven, privatization has occurred mainly in the services sector, 
and the overall economy remains a command-and-control system.  
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The European Union has been supporting the health sector in Tajikistan since 2007, mainly 
through institutional strengthening, support to the implementation and financing of a National 
Health Strategy and by contributing to the improvement of the Health Management Information 
System. These reforms have been assisted by the projects Development of a Health Management 
Information System (€ 1 million) and Health Sector Support Strategy (€ 5 million). 
In 2010, encouraged by the EU budget support benchmarks, Tajikistan raised the priority of 
the health sector and started to increase its relative share of government spending. The country also 
adopted a comprehensive National Health Strategy which includes an action plan for 2011-13. 
In 2009, the Commission has striven to promote agriculture-related private sector 
development through the project Support to Private Sector Development (€ 7 million). The project's 
finance framework component has been improving access to finance for Dehkan farmers to 
purchase supplies, and has been advising them on efficiency measures. The methodology developed 
by the project is now used by most Tajik banks to provide credit to farmers. 
In 2011, the EU plans to support a comprehensive package for both health and social 
protection with a Human Development Support Program (€ 40 million), including capacity 
development assistance for ongoing reforms in these sectors, and continued improvements to the 
health information systems. Since 2008, the Social Protection Sector Policy Support Program (€ 34 
million) has been providing assistance to support reforms of the pension system, social insurance, 
insurance and labor market policies. 
The EU is also supporting the development of a more business enabling environment in 
Tajikistan. It is helping to build up the strategic, legal and regulatory framework, improve the 
government’s capacity to implement reforms, and increase opportunities for accessing finance. The 
project Support to the Establishment of a Single Window for Export, Import and Transit Procedure 
(€ 2 million) has allowed for a simplification of procedures for businesses in the area of trade.  
Notably, the country improved its position in the ‘Doing Business’ 2011 ranking to 139, from 
149 in 2010 (out of 183 countries worldwide). In addition, following the soaring world food prices 
of 2008, Tajikistan was selected to receive funds from the EU Global Food Facility. This allocation 
was shared between two projects: Support to Social Safety Nets (€ 7.8 million) and Public 
Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Management (€ 7.8 million).  
The first project channels funds through sector budget support for social protection, i.e. the 
pension fund. The second project is helping to mitigate the risk of soaring food prices in Khatlon 
Oblast by increasing household food security while generating temporary employment. Moreover, 
in 2010, the EU allocated € 2 million under the Food Security thematic program to strengthen the 
country’s Food Security Information System.  
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Macroeconomic support projects and technical assistance, under the TACIS and the more 
recent projects, Public Finance Management Modernization (€ 2 million) and Public Finance 
Management and Institutional Capacity Development (€ 3 million), have contributed to the 
improvement of the capacity of the Ministry of Finance for budget planning. Activities have 
included macroeconomic modeling and forecasting, development of the medium term expenditure 
framework, automation of the local budget preparation process, internal audit and financial control, 
and surveillance of state-owned enterprises.  
In 2011, these efforts led to a new public finance law and the establishment of a national 
court of auditors. Tajikistan has faced severe budget constraints over the past two decades and the 
social protection system has no longer been able to meet the basic needs of the poor. 
The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development 
and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 66 million for bilateral programs with Tajikistan. An 
additional € 62 million was allocated by the second Multi-annual Indicative Program for the period 
2011-13. The focus continues to be on priority areas of social protection, health, private sector 
development linked with agriculture, and public finance management. 
 
 
 
 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
Governance
Agriculture
Social protection
Health
Ecomony
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Governance € 5 
million, Agriculture € 6 million, Social protection € 14 million, Health € 32 million, Economy € 9 million. 
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
Governance
Agriculture
Social protection
Health
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Agriculture € 16 
million, Governance € 6 million, Health € 20 million, Social protection € 20 million. 
 
 
Tajikistan’s economy has never really recovered from the civil war, and poverty is 
widespread. In 2005 Tajikistan’s GDP grew by 6.7 percent, to about US $1.89 billion and growth 
for 2006 was about 8 percent, marking the fifth consecutive year of annual growth exceeding 6 
percent. The official forecast for GDP growth in 2011 is 7.5 percent. Per capita GDP in 2005 was 
US $ 258, lowest among the 15 countries of the former Soviet Union. In 2007 services contributed 
48 percent, agriculture 23.4 percent, and industry 28.6 percent to GDP. Almost half of GDP is 
earned by migrants working abroad, especially in Russia, but the recession in 2009 threatened that 
income. The country is also dependent on oil and gas imports3. 
Economic hardship is seen as a contributing to a renewed interest in Islam - including more 
radical forms - among young Tajiks  and the country has been accused by its neighbors of 
tolerating the presence of training camps for Islamist rebels on its territory, an accusation which it 
has strongly denied. Economic ties with neighboring China are extensive. China has extended 
credits and has helped to build roads, tunnels and power infrastructure. Chinese firms are investing 
in oil and gas exploration and in gold mining. 
 
5.3.5 Education  
School attendance is mandatory between the ages of seven and 17, but many children fail to 
attend because of economic needs and security concerns in some regions. The core years of school 
attendance include four years of primary school and two stages of secondary school, lasting five and 
                                               
3
 Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, accessed in November 2012. 
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two years, respectively. In 2001 preprimary enrollment was less than 6 percent of eligible children. 
At all levels, Tajikistan’s education system suffers from a useless infrastructure and an acute 
shortage of teachers, which will increase because of the relatively high birthrate. The state-
supported Soviet system remains in place, but the poor condition of the national economy and years 
of civil war sharply reduced funding in the early 2000s, although government spending began to 
increase in 2004. In 2005 the total government expenditure on education was about US$80 million, 
15.9 percent of the national budget. The figure was scheduled to rise to US$108 million, 17.3 
percent of the budget, in 2006. A presidential program raised the salaries of teachers by 25 percent 
in 2005. The official literacy rate is 98 percent, but the poor quality of education since 1991 has 
reduced skills in the younger generations. Some private schools and colleges have appeared in 
urban centers, and some Russian and Uzbek schools exist. Tajik is the main language of instruction 
through secondary school, but in 2003 Russian was restored as a mandatory subject. Some 33 
institutions of higher learning were operating in 2003, when a constitutional amendment abolished 
free higher education, that year total enrollment was 96,600. 
 
5.3.6 Security & Safety 
Tajikistan has relied heavily on Russian assistance to counter continuing security problems 
and cope with the dire economic situation. Skirmishes with drug smugglers crossing illegally from 
Afghanistan occur regularly, as Tajikistan is the first stop on the drugs route from there to Russia 
and the West. 
Russia maintains military garrisons in Tajikistan and in 2004 took back control over a former 
Soviet space monitoring centre, since 2005 Tajikistan depended heavily for border control on 
12,000 troops of the Russian Federal Border Guard (which includes Tajikistani enlisted personnel). 
These developments were widely seen as a sign of Russia’s wish to counter increased EU and US 
influence in Central Asia. 
Russia is also mindful of the planned NATO pullout of Afghanistan in 2014 and is keen to 
maintain security in the region. 
In 2011, at least 42 people including 12 soldiers and 30 rebels have been killed in fighting in 
the remote Tajik region of Gorno-Badakhshan, due to the fatal stabbing of a top security forces, 
State Committee on National Security (GKNB) regional head, leading to military action against 
local opposition strongman Tolib Ayombekov. 
People were trapped in their homes because of the heavy fighting in the streets, where 
armoured vehicles have been seen and dozens of people have been reported wounded, while the 
dead included more than 100 military personnel and about 200 civilians 
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Security forces decided to use force after Mr Ayombekov refused to surrender, who was a 
member of the opposition which fought against the government during Tajikistan’s civil war in the 
1990’s. This kind of operation was another attempt by the Tajik government, which has little 
influence in the area, to bring Gorno-Badakhshan under its full control. The pre-dawn attack on 
fighters loyal to Mr Ayombekov deep in the Pamir mountains underlines the continuing instability 
of the impoverished former Soviet republic 15 years after the end of a civil war. 
EU financial support has helped turn a crumbling Soviet-era compound into a modern 
training facility for Tajikistan’s future border guards, while their training is important, with almost 
1,400km (870 miles) of mountainous border with Afghanistan, a frontier that is challenging to 
police. 
But after the Russians left, the EU and US began assisting with border security, implementing 
various projects from border guard training to supplying outposts with modern equipment in order 
to deter drugs, arms and terrorists can flow across the border. Of course one of main reason why 
they are spending money in Tajikistan is because the Central Asian nation is on a new supply route 
for US and NATO troops deployment in Afghanistan.  
The route is known as the Northern Distribution Network, the NDN, it is a series of rail, 
water and road links via Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia through which non-lethal military 
cargo such as construction materials, fuel and medicine is transported to troops in Afghanistan.  
The NDN is an alternative to the main supply route via Pakistan which is under constant 
Taliban attack, where 40% of supplies for US and NATO troops are now shipped via the NDN 
making sure that we are able to fully support our troops, fully support our development efforts in 
Afghanistan.  
The US has a long-term aim of boosting trade between Afghanistan and its Central Asian 
neighbors and for this purpose in 2007 it built a major bridge linking Afghanistan with Tajikistan. 
Although most of the NDN cargo enters Afghanistan via Uzbekistan, the Nizhny Pyanj bridge 
also serves as an important connection point, with trucks that carry US and NATO supplies. 
Tajikistan already has major security challenges, with reports of armed drug gangs making 
incursions into Tajik territory, with Taliban fighters trying to cross the border.  
In addition to reported incursions, however, there has also been a decline in the internal 
security situation, where more than 60 soldiers and Special Forces personnel have been killed in 
incidents in 2011. Tajikistan was also shaken by its first suicide bombing in September against a 
police station in the northern town of Khujand, where a number of officers were killed. 
The government blames religious extremists for the violence and recently launched a 
campaign to bring back young Tajik men studying at religious schools abroad and the President has 
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publicly claimed that many scholars are returning home as terrorists. For this reason both EU and 
NATO do not want Tajikistan to import Afghanistan’s problems.  
All over Tajikistan it is now possible to see evidence of the renewed interest in Islam, where 
CDs and DVDs of radical preachers are openly on sale at markets and outside mosques and in some 
areas it is no longer possible to buy alcohol or tobacco, with female on the streets wearing  the 
burka. 
But it is evident that militant groups operating inside and outside Central Asia see poverty-
stricken and fragile Tajikistan as a weak spot in the regional armor. Over the past 18 months there 
have been reports of IMU fighters moving across Afghanistan into the northern districts bordering 
Tajikistan. 
In early September, IMU fighters were involved in a violent jail break in Dushanbe that left 
six prison guards dead. They are also thought to be behind several attacks on a Tajik army convoy 
in a remote eastern area and these incidents are just the latest in a string of militant attacks across 
Tajikistan in 2011. 
The government’s response has been to crack down on the Islamists and hundreds of young 
people have been arrested and jailed, but the hard-line approach does not seem to be working. It is 
only hardening the resolve of a new generation who sees their government as corrupt and morally 
bankrupt and Islam as the only real alternative. 
 
 
5.4 Turkmenistan 
5.4.1 Geography 
Location: Turkmenistan, the farthest southwest of the former Soviet republics of Central 
Asia, is located on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. To the south is Iran, to the south and east is 
Afghanistan, and to the north are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  
Size: Turkmenistan occupies 488,100 square kilometers, almost all of which is land surface.  
Land Boundaries: The length of Turkmenistan’s borders with neighboring countries is as 
follows: with Uzbekistan, 1,621 kilometers; Iran, 922 kilometers; Afghanistan, 744 kilometers; and 
Kazakhstan, 379 kilometers.  
Disputed Territory: Boundary disputes with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were settled by 
treaties signed in 2001 and 2004, respectively.  
Length of Coastline: Turkmenistan’s only coastline, along the Caspian Sea, is 1,768 
kilometers long.  
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Maritime Claims: Turkmenistan has an ongoing dispute with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
over division of the Caspian seabed, which contains deposits of oil and other natural resources. 
Principal Rivers: The most important river is the Amu Darya, which flows across 
northeastern Turkmenistan, thence eastward to form the southern borders of Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. Other major rivers are the Tejen (1,124 kilometers), the Murgap (852 kilometers), and 
the Atrek (660 kilometers). 
Natural Resources: By far the most plentiful natural resources are natural gas and oil. 
Reserves of gas, estimated in 2005 at 2 trillion cubic meters (fifteenth in the world), could rise to as 
much as 9 trillion cubic meters if the newly discovered Iolotan field is as large as predicted. 
Reserves of oil are estimated at 500 million barrels. Small amounts of salt and gypsum are 
extracted. Agricultural land generally is of poor quality and requires intensive irrigation. 
Environmental Factors: Turkmenistan has fewer critical water- and air-pollution problems 
than most of the other former Soviet republics because it has relatively little heavy industry, a low 
concentration of motor vehicles, and low population density. Turkmenistan’s major environmental 
problems are the various effects of the desiccation of the Aral Sea; contamination of soil and 
groundwater by agricultural chemicals; desertification, which is reducing the stock of arable land; 
and a complex of conditions resulting from water levels and industrialization on the Caspian Sea.  
Related to the first two problems is an intensifying shortage of water, which is an absolute 
requirement for the development of agriculture, industry, and large population centers anywhere in 
the country.  
 
5.4.2 Society  
Population: In 2006 Turkmenistan’s population was estimated at 5,042,920. The annual 
growth rate was 1.8 percent and in 2006 some 55 percent of the population lived in rural areas. 
Population density, 10.3 people per square kilometer overall, varies greatly between desert areas 
and areas where water is available, while in the first post-Soviet years (1991–95), Turkmenistan 
experienced a strong rate of immigration as ethnic Turkmens returned to their homeland, but by 
2006 the net migration rate was  - 0.75 per 1,000 population.  
Ethnic Groups: In 2003 the population of Turkmenistan was 85 percent Turkmen, 5 percent 
Uzbek, and 4 percent Russian, smaller ethnic groups, in order of size, are Tatar, Kazakh, Ukrainian, 
Azeri, and Armenian. The Turkmens are divided into five major tribes: the Ersary, Goklen, Teke, 
Yasyr, and Yomut. The Teke, to which President Niyazov belonged, predominate in top cultural 
and political positions. In the early 2000’s, government and societal discrimination against minority 
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citizens, particularly Russians, has increased the rate of emigration and squandered the fund of 
Russian technical expertise. Dual Russian-Turkmenistani citizenship was abolished in 2003.  
Languages: In 2003 officially 72 percent of citizens spoke Turkmen, the official state 
language. Some 12 percent spoke Russian, and 9 percent spoke Uzbek. Russian is spoken mainly in 
urban areas, and Uzbek is spoken mainly in northern Turkmenistan. Since the late 1990’s, the 
government has discouraged the use of Russian. In 2000 President Niyazov decreed that all 
governmental office holders and officials in higher education must speak Turkmen, and a campaign 
has sought to abolish non-Turkmen instruction in institutions of higher learning. No Russian-
language newspapers or radio broadcasts were permitted as of 2005.  
Religion: Turkmenistan has no state religion, with an estimated 89 percent of the population 
practices Sunni Islam and 9 percent, Russian Orthodoxy. Islam in Turkmenistan often includes 
elements of mysticism and shamanism. 
Demography: In 2006 some 35.2 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, 
and 4.1 percent of the population was 65 years of age or older and the sex ratio was 0.98 males per 
female. The birthrate was 27.6 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate was 8.6 per 1,000 
population. The infant mortality rate was 72.6 deaths per 1,000 live births. Overall life expectancy, 
which fell substantially in the early 2000’s, was 61.8 years: 58.4 years for males, 65.4 years for 
females. In 2006 the fertility rate was 3.4 children born per woman. 
 
5.4.3 Governance 
Turkmenistan’s government nominally has three independent branches, however, after 
winning an uncontested presidential election in 1992 President Saparmurad Niyazov effectively 
dominated governance in all branches and at all levels until his death in late 2006.  
Political opposition reportedly is nearly non-existent and harsh, arbitrary punishments of 
administrative mistakes and unforeseen shifts in top government positions have discouraged 
competent individuals from seeking government appointments.  
After the parliamentary elections of 1999, the Parliament received nominal new powers, 
including a mandate to form committees examining a wide range of public policies, but because all 
members of that body were from Niyazov’s party, this mandate was meaningless and the Parliament 
has been a rubber-stamp body. 
The only national court is the Supreme Court, whose 22 members are appointed by the 
president without legislative review to five-year terms and he also has the authority to dismiss any 
judge and no constitutional court is in place. Although the constitution calls for an independent 
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judiciary, in practice the judicial branch is under the control of the president because of his 
authority to appoint and dismiss judges. 
Even EU also supports the modernization of the Judicial, Legal System and the public 
administration, with institutional strengthening and policy support. Therefore, the EU Institutional 
Strengthening and Policy Support Facility, with allocation of € 2.5 million, aims at identifying, 
defining, coordinating and managing programs to help modernize the state administration.  
The program also introduces international legal practices and requirements. The Legal 
Capacity Building project (€ 1.4 million), which is part of this facility, aims at supporting the 
building up of an appropriate training resource facility to enable the creation of in-country expertise 
in the area of comparative law and international practices.  
The EU also co-finances a program for Strengthening the National Capacity of 
Turkmenistan to Promote and Protect Human Rights (€ 2.2 million). The project aims at improving 
the capacity of the Government of Turkmenistan to comply with international human rights 
standards and developing a wide-scale public awareness strategy on human rights. In line with the 
priority reforms in the economic sector, the EU supports Turkmenistan in its implementation of 
public finance management reforms.  
The project Support to Further Economic Reforms (€ 2 million) seeks to enhance public 
finance management skills and assist the Turkmen administration in building capacity in key public 
finance areas. In 2011-12, new programs are foreseen to provide support to economic policies and 
the development of the Parliament.  
 
5.4.4 Economy 
As in the Soviet era, central planning and state control pervade the system, and the Niyazov 
government (in power 1991–2006) consistently rejected market reform programs. The state 
subsidizes a wide variety of commodities and services and economic planning is done in long-term 
programs, the latest of which is the Strategy for Turkmenistan’s Economic, Political, and Cultural 
Development for the Period to 2020.  
Privatization has been minimal, particularly in larger enterprises, while corruption is common 
and the business and legal systems are poorly developed. Based on Turkmenistan’s oil and gas 
deposits, industry is the dominant sector and because official economic statistics are unreliable and 
a dual exchange rate is used, the most accurate economic figures are estimates by international 
organizations.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the early 2000’s has risen annually and at current prices, 
the GDP for the years 2001- 4 has been estimated at US$3.2 billion, US$3.7 billion, US$4.5 billion, 
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and US$5.3 billion, respectively. In 2005 the World Bank estimated the GDP at US$6.8 billion, or 
US$1,350 per capita. According to estimates for 2005, the industrial sector contributed 38 percent 
of GDP. By comparison, for 2004 the respective shares were 42.7 percent for industry, 28.8 percent 
for services and 28.5 percent for agriculture. The private sector’s share of GDP was estimated at 25 
percent in 2005. 
Turkmenistan is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas, although a decaying infrastructure and 
state subsidies hinder efficient distribution and discourage conservation. In the early 2000’s, gas 
output has increased sharply because of export agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, 
while in that same period, Russia and Ukraine have made substantial investments in Turkmenistan’s 
fuel industries. In 2001 natural gas output was estimated at 48.2 billion cubic meters and oil output 
was estimated at 162,000 barrels per day.  
In 2003 gas output increased by 8 percent and oil refinery output by 19 percent compared 
with 2002 and the discovery of the large Iolotan gas and oil field in southeastern Turkmenistan in 
2006 promised to further improve the country’s position as a fuels exporter. Turkmenistan also is a 
net exporter of electric power, exporting 980 million kilowatt-hours in 2001. Natural gas generates 
most of Turkmenistan’s electric power and an excess of generating capacity has stimulated the 
refurbishing of the power generation and distribution systems in the early 2000’s, with assistance 
from Iran, Turkey, and the United States. That process is expected to improve generating efficiency 
by 40 percent starting in 2011. 
The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development 
and Cooperation Instrument allocated €22 million for bilateral assistance programs in 
Turkmenistan. The second Multi-annual Indicative Program covering the period 2011-13 allocated 
€31 million. The indicative priority areas for cooperation focus on poverty alleviation, comprising 
rural development and education, as well as governance, trade and sustainable energy development. 
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Other € 3.2 million, 
Economy € 6.5 million, Governance € 4.8 million, Energy € 3 million, Education  € 4.5 million. 
 
 
 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Economy € 4 
million, Governance € 9 million, Energy € 8 million, Agriculture € 4 million, Education € 6 million. 
 
 
The European Union supports the modernization and reform of the education sector as one of 
the major long-term areas of cooperation with Turkmenistan. A first series of programs targeted at 
the education system has been launched. The program Support to the Modernization of the 
Education System in Turkmenistan (€ 1.5 million) supports the reform of the education system to 
bring it closer to international standards.  
In 2006 Turkmenistan had 6,441 kilometers of natural gas pipelines and 1,361 kilometers of 
oil pipelines. The critical export of natural gas has depended on outmoded Soviet-era pipelines. The 
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Asian Development Bank has granted funding for a new gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across 
Afghanistan, linking Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea gas deposits with ports in Pakistan and reducing 
dependence on Russian lines. The onset of construction, which would take seven years, was delayed 
in 2006 by hostilities in the southern Afghanistan portion of the proposed route Agricultural 
production in Turkmenistan is the second largest sector in the economy and is very important due to 
the fact that more than half of the population resides in rural areas and makes its livelihood from 
farming activities. Therefore, sector reforms in agriculture and rural development are of prime 
importance in developing a sustainable policy and practice for effective use of resources and 
development of the social sectors.  
The current program Support to Further Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development (€ 1 
million) supports the Ministry of Agriculture in the achievement of the national sector objectives 
with regard to sustainable agriculture and rural development. It supports the institutional and 
technical capacities of the Ministry. 
The project strengthening the National Capacity of Turkmenistan to Promote and Protect 
Human Rights was launched in 2007 with an EU contribution of € 2.2 million. It is jointly 
implemented by the EU, UNDP, and OHCHR, in partnership with the government of Turkmenistan. 
The project has two interrelated objectives. Firstly, it aims at improving the capacity of the 
Government of Turkmenistan to comply with international human rights standards.  
Secondly, and crucially for the EU and its Member States, it aims at developing a wide-scale 
public awareness strategy on human rights. 
 
5.4.5 Education 
In the Soviet era, Turkmenistan’s population was considered to be well educated, but in 2002 
the literacy rate was estimated at 98 percent, however, since independence a serious deterioration of 
the education system has depleted the overall skill level of the working population. The government 
has limited curricula by eliminating a wide variety of studies that are considered dangerous or 
useless.  
Funding has not matched the growing population, teacher salaries have been reduced and the 
infrastructure is in poor condition. The dismissal of many ethnic Russian teachers also has damaged 
the system, along with the reduction of obligatory education from 11 years to nine years put 
Turkmen students at a disadvantage in continuing their education past secondary school. Some 
Institutions of higher learning were operating in the early 2000’s, but the government has limited 
access to higher education by eliminating free tuition in 2003 and by requiring ethnic background 
checks on applicants.  
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Instructors in higher education must have degrees from institutions in Turkmenistan and 
bribes often are necessary to enter a university. The EU Further Improvement of Quality and 
Relevance of Professional Education program (€ 3 million) contributes to reestablishing and 
strengthening the vocational and training education system by providing skills and qualifications in 
accordance with the labor market needs, thus contributing to the economic and social development 
of Turkmenistan.  
 
5.4.6 Security & Safety 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Turkmenistan inherited the largest armed force in 
Central Asia, however, since that time neutrality and isolationism have dominated Turkmenistan’s 
defense doctrine and the armed forces have been neglected. A 1992 bilateral treaty named Russia as 
guarantor of Turkmenistan’s security and provided for command of the armed forces to gradually 
shift from Russian to Turkmenistani officers.  
That process concluded with the withdrawal of the last Russian border forces in 1999. In a 
move to balance Russian influence, Turkmenistan established an agreement for limited military 
cooperation with China in 1999. To maintain its neutrality, Turkmenistan consistently has refused 
to join multilateral military groupings of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although 
it participates in the Caspian Sea Flotilla with Russian and Kazakhstani naval forces.  
In 2001, Turkmenistan allowed the passage of humanitarian but not military supplies for the 
U.S. campaign in neighboring Afghanistan and the United States provided equipment and training 
to Turkmenistani border guard personnel.  
The criminal justice system of Turkmenistan essentially retains the structure of the Soviet 
system, where the Ministry of National Security has most of the same functions as the Soviet-era 
Committee for State Security (KGB). The chief responsibility of security forces is to ensure that the 
government remains in power, using whatever social controls and repressive measures are 
necessary.  
The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the operations of police departments, which cooperate 
closely with the forces of the Ministry of National Security on matters determined to affect national 
security. Personnel numbers for the police and security forces are not known.  
As far as the internal threat is concerned, in the early 2000’s the volume of narcotics 
trafficking, mainly in heroin, from Afghanistan through Turkmenistan increased significantly, in 
part because Turkmenistan’s long borders are poorly controlled. Opposition groups in exile accused 
the Niyazov government of involvement in arms and drug trafficking operations, which are known 
to rely on the corruption of local officials and police.  
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The presence of narcotics also has increased the incidence of related crimes and drug 
addiction and Turkmenistan has a low rate of violent crime, but in the early 2000’s common street 
crime increased. About terrorism, although the government has used the threat of terrorism to 
justify repressive policies, there is no record of a terrorist presence or of terrorist acts committed in 
Turkmenistan.  
 
 
5.5 Uzbekistan 
5.51 Geography 
Location: Uzbekistan is located in Central Asia, east of the Caspian Sea, directly south of 
Kazakhstan, north of Turkmenistan, and on the western borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
Size: The area of Uzbekistan is 447,400 square kilometers, of which 425,400 square 
kilometers is land surface.  
Land Boundaries: Uzbekistan has land boundaries with the following countries: 
Kazakhstan, 2,203 kilometers; Turkmenistan, 1,621 kilometers; Tajikistan, 1,161 kilometers; 
Kyrgyzstan, 1,099 kilometers; and Afghanistan, 137 kilometers.  
Length of Coastline: None. Uzbekistan is landlocked. 
Principal Rivers: Uzbekistan is not endowed with substantial river systems; the most 
important rivers are the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, and the Zarafshon, all of which flow from other 
countries across a small expanse of Uzbekistan. Other rivers are the Akhangaran and the Chirchik, 
both in the northeast. 
Natural Resources: Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in natural gas and oil in the near term and 
Gold is the most plentiful mineral having export value, but significant amounts of copper, lead, 
silver, tungsten, uranium, and zinc also are present. Nearly all of Uzbekistan’s arable land requires 
intensive irrigation and water is Uzbekistan’s most crucial resource, comes mainly from rivers 
whose sources are in other countries, requiring bilateral agreements with source countries as well as 
with other user countries downstream.  
Uzbekistan’s chronically poor water and irrigation management has resulted in severe 
environmental crises and regional tensions.  
Environmental Factors: The Aral Sea, half of which is in Uzbekistan, has been severely 
desiccated by overuse of its tributary rivers, a situation recognized as one of the world’s worst 
environmental disasters. Enormous overdrafts on these rivers are caused by the extremely low 
efficiency of irrigation systems in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Without the moderating influence 
of the sea, winters became significantly colder and summers hotter. Vozrozhdeniye Island in the 
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Aral Sea, now connected to the shore by shrinkage of the sea, contains the lethal remains of a Soviet 
anthrax weapons testing laboratory, most of which lies in Uzbekistani territory.  
Drinking water quality also is a major problem, especially in the western province of 
Karakalpakstan, where water is not properly distributed and sources are exposed to various types of 
surface and underground contamination. Inadequate sewage disposal adds to Uzbekistan’s water 
pollution problem. Indeed, only 40 percent of the population is served by sewerage systems.  
 
5.5.2 Society  
Population: In 2006 Uzbekistan’s population was estimated at 27.3 million, the largest of the 
five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The annual growth rate was 1.67 percent, and overall 
population density was 64.2 people per square kilometer. Population density varies greatly, as the 
Fergana Valley includes most of Uzbekistan’s population centers. In the middle 2000’s, the greatest 
population growth has occurred in rural areas and emigration has occurred mainly from urban areas.  
Demography: In 2006 some 32.9 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, 
and 4.8 percent of the population was 65 years of age or older. The sex ratio was 0.98 males per 
female. In 2006 the birthrate was estimated at 26.4 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 
7.84 per 1,000 population. Infant mortality was 70 deaths per 1,000 live births. Overall life 
expectancy was 64.6 years: 61.2 years for males and 68.1 years for females. In 2011, the fertility 
rate was 2.91 children per woman.  
Ethnic Groups: Before the Soviet era, Uzbeks identified themselves by clan and by khanate 
rather than by nationality, which became an ethnic identifier only in 1924 with the union of the 
khanates in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. According to the 1998 census, 76 percent of the 
population was Uzbek, 6 percent Russian, 4.8 percent Tajik, 4 percent Kazakh, 1.6 percent Tatar, 
and 1 percent Kyrgyz. However, a substantial portion of the officially Uzbek population, estimated 
as high as 40 percent, is of Tajik ancestry and Tajiks predominate in the urban centers of Bukhoro 
and Samarqand. Substantial numbers of Germans and Ukrainians left in a mass emigration during 
the 1990’s. The Karakalpaks, about 475,000 of whom inhabit western Uzbekistan, are a Turkic 
people of unclear ethnic origin who now are included with the Uzbeks in official ethnic statistics.  
Languages: Some 74.3 percent of the population speaks Uzbek, 14.2 percent Russian, and 
4.4 percent Tajik. Speakers of Karakalpak, a Turkic language related to Kazakh and Tatar, are 
included under “Uzbek” in statistics; the number of Karakalpak speakers is not known because 
many ethnic Karakalpaks use Uzbek dialects. Speakers of Russian, which is officially designated as 
the “language of interethnic communication,” live mainly in the large cities. Tajik is the most 
common language in Bukhoro and Samarqand.  
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Religion: About 88 percent of the population is Muslim and 9 percent Russian Orthodox, 
while most Uzbek Muslims practice a type of mystic Sufism that is Sunni and distinctly non-
political. Uzbekistan also has between 15,000 and 20,000 Jews and congregations of Baptists, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Korean Protestants, and Seventh-Day Adventists.  
 
5.5.3 Governance 
Moscow’s control over Uzbekistan weakened in the 1970’s as Uzbek party leader Sharaf 
Rashidov brought many cronies and relatives into positions of power, but in the mid-1980’s, 
Moscow attempted to regain control by again purging the entire Uzbek party leadership. However, 
this move increased Uzbek nationalism, which had long resented Soviet policies such as the 
imposition of cotton monoculture and the suppression of Islamic traditions.  
In the late 1980’s, the liberalized atmosphere of the Soviet Union under Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev fostered political opposition groups and open opposition to Soviet policy in Uzbekistan. 
In 1989 a series of violent ethnic clashes involving Uzbeks brought the appointment of ethnic 
Uzbek outsider Islam Karimov as Communist Party chief.  
When the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan reluctantly approved independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Karimov became president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in 1992 Uzbekistan 
adopted a new constitution, but the main opposition party, Birlik, was banned and a pattern of 
media suppression began. In 1995 a national referendum extended Karimov’s term of office from 
1997 to 2000, but a series of violent incidents in eastern Uzbekistan in 1998 and 1999 intensified 
government activity against Islamic extremist groups, other forms of opposition and minorities. 
In 2000 Karimov was re-elected overwhelmingly in an election whose procedures received 
international criticism and later that year, Uzbekistan began laying mines along the Tajikistan 
border, creating a serious new regional issue and intensifying Uzbekistan’s image as a regional 
hegemonic. In the early 2000’s, tensions also developed with neighboring states Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan provided logistical 
support to the U.S. antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan.  
This move continued a rapprochement that began in the late 1990’s however, in 2004 the 
United States cut non-humanitarian aid to Uzbekistan, citing recurrent human rights violations. 
Indeed, the mid-2005 brutal suppression of riots in Andijon brought severe criticism from the 
United States and the European Union (EU) and under pressure from the Karimov regime, the 
United States vacated its air base at Karshi-Khanabad and sanctions by the EU and the United 
States followed.  
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In the same period, a mutual defense treaty substantially enhanced relations between Russia 
and Uzbekistan. Tension with Kyrgyzstan increased in 2006 when Uzbekistan demanded 
extradition of hundreds of refugees who had fled from Andijon into Kyrgyzstan after the riots. A 
series of border incidents also inflamed tensions with neighboring Tajikistan. In 2011 Karimov 
continued arbitrary dismissals and shifts of subordinates in the government, including one deputy 
prime minister. 
Within the framework of the rule of law, the EU program Support to Criminal Judicial 
Reforms in Uzbekistan (€ 10 million) supports the reform process of the criminal justice sector. 
There will be long-term capacity building at strategic and operational levels within the Uzbekistan 
Supreme Court Research Centre, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, regarding the implementation of new decrees on the rule of law and on 
the death penalty.  
Through the project Strengthening of the Bicameral Parliamentary System and Networking 
with Regional Assemblies (€ 1.5 million) the EU will be supporting capacity building of the Oliy 
Majlis by establishing an electronic library and a centre for legal expertise, providing information 
and analytical support, introducing a new training curriculum and exchanging best EU 
practices in legislative drafting and functioning of bicameral parliaments.  
Economic reform The EU supports the capacity building for SME managers and business 
support organizations through the Management Training Program - Capacity Building for Small 
Business and Private Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan (€ 3 million). This program will facilitate an 
exchange of experience through training courses and internships for entrepreneurs, managers and 
business support organizations in European companies.  
 At the local level, the program will support capacity building and institutional strengthening 
of chambers of commerce and industry. Among the program’s achievements to date, over 13 000 
health providers (doctors, nurses, midwives and health managers) have been trained, and infant 
mortality rates, though still quite elevated, are falling. 16 regional training centers have been 
renovated and re-equipped. They have been running targeted training courses on maternal care for 
key medical staff from the eight regions covered by the program. A pool of 665 national and oblast 
trainers was established. 
Uzbekistan is the second most autocratic state in the Index and there are no checks and 
balances on the power of the executive and very little competition for legislative or executive power 
and no independent judiciary. However, the government has brought stability of a sort to the 
country, with almost 20 years since the last major constitutional change. Over nine in 10 Uzbeks 
voiced confidence in their national government, and around seven out of 10 reported satisfaction 
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with the country’s efforts to address poverty and preserve the environment, placing Uzbekistan 
amongst the top 10 countries in the Index on both variables.  
Uzbeks are equally quick to voice support for other state institutions: 97% expressed trust in 
the country’s armed forces, and a high 78% had confidence in the judiciary. Nevertheless, 
Uzbekistan’s government is one of the 10 worst at enforcing the rule of law and regulating the 
business sector.  
Surprisingly, although political rights are almost non-existent in Uzbekistan, nearly one-
quarter of the population said that they had voiced their opinion to an official in the previous 12 
months, and over seven out of 10 Uzbeks expressed confidence in the honesty of the electoral 
process, which places Uzbekistan in the top 30 countries in the Index for both these variables.  
 
5.5.4 Economy 
Although Uzbekistan’s economy has an inflation rate above 14%, gross domestic savings 
amount to 26% of GDP, the 31st highest in the world. Official unemployment stands at 8%, 
although when asked in a 2011 survey, a relatively high 60% of respondents said that they were in 
paid or unpaid work, which suggests an informal economy exists.  
Uzbekistan performs well below average for the number of people who struggle to feed and 
shelter their families, although 79% of Uzbeks claim to be satisfied with their standard of living, a 
figure well above the global average and between 2005 and 2011, Uzbekistan’s GDP per capita 
grew at an average almost 7% per annum.  
A relatively high number of people report that job market opportunities are good and overall 
levels of optimism about the economy are the fourth highest in the world. Uzbekistan has a 
relatively small domestic market, and physical capital per worker is among the 20 lowest in the 
Index, so foundations for future growth are relatively weak.  
However, Uzbekistan ranks first in the world for foreign direct investment, as measured by 
both net inflows and volatility. A high 6% of loans are non-performing, indicating inefficiencies in 
the banking sector yet a robust 65% of people had confidence in their financial institutions. No data 
were available for levels of high-tech exports. 
Transport infrastructure is like blood arteries of the economy of any country, therefore well-
developed transport system is particularly important for developing countries. That is why transport 
infrastructure development was and remains to be one of the priority areas of EU cooperation in 
Uzbekistan where European projects had long and impressive records of assistance for development 
of transport infrastructure, including grant aid for road construction and maintenance for 
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Samarkand-Termez highway and loan project for construction of the Tashguzar-Kumkurgan new 
railway line through difficult mountainous area, including erection of state-of-arts steel bridges. 
In this respect, on February 2011 the Uzbekistan Government has signed loan agreement 
amounting for USD 220,6 million for Karshi-Termez Railway Electrification Project, which is 
logical continuation of the previous new railway construction project. Electrification of the railway 
will strengthen transport capacity of Karshi-Termez line by increasing efficiency of both passenger 
and cargo transportation and enhancing the quality of railway services.  
Moreover, it is expected that the Project will contribute to the social and economic 
development not only Uzbekistan but also its neighboring countries including Afghanistan. As 
Uzbekistan is the double-land-locked country sharing borders with all Central Asian countries and 
Afghanistan, the Project will be vital for further regional development.  
Today infrastructure is a key concept as nations along the original Silk Road in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus region struggle to overcome decades of under-development, ingrained poverty, 
conflict and ongoing political and social instability, therefore, new infrastructure and connectivity is 
vital to this nation, not only build new roads and ports but also act in concert and close cooperation, 
together with donors and private enterprise 
In southern Uzbekistan Japan financed the construction of five ultra-modern railroad bridges 
on a 219-kilometer stretch of new track which helps by pass old routes through neighboring 
Turkmenistan and provides a vital link for supplies to Afghanistan.  
A major EU project in Uzbekistan was the modernization of a thermal power plant and water 
where it is a particularly contentious issue in a region where some areas enjoy an overabundance 
and others are reduced to virtual desert. There are longstanding governmental differences about how 
much available water should be allocated to power production, how much for farming and irrigation 
and how much for domestic use. Since 2009 EU consultants and experts have helped construct new 
boreholes and replace hundreds of kilometers of pipelines.  
The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development 
and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 28.6 million towards the development of national 
cooperation programs in Uzbekistan. These provided targeted technical assistance, training, 
opportunities for benchmarking with EU experiences and specialized equipment. Cross-cutting 
issues such as gender equality and social inclusion for vulnerable groups of the population have also 
been addressed.  
The second Multi-annual Indicative Program covering the period 2011-13 allocated € 42 
million. The indicative priority areas for cooperation include governance, rural development and 
environment.  
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm, Economy, Trade, 
Private sectors € 3 million Governance € 12 million Education/Higher education € 10.4 million, Other € 3.2 million 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/index_en.htm,  Economy € 5 
million, Governance € 10 million, Energy € 10 million, Agriculture development € 12 million, Health € 5 million. 
 
 
 
Improving living standards at community level is at the core of the EU-Uzbekistan 
cooperation. Since 2002, and under the TACIS approach, a set of programs on Enhancement of 
Living Standards in Rural Areas (€ 6.5 million), this has been helping to respond to immediate 
community needs. By means of these programs and in joint management with the UNDP, the 
European Union has provided support for improved water services, health and education, as well as 
training, equipment and supplies.  
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Through the Institution Building Partnership Program the EU has also been delivering 
technical assistance to Uzbek local initiatives. This has been made possible through a partnership 
between local organizations and international NGOs. Focal areas of this program include women 
entrepreneurship, job creation and integration of children with disabilities in the mainstream 
education system. So far, the Institution Building Partnership Program has already implemented 22 
projects with an average budget of € 200,000 each.  
In the area of integration of disabled children into mainstream schools, the EU envisages 
supporting the process with the transfer of EU Member States’ experiences and know-how. The 
Improvement of Mother and Child Care Services (€ 3.5 million) is a joint program of the EU, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund and the Ministry of Health.  
 
 
 
5.5.5 Education 
Although Uzbekistan enrolls fewer than 90% of eligible children in primary school, which is 
in the bottom twenty of the Index on this variable, it achieves enrolment in secondary education that 
places the country 13th.  
However, only around 10% of students proceed to university, which is one of the 30 lowest 
rates of higher education in the Index. There is a slight under representation of girls in primary and 
secondary education in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, levels of public satisfaction with schooling are 
among the highest in the world: 85% of Uzbeks reported themselves happy with the quality of the 
education, while an even higher 93% said their children can learn and grow every day.  
Primary schools have one teacher for every 17 pupils, placing the country in 17th place for 
this variable. However, the Uzbek labor force is generally under-educated and the average worker 
has had just 1.6 years of secondary education and 0.4 years of tertiary education: on both variables, 
Uzbekistan ranks in the bottom half of the Index.  
Eleven years of primary and secondary education are obligatory, starting at age seven. This 
requirement includes four years of primary school and two cycles of secondary school, lasting five 
and two years, respectively. The rate of attendance in those grades is high, although the figure is 
significantly lower in rural areas than in urban centers and in the post-Soviet era educational 
standards have fallen. Lack of budgetary support has been more noticeable at the primary and 
secondary levels, as the government has continued to subsidize university students. The three 
largest of Uzbekistan’s 63 institutions of higher learning are in Nukus, Samarqand, and Tashkent 
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and are all state-funded. Private schools have been forbidden since the establishment of Islamic 
fundamentalist schools in the early 1990s brought a government crackdown.  
 
5.5.6 Security & Safety 
There are many refugees and internally displaced people in Uzbekistan and a high number of 
groups with a grievance deriving from recent or historic injustices. The country also has one of the 
30 highest levels of demographic instability resulting from border disputes, ownership or occupancy 
of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, or proximity to 
environmental hazards.  
Although there were no casualties from civil or ethnic strife in 2010, there are some incidents 
of political and state-sponsored repression or violence, with Uzbeks are less likely than the global 
average to believe that people feel safe expressing their political views openly. In response to this, a 
high proportion of middle class Uzbeks, professionals, intellectuals or political dissidents flee 
abroad in search of better opportunities.  
In terms of personal safety, however, around 1% of the population reported being assaulted in 
the 12 months prior to being surveyed in 2011, while fewer than 5% had experienced theft. These 
figures place Uzbekistan in the top five of the Index on these variables. This is not entirely reflected 
in perceptions of crime, however, as just 72% of Uzbeks feel safe walking the streets at night. 
Another issue that afflicts central Asia republics is the border one, where border confrontation 
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is creating hardship for citizens of both countries, along the 
non-delimited frontier and in at least one case, is stoking a food shortage in area.  
Authorities in Uzbekistan try keeping a low profile on the event but that approach should not 
be confused for passivity. Indeed, according to some international analysts sustain that some high-
ranking security officials are purportedly pushing for armed action, itching for a chance to gain 
retribution for what they see as Kyrgyz persecution of ethnic Uzbeks going back to the Osh events 
of June 2010. 
The border standoff in the ethnically diverse Ferghana Valley where hundreds of residents of 
Sokh, a densely populated valley that belongs to Uzbekistan, is mostly populated by ethnic Tajiks 
and is entirely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Province, have attacked Kyrgyz border guards 
several times, as they were installing electricity poles on contested territory. Many Kyrgyz villagers 
have blocked the main road linking the Sokh exclave to Uzbekistan proper, apparently in retaliation 
and as consequence Uzbekistan has closed more than once its border with Kyrgyzstan and blocked 
rail shipments.  
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In one tiny Kyrgyz enclave surrounded by Uzbekistan’s Andijan Region, 300 families are 
running out of food and Uzbek leaders have also threatened to stop gas shipments to southern 
Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Kyrgyz villages those are in Kyrgyzstan proper, but depend on road 
connections through Sokh, have also been cut off and are running short of essential supplies.  
Once again, the Ferghana Valley is a checkerboard of enclaves, exclaves and non-delimited 
borders dating from the Communist era, when all three countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan were part of the Soviet Union. Since independence in 1991, the three countries have 
been unable to agree on frontiers, especially in densely populated areas, such as Sokh. These events 
bout of tension is connected to population growth and poverty in the Ferghana Valley where arable 
land and water are limited and competition among residents for scare natural resources is 
increasing.  
Throughout the standoff, one mystery has been how Uzbekistan, which has a much larger 
military than Kyrgyzstan, might respond, if conditions deteriorate for Uzbekistani nationals in 
Sokh. Though both sides have pledged to negotiate, there has been little visible progress toward a 
border agreement.  
President Islam Karimov strongly opposes military action, fearing that a regional border war 
would destabilize the whole region and being Kyrgyzstan a member of the CSTO, the Russia-led 
security alliance that Uzbekistan recently abandoned, plays a considerable role in the thinking of 
Karimov and his interventionist-shy allies, where CSTO members are treaty-bound to aid 
Kyrgyzstan in the case of external aggression. 
The fact that Karimov, who often ignores requests from his neighbors, quickly ordered local 
officials to negotiate with the Kyrgyz underscores the gravity of the situation, highlighting that 
Karimov doesn’t like to be perceived as weak, therefore, he order to negotiate with the Kyrgyz side 
reflecting his deep concern. 
According to open sources4, Uzbek military officers are eager to engage their counterparts 
across the border in Kyrgyzstan, whom they blame for ethnic violence in June 2010 that left over 
400, mostly minority Uzbeks, dead. Indeed, the Sokh incident is actually a continuation of a long-
running feud between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz military leadership. 
In his effort to calm trigger-happy generals, Karimov has resorted to a familiar crisis-
management tactic, blaming faceless outsiders for stirring up trouble, who are eager to foment 
tensions among the five Central Asian republics, banning and attracting investment.  
 
 
                                               
4
 Source: www.euorasia.it, accessed in December 2012.  
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5.6 Afghanistan 
5.6.1 Geography 
Location: Afghanistan is located in Central Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran, and 
south of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The narrow Wakhan Corridor extends from 
northeastern most Afghanistan to meet with China.  
Size: Afghanistan occupies approximately 647,500 square kilometers, slightly less than 
Texas.  
Land Boundaries: Afghanistan has borders with the following countries: China, 76 
kilometers; Iran, 936 kilometers; Pakistan, 2,430 kilometers; Tajikistan, 1,206 kilometers; 
Turkmenistan, 744 kilometers; and Uzbekistan, 137 kilometers.  
Disputed Territory: Afghanistan has no boundary disputes; ongoing incursions, smuggling, 
and terrorist movement across the Pakistan border are addressed in periodic bilateral tripartite 
meetings.  
Natural Resources: Agricultural resources are primarily grazing land, with fertile crop-
growing land is concentrated in Kondoz Province in the north and Helmand Province in the south. 
Afghanistan is known to have major deposits of chrome, coal, copper, iron, and salt, as well as 
lesser amounts of a wide variety of minerals including gold, silver, and uranium. Natural gas is the 
most abundant hydrocarbon resource, while substantial oil deposits are recognized but not yet 
quantified. Water for all purposes is in critically short supply.  
Environmental Factors: Although little studied before recent times, the environment of 
Afghanistan is assumed to have been spared large-scale disturbances until the Soviet invasion of 
1979. Afghanistan, which has no appreciable bodies of water, suffers from a limited freshwater 
supply that makes potable water unavailable to more than half the population. In recent years, 
groundwater quality has deteriorated because of agricultural and industrial runoff and water 
quantity has been diminished by large-scale land clearing and desertification. Because of 
insufficient water treatment, the incidence of water-borne diseases is very high.  
Widespread overgrazing, soil erosion, salinisation, and water logging have reduced 
agricultural productivity. Although Afghanistan has little industry, particularly pollutants from the 
Aral Sea and industrial complexes in Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan contaminate the 
atmosphere in northern Afghanistan. Chemical use and physical destruction in recent military 
conflicts have damaged the environment and landmines are residual hazards endangering an 
estimated 4 million Afghanis in 32 provinces.  
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5.6.2 Society  
Population: In the early 2000’s, population assessment has been difficult because many 
people have not had fixed residences. In 2008 the estimated population was 32.7 million, with 
growth rate was 3.1 percent per year. The population is approximately 75 percent rural and after 
heavy out-migration and internal displacement in the 1980’s and 1990’s, an estimated 3.5 million 
Afghans returned to Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 before the numbers began to decrease. In the 
early 2000s, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced within Afghanistan, mainly from rural 
to urban areas, because of drought and instability. In 2007 more than 2 million Afghans were living 
in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran, later on both countries, the main recipients of Afghan refugees, 
began preparations for large-scale deportation. Tajikistan closed its border with Afghanistan in 
2007, meanwhile, in that year insecure conditions in Afghanistan noticeably decreased the rate of 
return. The United Nations reported that in 2008 some 365,400 Afghanis returned to their country, 
bringing the total of repatriations since 2002 to 4.1 million. In the first quarter of 2008, an estimated 
13,000 people fled their homes as conflicts occurred in previously safe regions.  
Demography: In 2010 some 45.8 percent of the population was younger than 15 years of age 
and 2.4 percent was older than 64. The estimated birthrate was 46.3 per 1,000 population and the 
estimated death rate was 20.4 per 1,000 population. The infant mortality rate was 158 deaths per 
1,000 live births. Life expectancy was 43 years for males and 45 years for females with fertility rate 
were 6.6 children born per woman.  
Ethnic Groups: The main ethnic groups are Pashtun 42 percent, Tajik 27 percent, Hazara 12 
percent, Uzbek 9 percent, Aimak 4 percent, Turkmen 3 percent and Baloch, 2 percent. The largest 
remaining nomadic group is the Kuchis, a Pashtun group whose population has dwindled to about 
1.5 million since 1980’s. The Pashtuns are the major ethnic group in the south and the east, the 
Tajiks in the northeast, with Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks as predominant groups in north-central 
Afghanistan.  
Languages: More than 30 languages are spoken in Afghanistan, but the official languages are 
Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashtu. Dari is spoken by 50 percent of the population, while Pashtu is 
spoken as a first language by 35 percent. Turkic languages (primarily Turkmen and Uzbek) are 
spoken by 11 percent of the population. Of the languages spoken by smaller segments of the 
population, the most important are Balochi and Pashai.  
Religion: Virtually the entire population is Muslim, but between 80 and 85 percent of 
Muslims are Sunni and 15 to 19 percent Shia. The minority Shia are economically disadvantaged 
and frequently subjected to discrimination, moreover, there are small numbers of Hindus and Sikhs 
who live in urban centers. 
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5.6.3 Governance 
The adoption of a new constitution in January 2004 and the election of Hamid Karzai as 
president in October 2004 were considered major advances in Afghanistan’s fragmented political 
life. However, day-to-day control of the provinces proved to be difficult both before and after the 
election and substantial regional power centers are still in place. After the first National Assembly 
was seated in December 2005, the balance between the executive and legislative branches was 
uncertain and Karzai has been obliged to award cabinet positions to key regional warlords. The role 
of Islamic principles in governance remains extremely controversial, particularly in the judicial 
branch. The UN, EU and NATO have continued its policy of one-year renewals of its Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan, designed to coordinate international aid and guide the rebuilding process.  
Following the reorganization in early 2009, the government included 25 ministries; 
appointments to these ministries have been distributed among influential regional and military 
groups, but reducing the number of ministries by two and shifted key individuals. One woman 
headed a ministry and the National Defense Commission, headed by Karzai, is a six-member 
advisory board that includes leaders of the main regional groups. Karzai has attempted to 
manipulate key regional individuals and groups to maintain a base of power. An example is 
Karzai’s careful treatment of Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful Uzbek warlord considered vital in 
holding northern Afghanistan against the Taliban. That strategy has involved Karzai in complex 
regional power struggles. He has been accused of supporting certain opium traffickers in exchange 
for support in southern provinces.  
The constitution calls for a bicameral legislature, the National Assembly and members of the 
lower house, the 249-member are elected directly for five-year terms. The government can convene 
a Loya Jirga (Constituent Assembly) to decide urgent matters of independence, national 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Such an assembly, which can amend the constitution and bring 
charges against the president, must include members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of 
the provincial and district councils.  
The first parliamentary and local elections were held in September 2005 after being 
postponed for nearly a year for security reasons. Although the election commission ostensibly 
disqualified individuals commanding armed groups from the parliamentary elections, several of the 
most powerful regional warlords gained seats. The complex voting system for those elections, in 
which about 50 percent of eligible voters participated, received substantial criticism. Because all 
candidates ran as individuals and no party representation was allowed, substantial fragmentation of 
parliamentary coalitions resulted. The next presidential election is scheduled for 2014. 
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On the Afghanistan’s judicial branch deteriorated during the Soviet occupation, and justice 
was administered by strict Islamic law during the Taliban era (1996–2001). To replace the ad hoc 
system in place under the transitional government, the constitution of 2004 stipulated that the 
Supreme Court include nine justices appointed by the president.  
According to the constitution, provinces, districts, and villages are governed by directly 
elected councils. The chief executive at the province level is the governor, who is appointed by the 
president, as is the case with the national cabinet, the president has distributed governorships among 
influential regional and military groups. Province and district administrations have the same basic 
structure as the national government.  
According to the current Constitution, the central government, which theoretically stands at 
the center of a highly centralized system, delegates authority to the sub-national jurisdictions in 
matters where local or regional action is more efficient. In some southern jurisdictions, the Taliban 
insurgency has been able to establish parallel governments, including administrators and judges.  
Although every province has a lower and a higher court, judicial procedures are influenced by 
local authorities and traditions. The respective roles of Islamic and secular law in the new national 
judicial system have not been well established and a large portion of the current law code is based 
on laws passed under the last king, Mohammad Zahir Shah. In rural areas, where local elders and 
tribal authorities resolve criminal cases, Taliban laws have remained in effect. Indeed. according to 
a 2006 estimate, in all provinces some 90 percent of local cases are based on Islamic and tribal law.  
The Political Parties Law of 2003 requires that all political parties be registered with the 
Ministry of Justice and observe the precepts of Islam. Most political groupings are based on 
alliances that formed during the military struggles of 1979–2002. The Northern Alliance is an 
influential loose confederation of several Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups who fought against the 
Taliban. Factions of the alliance were key forces in the parliament elected in 2005, but in 2008 the 
largest individual parties were the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, the National Congress Party of 
Afghanistan, the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, the National Movement of 
Afghanistan (a coalition of 11 parties also known as the Afghan Nationalist Party), the Islamic 
Society of Afghanistan, the Islamic Unity Party and the United National Front.  
 
5.6.4 Economy 
Overview: Economic statistics for Afghanistan are inexact and Afghanistan’s economy, 
which always has been heavily agricultural and one of the poorest in the world, was shattered by the 
wars of the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Industry, much of which depended on agricultural output, 
suffered as well and after the wars, small-scale trade in urban centers and agriculture in some 
regions revived quickly. Since 2007, some 17 provincial reconstruction teams led by Western 
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civilian and NATO military personnel were working to restore economic infrastructure and security 
in Afghanistan, with large-scale international aid, recovery of the agriculture sector and substantial 
growth in the services sector.  
The 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan pledged US$10.4 billion for economic 
infrastructure reconstruction during the following three years, in 2008 President Hamid Karzai 
announced a new five-year National Development Strategy, which includes economic and social 
components, to be supported by US$50 billion of foreign funds. Donor countries at the International 
Conference in Support of Afghanistan pledged US$21 billion for this program over five years, 
starting from 2009.  
Afghanistan faces a number of serious economic challenges, as the need to replace the 
income generated by opium production, which in 2011 yielded an estimated 68 percent of the 
country’s gross domestic product. Smuggling, particularly across the Pakistan border, also is an 
important part of the “black economy,” which drains resources from the formal economy. 
Privatization, designed to promote economic growth and productivity, was to have been completed 
in 2011 according to the 2006 Afghanistan Authorities, but further efforts in that direction have 
been officially postponed by the lower house of parliament.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Excluding illegal poppy production, for the fiscal year 
running from March 21, 2010–March 20, 2011, Afghanistan’s GDP was estimated at US$ 9.8 
billion or US$ 370 per capita. In 2011 agriculture contributed an estimated 38 percent to the GDP, 
services 26 percent and industry and mining 23 percent. Following the economic standstill of the 
late 1990’s, GDP growth rates in the early 2000’s have been very high, although they moderated 
after reaching 16 percent in 2010 and 14.5 percent in 2011. The growth rate for 2010 was between 7 
and 8 percent. However, the starting points upon which such figures are based were very low.  
Inflation: Under the pro-Soviet regimes of the 1980’s, inflation was high but limited by 
government controls. Inflation reached 150 percent per year during the civil war of the early 1990’s 
and is believed to have remained high under the Taliban. After the currency reform of 2002, 
inflation averaged about 10 percent per year for the first two years, but it rose to 18 percent in 2011. 
Agriculture: Agriculture traditionally has been the foundation of Afghanistan’s economy, 
employing as much as 80 percent of the workforce and contributing at least half of the gross 
domestic product (GDP). Because of the poor quality of most agricultural land, subsistence 
agriculture predominates. Although many displaced Afghan farmers returned to their land in the 
early 2000’s, land mines and the destruction of irrigation systems had made much agricultural land 
unusable. The drought of 1999–2002 devastated the rural population and further reduced all types 
of agricultural output.  
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With increased rainfall, 2006 output again increased, but delays in the restoration of irrigation 
systems hampered the reclaiming of additional agricultural land. The main legal crops are wheat, 
vegetables, grapes, rice, barley, corn, fruits, and potatoes. The main types of livestock are cattle, 
sheep, and goats; cow’s milk is the most valuable product of livestock raising. In the winter of 
2007- 8, Afghanistan faced a severe grain shortage, partly because poppy cultivation replaced wheat 
in some areas, partly because of intensified violence and partly because of reduced grain imports. 
The internationally supported program to replace poppies with legal crops showed progress, 
mainly in the poorer agricultural regions of the north and west, but since 2007 the area and volume 
of poppy cultivation increased substantially in the richer soils of the south, especially in Helmand 
Province.  
Industry and Manufacturing: Before the wars of the late twentieth century, industry was 
based on the processing of local agricultural products, including textiles, sugar, and chemical 
fertilizers made from natural gas or coal. The main manufacturing center was the Kabul region. In 
2004 all of Afghanistan’s industrial sector had stopped producing or was producing at a 
substantially reduced rate. The reasons for this reduction in productivity are war damage, shortages 
of raw materials and spare parts and the postwar priority of rebuilding overall infrastructure before 
industry. In the 2000’s, foreign investment in the industrial sector focused on small and medium-
sized enterprises, predominantly in telecommunications. Revival projects have concentrated on 
agricultural processing and carpet enterprises. In 2007 the carpet industry, which provides the most 
valuable legal export commodity, employed an estimated 1 million people directly. Some small 
plants in Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e Sharif produce textiles, leather goods, and processed foods.  
Energy: War damage depleted Afghanistan’s energy generation infrastructure, particularly 
generators and power lines. Some natural gas wells and 31 oil wells that were active during the 
Soviet occupation have remained capped since that era. In 2004 energy shortages were a critical 
obstacle in resuming economic activity, but between 2005 and 2010 the electricity supply improved 
under Minister of Water and Energy. Reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam on the Helmand River in 
south-central Afghanistan, begun in 2005, aims to provide electricity to an additional 3 million 
people and to expand the existing irrigation system in the region. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan have sent electric power to some northern regions of Afghanistan.  
In August 2008, Afghanistan signed an agreement for construction of new lines bringing 
electric power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2013, within a new 
regional energy grouping, the Central Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market. In 2008 
Turkmenistan also signed a new agreement to supply natural gas for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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Given adequate extraction and distribution infrastructure, Afghanistan’s domestic coal, natural gas, 
and oil resources can meet its energy needs.  
In 2004 natural gas reserves were estimated at 5 trillion cubic feet, while in the early 2000’s, 
oil reserves were estimated at 95 million barrels and coal reserves at 73 million tons, but 
substantially larger oil reserves have been identified in the Amu Darya Basin and the Afghan-Tajik 
Basin north of Kabul. Resumed extraction of natural gas, once a key export, is a top economic 
priority. Afghanistan is a natural pipeline route between Central Asian natural gas fields and the 
Arabian Sea, and the often-discussed Trans-Afghan Pipeline, clearly would be an economic boon to 
Afghanistan, but the line would pass through territory controlled by the Taliban.  
Hence, security issues have prevented construction since the original agreement was signed in 
2002 by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan’s domestic pipelines connect gas 
fields only with local consumers and the Mazar-e-Sharif power plant.  
Services: Afghanistan’s banking system, which collapsed during the civil war of the early 
1990’s, was limited to financial transactions supporting retail commerce. With the collapse, money-
changers became the main source of financing and opium and wheat became the primary forms of 
capital for the agricultural population. Elimination of poppy cultivation would mean destitution for 
many farmers relying on opium for credit. Since 2002 the government has encouraged recovery of a 
formal banking system. New commercial banking laws were passed in 2003 and banks from 
Britain, India, and Pakistan opened branches in Kabul. In mid-2004 the Afghanistan International 
Bank (AIB) began operating with the backing of the Asian Development Bank and 75 percent 
ownership by Afghan businessmen.  
Labor: Because of the very large black-market economy, statistics on the labor force are 
incomplete, however, in 2004 the labor force in the legitimate economy was estimated at 15 million, 
of whom about 28 percent were women. The conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990’s seriously depleted 
the supply of skilled labor. According to a 2004 estimate, about 80 percent of the workforce was in 
agriculture, 10 percent in industry, and 10 percent in services.  
Foreign Economic Relations: The United States has given Afghanistan status as a least-
developed beneficiary developing nation, which removes tariffs on several U.S. imports from 
Afghanistan. In 2004 the United States signed a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement, which increased trade levels with Afghanistan. In 2007 a joint statement under that 
agreement created a new framework for bilateral commercial cooperation. The European Union 
also gives Afghan products preferential trade status.  
Trade with Iran has increased substantially in the post-Taliban era and it has given 
Afghanistan the use of its Arabian Sea port at Chabahar under favorable conditions, despite U.S. 
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objections. In 2003 Afghanistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan established a trans-Afghan trade corridor 
linking Uzbekistan with Chabahar and Bandar-e Abbas. Uzbekistan’s border procedures have 
slowed commerce along the route, however. Trade with Pakistan is complicated by a high level of 
smuggling across the border 
In 2009 an estimated 80 percent of goods entering Afghanistan from Pakistan were 
subsequently smuggled back into Pakistan and the volume of that commerce was estimated at 
US$10 billion, compared with US$2 billion of legitimate trade between the two countries. Several 
attempts to review their Joint Economic Commission, which had been moribund for 10 years, 
brought improving commercial relations. The main purchasers of Afghanistan’s exports in order of 
volume were India, Pakistan, the United States and Britain. The main suppliers of Afghanistan’s 
imports in order of volume were Pakistan, the United States, Germany and India.  
The main legal export commodities were fruits and nuts, carpets, wool, cotton, hides and 
pelts, and precious and semi-precious gems. The main imports were capital goods, food, textiles, 
and petroleum products. Afghanistan’s foreign trade increased substantially in volume in the early 
2000’s.  
Balance of Payments: For fiscal year 2011, Afghanistan had a balance of payments surplus 
of US$ 131 million, mainly because of US$ 2.7 billion in international grants.  
External Debt: In 2010 Afghanistan had US$ 11.9 billion in external debt, but in 2011 it 
qualified for World Bank assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.  
Foreign Investment: To encourage foreign investment, in 2002 the government began 
allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of Afghan enterprises, offering substantial tax benefits and 
unlimited transfer of assets out of the country. The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency was 
established in 2003 to centralize foreign investment activities. However, Afghanistan’s highly 
corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy has limited investment, there is no legal system for adjudication 
of commercial disputes, there is significant resentment in the provinces against foreign intrusion, 
and the government has passed no significant reforms.  
In addition, the liberalized ownership policy does not apply to investment in pipeline 
construction, telecommunications infrastructure, the fuels and minerals industries, or other heavy 
industry where state-owned enterprises predominate. In 2011 the World Bank’s international rating 
on business conditions rated Afghanistan number 162 in the world, in part because of security 
conditions. In 2006 Coca-Cola opened a US$ 25 million bottling plant in Kabul and in 2007 two 
Chinese companies agreed to invest US$ 3.7 billion for access to the Aynak Valley copper deposits, 
the largest single foreign investment ever made in Afghanistan. Other large investors include 
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Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Central Asian countries, members of the European Union, 
and the United States. 
Overview on the Transportation: Afghanistan’s transportation system, which prior to 1979 
was just rudimentary, suffered severe damage during the ensuing two decades. In the post-2001 era, 
the weak transportation infrastructure has been a major deterrent to realizing Afghanistan’s 
potential commercial crossroads. The road system, which provides the only transport in most parts 
of the country, has been an urgent reconstruction project implemented by the International 
community. At the current stage, there is no rail system and the main and quick transport system is 
the air, where several airports have been reviving in the early 2000’s.  
Roads: The main internal road system that was built in the 1960’s included about 2,000 
kilometers of roads. After an intensive international road-building and restoration effort, in 2011 
Afghanistan had an estimated 15,100 kilometers of paved roads, however, even in Kabul the 
condition of many roads still was poor and heavily damaged. 
The main arteries connect the cities of Ghazni, Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar with roads 
crossing the Pakistan border. Critical commercial and military roadways through the Salang and 
Tang-e Gharu Mountain passes, north and east of Kabul, respectively, were badly damaged during 
the Soviet occupation and ensuing conflicts.  
The railroad connecting Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, with the Uzbekistan border town of 
Hairatan, has opened in 2011, putting into operation a key node of the NATO military’s overland 
transport route through Central Asia to Afghanistan5. 
 As of 2011, most of the so-called Ring Road network, which link most population and 
commercial centers, had been completed, including a highway connecting Kabul with Kandahar, 
but a connector between Kandahar and Herat, begun in 2004, was not yet complete in 2008. EU and 
in particular Germany are financing a road connecting Jalalabad with the Pakistan border. India, 
Iran, and Pakistan are constructing roads connecting Afghanistan with their respective national road 
systems and another route is to connect Iran’s port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman with 
Tajikistan via Afghanistan. Provincial roads, which also received heavy damage during conflicts of 
recent decades, generally have not been repaired since the end of hostilities.  
Civil Aviation and Airports: In 2007 some 46 airports were in operation and 12 had paved 
runways, but only four had runways longer than 3,000 meters. Nine heliports also were in 
operation, especially for military use. In 2006, the Kabul International Airport, the only destination 
for international flights into Afghanistan, began a major reconstruction project with Japanese aid, 
followed by NATO - led International Security Assistance Force begin turning over air traffic 
                                               
5
 Source: http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/08/23/feature-01, accessed in 2012. 
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control at Kabul International to civilian operators. Connections to Kabul are made via Delhi, India; 
Islamabad, Pakistan; and Baku, Azerbaijan. Airports at Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e Sharif also 
were renovated in the early 2000’s.  
Telecommunications: In 2004 Afghanistan had an estimated 50,000 main telephone lines 
and 600,000 cellular phones. Mobile phones, introduced to Afghanistan in 2001, became the 
principal means of communication in the early 2000’s. In 2006 an estimated 3.2 million mobile 
phone subscriptions were active and in 2008, four mobile phone companies were in operation. The 
number of Afghans with Internet access increased rapidly between 2000 and 2011, multiplying 
from an estimated 1,000 to 890,000. Public Internet facilities are available in Herat, Kabul, 
Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. In many areas, however, unpredictable power cuts hinder Internet 
access. 
 
5.6.5 Education 
Despite substantial improvements during the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (ruled 1933–
73), in 1979 some 90 percent of Afghanistan’s population was illiterate, with a 2006 estimation of 
57 percent of men and 87 percent of women were illiterate, bringing a major economic 
disadvantage as lack of skilled and educated workers. Beginning with the Soviet invasion of 1979, 
successive wars virtually destroyed the education system and most teachers fled the country. By 
1996 only about 650 schools were functioning and moreover, the Taliban regime banned 
education for females, imposing the madrassa (mosque school) as the main source of primary and 
secondary education.  
After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the interim government received substantial 
international aid to restore the education system, but for the next six years the Taliban attacked 
public schools wherever possible. In 2007 increased Taliban activity forced the closure of 35 
percent of the schools in the southern provinces, while the Taliban were able to open some 
fundamentalist schools in regions. Later on, through the International Community commitment 
about 9,500 schools reportedly were operating, at least some in every province. The Ministry of 
Education6 estimated that in 2011, about 9 million children were in school, including nearly 3 
million girls.  
Despite renewed emphasis on educating girls, in 2011 the ratio of girls to boys in secondary 
schools was one to three or four, as rural families continued the tradition of educating only males. 
Higher education also has been problematic, but the Kabul University7 reopened in 2002, some 
44,000 students, male and female, enrolled. Nowadays, it suffers from lack of enough 
                                               
6
 Source: http://mohe.gov.af/?lang=en, accessed in December 2011.  
7
 Source: http://ku.edu.af/en, accessed in December 2012.  
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infrastructure such as classrooms, labs, libraries and qualified teaching staff, which has been the 
result of many years of war and destruction. Projects have been carrying out by US and EU to 
realize number of schools and departments, the central administrations, long-term academic 
strategy. However, in the middle 2000’s, the rehabilitation of five other universities progressed 
very slowly. Although seven universities were operating in 2007, only a total of 22,700 students 
were active in higher education. 
 
5.6.6 Safety &Security 
Overview: Beginning with the accession of the Karzai government in 2004, national security 
policy has aimed to establish a credible armed force, the Afghan National Security Forces8, 
including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In 2008 some 
65,000 soldiers had been trained by U.S., NATO and EU forces and participated in counterterrorism 
operations. The long-term goal has been to prepare an army of 70,000 (in five corps), an air force of 
8,000, a border guard force of 12,000, and a police force of 82,000 in order to move the 
Afghanistan into an active role and taking the lead for a wide range of operations. But the security 
forces mirror image the corruption and weaknesses of the government they served, often committed 
abuses equal to or greater than those of the insurgents, and had no ability to “win and hold” on a 
lasting basis.  
With forces near their current goal of 352,000, nowadays, only a total of 194,466 (57%) were 
military - including 7,809 ANA Commandos, 646 ANA Special Forces and 5,541 Air Force. The 
rest - a total of 149,642 (43%) were police with very different functions, plus large numbers of 
Afghan Local Police (ALP). Additionally, there was no clear plan to create enough men in the 
Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to replace virtually all private security contractors. The 
police have only one comparatively small element that is really intended to fight as a paramilitary 
force. However, ANSF capacity and the various elements of the Afghan military might be able to 
replace US and allied forces during 2014-2020, that will determine the Afghan government’s ability 
to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents. 
ISAF and its training mission, National Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), did make 
major progress in developing the Afghan forces after 2009, and some aspects of this progress have 
accelerated over time. Current plans talk about a future force level of 230,000 and a budget reduced 
to around $4.1 billion a year, but it is not clear such plans will be put into practice, how the current 
force goals will be adjusted, what budget will actually be available, and how much the Afghan 
government can spend of its own revenues.  
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 Source: http://mod.gov.af/en, accessed in December 2012.  
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The security situation remains unpredictable, as do the challenges posed by peace 
negotiations and the police effort presents special problems both because of corruption and because 
it is being developed without a matching real-world justice system and Afghan government 
presence in the field. It is unclear whether the International Community are willing to fully fund the 
necessary development and support effort through 2014 and for as long as it takes after this time to 
achieve lasting security and stability - a truly massive funding effort that so far has dominated total 
aid expenditures in Afghanistan. 
The National Security Directorate, the national intelligence agency, is administered by the 
Ministry of Interior and about 10,000 militia organizations existed, many of them commanded by 
regional warlords. A series of amnesty programs have disarmed some militia units and reintegrated 
them into society, but the elimination of militias remains an elusive goal of the central government. 
Much territory remains outside government control and is dominated by narcotics traffickers, tribal 
leaders and insurgent groups.  
Foreign Military Relations: Afghanistan has depended almost entirely on U.S. and NATO, 
as Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to provide 
security in and around Kabul and to combat Taliban forces elsewhere in Afghanistan. In 2008 the 
ISAF, which since 2003 has been under the rotating command of officers from NATO countries, 
included about 43,000 troops from 40 countries.  
In 2003 Afghanistan received an estimated US$ 191 million in foreign military assistance, in 
2005 that figure was US$ 396 million and a 2008 U.S. proposal would expend a total of US$ 20 
billion developing the ANSF and reorganizing occupation forces between 2009 and 2013. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and EU have also ongoing advisory 
programs9 on Police and Rule of Law (Justice, Anti-Corruption, Human Rights and Gender). 
Moreover, the Crime Management College has recently established (2013), through a Memorandum 
of Understanding signed between the European Union Delegation in Kabul and the Ministry of 
Interior.  
It is expected to open its doors for students by September 2013 and currently, the Crime 
Management College is housed within the Central Training in Kabul. Since it was formally opened 
by General Patang (then Head of Afghan General Training Command) in February 2012 over 1400 
students have attended training courses run by EUPOL’s Training Component. This latest 
commitment of over one million Euro will see the renovation of two buildings within the Afghan 
National Police Academy. A comprehensive curriculum is currently being trained at the Crime 
Management College, jointly by EUPOL trainers and Afghan trainers. 
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 Source: http://www.eupol-afg.eu/, accessed in December 2012.  
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External Threat: The major external threat is the movement of hostile forces, militias and 
terrorists from staging areas across Afghanistan’s porous borders of Pakistan.  
Defense Budget: Between 2003 and 2011, the estimated military expenditure increased from 
US$ 65 million to US$ 241 million.  
Police: Increasingly after 2002, the police were the only defense for civilians against 
insurgent forces in many parts of the country. Thus police duties often include paramilitary 
activities that are vital to national defense. Plans call for Afghanistan to increase its police force, the 
Afghan National Police (ANP), to 82,000, including conventional, border, highway, and 
counternarcotics police, by 2012. The force, which had an estimated 75,000 members in 2011, was 
to include members of all ethnic and tribal groups. Germany initiated the restoration program in 
2002 and the European Union took over in 2007, where some 200 European trainers were in 
Afghanistan as said before. However, the program has been handicapped by low pay, low recruit 
quality, pervasive corruption and the increasing insecure environment. Indeed, in 2009 an estimated 
1.295 local police were killed, often by insurgents and none of the 433 police units that have been 
trained to face insurgent forces properly.  
Internal Threat: In 2008 a large part of the country remained without adequate security and 
armed bands launched attacks in regions not controlled by the central government. Reportedly, in 
2009 the number of violent incidents increased by one-third over 2008, killing about 6,500 
combatants and 2,500 civilians. In 2010 - 11 the number of suicide attacks increased from 216 to 
340 and the number of roadside bombings increased from 2,571 to 3,488. In 2004 the international 
medical organization Doctors without Borders withdrew its aid workers from Afghanistan when 
five members were killed and in the years that followed other international nongovernmental 
organizations periodically suspended operations because of insecurity. In the first half of 2011, 
some 12 international aid workers were abducted and 8 killed. 
A major internal security factor has been criminal and terrorist activity associated with the 
prosperous drug trade, where drug-processing laboratories are located throughout the country, 
traditional informal financial networks launder narcotics profits, and some provincial and national 
government officials have been implicated in the drug trade. Forcible eradication of poppy crops 
has caused controversy between Western policymakers and the Karzai government and Western 
troops have been reluctant to antagonize local populations by eradication measures.  
Some government agencies have been implicated in the protection of the opium trade. The 
smuggling and other illegal economic activity that were pervasive during the war periods left a very 
strong residual black-market economy specializing in exporting goods illegally into Pakistan and 
moving illegal drugs northward into Central Asia and ultimately Russia and Western Europe. The 
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opium production supporting the latter activity remained very high (accounting for an estimated 93 
percent of the world supply in 2007), despite government efforts to reduce it.  
Terrorism: Between 2002 and 2008, President Karzai suffered four assassination attempts 
during which some government officials were killed and the latest such attack occurred in April 
2008. Small-scale attacks on villages and in Kabul were common throughout the 2009-2011.  
 
5.6.7 Afghanistan Future 
The International Community, EU, NATO and the Afghan government have established a 
framework for reconstruction assistance through the 2014 security transition and into what they are 
calling the “transformation decade” (2015–2024). Through 2014, the international community 
estimates that Afghanistan will require at least $9 billion a year to sustain current operations and 
fund development. It will take about $5 billion to cover the costs of the Afghan security forces at 
current levels and another US $4 billion to support the Afghan budget and provide economic 
assistance. The Afghan President has request to include nearly $9.7 billion to strengthen the Afghan 
security forces during this critical transition period and to fund programs to build governing 
capacity, promote economic development, and counter the drug trade. Funding needs are expected 
to decline gradually after 2015 as Afghanistan generates increased government revenue and 
becomes more self-reliant. 
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Three key events this quarter - the signing of the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement, 
the NATO Summit and the Tokyo Donors Conference - broadly outlined Afghanistan’s security 
relationship with the United States, endorsed an accelerated timetable to transition security to the 
Afghan government. On May 2, 2012, after over a year of negotiations, President Barack Obama 
and President Hamid Karzai signed a new pact, laying a foundation for a relationship between the 
United States and Afghanistan after the bulk of American troops have gone home. The Enduring 
Strategic Partnership Agreement signaled a long-term U.S. commitment to sustain the Afghan 
security forces, fund economic-development programs, promote good governance, support regional 
security and cooperation, and help Afghanistan deal with its budget shortfall. The United States said 
it would support efforts to build Afghan governing capacity. The Agreement was intended to 
reassure Afghans and warn insurgents that the United States had learned the lessons of the past and 
would not abandon Afghanistan after 2014. President Obama said the agreement ensures that “as 
Afghans stand up, they will not stand alone”. The agreement also underscored the importance of 
fighting corruption. Afghanistan pledged to strengthen its anti-corruption institutions, adopt 
measures to protect its financial system, and take steps to increase efficiency and accountability at 
all levels of the government. Afghanistan also committed to protect and promote democratic values 
and human rights, including “the essential role of women in society, so that they may fully enjoy 
their economic, social, political, civil, and cultural rights”. Afghanistan’s National Assembly 
ratified the agreement in early June. 
 
 
5.6.8 Afghanistan Designated a Major Non-NATO Ally 
The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement included a provision that the United States 
would designate Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), thus establishing a framework for 
continuing security and defense cooperation. NATO is the major international organization 
providing military assistance in Afghanistan. MNNA countries are eligible for U.S. training, loans 
of equipment for research and development and ultimately for foreign military financing for defense 
purposes. On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the order giving Afghanistan MNNA status and 
signaling the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan after the transition. Afghanistan is the first country 
to be designated an MNNA since 2004, when Kuwait, Morocco and Pakistan were added to the list. 
On May 21, 2012, the leaders of the 50 countries contributing to the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan met in Chicago and agreed to a new transition timetable that would put Afghan 
security forces in charge of security throughout the country by the summer of 2013. The NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will support the Afghan security forces as coalition 
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forces withdraw. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the one-day meeting, the leaders said 
that by the end of 2014, the NATO mission will have shifted from combat to one of training, 
advising, and assisting. The leaders pledged that their close partnership with Afghanistan “will 
continue beyond the end of the transition period. 
The Afghan government does not have sufficient revenue to pay for its security forces and 
looks to the international community for funds to help cover the salaries and operating costs of the 
ANA and the ANP through 2024. The United States and its coalition partners have been building 
the ANSF to a combined strength of 352,000 soldiers and police. NATO leaders agreed to scale 
back the total force to a more financially sustainable 228,500 by 2017, security conditions 
permitting. They estimated it will cost $4.1 billion per year to maintain a force of this size. NATO 
leaders pledged to play their part in creating funding mechanisms for these forces, but cautioned, 
“such mechanisms will be flexible, transparent, accountable, cost-effective, and will include 
measures against corruption”. 
The United States is covering most of the costs of the ANA and provides a substantial 
amount for the ANP along with EU and other International Organizations. The NATO Summit 
stipulates that the Afghan government will contribute $500 million in 2015 toward the sustainment 
of its security forces and gradually increase its share of the ANSF costs until 2024, when it will 
have full financial responsibility for its security forces. In the meantime, however, the United States 
is likely to be footing much of the bill for the ANSF. In 2012, President Karzai announced that a 
third group (“tranche”) of provinces, districts, and cities would begin transitioning to Afghan 
government control of security. After the third tranche transition, about 75% of Afghanistan’s 
population will live in areas where Afghan forces have the primary responsibility for security. 
Coalition forces began transitioning areas in March 2011. The first tranche accounted for about 
25% of the Afghan population. In November 2011, the Afghans took the security lead in a second 
set of areas. However, coalition forces are still engaged in combat in many of the areas in transition. 
At the Tokyo Summit, representatives from 70 countries, international organizations, and 
non-profit groups agreed to create a framework for continued international support for 
Afghanistan’s economic development from transition at the end of 2014 through the 
“transformation decade” (2015–2024). At the conference, the international community offered to 
provide an estimated $16 billion in aid from now through 2015, but with conditions. In return for 
the assistance, the Afghan government promised to implement political and economic reforms to 
improve governance, make public institutions more accountable, and tackle pervasive corruption. 
The $16 billion does not represent firm pledges by individual countries, but rather a general 
commitment to maintain current development funding over the next four years. Afghanistan and the 
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international community provided an annex to the conference declaration entitled the “Tokyo 
Mutual Accountability Framework” which described priority areas, provided benchmarks for the 
Afghan government to meet, and clearly stated that “the international community’s ability to sustain 
support for Afghanistan depends upon the Afghan government delivering on its commitments. 
The agreed that international aid will focus on achieving objectives in five major areas: 
• Ensuring credible, inclusive, and transparent presidential elections in 2014 and 
parliamentary elections in 2015; 
• Increasing access to justice for all, especially women and combating corruption; 
• Improving the integrity of public financial management and the banking sector; 
• Improving the Afghan government’s ability to collect revenues and develop and execute 
budgets; 
• Achieving inclusive and sustained growth through a focus on human development, food 
security and private investment. 
This process will build on the existing Joint Monitoring Control Board, which approves 
major reconstruction initiatives such as increasing the force strength of the ANSF, relying heavily 
on the World Bank’s latest assessment of the Afghan economy to project Afghanistan’s financial 
needs and to identify the five priority areas. 
 
 
5.6.9 Conclusion  
Based on the analysis above, Russia is one of the main actor in CA region where divergences 
between Moscow’s and Beijing’s strategies are less visible. However, both give support to the 
Central Asian ruling elites, despite the fact that Russian and Chinese experts voice their concerns 
about the inability of the governments to reform and modernize.  
The EU’s point of view, which is that long-term state stability is possible only with a certain 
level of political diversity and realistic alternatives, is not shared by the two major external actors 
nor put into practice by Central Asian regimes.  
In security thinking the European approach also diverges from that of Russia and China. In 
contrast to Russia the EU does not give priority to hard security and does not seek to engage the 
Central Asian states in new strategic alliances besides having organized two security conferences 
there in 2009 and 2010. The EU has not put forward any proposals for regional security structures 
that might compete with the CSTO or the SCO and believes this issue should be addressed through 
NATO and the OSCE. The multilateral and soft-security-based approach of the China-led SCO 
seems closer to European thinking, although in practice the EU is unable to corroborate the SCO’s 
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security narrative, which is modeled on the Chinese concept of the “three evils” and which serves to 
justify the repressive policies conducted in Xinjiang. 
Another point of contrast with Russia is the fact that Europe unambiguously emphasizes the 
relationship between long-term security and development. The US and Europe believes that a 
commitment to economic development and social well-being is a major element of international 
peace and of internal stability. Russia does not hold a counter-narrative, but neither does it consider 
its actions in Central Asia in such terms. Therefore, Europe, in some ways, seems to share more 
similarities with the Chinese discourse, insofar as it recognizes that inequalities in wealth and a lack 
of prospects directly fuel political crises.  
However, the Chinese definition of development is limited to a socio-economic 
understanding of the term and the need for political reform is not part of its official preoccupations. 
In Central Asia, China’s “harmonious society” policy provides unfailing support for corrupt and 
authoritarian regimes, going against its own development-security narrative. 
Now this new center of gravity has its own official organization to represent its interests and 
this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO, while the US has the “Axis of Evil” 
(composed, at one time at least, of Syria, Iran and North Korea), which, by extension, furnishes 
NATO and the West generally with its collective bogeyman, the loose unity of interests represented 
by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia, China, US and the EU therefore have 
divergences in the prioritization of their interests in Central Asia, as well as in their conceptions of 
the link between security and development.  
Finally, it has to taken into account that lack of a single unified strategy within the EU is the 
biggest issue in the determination of how to spend funds in Afghanistan. This understanding 
permeates the literature on reconstruction and development in Afghanistan that it is difficult to 
understand why effective solutions have not been implemented.  
Often problems of donor coordination are leading to a proliferation of disparate projects, with 
low local impact of funding and creating a poor impression in Afghanistan about donors’ lack of 
agreement. EU is no stranger to this issue and the key to understanding the lack of coordination in 
the EU comes with an examination of how the EU institutions interact with each other.   
In regard to Afghanistan policy, for instance, the competing institutions in the European 
Union include the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament. Although there is not a great deal of literature dealing with internal EU responsibility 
overlap and conflict in regard to Afghanistan and development, there is a broader history of 
overlapping functions and conflict among the main EU institutions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA COUNTRIES:  
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All ecosystems are exposed to gradual changes…Nature is usually assumed to respond to 
gradual change in a smooth way. 
However…smooth change can be interrupted by sudden drastic switches to a contrasting 
state. Although diverse events can trigger such shifts, recent studies show that a loss of resilience 
usually paves the way for a switch to an alternative and adverse state. 
This suggests that strategies for sustainable management of such ecosystems should focus 
on building and maintaining resilience….Stability domains typically depend on slowly changing 
variables…These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In contrast, stochastic events 
that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Marten Scheffer, Steve Carpenter, Jonathan A. Foley, Carl Folke, and Brian Walker. “Catastrophic Shifts in Ecosystems,” Nature 413 (11 October 
2001), pp. 591- 596. 
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6.1 Comparative analysis  
The previous Chapter V has introduced the analysis about the gathering of all data under the 
heading of the EU and NATO commitments and engagement in CA States through their wide and 
long-term Strategy. It represents as a form of gradual change and development over Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. 
The research has collected a huge amount of quantitative and qualitative data to support 
arguments and to measure and evaluate the human advance, through taking in and pooling projects 
by the European Union, NATO and their Member States on the bases of bilateral agreements too. 
However, as mentioned in the pervious Chapter, Russian interest remains an essential 
variable in every decision made by regional leaders and as far as its power continues to loom large 
over the region.  
Although the EU and NATO influence and engagement made major inroads as a useful 
counterweight to Russian preponderance, their impact on the political, economical and social 
spheres remains limited, despite European interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and 
eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. 
This situation has also been “helped” by NATO’s internal uncertainty as the organization 
had difficulties in finding adequate motivations and activities for the Central Asian states’ security 
needs as a whole and security assistance programs as SSR, SFA in particular.  
Russia’s success in influencing the CA States, through the strengthening of the CSTO, as 
well as the SCO, currently comprises Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - a 
group of undemocratic nations primarily driven by Russia and China- continue keeping the region’s 
rich energy resources and its renewed interest in Afghanistan at the cost of failures of the European 
and American strategies in these areas. 
Yet, the establishment of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces should be viewed as an 
extension of the Russian influence in Central Asia and by emphasizing the threats coming from 
Afghanistan and NATO’s problems in managing the situation, Russia again attempts to portray 
itself as a better security solution for the Central Asian countries2. 
NATO’s activity in the CA States has always been regarded by Moscow rather as a threat 
than as factors of stability or security cooperation in the region, therefore Russia’s constant 
objective has been limiting the organization’s activities and success. 
                                               
2
 Dmitry Astakhov, “Customs Union Given a Start at the 10th  EURASEC Summit”, RIA Novosti, July 5, 2010, 
http://rt.com, accessed in December 2012. 
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Clearly Russia is the main security actor in the region and able to act with military means in 
its “sphere of influence” for better or worse, indeed, in the case of conflict in Central Asia, it is 
highly unlikely that the EU, NATO and the US would act, even though the latter two have several 
military bases in the area focusing on the war effort in Afghanistan. The European Union does 
however regard itself as a security actor and takes a keen interest in working with Central Asian 
states on the basis of joint security interests.  
One security aspect that is key to the EU and NATO on national and regional security 
cooperation is the concept of Security Sector Reform3 (SSR), which aims to support reforms of all 
national security-related agencies and security oversight mechanisms.  
Although the EU policy documents concerning Central Asia do not refer to SSR, the EU and 
NATO activities can be directly related to the holistic concept of SSR and others might contribute 
indirectly to reform of the security sector, however, one of the main focus on security fro EU is its 
direct engagement on Border Crossing Points (BCPs) through the BOMCA. Indirect activities such 
as education, trade and judicial programs that might be beneficial to security and stability in the 
long term will not be ignored.  
The Russian variable also affected the EU and NATO States deeply, with regard the so 
called Russia-Ukraine gas crisis at the end of 2005, which was a “wake-up call” for the EU, relying 
on Russia for 25 % of its gas and 30 % of its oil supplies. Some EU members, such as Slovakia and 
Finland, are totally reliant on Russian gas, while other states (e.g., Poland and Hungary) are heavily 
dependent on Russian gas, 90 % of which passes through Ukraine on its way to the EU. 
Diversification of EU energy supply is seen as the key to greater energy security and is the 
cornerstone of its energy policy. Besides stepped-up efforts to improve energy efficiency and the 
expansion of other energy sources to reduce gas consumption, the EU needs to increase imports 
from other countries and regions. With the oil and natural gas resources in the North Sea in decline, 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia regions have become a serious alternative supplier of energy.  
  According to international analysts the Caspian Sea region’s reserves are crucial for 
meeting Europe’s demand for oil next future and without them, it is estimated oil exports from the 
Persian Gulf to Europe would have to increase by 0.5 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) in 2012. 
However, if the Caspian Sea region fully participates in the export market, oil from the Persian Gulf 
to Europe will decrease by 1.5 MMbbl/d. 
Countries belonging to the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) group 
called a 2,715 kilometer road corridor through Kazakhstan the most important route within the 
                                               
3 Security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively recent concept in state transformation, development and post-conflict 
peace building. Notions of democratizing societies, good governance with transparency and accountability, peaceful 
transformation of societies, human security and poverty reduction programmers have made inroads in security thinking. 
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entire Central Asian region, linking Russia, China and Afghanistan, with EU and NATO sharing the 
burden and providing a loan of 6,361 million euro for an on-going project including road widening, 
bypasses, highway rehabilitation and related poverty reduction and social service programs.  
Other example is the largest project in Tajikistan, begun in 2007 and still underway, with EU 
90 million euro aid project for upgrading parts of a highway known as International Trunk Road 
number 11 and part of the Asian Highway, which will allow the landlocked state easier access for its 
imports-exports to ocean ports via neighboring Afghanistan.  
An equally vital road artery in Kyrgyzstan links the northern capital of Bishkek with the 
country’s second largest city, Osh, in the south and the construction of a series of bridges has 
helped providing access for tens of thousands of weekly shoppers from Kyrgyzstan and surrounding 
countries to the largest market in Central Asia. EU has also modernized several local airports in 
Uzbekistan and upgraded Manas airport in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.  
An additional reason for EU and NATO to keep an eye on the CA oil resources is the fact that 
the US and NATO allied troops in Afghanistan are supplied in part via these neighboring states and 
with the international forces scheduled to leave Afghanistan in 2014, there is widespread concern 
about a potential destabilizing impact about filling such a void with the creation of a new silk road, 
integrate Afghanistan and its neighbors.  
Therefore, assessing and, where possible measuring the impact of EU and NATO presence in 
CA region, is imperative for planning reasons to implement effective strategies for strengthening 
stability in countries where transition is still in place and conflict zones still exist.  
 
 
6.2 Impact of EU and NATO efforts on the CA countries: Empirical analysis 
In this paragraph, the research explores the impact of the Efforts4 on the CA states, analyzing 
the phenomenon as a tool of assessing the governance, education, economic and security 
developments in those countries and whether there is correlation before and after the EU and NATO 
engagement.  
It is argued that Good Governance and liberal democracy are not a prerequisite for successful 
political and economic developments contrary to what some academic environment believe (Held, 
Goldblat, Perraton, 1999). For instance, taking into account on the one hand the economically 
successful China and Kazakhstan which have authoritarian regimes, with robust economy and on 
the other hand the democratic Ukraine with severe economic problems.   
                                               
4
 Efforts are referred to the joint EU and NATO engagement in the Central Asia region. 
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The hypothesis states that democratic political regime is an important part of development but 
not a necessary precondition for it and there are other elements that contribute to development and 
preliminary conclusions suggest that external factors as EU and NATO engagement do not affect 
successful political, social and economic developments. During the last decades the world has been 
affected by an unprecedented rise of globalization and interconnections that are often associated 
with spread of neo-liberalism and democratization doctrine. 
In this respect, the C.A. countries are still trying to find their place in the changed 
International Environment. According to Huntington, Shin, and Diamond the spread of democratic 
governance that has been on a rise since the end of the Cold War is contributed to an accelerated 
globalization that not only brought military and oligopolistic regimes all over the world down but 
also speeded up economic development in many developing countries (Scholte, 20055). 
However, it is obvious that there are certain limitations that affect the results and do not allow 
being certain about the relationship between governance/democracy and political, social and 
economic developments. One of them is the use of Democracy Index and Index of Economic 
Freedom for the Former Soviet Union countries6. Despite all claims, the Central Asian countries are 
still considered to be in the transition from centrally-planned to market economy. That is why some 
of the variables included in these indexes cannot objectively reflect the current political or 
economic situation in some Central Asian republics.  
Before analyzing the impact on the political, social, economical, education and security 
spheres, it is needed to define concepts that will be used in this chapter. 
Democracy and governance are a very complex phenomenon that is featured by having 
multiple definitions and conceptions that reflect particular cases. Many of them were developed 
within comparative politics field. One of the most used definitions of democracy was formulated by 
Joseph Schumpeter who understood it through perspectives of free election (Fish, 20087). 
There is another definition of democracy which was formulated by Stephen Fish who 
measures political regimes in terms of degrees of openness. According to him regime is democratic 
if there is an open political participation for everyone, where competition is open and political 
communication flows openly. 
It is very important to mention that the independent variable is democracy/governance which 
is measured by HDI and its scaling used for a case study is as follow: 
Full democracies - scores of 8-10;   
                                               
5
 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2005, Palgrave Macmillan, p.312. 
6
 Source: http://eastbook.eu/en/2013/01/uncategorized-en/the-index-of-economic-freedom-2013-and-the-european-ex-
soviet-states/, accessed in December 2012.  
7
 Stanly Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 2008, Oxford University Press, pp. 74-77. 
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   Flawed democracies  - scores of 6 to 7.9;   
   Hybrid regimes - scores of 4 to 5.9; 
   Authoritarian regimes - scores below 4.    
The education component of the HDI is now measured by mean of years of schooling for 
adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. Mean 
years of schooling is estimated based on educational attainment data from censuses and surveys 
available in the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database and Barro and Lee (2011) methodology8. 
Expected years of schooling estimates are based on enrolment by age at all levels of 
education and population of official school age for each level of education. Expected years of 
schooling are capped at 18 years.  
The life expectancy at birth component of the HDI is calculated using a minimum value of 20 
years and maximum value of 83.4 years. This is the observed maximum value of the indicators from 
the countries in the time series, 1980-2010. Thus, the longevity component for a country where life 
expectancy birth is 55 years would be 0.552. 
For the wealth component, the goalpost for minimum income is $100 (PPP) and the 
maximum is $107,721 (PPP), both estimated during the same period, 1980-2010. 
The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with 
increasing GNI. The scores for the four HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a 
composite index using geometric mean. 
The significant numbers of countries have medium HDI and medium democracy index. These 
results demonstrate that anything can be concluded. Someone can argue that there is a connection 
between democracy and development or it can be the opposite and someone can conclude that there 
is no effect of democratic regimes on socio-economic development9. 
The answer is that these states have chosen functional cooperation which is one of the forms 
of regionalism and at certain extent regional integration, especially in areas of economy as a priority 
for development and maintenance of political and economic stability. 
Indeed, with disintegration of the Soviet Union five new Central Asian states were created.  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan appeared as a single State. As 
stated in the Chapter one, Afghanistan is also included as part of the research. Each country has 
                                               
8
 Source: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/EXTDATASTATISTICS/EXTEDSTAT
S/0,,contentMDK:21218180~menuPK:4324130~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3232764,00.html, 
accesed in December 2012. 
9
 United Nations Treaty Collection, “Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism (DOC. A/62/160)”, New York: United Nations Organization, http://untreaty.un.org, accessed in 
December 2012. 
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unique features, for instance, Uzbekistan has the largest population of 27 million and is the hub of 
transit corridors in Central Asia (Swanstrom, 2004), Kazakhstan has the largest land area, highest 
nominal GDP of $6,791 and largest oil resources among former Soviet Union countries after 
Russia.  
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan control more than 90% of water resources in Central Asia 
(Primbetov, 2006), while Afghanistan has a special strategic importance in the region because it has 
borders with three Central Asian republics and it is a place of the land routes between Indian 
subcontinent and resource rich Central Asia.   
Having these distinctive features have made leaders of the Central Asian states rethink their 
positions in the region and on the international arena, choosing between individual pursuing of 
goals and common efforts in the form of cooperation.  
However, weak economic development of Central Asian countries, lack of trust among them 
and emergence of new outside actors which were interested in gaining political and economic 
influence in the region have complicated transitional process. Since then, post-Soviet Central Asia 
has been confronting several major challenges which were coming from regional and global forces. 
Regional interdependence, illegal drug-trafficking, management of water resources, transnational 
crime and extremism, immigration as well as growing influence of Russia and China10.   
One of the biggest local challenges that Central Asian countries have been facing after 
becoming independent was a lack of institutional mechanism and economic interdependence those 
states have inherited as a part of Soviet Union legacy and which have been paralyzing an ability of 
states to pursue their own sovereign policies and to engage in economic activities (Zhalimbetova 
and Gleason, 2006).  
Deep economic, political and social connectedness has driven Central Asian states to a socio-
economic decline during the first years of sovereignty. Another problem that has emerged 
immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union is a management of water resources that used to be 
regulated by Moscow through mutual cooperation (UNDP, 2005). Independence has empowered 
each state to pursue own policies toward water distribution which has created a potential danger of 
conflicts in the region where water plays an important role.  
Kyrgyzstan is one of the main suppliers of water to all republics already has reduced its water 
supply due to technical reasons. Mismanagement of water resources also has created bigger 
problems such as drying of Aral Sea that has an impact on agricultural sector of Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. Illicit drug trade, transnational crime and terrorism are other big challenges for the 
                                               
10
 Source: www.interpol.int, accessed in December 2012. 
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region, with a transit corridor for huge illicit drug flows, primarily from Afghanistan, to the 
principal hubs of demand in Europe, Russia and China.  
Lack of local institutions and cross border cooperation initiatives, as well as high demand, has 
been exacerbating the situation and supporting flourishing of transnational crime. Central Asia also 
inherited border disputes with each other as a result of demarcation of territory that was done during 
the Soviet era. The same demarcation of the territory created zones of potential conflicts, especially 
in the Fergana Valley that is located at an intersection of three states and comprises three ethnic 
groups (Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tajiks) and is a safe haven for different militant and religious groups 
that successfully hide there from Uzbek and Tajik authorities and periodically destabilize situation 
in those countries.   
One of the biggest global challenges for Central Asian countries is an appearance of actors 
such as Russia, China and the USA11 eager to fulfill an empty niche that has formed after 
dissolution of the USSR. Each of these states has been interested in strengthening influence in the 
region, with Russia trying to recovering its influence in the Central Asian region through increasing 
its military, expanding bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, signing a security pack with 
Uzbekistan and having joint military exercise as well.  
Russia also maintains tight relations with Turkmenistan by retaining control over Turkmen 
gas supplies (Nygren, 200812). China is another important player that has emerged in Central Asia 
having own agendas for strengthening influence in the region. One of them is the Xingjian 
autonomous province, the Chinese part of Central Asia which is highly populated by ethnic Turks 
such as Uyghur, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and reluctant to be incorporated in political and economic 
structures of China.  
Another biggest interest of China in Central Asian is energy reserves that are vital for Chinese 
economic growth. It already has built one part of a pipe line from Kazakhstan to Xingjian that is 
designed to carry 10 million tons of oil annually and which will stretch from West China to East 
Kazakhstan. China was also able to get a deal with Petro Kazakhstan, the Canadian oil company 
                                               
11
 Presidents Nazarbayev and Obama Meet in Washington, DC to Discuss Kazakh-US Strategic Partnership," Embassy 
of Kazakhstan News Bulletin, April 12, 2010, www.kazakhembus.com. 
 
12
 Bertil Nygren, describes the strategies used by President Putin from 2000 onwards to recreate “Greater Russia”, that 
is a Russia that controls most of the territory of the former Soviet Union. He shows the subtlety of the means of control, 
often through creating economic dependencies in the “near abroad”, including exploiting energy dependency, through 
prolonging other political and military dependencies, and sometimes through traditional “power politics”. He argues 
that after seven years in power the results of this strategy are beginning to show, providing comprehensive coverage of 
Russia’s relations to the former Soviet territories of the CIS countries, including Ukraine and Putin’s role in the events 
surrounding the “Orange Revolution”, Belarus and the attempts to form a union, the Caucasus and Russia’s role in the 
various conflicts, Moldova, including the Transdniester conflict, and Central Asia. 
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that was acquired by China National Petroleum Corporation, thus getting access to Kazakh oil 
(Allouche, 2007).  
China also has been interested in hydro power potential of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which 
control over 90% of region’s water resources and are vital for Western China that is undergoing a 
massive state-sponsored population migration into this area that depends on agriculture. 
The US and NATO are another big player on the Central Asian political arena that has started 
actively strengthening its influence after the events of September 11 2001, changing the 
“geopolitical map” of Central Asia and creating new challenges for the Central Asian states 
(Nygren, 2008).  
Immediately, after entering the region under the shade of War on Terror, the US, NATO and 
EU (with minor military engagement) have started to aggressively implement Western policies 
toward democratization of the Central Asian states and other former Soviet Union republics. The 
US was an active supporter of “colored” revolutions that were taking place in different countries of 
the former Soviet Union.  
It also greeted the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan that had to bring a pro-American 
government into place and what did not come true. It also has started to build its military presence 
by opening military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and using airspace of Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan for the US military and NATO to conduct their operations in Afghanistan. One of the 
main reasons for the US involvement in the region is a desire to weaken Russian influence in the 
region and get an access to oil, gas and  routs that connect Sub-Indian continent and resource rich 
Central Asia and represent a potential corridor to Iran and Middle East.    
The existing dynamics and conditions of security that are shaped by global and regional 
forces in the CA region have defined political strategies that can be described as balancing between 
inside and outside actors. In the light of such balancing the Central Asian states have chosen 
regional cooperation as a priority of successful development and maintaining stability. They have 
chosen active engagement with international institutions to solve common challenges and protect 
own interests.  
Today, most of the Central Asian states are active members or observers of such organizations 
as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization of Security and cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and many more.  
Due to the fact that all Central Asian states have been experiencing common challenges in the 
face of global and regional political forces, cooperation has become a choice that has defined 
foreign politics of those countries. Here, it is very important to define what cooperation is and how 
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it differs from integration, because Central Asian countries mainly involved in functional 
cooperation which is a form of regionalism, with some attempts of integration primarily in the area 
of economy.  
According to Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen cooperation is one of the dimensions of 
regionalism, a process that refer to “the growth of societal integration within a region and often 
involves economic and social interaction”. However, due to the fact that each region and its 
members have unique nature it produces different forms of interaction “between the various 
dimensions and dynamics of regionalism”. There are two main forms of regionalism that are well 
known. It is functional cooperation and regional integration, the functional cooperation represents 
limited or specific arrangements between states that aim to bring countries together on certain issues 
such as security or managing nature resources.  
Political cooperation refers to commitment of countries in dealing with certain issues such as 
security and is based on adopting common positions in international organizations such as SCO and 
sometimes joint actions such as join military exercises. Functional cooperation implies that states 
will participate in cooperation arrangements to solve immediate issues, but they do not have long 
term agendas to create a space that will be subjected to some “distinctive rules” contrary to regional 
integration which refers to elimination of barriers to create a unified political or economic space 
such as EU.  
According to an Asian Development Bank13 report “increased cooperation” among the 
Central Asian Republics could produce big gains for the people of the region, with benefits from 
reducing trade cost, more efficient use of water and other natural resources, generating a regional 
economy twice as large and well off 10 years from now. The price of non-cooperation could also be 
large from lost economic opportunities, conflict and insecurity. 
 There are two organizations in which Central Asian states are engaged and which deserve 
taking a closer look at. These organizations reflect the needs these countries experience (security 
and economy) and have unique nature which let them have a special impact on the regional politics. 
These organizations are Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Eurasian Economic 
Community (EEC).  
However, the SCO strategic plan for medium term continues to be fixed on two agendas, 
security and economics. These objectives do not necessarily contradict one another, but they 
emphasize different priorities according to different member states. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan complain that the SCO is moving away from the purely security objectives that had 
                                               
13
 Source: http://www.adb.org/documents/adb-annual-report-2011, accessed December 2012. 
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been emphasized during its creation. Meanwhile Kazakhstan and Russia are primarily interested in 
the economic potential of the organization and have cast aside its security role. 
Central Asia is a pivotal region that possesses enormous natural, human and strategic 
potential that has been attracting attention of major global powers for decades. With the 
disintegration of the USSR and creation of new independent Central Asian republics it has become 
easier for global forces to enter the region and start spreading their influence. Global and domestic 
challenges that have emerged after those countries gained independence have forced young and 
weak Central Asian countries to find a political position that would protect their own interests and 
satisfy interests of global powers in the face of Russia, China and the Westerns. 
  
 
6.3 Assessment of the Economic Impact 
Labor migration is a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in which independent 
states have chosen different paths of socio-economic development, coupled with weak political 
systems as well as economic stagnation of some countries, these have created significant disparities 
in development among former Soviet Union.  
During the last two decades remittances became one of the most important sources of 
external financial flows in developing countries and for most countries of the Former Soviet Union, 
remittances are considered to be the second largest financial sources after Foreign Direct 
Investment and Foreign Aid (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007:41).  
Remittances are associated with labor migration that has been on a rise during the last years 
of accelerated globalization that triggered an unprecedented size of international migratory 
movements. Data from IMF and World Bank show that financial flows that come from migrant 
workers constitute a large portion of countries GDP. For instance, remittances in Tajikistan 
represent 36.2 % of GDP, in Kyrgyzstan it is 27.4 % and in Uzbekistan 18.3%. For such countries 
as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where remittances constitute a large portion of GDP, 
worker’s remittances are not only an external source of finance but also a tool for fixing 
unemployment which is a serious problem in these countries. 
In Kyrgyzstan socio-economic structural changes have been affecting political, social and 
political spheres of the country, represented by improvements in living standards such as rising 
income and improving health and educational systems since the EU has engaged in those areas 
(Jaffe 1998:70).  
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In theory, start-up capital should be available locally due to remittances from labor migrants, 
but in reality money is mainly spent on consumption and is seldom invested in revenue-generating 
activities due to a lack of incentives. The reasons mostly relate to the absence of regulatory 
framework an abundance of red tape and unclear rules of the game.  
Often arbitrary actions of the authorities contribute to the climate of uncertainty and 
insecurity and prevent business people from taking risks they consider unacceptable. 
Administrative restrictions on business prevent the generation of income and tend to generate 
poverty instead and in Uzbekistan, there are tensions in the regions related to government policies 
of import substitution, restrictions on entrepreneurial activities and initiatives against the petty retail 
trade, as well as unfulfilled social promises by the government.  
Regional disparities, however, show that energy-rich and economically better off Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan are suffering from population decrease, while gender issues emerge as a source 
of social tensions.  
Political systems of the CA region are still in the process of transition from central planning 
to more efficiently functioning economic systems, explaining the effects of slow economic 
developments. 
However, this is based on a smaller data set, which due to data limitation does not allow 
having more observations which could increase statistical significance of the results. These results 
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also show that remittances may not be the main contributors to socio-economic development of CA 
countries. 
Potential for conflict in Central Asia does not derive from absolute poverty, but from the 
fragility of economic arrangements that, if disrupted, can lead to dire social consequences. Locally, 
poverty in Central Asia is explained away as originating from the collapse of the USSR, the lack of 
start-up capital, natural causes such as droughts and in Tajikistan, by the consequences of the civil 
war. In reality, other factors contribute significantly, such as poor governance and corruption, 
administrative restrictions and closed borders, extensive cotton cultivation in place of other crops, 
and gross inequalities in land distribution.  
Cotton, for instance, remains the main cash crop in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and is 
important for Turkmenistan, since much of its labor force is employed in the cotton sector. In 
Uzbekistan land is owned by the state and farmers in theory lease it, but the conditions of the lease 
are unclear and in reality the state can take the land back under various pretexts or as a punishment.  
In Turkmenistan land is owned by the state and cultivation is done by “leaseholder 
associations”, where state intervention remains high, so that the state agents can even confiscate 
harvests, which peasants grow for their own consumption in garden allotments. In Tajikistan land 
distribution remains a source of grievance, since land was distributed unfairly and to those who had 
right connections and money.  
Hence a shadow economy, smuggling and labor migration have emerged as predominant 
alternatives for income-generation and legitimate trade is restricted, being monopolized by 
“business groupings” close to power-holders. 
Smuggling is closely related to the shadow economy, since trade restrictions are so severe 
that regular business has become progressively unviable and extensive smuggling goes on across 
the Turkmen/Uzbek border mainly from Turkmenistan, involving goods such as petrol, building 
materials and consumer goods from Iran. 
Many poor families in the region survive due to men working abroad and sending remittances 
to the families and locally, this is generally regarded as positive. There is considerable labor 
migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia and increasingly to Kazakhstan.  
Annual seasonal migration is extensive-over 1 million men from Tajikistan to Russia every 
year and the remittances they send amount to $600 million dollars, exceeding the state budget. This 
money provides a lifeline for the majority of Tajik households and in some areas of the country 
70% of households depend on remittances sent by relatives. It is estimated that 700,000 Kyrgyz and 
800,000 Uzbek citizens work in Russia and their remittances is estimated at $500 million in 
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Kyrgyzstan, roughly twice as much as the amount the whole development community puts into the 
country.  
The same applies to Uzbekistan, with remittances estimated at over $500 million and the 
states have no ability to levy tax on this money. The social consequences of labor migration are 
worrying, where many migrants stay in Russia for years, if not forever. At this rate, about one-third 
of the male population of Tajikistan has gone, leaving mostly boys and older men behind, regions 
peopled mainly by women are emerging, with obvious impacts on the social structure. 
Yet, Central Asian states are vulnerable to fluctuations in Russia’s policies over migration, 
being aware that remittances are the largest source of income and that an influx of returnees risks 
social disruption. 
However, the five countries of Central Asia have expanded their trade significantly since the 
beginning of their transition with exports quadrupling to almost $70 billion between 2010 and 2011 
but without substantial diversification. These countries achieved this economic performance by 
promoting private investment, property rights, trade liberalization and transport infrastructure in 
varying degrees.  
In 2011, the proceeds from exports of crude material and mineral fuels reached $49 billion, 
nearly four times the 2009 level, while exports of food and manufactured products reached $18 
billion in 2011. As of 2011 the bulk of exports still came from a narrow range, with more than 80 
percent of total export proceeds from just two sectors in Kazakhstan the mineral fuel and metal 
products, while in Tajikistan cotton and aluminum products.  
Only Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan exported 80 percent of their exports from three or 
more sectors. Diversifying production and exports exposes firms to domestic and international 
competition, which enhances productivity. Such diversification drives a country’s structural 
transformation from agriculture to industry to service accompanied by a spatial transformation as 
leading cities and their hinterlands play a stronger role in trade.  
However, the global crisis reduced trade and exports of the three countries in 2009, as it did 
for the world as a whole, notwithstanding as the world economy recovers, these countries must 
think strategically about how to diversify and expand their exports in the medium to long term. 
Without competitive connections to large markets abroad, investors will not invest in 
productive capacity in cities even when major cities are competitive producers of goods because 
such investments will not be profitable.  
Policy and investment actions at the urban level are needed to promote more open and 
competitive environments and foster agglomeration economies. 
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At city-hinterland level, policy actions must increase mobility of production factors within 
macro-regions anchored on leading cities. Better connections between leading cities and immediate 
agricultural hinterlands, such as improved road connections and extension services to farmers 
would provide a sound basis for intensifying agro-industrial activities within the country.  
At regional level, investments and policy actions are needed to reduce transport costs and 
transport time to key regional markets and in the long-term it is needed to enhance the bedrock of 
connections between the macro-regions within countries.  
 
 
6.4 Security and Safety Impact  
Repression is often used as the main problem-solving tool, as grimly demonstrated by the 
Andijan events and the actions of security agents are one of the main sources of citizens’ 
grievances. This implies emphasis on the security of the ruling regimes, presented as the sole 
guarantors of stability. The US-led “War on Terror” has served only to strengthen and legitimize 
this trend in some case. To varying degrees, the Central Asian states tend to base their rule on 
coercion and at the same time, the legitimacy of the regimes is partially based on their ability to 
provide security. Rule by coercion is expensive, as it necessitates maintaining large security sector 
agencies, as the danger is that when the lid is taken off, all the hidden stresses will break loose.  
As internal pressure is great, most of the ruling regimes in Central Asia tend to identify state 
security with their own and make sure that they hang onto power on this basis. This preoccupation 
with the safety of the regime leads to an emphasis on internal security and the suppression of 
political opponents.  
Increasingly, the state presents itself to its citizens in a police uniform rather than as a 
provider of goods and services and often the degree of harassment and brutality by the law-
enforcement agencies varies from country to country, but the pattern is clear and well-established. 
The popularity of the police and security forces is universally low: attacks on police in Uzbekistan 
in 2008 provoked more sympathy for the attackers than for their police victims. 
The political standing of agencies within their respective regimes varies depending on their 
importance for the regime’s survival, typically, the agencies vested with responsibility over internal 
security-interior and state security ministries-carry more clout, as leaderships have to rely on them 
for a range of key tasks. 
Another “hot potato” is the Border management which is an especially lucrative field. 
Positions in border and customs agencies in the Ferghana Valley are particularly attractive, as 
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restrictions on trade and travel in this densely populated area provide excellent extraction 
opportunities: Prohibited or highly taxed goods are taken across borders by paying bribes. 
The tough border regime introduced by Uzbekistan gained a momentum of its own, giving 
birth to an integrated network of corrupt officials and smugglers from all sides. Appointments in the 
border areas are prestigious and “job buying” is widespread, provided that a contender already 
belongs to a patronage network.  
There are many stakeholders in these arrangements, such as customs officers, border guards, 
police, local authorities and populations who live off smuggling. As a result, strong vested interests 
at the borders need to be serviced by lobbyists at the central level. Even if the leaderships were 
inclined to relax the border restrictions and facilitate trade, it would be hard to do it in practice, as it 
would run against powerful interests that have a stake in the preservation of the status quo. 
Tajikistan is perhaps the last place in Central Asia likely to slide into violence again in the 
near future and its experience of civil war conveyed a lesson to the Uzbek leadership that an 
expansion of political participation and Islamism can create an explosive mixture and propel the 
country into a civil war14. 
Predictions regarding violence are hard to make for two reasons: one is the nature of violence 
in Central Asia. Unlike in the Caucasus or the Balkans, outbreaks of violence are characterized by 
having a relatively short run-up to them, an unclear agenda and obscure leadership; violence tends 
to be extremely brutal and can end as quickly as it started15.  
Yet, violence often erupts in a form of sporadic terrorist acts, such as bomb attacks, which are 
likely to continue, as well as assassination attempts. If and when they can ignite a bigger 
conflagration, depends on whether large groups can be mobilized for fighting. At present, this 
seems unlikely, however, there are enough grievances in store and too little means to manage them, 
thus creating a potential for explosion. 
The drug dilemma is one of the major concerns of the CA, where drugs yards are widespread 
and 40% of GDP is made up of narcotics and in 2011 the drug profits were equivalent to 5 times the 
annual budget of the Afghan state. The Afghan border is 5,530 kilometers long, including 1,344 km 
with Tajikistan and 744 km with Turkmenistan.  
Drug production has led to a boost in trafficking throughout Central Asia. The EU Situation 
Report on Drug Production and Trafficking states that significant trafficking takes place along the 
                                               
14
 Suicide bombing in Andijan ups the ante for Karimov," EurasiaNet, Uzbekistan, May 27, 2009, www.unhcr.org, 
accessed in December 2012. 
15
 Central Asia and The Caucasus," Journal of Social and Political Studies, Volume 13 Issue 1 2012, www.ca-c.org, 
accessed in December 2012. 
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Silk Route from Afghanistan to Central Asia and leads via Russia or the Caucasus and Turkey into 
the EU.  
Drug traffickers have shifted part of their activities following enhanced interdiction efforts in 
Iran focused on its eastern border with Afghanistan. Yet, the EU estimate puts the amount of heroin 
from Afghanistan going through Tajikistan at roughly 80 to 120 tonnes a year. Hashish from 
Afghanistan also transits Tajikistan en route to Russian and European markets and for this reason 
the CA governments, with the exception of Turkmenistan, made efforts to combat drug trafficking 
and made cultivation of opium nearly impossible. 
However, their response to trafficking was to close borders and introduce harsh border 
regimes, creating a vicious circle: closed borders paralyze the economies and generate poverty, 
which in its turn makes ordinary people resort to trafficking. 
Unlike in Afghanistan, there is little drug-related violence in Central Asia and one 
explanation may be that because these are functioning states, it is easier to bribe than to fight one’s 
way through. The main impacts are twofold: Firstly, supply creates a demand and domestic 
consumption grows; secondly, drug trafficking generates opportunities for crime, corruption a 
growing merger between crime and politics.  
One additional security issue is the presence of a number of separatist and extremist groups 
have operated on the territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. There has not been much terrorist activity in Central Asia in terms of attacks since 2002, but 
concerns linger about the penetration into the Central Asian territory of militants from South Asia 
and the Middle East.  
The ethnically diverse and volatile Fergana Valley, shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, has received particular attention in this respect. Groups such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, al-Qa’ida, the Islamic Jihad Union and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement is active in the region. 
The Russian tactics of border protection consisted of a combination of stationary and mobile 
patrols and through the International assistance and capacity building of the CA border troops the 
Russians practiced mostly local recruitment, when only the officers came from Russia and soldiers 
were from Tajikistan, handpicked by the officers at conscription points. They were paid a 
considerable salary by the local standards ($40 a month), in addition to provision of uniforms and 
food rations.  
Throughout 2005 Tajikistan’s leadership advocated their withdrawal and an agreement 
between Russia and Tajikistan was signed in order to transfer the border to the jurisdiction to 
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Tajikistan and therefore, Russia handed over military installations and equipment to the Tajik side 
and its experts stayed behind as advisors. 
Before the withdrawal of the Russian border troops, Tajikistan ranked fourth in the world for 
quantity of heroin seizures, but since Tajik soldiers are in place the seizure has dropped 
considerably: the first six months of 2011 there were seizures of 268,000 kg of heroin and 480,500 
kg of opium, according to the UN16.  
NATO’ reports note that the Turkmen-Afghan border is poorly guarded and trafficking is 
rampant, however, Russian law-enforcement circles are not alarmed and view Tajikistan as the 
main country for trafficking to Russia.  
This is confirmed by the nationalities of detained drugs couriers: the UNODC Bi-Annual 
Report based on government-provided statistics shows that many Tajik but no Turkmen citizens 
were intercepted as traffickers in Russia. This would imply that drugs from Turkmenistan are likely 
to go via a southern route to Europe.  
The huge problem for the combat against drugs is that corruption remains endemic, with 
involvement of government officials, including those with direct responsibility for the fight against 
drugs, in trafficking and money laundering. It is impossible to determine how pervasive drug-
related corruption is within government circles.  
High-ranking officials of the Drug Control Agency in Tajikistan stated that corruption in law 
enforcement agencies has become critical and hampers drug control activity and in the international 
donors’ view, however, Tajikistan is a success story in the implementation of an anti-drug strategy. 
To this regards, the new Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) 
opened in February 2006 in Almaty and is staffed by law enforcement officials from the countries 
in the region, outreaching the Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan and establishing a liaison officers’ 
network in Afghanistan and in Kazakhstan. 
International attention to anti-drug measures is significant and growing, EU and NATO are 
heavily involved in Central Asia and its drug control portfolio for the region is about $20 million 
per year. A number of the EU member states, such as the UK, Germany and France, provide 
substantial bilateral assistance, as well as the European Commission.  
Support by the European Commission too, for border management on the Afghan side of the 
border with Tajikistan was finalized by June 2006, leading to the start of the Border Management in 
Afghanistan Program (BOMAF).  
Apart from drug trafficking, instability in some of CA countries and in Afghanistan in 
particular can still spill across the border into Central Asia, where the situation is unlikely to change 
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 Source: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/search.html?q=central+asia, accessed in December 2012 
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for the better anytime soon and challenges from the South would affect Central Asia. The opium 
economy in Afghanistan is socially embedded and widely seen as a normal economic activity. As 
Koehler and Zuercher17 note, wider state-building in Afghanistan is endangered by the drug 
economy and by badly designed and poorly executed measures against it. 
State capacity in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan remains weak, with warlords presenting a 
serious challenge to the proper functioning of the state and the interplay between opium cultivation 
and military patronage has given rise to powerful warlords who are able to challenge the state 
armed forces.  
Although external provision of security is inevitable and will remain so in the long term, the 
troops committed by the EU countries to NATO are not engaging in drug eradication efforts 
directly. Afghanistan is experiencing high population growth and it is a matter of time before the 
Afghans start to become interested in labor opportunities in Central Asia and cross-border migration 
follows.  
It should be stressed that regional cross-border problems impact upon systems of governance 
that are often too weak to cope with additional challenges, with leaderships potentially in dangers, 
but as mutual suspicion in interstate relations prevails, it creates political and personal obstacles to 
cooperation. Thus, the wider security threats tend to upset already strained interstate relations and 
the authorities tend to aggravate the impact with their own actions and policies.  
The only genuine cooperation unfolds among mid-ranking security officials who belong to 
the old Soviet network and sometimes the response to regional threats has been to erect as many 
barriers as possible. Although there has been hardly any interstate conflict, mutual hostility and 
numerous intra-regional disputes have become a characteristic of the post-independence period. The 
Aga-Khan Development Network18 has developed the concept of a Rectangle of Concern, i.e. a 
politically, economically and socially fragile region that includes Afghanistan, Tajikistan, southern 
Kyrgyzstan, the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan, Western China and Northern Pakistan. 
Oil, gas and hydropower are both Central Asia’s greatest assets and its curse, the attention 
paid to water and energy issues as sources of potential conflict has been considerable. Indeed, 
disruptions in this sphere have been painfully felt.  
With the Soviet system gone, such enforcement and arbitration mechanisms have disappeared 
and have not been replaced with suitable international legal frameworks, despite many efforts to 
work them out. Various regional institutions have been set up, but so far have had a limited impact. 
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 Source: 
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~czurcher/czurcher/NEA_LTS_files/AFG_Final_Report_final_pdf_2010_0106085.pdf, accessed 
in December 2012.  
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As a result, stronger states can act largely unchallenged to the considerable disadvantage of the 
weaker states.  
The main hope of the smaller states is that the West or Russia can intervene on their behalf. 
After almost 20 years later, much of the former economic interdependency and social intermix has 
disappeared, having been surpassed by political and security considerations. Some leaders view 
isolationism as a preferred way of preventing a spillover of regional instability.  
President Niyazov is by far the leader in this policy of isolationism, followed by President 
Karimov who closed the borders to an influx of refugees from Tajikistan during the civil war and 
would surely do it again, if turmoil were to unfold in Kyrgyzstan. More liberal Kazakhstan closed 
its border with Kyrgyzstan following the March 2005 events. Even Tajikistan grew more cautious 
about interaction with its northern neighbors, from whom it can expect trouble.  
Trans-regional security threats are growing, but political obstacles to genuine security 
cooperation are too great. Moreover, national capabilities for dealing with the challenges are weak. 
External powers would have to compensate for this strategic weakness and broker alliances when 
necessary.  
The EU and NATO have to bear in mind that drugs, crime and Islamism are the factors that 
will shape the future of Central Asia. The countries are likely to combat them in the ways that are 
habitual for their leaderships, but not appropriate from a European perspective. The EU can play a 
greater role in helping to create alternative and more humane solutions, but acknowledging the 
political realities of deep mistrust between the states of the region.  
Finally, the EU cannot shy away from its responsibility to help Central Asians, who are the 
victims of their location to cope with the drug trafficking challenge. 
Recently an element of rivalry over Central Asia has entered the relationship between the 
West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, although their overall goals towards 
stability and security are parallel.  
The difference with the Great Game of the past is that the Western powers are not looking for 
a permanent presence in Central Asia. Rather, the significance of the region derives from security 
concerns elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. Thus, their long-term commitment cannot be taken for 
granted. But there are important similarities too, such as support for the local regimes in exchange 
for loyalty and friendly “orientation” and a spirit of rivalry between the players. 
At the beginning, Russian-American cooperation in the Global War on Terror reached 
unprecedented heights when President Putin gave his blessing to the initially hesitant Central Asian 
governments to host the Western troops, but has scaled down since. The Western engagement 
brought an element of competition into an otherwise neglected region.  
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Although the initial effect was positive, Moscow became more disciplined in fulfilling its 
commitments, but eventually got involved in competitive behavior, since the matters in Central 
Asia are central to its own priorities, while less essential to US foreign policy. China has its own 
reasons to be apprehensive about expansion of the US military presence. 
A position shared by Russia, thus, a range of bilateral and multilateral instruments are 
currently employed to consolidate the presence of the two regional powers.  
 
 
6.5 The “energy game”   
The 2006 and 2009 gas crisis - when gas deliveries from Russia to Ukraine were cut off for 
two days because of a disagreement over prices - which revealed high levels of non-commercial 
risk in dealing with Russia, energy assumed a new importance for EU security thinking. Energy 
issues have gone up the EU on the Central Asia agenda as well, where two states might benefit 
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). 
Kazakhstan already enjoys considerable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Europe, while 
Turkmenistan has proved to be a difficult partner, indeed, Oil from Kazakhstan is interesting for the 
EU, but is not regarded as crucial. At present, the bulk of oil goes westwards via Russia and tankers 
ship some oil across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In future, more oil is likely 
to go eastwards. China-Central Asia routes have large potential and will create a new dynamic in 
the energy market.  
Gas is a more strategic commodity and Gazprom is the Europe’s main supplier, however, 
Gazprom is making little new investment in gas fields in Russia, meaning that the significance of 
gas from Central Asia in Gazprom’s deliveries to Europe will grow. With major fields yielding less 
as they age, Gazprom has chosen to maintain its gas balance by purchasing gas on the side, 
including in Central Asia, rather than develop Arctic fields. 
If Russia and Central Asia combined production declines, a supply gap may follow, meaning  
that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will be important for future EU energy needs and their political 
isolation might need to be rebalanced. Politics, such as the events in Andijan, will have to be 
factored into the EU energy security equation. 
In 2010 the search for alternative gas sources intensified and plans for a pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan under the Caspian Sea bed, dormant for nearly a decade, were 
rejuvenated. This is because the EU and others felt the need to reduce their dependency on gas 
deliveries from Russia by exploring various possibilities for diversifying its energy supplies. There 
are two schools of thought on the feasibility of this option. According to one, a Trans-Caspian 
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pipeline is feasible a pipeline through Iran can only be a partial solution, given that Iran is a major 
gas exporter and is affected by political problems of its own.  
A route via Afghanistan to India has still a way to go, however, by 2020 Azerbaijan’s gas 
reserves may dry up and it will need additional gas to keep the pipeline going. Gazprom’s Blue 
Stream, an underwater pipeline to deliver gas from Russia to Turkey built in partnership with ENI, 
demonstrating that such construction can be done quickly and safely. Private investors are interested 
in financing a Trans-Caspian pipeline.  
According to this view, the EU’s role would be to facilitate access and resolution of problems 
rather than act as an investor, with the EU has already initiated a Caspian-Black Sea Energy 
dialogue, known as the Baku Process to enable international companies to gain easier access to 
energy markets and supplies.  
The second school of thought is that construction of such a pipeline is unrealistic. 
Diversification of gas deliveries most likely would go eastwards rather than westwards. China, 
rather than European investors, will be the driving force, since the country will demand more 
energy as its economy continues to grow. Earlier attempts by Western companies to strike a deal 
with Turkmenistan ended in disappointment and no progress at all, while the Chinese investors is 
able to make deals with a difficult partner.  
Thus, the interesting market for the Turkmen gas is China, while the market opportunities in 
Europe are less obvious, notwithstanding all the efforts and engagements made by EU in the fields 
of economical and social recovery. Additionally, the relationship between Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan is too problematic for pipelines between the two countries to be built. Moreover, it is 
difficult for EU companies to do business in countries like Turkmenistan because of governance 
issues on human rights. Indeed, the companies will be constrained by OECD standards and by the 
Turkmen government’s record in human rights, while Chinese and Russian investors can disregard 
such considerations.  
Neither the possibility of getting a better price from the West may be so attractive. In general, 
the developments around Turkmen gas are characterized by a high level of complexity and 
uncertainty. Discussions started with the US and Turkish envoys over a Trans-Caspian pipeline as 
most of the Turkmen gas currently produced is committed to Russia, only new gas can be supplied 
through the Trans-Caspian route.  
The idea of deliveries to Pakistan and India has been revived and a steering committee for the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline took place in February 2006 in Ashgabat and 
further progresses were made in 2012. 
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Finally, a pipeline to China may become a reality, where an agreement was signed in 2006 on 
gas exports. The agreement calls for Turkmenistan to export 30 billion m3 of gas a year to China 
through a pipeline to be built via Uzbekistan19.  
Russia controls the transit route from Turkmenistan to Ukraine and Ukraine must arrange 
deliveries of Turkmen gas through Gazprom. Along the fact that Russia has become active in the 
energy sector in Central Asia, especially in gas and hydropower. Investment in the pipeline system 
is planned to rehabilitate and expand the existing capacity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and to lay 
new pipelines. Gazprom signed a contract with Uzbekneftegas to invest $1 billion, as a result of 
which Gazprom would increase gas imports threefold and has reached an agreement to buy 9 billion 
m3 of gas at $60 in 2006.  
In Kyrgyzstan, Gazprom signed a memorandum of intent to form a Kyrgyz-Russian joint 
venture for energy sector projects, while in Tajikistan gas exploration started in Sarykamysh and 
Western Shaambary, with Russian Energy Company as RAO UES20, plans to develop the Sangtuda 
hydropower station at Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, in which it will hold a 75% stake. Moreover, 
RusAl, the Russian aluminum giant, is investing $1.5 billion in Rogun hydropower station and in 
aluminum production in Tajikistan, expanding its capacity to 100,000 tonnes per year21. Two new 
aluminium production facilities are envisaged, including a new plant with a capacity of 200,000 
tonnes, into which RusAl plans to invest $600 million. 
In March 2006 construction started on the Sangtuda hydroelectric power complex, in which 
Iran is the main investor with $180 million22. Symptomatically, when Russia disapproved of the 
performance of the Sangtuda agreement, the decision to change it was announced by the Russian 
Ambassador, rather than by Tajik officials, proven once again the strong Russian interests and 
influence upon Tajikistan by Russian Officials.  
Although Russia and China may not be global players, they are relevant powers for Central 
Asia and their role in the political economy is crucial and can be a catalyst for regional cooperation. 
The cultural influence and the educational facilities Russia offers are here to stay and will continue 
to produce a political impact, marginalizing EU and NATO role and from the perspective of many 
Central Asians this is positive, due to the fact that Russia can provide the only alternative to the 
trend towards Islamisation coming from Pakistan and the Gulf.  
The key regional trend is the re-assertion of Russia’s influence, a consolidation of Chinese 
strategy and the formation of a tactical alliance between them. Both have started to dedicate more 
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attention to military cooperation and counter-terrorism, which they feel threaten their own stability. 
By contrast, EU, US and NATO are in “retreat”, reconsidering options and reasons for continuation 
of engagement, despite the fact that they have made inroads into the military and political sphere in 
Central Asia. The climate among the main players has been rather competitive, with economic 
trends, previously dominated by the issues around Western companies’ investment in the oil and 
gas sector in the CA region. 
Kazakhstan is the emerging Central Asian powerhouse, with ready money in search of 
investment opportunities as its the economic situation has improved, they are more ready than they 
were ten years ago to engage in projects in their neighborhood.  
The other trend is the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which 
Russia and China promote as a regional organization capable of dealing with a wide range of issues. 
There is considerable skepticism about regional organizations in Central Asia, whose record so far 
has been miserable. However, SCO may prove more to have a more effective impact, with same 
international actors, such as the ADB, have already started making connections with it.  
The same goes for EurAsEC, which may be able to make some improvements in economic 
governance and free trade and transit in Central Asia, leading to a better investment climate. The 
EU should not dismiss these initiatives out of hand, but consider case-by-case cooperation to give it 
a chance. EU and NATO relations over Central Asia are largely extremely cooperative, being 
motivated by a common concern over the stabilization of Afghanistan, where both actors are 
involved for the long.  
NATO has responded with understanding to the European concerns over proliferation of 
drugs from Afghanistan and become a large contributor to the anti-narcotics efforts, however, 
policy differences over Central Asia and over global issues exist. At times lack of coordination with 
regard to the provision of assistance hampered cooperation in the field, especially since the two 
actors tend to move at a different pace. Moreover, the short-term goal of the current administration 
to promote its ‘freedom agenda’ may undermine its longer-term goal to enhance stability and 
security.  
The EU needs to be careful not to be tarnished by the same brush by being perceived as 
echoing the ideological crusade of the US’s interests, with the room for the OSCE to operate in 
Central Asia is narrowing down and the tendency is for the missions to implement projects in the 
social and economic sphere rather than for the organization to play the role of a political actor23. It 
would not be effective for the EU to continue to rely heavily on the OSCE as a framework for its 
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policies, while it would be more useful to learn from the OSCE experience in order not to fall into 
the same trap.  
Given Russia’s influence, it is imperative establishing a working relationship with Russia as a 
continuation of the “Great Game” paradigm risks, making external relationships and alliances stable 
and secure. At present, dialogue between Russia and the EU on Central Asia is not institutionalized, 
but issues are regularly raised in bilateral meetings.  
The EU and Russia are rather ambivalent over engagement with each other on Central Asia 
and both sides are not against it in principle, but neither feels that it ultimately needs the other and 
nobody takes the initiative to explore what the common ground might be. This is not to say that 
Russia’s and the EU’s interests are identical, but their respective stance on civil liberties and human 
rights is quite different, where Russia prefers to ignore the governance patterns of Central Asian 
regimes rather than challenge them directly.  
On energy and pipeline issues Russia is more in competition with China, rather than with the 
EU, as the prospects of EU investment in the energy sector in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
very remote, while the Kazakh market is largely divided.  
However, given the importance of security concerns to both sides, it is worth making an 
effort to find a common meeting ground. So far, the lack of clarity over the EU’s interests and 
reluctance to acknowledge Central Asian realities has somehow obscured its vision. In formulating 
a new policy, the EU has to agree on a realistic agenda for Central Asia, be mindful of the 
challenges to achieve and be responsible about how this could be done.  
New gas Pipelines in the Caucasus and Central Asia Region began operating at end of 2009, 
with pipeline starts in Turkmenistan and transits through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and second 
parallel line opened in 2011, with full capacity reaching 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. The 
pipeline currently delivers gas from Turkmenistan and 2011 volumes were about 4 bcm. Exports 
from Uzbekistan will come on stream in 2011 and an extension will link in gas supplies in 
southwestern Kazakhstan. In addition, a new pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was opened in 
early 2010, doubling existing capacity. 
When the EU formulates what its interests in the region are, this can replace technical and 
project-driven approaches which reflect a vague desire to have some kind of ill-defined role in 
Central Asia. If the aims are sufficiently clear, the EU can be more pragmatic about the choice of 
means, working closely with multilateral agencies such as the UN agencies on some issues, and 
with Russia, the US and China on others and employ bilateral and regional approaches as 
appropriate.  
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When discussing the future for the EU’s involvement in CA, a degree of political realism has 
to be borne in mind. The EU is looking at a vast number of engagements and has critical issues, 
such as Turkey, the Balkans or Iran, to deal with. A case for Central Asia has to reflect its position 
in respect to other pressing priorities, bearing in mind that the EU’s influence is likely to be 
secondary to that of the US, Russia and China, so the geopolitical impact that the EU can have 
should not be overestimated.  
The question for the future is how political oversight of technical assistance in the security 
sphere is to be ensured and by whom. The current paper argues that BOMCA/CADAP can be used 
as a vehicle and a pilot case for advancement of EU thinking on common security policy, including 
security sector reform. In conceptual terms, there are different perspectives on the role and meaning 
of BOMCA, as it has evolved. The first view, coming from certain member states, is an ESDP 
oriented one. Although BOMCA is a Commission-led activity, the fact that it engages with the 
security sphere - which is a second pillar for the EU and thus a domain of the member states - 
allows the latter to become involved in BOMCA. The failure of the European Constitution limits 
the role of the Commission at this stage. BOMCA should act as a vehicle for pulling together 
expertise of the member states in security and law enforcement. From this viewpoint, the EU should 
not subcontract a common security program to an outside agency, but lead on its implementation 
instead.  
When BOMCA acquired a specific rationale that presented interest for the member states, i.e. 
a focus on the Afghan border, they came with offers of support. For example, at the initiative of the 
Commission a consultative group of security officials from the embassies was formed to act as a 
quality control mechanism and to advice on implementation.  
Others, mostly within the UNDP and some within the Commission, view BOMCA as 
primarily being about promoting trade and transit. Such a view tends to brush aside political choices 
and sensitivities involved and lay emphasis on economic cooperation.  
This misses the point that border management reform achieves both improved security and 
facilitation of movement of goods and people and both are vital to the broad human security 
agenda. However, neither the Commission nor the Member States presented BOMCA/CADAP as 
an exercise in SSR, although there are good grounds to regard it as such, i.e. an expansion of 
civilian control of the security sector.  
Arguably, this is a territory where the Council and the Commission can meet and make such a 
case together, where the idea of SSR is not a new one. The European Security Strategy 
acknowledges the need for supporting the third countries in the SSR in a broad context of institution 
building. But, the Political and Security Committee of the Council discussed the Initial elements for 
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an EU Security Sector Reform Concept, inviting the Council Secretariat and the Commission to 
develop a draft concept for ESDP support to SSR which resulted in the Commission’s background 
paper on EC support to Security Sector Reform. 
In the case of Central Asia, there is a concrete program upon which an EU task force can 
focus and the EUSR can take the lead in such an initiative, linking the Council and the Commission 
together. The second issue to explore is the borderline between security assistance and development 
aid. The distinction is a fine one, raising the question of where and how the two join. The OECD 
DAC policy24 and guidelines could serve as a starting point. This encompasses all civilian aspects 
of SSR and activities in relation to civilian control of the military parts of SSR. But there is no 
consensus to broaden ODA eligibility to include expenditure items within the security sector itself, 
and expenditure on training and equipment supply. 
A policy framework for SSR in Central Asia can be developed, strengthening the external 
dimension of security which is essential to address challenges facing the EU such as terrorism, 
migration and organized crime. The rationale is that states which enjoy stability, rule of law, good 
governance and sound institutions will be more effective in preventing domestic threats, which 
might otherwise spill over and affect the EU. 
Lastly, links between security and development can be strengthened. The EC funds both 
BOMCA/CADAP and a poverty alleviation program which operates in the Ferghana Valley, but 
they are not interrelated in a security/development nexus. The Commission has chosen the Ferghana 
Valley for poverty alleviation because of the closed borders and high concentration of population, 
indeed, in 2005, witnessed violence in the Valley, but the causes were political, rather than derived 
from poverty.  
By the same token, conflict-prevention aspects of BOMCA target local communities, while 
conflict potential arises out of the policies adopted in the capitals. Thus, a political lead is needed to 
integrate the security and development aspects. BOMCA/CADAP can be an agent of this, provided 
that it is reinforced with appropriate mandate and expertise.  
The same can be applied to the anti-drugs field. Drug trafficking is often linked to poverty 
and many people resort to becoming dealers due to basic survival needs. Integrating anti-drug and 
development assistance in the areas which lie on the main trafficking routes, such as in Khatlon 
province on the Tajik/Afghan border, is essential. The EC has already allocated assistance to 
Khatlon, but unrelated to drug prevention. In future, poverty alleviation should be linked to drug 
prevention much more closely. The Ferghana Valley may not be as important as other areas on the 
major smuggling routes. 
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 From CA countries point of view, it has not been easy for inexperienced governments to 
navigate through multiple funding opportunities, to match the donors together to get larger projects 
going and to educate donors about the local realities. Fighting against corruption is an essential part 
of state-building, but outsiders can do little unless there is sufficient political will at the top.  
The EC has implemented a project on ‘Fundamental Steps’ in legislation, i.e. measures 
designed to eliminate some opportunities for corruption. Corruption is a burden for the states, but it 
becomes a security problem when the rot is in the law-enforcement sphere. It is worth remembering 
that terrorist attacks in Russia have been facilitated by corruption among security and law-
enforcement personnel. Thus, developing a “security consciousness” and anti-corruption measures 
in the domain of law-enforcement is vitally important.  
 
 
6.6 Changes? 
In general, the citizens of the Central Asian countries believe in the notion of a strong state, 
but they expect it to rule fairly and to care for the well-being of the population at large. The 
expectation is that the rulers, without neglecting their own interests and appetites, will nevertheless 
rule in the interests of all. The focus is on the accountability of politicians rather than their periodic 
replacement through the ballot box.  
An aspiration is that a leader should be a good manager, not excessively corrupt and should 
not be accompanied into politics by his whole family, whether he is appointed or democratically 
elected is of secondary importance. In reality, these expectations are regularly frustrated, as the 
ruling elites are largely interested only in their own grip on the levers of power and in the 
privatization of their countries’ assets in their favors. 
This phenomenon has created a tremendous and widespread sense of injustice, even after 
overwhelming repression in Andijan, the population is once again beginning to protest over socio-
economic hardship. 
To sum up, the quality of statehood remains low, often overt repression and brutality is 
employed to conceal a lack of competence on how to run the affairs of the state and to keep 
undesirable elements outside the political system. As governments prefer to adopt the strategy of 
keeping a lid on existing tensions rather than allowing modernization and change to address deep-
rooted problems, it is to be expected that the potential for radical and violent protest will persist. 
This can disrupt any economic and social advances. It has already resulted in the emergence 
of a small but growing number of mainly young people who no longer believe that the state can 
deliver and who seek anti-system solutions. The states of Central Asia, already experiencing serious 
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internal problems, are affected by security challenges of the “new age”. These are partly of their 
own making and partly stem from the volatile neighborhood in which they are located. Forces of 
globalization take their toll by including Central Asia in an international jihad and connecting it to 
faraway drug markets. The states fight these dangers the way they can, but their response so far has 
not been promising.  
More crises may disrupt an already fragile regional system, security concerns in Central Asia 
can have an impact on wider international relations in the region, especially on Russia and China, 
but on the EU as well. Firstly, most of the heroin in the streets of Europe originates from 
Afghanistan and Central Asia lies on one of the major trafficking routes, secondly, jihadi Islamism 
constitutes a pressing concern for Europe which still has little understanding of its ideological 
drivers, recruitment practices, social profiles and international connections.  
The EU has an interest in cooperation with Central Asians to make advances on these 
questions and to support the viability of the moderate Muslim states. Yet, serious upheavals, if they 
happen, would be impossible to ignore, as they can trigger off refugee flows, disrupt investment and 
create wider destabilization in the region of the borders of Afghanistan. Lastly, despite external aid, 
the ability of the states to cope with security challenges remains weak and they may require outside 
security assistance in the event of an outbreak of acute violence. 
 
 
6.7 Room for cooperation? 
The EU and US’s engagement in the region after September 11 has been a history of rise and 
fall. The importance of Central Asia for the US derives from its proximity to other places, such as 
Afghanistan, or to the causes it focuses upon, such as the Freedom Agenda of the current 
administration. The US’s interests appear to present a combination of different elements, while the 
importance of each can alternately go up or down the agenda; however, the main reasons for the US 
involvement in Central Asia are Afghanistan, anti-terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction25.  
Added to these are efforts to find constructive ways to deal with Islamism, the effort to spread 
democratization and the energy issue. Although energy from Central Asia does not reach the US 
domestic market, its companies, such as Chevron, have investments in Kazakhstan.  
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Tajikistan continues to benefit from US assistance, earmarking $3.2 million in assistance to 
Tajik border guards in 2011 since drug control, border security and training law enforcement 
officers have become spheres of success in Tajik-US cooperation.  
Providing a counterweight to Russia’s influence and focusing on democratization became 
more pronounced during the recent years. As a result, the US is left outmaneuvered on a number of 
fronts where it seemed to hold ground, while the remaining allies appear unreliable. The US will 
continue to play a role in the regional balance of power (at the expense of EU), but the extent of its 
long-term involvement will depend on its relationships with Russia and China.  
Another player in the region is NATO, with its International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), deployed in Afghanistan, the Alliance’s most prominent military operation in the region. 
Currently 26 Allies and 10 non-NATO countries contribute 9,000 personnel to ISAF. 
Understandably, NATO has to maintain favorable relations with Central Asians, signing a bilateral 
transit agreement with Tajikistan on support for ISAF.  
CSTO, a military-political alliance, intends to transform itself into a multi-level organization 
capable of engaging with different kinds of threats, including drug trafficking and terrorism. 
According to the Secretary General of CSTO, cooperation within the organization is proceeding 
well, because it is easier for the security officials from post-Soviet countries to find common 
ground. CSTO argues for closer security cooperation between SCO, CSTO and NATO to pull 
together in the same direction.  
Recently, Russia approached NATO with a proposal to cooperate more closely with CSTO in 
such areas as drug-trafficking, terrorism, and response to natural and man-made disasters, but 
NATO has been rather reluctant, citing CSTO’s insufficient institutionalization, although some 
movement has been happening however, such a reaction derives from NATO’s lack of political will 
to cooperate with CSTO rather than from genuine doubts about the latter’s capacities. 
NATO, in its turn, prefers to deal with the countries on a bilateral basis rather than through a 
Russia-led alliance. 
 
 
6.8 EU “regional approach” outcome 
The EU should be mindful that its ‘regional perspective’ on Central Asia has its limitations. 
Too often it would like to see Central Asia as a “region” with common values and united by a 
shared infrastructure, along similar lines to the EU. However, “regionalism” - understood as an 
active process of change towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and 
identity - has not been an obvious feature of security policy interactions in Central Asia. 
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It has to be noted that support to “regional cooperation” cost the EC 60 million in 2011-12, 
while it is unclear whether its goals and values have been advanced considerably. The EU “regional 
approach” needs refining, making it more imaginative and more pragmatic. A “regional cooperation 
approach” may be a valid long-term aspiration, but not necessarily a current guide to the practice of 
the EU, especially since it does not have real leverage to deal with the non-compliance of those 
actors who are reluctant to play a regional game.  
Throughout 2011, adverse security trends developed in Central Asia and the limits of Western 
influence over domestic politics in the region became increasingly obvious. Still, these setbacks are 
not a reason for disengagement. On the contrary, new policy approaches are needed to stabilize a 
potentially risky situation. Afghanistan, Islamism and state fragility make the case for engagement 
quite real, albeit constrained by the difficult regional environment. The EU has direct security 
interests in the region, embodied by unconventional dangers such as jihadi terrorism, drugs and 
criminal networks26.  
There is a chance to strengthen moderate Islamic states, which are well disposed towards 
Europe and to promote harmony between Islam and secularism in these societies. There is also the 
opportunity to connect European stabilization efforts in Afghanistan to the positive experience of 
development in Central Asia.  
Russia’s influence is not going to just disappear and will be lasting factors in Central Asia 
politics, economy and security. The EU, in defining its own role, would have to accommodate this 
basic premise. The political vision for EU engagement in the region has to serve both the interests 
of the member states and of Central Asia as well. Achieving this may not be easy, given the factors 
which place limitations on the EU’s engagement, such as the region’s remoteness from Europe, a 
lack of political leverage, the stubbornness of the Central Asian leaderships and constraints on 
engagement posed by the EU’s own values of human rights.  
A historical chance to work together towards prosperity and security of the region is all but 
gone. It is in the EU’s interests to ensure that this trend is reversed. Two interrelated goals - stability 
and security, and prosperity and development - should guide its actions.  
The EU has to understand the concrete conditions that pertain specifically to each country, 
avoid being mechanistic in its approach and see six distinct states with their problems and 
opportunities. Each Central Asian country in its own right is valid for the EU, in terms of concrete 
issues, such as energy or drug trafficking, but also with regard to the less tangible, but vitally 
important, challenges of Islamism or potential state collapse.  
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The EU needs to develop an analytical perspective on Central Asia in the context of the future 
of Afghanistan. This means more analysis on how developments in Afghanistan would affect 
Central Asia, such as population growth, long-term presence of NATO forces, requirements for the 
supply of troops, development of the Afghan economy and transport infrastructure.  
 
 
6.9 Conclusion  
In the 20-years period since achieving independence, CA countries have had to move away 
from the Soviet system, where countries became highly specialized in the production of a few 
commodities and trade and financial flows between the republics. Integration is further complicated 
by shocks and frictions between countries in the CA region and these hampered intraregional 
cooperation by disrupting trade and transportation links and hindering development of labor, 
energy, and capital markets. 
On an aggregate level, trade among CA countries appears lower than would be expected on 
the basis of the size of the economies and their geographical proximity, only about 5 percent of total 
exports or imports of these countries are destined for or come from other CA countries. 
Furthermore, this ratio has been on a declining trend, with China and the EU are the main 
destinations for CA exports, while imports come mainly from China and Russia.  
China is growing rapidly in importance not only for Central Asia, but also for the Caucasus. 
Low aggregate numbers for intra-CCA trade are driven to some extent by the region’s two major 
exporters - Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  
Most of the CA countries rank poorly on indicators of trading across borders, such as the 
number of documents and days needed for export or import procedures. Costs of exporting or 
importing are higher than in other transition economies. 
Although official data do not capture poverty, inequality, and unemployment adequately in all 
CA countries, evidence suggests that poverty is still high, especially in Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Uzbekistan. Income inequality, unemployment, and underemployment are also 
matters of concern throughout the region. Because of the Soviet legacy, human development 
indicators are better than in other countries at a similar income level. 
However, they are now deteriorating in some countries, where insufficient funding, weak 
administrative capacity and corruption limit their effectiveness. Poverty, inequality and inadequate 
social protection combined with corruption elevate the risk of social disruption. Significant 
enhancements in governance, transparency, accountability and a boost in investment in human 
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development should help provide employment opportunities, including to the sizable youth 
population, which in a few years will enter the job market in large numbers. 
The labor-supplying countries of the region have not invested sufficiently in migration 
infrastructure to enhance benefits in terms of stable employment and thereby social protection. 
Given that the ongoing migration to Russia, it acts as a safety valve in terms of job opportunities 
and remittance flows, better skills and language training would benefit the migrating population and 
with other business environment reforms, eventually lead to better prospects at home.  
Although the EU and NATO have been heavily committed to the stabilization and 
development of Central Asia states and Afghanistan for almost a couple of decades, providing 
extensive resources and expertise to those countries in a variety of areas, including humanitarian 
relief and assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs and infrastructure 
projects, progresses appear slow. 
While EU, US and NATO have undertaken several attempts to influence the C.A., China is 
increasing its active role in that region, building pipelines and infrastructure projects, as well as 
expanding its diplomatic and cultural presence in the region and at the same time. 
Analysts studying China’s activity in Central Asia differ on what is the driver, whether the 
effort to pacify Xinjiang is intended to build that region into a secure platform from which to 
expand economically into Central Asia, or the opposite Beijing is building up its Central Asia ties in 
order to more strongly bind Xinjiang to the rest of China27. 
The most notable Chinese projects in Central Asia have been pipelines, especially a natural 
gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. China also is working to improve transportation networks in the 
region, building new roads and tunnels in Tajikistan. But what China’s goal is with these projects 
remains opaque, part of the reason is that Central Asia remains a low priority for the government of 
Beijing and so policy is shaped on an ad hoc basic via deals made by various companies and 
government organs28. 
In some ways, China’s ties with Central Asia resemble those that it is building in Africa and 
Latin America, with a strong focus on resource extraction, involving a lot of natural resources 
coming in and a lot of trade going out.  
But other analysts argue that, in the case of Central Asia, that energy extraction focus is 
secondary compared to the need to pacify Xinjiang. The stability of East Turkestan is the most 
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significant, both in terms of attracting foreign direct investment or any kind of investment, to the 
region or providing a safe ground for trade and international economic interactions29.  
China’s strategy of pacifying Xinjiang and quelling separatist movements there has been 
rooted in economic development. But it has not worked out as originally envisioned because 
Uyghurs’ dissatisfaction has to do with cultural and political rights, rather than economic issues. 
Nevertheless, China’s strategy towards Central Asia may be a function of its need to pacify 
Xinjiang, but has to do with security concerns about Xinjiang and only secondly is it about 
resources and economic development. 
In particular, the EU wanted to support the CA countries through a very pragmatic way, 
putting in place the Strategy for Central Asia for the period 2007-13, allocating an overall financing 
of €674 million for development assistance in the region. This is fully in line with the European 
Union’s Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, developed together with the EU Member 
States since 2007, incorporating a broad range of regional initiatives in areas such as education, rule 
of law and environment, but once again progresses on the ground and benefit for EU are low. 
The seven-year period has been split into two for planning purposes and the first Central Asia 
Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the DCI allocated € 352.8 million for four years, 
with € 215.8 million provided for bilateral operations, and € 137 million for regional programs. In 
2009, the assistance strategy was reviewed by the EU in conjunction with national governments, 
parliaments, civil society and other national stakeholders.  
Both strategy and priority areas for cooperation were found to be still relevant. The new 
Multi-annual Indicative Program (2011-13) provides for € 321 million over three years which 
represents an annual increase of 20% per year. It allocates € 216 million for bilateral, and € 105 
million for regional cooperation.  
As a result, the total amount of the EU budget for cooperation, dialogue, education and 
security with Central Asia has been about 950 billion euro (2005-2011), while NATO budget has 
been 2 billion euro in the same period.  
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EU regional and bilateral funding, 2007-13 
 
Kazakhstan
Kyrgystan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Regional
 
 
Here are the figures: Kazakhstan € 74 million, Kyrgyzstan € 106.2 million, Tajikistan € 128 million, Turkmenistan € 53 
million, Uzbekistan € 70.6 million, Regional € 242 million. 
 
 
EU funding by main cooperation sectors, 2007-13 
 
Education
social protection
Agriculture
Energy
Governance
Economy
Other
Security
 
Here are the figures: Security € 23 million, Economy sector € 48.9 million, Governance € 125.8 million, Energy € 106.2 
million, Agriculture € 55.2 million, Social protection € 139.5 million, Education € 159.8 million and Other € 15.4 
million. 
  
 
 
 
 
Yet, from 2007 to 2013, € 242 million have been allocated for regional cooperation programs in 
Central Asia  € 137 million under the first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative program (2007-10) 
and € 105 million under the second Multi-annual Indicative Program (2011-13). 
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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010 
 
Security
Economy
Governance
Energy
Education
Other
 
Here are the figures: Security € 13 million, Economy sector € 10.4 million, Governance € 2 million, Energy € 39.2 
million, Education € 66.4 million and other € 6 million. 
 
 
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013 
 
Security
Economy
Governance
Energy
Education
 
Here are the figures: Economy sector € 5 million, Governance € 2 million, Energy € 46 million, Education € 42 million, 
Security € 10 million. 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that EU launched in 2010 the Investment Facility for Central Asia 
(IFCA), with an initial allocation of €20 million, which promotes additional investments and key 
infrastructure with a priority focus in the first implementation period on energy, environment and 
social infrastructure. The funding was increased by a further € 45 in the period 2011-201230. 
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Efforts on the first Border Management program for Central Asia (BOMCA), implemented 
by the UN Development Program (UNDP), ran from 2003 to 2011 with a budget of over € 26 
million. 
In the eight years, BOMCA reconstructed, refurbished and equipped 12 border crossing 
points, 11 border outposts, five training centers for border guards, three dormitories for training 
centers, three dog training centers and one veterinary unit for dog training centers in all five 
countries. Over 2,000 border force and customs officers, specialists from the quarantine service, 
received appropriate training and participated in study visits to the EU where they were acquainted 
with the latest technologies used in modern border crossing points.  
Kyrgyzstan embarked on a major reform program in border security for which BOMCA 
provided guidance in the drafting of a reform strategy and the development of an action plan. 
The region has been experiencing modest growth and asset-striping has not taken place on a 
vast scale. Basic security and stability exists, while crime is becoming a big issue as a whole.  
Tajikistan recovered from the civil war remarkably quickly and the flares of conflict did not 
spread, however, concern is that beneath the acquired stability much tension is concealed. The 
domestic context and developments inside the countries are of primary significance for 
understanding prospects for the region’s stability.  
The central issue stoking the potential for violent conflict is the relationship between the 
citizens and the state, where lack of understanding of how power functions at a national level is 
what these states essentially fail.  
Personality politics substitutes for an orderly political process and patronage networks take 
the place of open competition based on merit, while a place in the network guarantees a position in 
the power hierarchy or in state-controlled businesses, enabling advantages to be secured during the 
privatization of state assets.  
Networks are based on the principle of personal loyalty and most commonly, they are rooted 
in kinship, but can incorporate other affiliations, such as belonging to a wider region or a shared 
educational experience. Appointments held by outsiders carry little weight and therefore patronage 
networks operate on the provincial and local level are dependent on the standing of the patron in the 
capital.  
When a patron falls out of grace, the whole network becomes redundant and is replaced by an 
alternative one, sometimes local elections are used to legitimize such transfers of power. On the 
surface, Central Asian institutions resemble their Soviet predecessors, but power arrangements 
within them are different.  
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Some institutions are of dual use, Parliaments, for instance, are a way of expanding the power 
base beyond the ruling group and membership in the parliament is used to reward the loyalty of 
officials who have to be moved from their executive jobs to give way to new appointments, a kind 
of “honorary retirement”.  
In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan kinship and regionalism is a key factor in networks, where clan 
loyalties and nepotism became more explicit as the case of Kyrgyzstan President where his brothers 
got lucrative appointments when the family leader came to power. 
In Uzbekistan, although power is highly centralized with a strong presidency on the top, the 
pyramid on which the power rests is not hollow, but consists of a number of pillars. 
Following this line, the policy of border partial closure in the Fergana Valley has been 
designed to weaken the resource base of the Fergana clans in power struggles in the capital. Yet, 
power is split between the security and law-enforcement agencies on the one hand and those figures 
who oversee major assets, such as cotton, energy and gold, on the other hand.  
The old elites are those who are in charge of industries inherited from the Soviet era, while 
the new elites have capitalized on the industries which did not exist before, such as banking, the 
retail trade, service industry and tourism.  
Yet, in Uzbekistan, the new elites are smaller and weaker than the old, but have more energy 
and connections in the right places, including the presidential family.  
In Kazakhstan, in the view of the local analysts, current influence groups are formed along 
with the principle of personal loyalty and affiliation and each other on the basis of hard, pragmatic 
interests. The groups can be structured in a hierarchy, with President Nazarbayev’s own group at 
the top of a pyramid and all groups maintaining links to the president.  
Four of the five Central Asian countries have been ruled by the same leaders for nearly two 
decades, the exception being Kyrgyzstan. These four are authoritarian regimes practicing varying 
degrees of repression, brutality and state control of the public sphere.  
In such circumstances, the danger of turbulent political succession is acute, especially since 
the leaders are ageing and the post-Soviet experience has provided stark examples of “disorderly” 
leadership succession, including coups and revolutions. It has also demonstrated orderly succession: 
Western-style democratic elections, legitimization through the ballot-box of a chosen successor 
politically loyal to the ancient regime or the establishment of a dynasty by the handing of power to a 
direct heir. In Central Asia, as the case of Kyrgyzstan has shown, the ruling leaders may not be able 
to put any of these scenarios of orderly change into practice.  
The research found evidence that financial and social support to the CA States have 
developed a positive impact on attitudes to-wards the Westerns, countries have broadly profited 
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from financial and educational support by EU and NATO as a whole. Levels of perceived presence 
of EU and NATO do not influence the levels of threats that people perceive, indicating that EU and 
NATO influence has little impact on objective security threats.  
Moreover, threat perceptions differ between countries and people in Afghanistan who feel 
more threatened by the Taliban in Afghanistan, while people in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan feel much more threatened by organized crime.  
The research also find no evidence that huge amount of economic and financial support has 
so far increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually 
absent as a problem solver and service provider. Most people think that the state has not contributed 
to the provision of basic services and does not look after the needs of the rural population.  
An overwhelming majority in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan think that security has very 
much increased over the last two years, most people credit foreign forces with this presence and 
progress their own Armed Forces.  
Despite substantial progress in security, many people feel that their physical security is 
threatened, but the main threat does not stem from Taliban or other armed forces only, but from 
organized crime and by foreign forces.  
International Organization are also widely credited by CA countries people for bringing along 
positive and widespread changes in basic services for many communities, most notably with regard 
to drinking water, roads, schooling and IT systems. Progress in other fields seems to be much 
slower, although CA populations support international presence that are usually associated with 
Western values. However, despite these positive assessments of foreign involvement, many CA 
population remain cautious about the presence of foreign troops in general for the so called 
“collateral damages”. 
Yet, the results of this research demonstrate that Central Asian states chose the liberal 
institutionalism model to build their internal and foreign policies, suggesting that countries would 
benefit from socio-economic and political integration and cooperation. These states have been 
relatively successful engaging in different regional organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization or Eurasian Economic Community, Partnership for Peace with NATO framework, 
which reflect immediate needs those countries have, especially in areas of security and economy.  
Central Asian foreign politics shows that they view cooperation as a toll to gain interests, 
indeed, some CA countries are driven by selfish interest, but they overcome them by being involved 
in regional organizations and institutions which guarantee them stability and protection of their 
status quo. There are also evidences that these regional organizations especially SCO and EEC are 
not only helping member countries to solve common regional challenges but also have far going 
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political and economic agendas for making the region as an important player on the international 
arena. 
The empirical studies analyses on the comparison of the six CA countries demonstrate that the 
socio-economic effect of globalization on development of these countries is twofold. On the one 
hand benefits produced by globalization such as migration and remittances can be useful for 
economic development in the short run. They take a role of a shock absorber of the challenges that 
are associated with transition to a free market economy.  
The immediate impact of remittances and migration is represented by growth of GDP per 
capita and increased in private consumption have a small but still positive effect on the growth of 
services sector. On the other hand, their long term economic impacts can be negative especially in 
the areas of industry and export. It is consistent with economists predictions about the negative 
effects of both migration and remittances. According to it, excessive reliance on external financial 
flows can paralyze the manufacturing sector of the country that will lead to stagnation of the 
economy in the future.  
One of the reasons for not finding positive or negative effect of remittances and migration on 
development is the data limitations, but most of the data is based on official sources that do not 
include unofficial statistics and for the same reason data for some countries such as Uzbekistan or 
Tajikistan is hardly available.  
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Annex 1 
 
 
INDEX VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMY SUB-INDEX – 15 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE 
CALCULATION) 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
DEFINITION 
 
SOURCE 
 
 
5 -Year Rate of Growth 
 
5-year average GDP per capita growth (% annual) 2005-2009. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Capital per Worker 
 
Average amount of physical capital per worker for the production of 
goods and services. Logged value. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Confidence in Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
 
Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence 
in financial institutions or banks?” 
Gallup World 
Poll 
 
Gross Domestic Savings 
 
Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption 
expenditure. The domestic savings rate is this figure divided by GDP. 
Logged value. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Inflation 
 
Annual change in consumer price index. Logged value. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Market Size 
 
Value of Domestic consumption plus country exports minus country 
imports in US dollar terms. Logged value. 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Satisfaction with 
Standard of Living 
 
question: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard 
of living, all the things you can buy and do?” 
Gallup World 
Poll 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Percentage of labour force not employed 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
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GOVERNANCE SUB-INDEX – 16 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE 
CALCULATION) 
 
 
Business and 
Government Corruption 
 
Composite variable includes two survey questions: “Is corruption 
widespread within businesses located in (respondent’s country), or 
not? Is corruption widespread throughout the government in 
(respondent’s country), or not?” 
Gallup World Poll 
 
Confidence in Military 
 
Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence 
in the military?” 
Gallup World Poll 
Confidence in the 
Honesty of Elections 
Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence 
in the honesty of elections?” 
UNDP 
Confidence in the 
Judicial System 
Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence 
in the judicial system and courts?” 
UNDP 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Captures the efficiency and quality of bureaucracy, level of 
government stability and effectiveness with respect to the 
implementation of policies. Ordinal rating. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
 
 
Political Rights 
 
Ability to participate in political processes such as voting in 
legitimate elections, joining parties, running for office, etc. This 
variable captures elements relating to the electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation as well as the functionality of the 
government and additional discretionary political rights. Ordinal 
rating. 
 
 
Freedom House 
and OSCE 
 
Government Stability 
 
The number of years since the most recent regime change. 
 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
 
Regulation 
Measures the extent of regulation within society. It captures general 
regulation with respect to investment and competition. Ordinal rating. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
 
Rule of Law 
The extent to which individuals within a society respect property 
rights, the police and the judiciary system, as well the quality of 
police and legal safeguards. Ordinal rating. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
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EDUCATION SUB-INDEX – 9 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE 
CALCULATION) 
 
 
Girls to Boys Enrolment 
Ratio 
 
This variable is defined as the ratio of the gross enrolment rate of 
girls to boys in primary and secondary education levels in both 
public and private schools.  
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Gross Secondary 
Enrolment 
 
The ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
secondary education. Secondary education completes the 
provision of basic education that began at the primary level and 
aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 
development, by offering more subject or skill-oriented 
instruction using more specialized teachers. 
 
 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
 
Gross Tertiary Enrolment 
 
The ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of tertiary 
education. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced 
research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition 
of admission, the successful completion of education at the 
secondary level. 
 
 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
 
Net Primary Enrolment 
 
Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of children of official school age 
based on the International Standard Classification of Education 
1997 who are enrolled in school to the population of the 
corresponding official school age. Primary education provides 
children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along 
with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. 
 
 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Satisfaction with 
Educational Quality 
 
Survey question: “In the city or area where you live, are you 
satisfied or dissatisfied with the educational system or the 
schools?” 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Secondary Education per 
Worker 
 
Average years of secondary education completed amongst the 
labour force. 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
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SAFETY & SECURITY SUB-INDEX – 10 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE 
CALCULATION) 
 
Ability to Express 
Political Opinion without 
Fear 
 
Survey question: “In your opinion, how many people in your 
country, if any, are afraid to openly express their political views?” 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Assault 
 
Survey question: “Within the past 12 months, have you been 
assaulted or mugged?” 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Civil War 
 
Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil violence, ethnic warfare 
and ethnic violence involving that state in that year. Ordinal 
rating. 
 
 
Failed States Index 
 
 
Demographic Instability 
 
Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food 
supply and other life-sustaining resources. The pressure from a 
population’s settlement patterns and physical settings, including 
border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to 
transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and 
proximity to environmental hazards. Ordinal rating. 
 
 
 
 
Failed States Index 
 
Group Grievances 
 
Grievances based on recent or past injustices, which could date 
back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity 
against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by 
state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or 
repression. Ordinal rating. 
 
 
Failed States Index 
 
Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons 
 
Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or 
targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, 
disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that 
can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both 
within and between countries. Ordinal rating. 
 
 
 
Failed States Index 
 
Safe Walking Alone at 
Night 
 
 
Survey question: “Do you feel safe walking alone at nights in the 
city or area where you live?” 
 
Amnesty 
International 
& US State 
Department 
Political 
Terror Scale 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL SUB-INDEX – 7 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE 
CALCULATION) 
 
 
 
Donations 
 
Survey question: “Have you donated money to a charity in the 
past month?” 
World 
Development 
 
Helping Strangers 
 
Survey question: “Have you helped a stranger or someone you 
didn’t know who needed help in the past month?” 
 
Indicators 
 
Formal Volunteering 
 
Survey question: “Have you volunteered your time to an 
organization in the past month?” 
 
 
World 
Development 
 
Marriage 
 
Survey question: “What is your current marital status?” (Single, 
married, divorced, living with partner, widowed). Percentage of 
respondents who are married. Binary variable constructed from 
survey. 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Perception of Social 
Support 
 
Survey question: “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or 
friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or 
not?” 
 
World 
Development 
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Annex 2 
 
 
SURVEY 
 
 
COUNTRY 
MOST 
RECENT 
SURVEY 
DATES 
FOR DATA 
USED IN 2011 
 
NO. OF 
INTERVIEWS 
 
MODE OF 
INTERVIEWING 
 
NOTES ON 
REPRESENTATIVEN
ESS OF SAMPLE 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Jun 3 – Jun 20, 
2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
 
Kyrgystan  
 
Jul 20 – Aug 
4, 2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
 
Tagykystan  
 
Sept 3 – Oct 
20, 2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
 
Turkeministan 
 
Nov 2 – Dec 
15, 2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
 
Uzbekistan 
 
Apr – Maj 29, 
2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
Afghanistan Jun 10 – Jun 
26, 2011 
1.000 Face-to-face None 
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Selected Social and Economical Indicators 
 
 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
General      
Area (millions km²) 2.7 0.199 0. 143 0.488 0.447 
Population (millions) 15.0 5.1 6.4 4.9 26 
Urban Population (% of 
total) 
57.0 34.0 24.8 46 36.7 
Life Expectancy at birth 
(years) 
63.2 65.0 66 64 66.5 
Population growth rate 
(annual %) 
0.5 0.9 0.7 1.5 1.3 
Human Development 
Index (HDI)/Ranking 
0.76 0.70 0.65 0.73 0.69 
 
     
Economy      
GDP (billions US $) 40.7 2.2 2.1 6.6 12.0 
GNP per capita (US$) 2260 400 280 1340 460 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 9.4 7.1 10.6 17.0 7.7 
Inflation Rate % (2011) 6.9 4.1 7.1 10.0 1.7 
Exports of goods and 
services (billions US$) 
20.603 0.733 1.097 4.094 4.837 
Imports of goods and 
services (billions US$) 
13.818 0.904  1.232  3.524  3.949 
 
     
Social       
Primary enrolment rate 95 90 111 // 103 
Access to safe water (%) 86 76  58 71 89 
Access to improved 
sanitation  (%) 
72 60  53 62 57 
 
 
Sources: World Bank website, UN Human Development Report for Central Asia (2011), EU Trade Website. 
 
 
